The religious and theological foundations of natural science by Sharp, John C
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
mm  K iG io m   m oioG-icAL PommATioms 
œ
mm'ÜEÆb BCÎWE
"by
M B -S ï.J te a .â s § a a s .j4 â fc
A %eBl8 Submitted. Po2? U?he Bogxe© Of 
jDoetor of Philosophy
Preaentecl to Tho tlnlToraity of Glasgow 
HoBeo^ehoA :üi ïhe 3?aGulty of Divinity
October 1
ProQuest Num ber: 10646303
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The q u a lity  of this rep roduc tio n  is d e p e n d e n t upon the q u a lity  of the copy subm itted .
In the unlikely e ve n t that the a u tho r did not send a c o m p le te  m anuscrip t 
and there are missing pages, these will be no ted . Also, if m a te ria l had to be rem oved,
a n o te  will in d ica te  the de le tio n .
uesL
ProQ uest 10646303
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). C o pyrigh t of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is p ro tected  aga inst unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o de
M icroform  Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1346
STO#mY 20ci.
lETROmCTIOm 1 •
PEEPACB
_Gh,i * m s  m sE  mm Dm3Pii^m.oF 7 .
1 .1 . œ E O B üG flO l 7 #
1 .2 . mm  LSGACY OP m a o p o m -iiA  # D  m ïH ) 7*
1*5. ®03 ïtEGACY OP G E » P  9.
1.5*1. The loBtoi Period 
1.5*2. The Athenian Period 
1*5*5* The Alexandriaai Period 
1,5*4# Attitude to ¥ork/Technology
1.4. Tim EAELY OmiBTim M A  AED TBE DECLTJE OP SCIMGE 18.
1.5* THE W A G I  OP THE MXDDIAl AGES 19.
1.5*1* Alchemy 
1.5*2. Hedioi-ne
1.5*5* Methodology
1.5*4* Teolmioal Progroeo 
1*5*5* The Seholastic Infliience
1.6. THE B M G T  OP THE imUISBiMOE 26.
1.7. 1»IE¥ 28.
Oh.g. THE RISE OP Mp H «  SCIMGE 50.
2.1, T M  BAGKGHOÏÏED TO CFAIGE 50.
2.1 *1. The General Rooto of Change
2.1.2. The Scientific Hoots of Change
2.1 #5* Reasons Against Change to -Oentredness
2*1.5*1* Theoretical 
2.1*5*2. Observational 
2.1*5.5• Theological 
2*1*4* The Ancient Theories
2* 1.4*1* The lT;o-Sphere Universe
2.1,4.2. Ptolemy
2.2. M*G01«¥1CUS (1475-1545) 56.
2.2.1* His Method
2.2.2. m s  Theory
2,2*5. Reactions to Copernicus
2.2*5*1« The Scientific Response 
The Popular Response 
2*2»5*5« The Theological Response 
2 ,5 . im r m s  op scim ^oB ? 47
2*4* TYCHO BEâïlE (1546-1601 ) 48
2*5. j o i m m  KEPhm (1571-1650) 49
2*6. GALILEO GALILEI (1564-1642) 51
2*6*1* Hie Soientifie Contribution
2*6.2* Galileo and the Church
56.MOHSEH SOimOE
5 *1 . m m RAL BAOEGRomm 56*
5*1.1. How Interpret ?
5*1*2. The Piiritens
5.1.2.1* Theology of Social Implication 
5*1 *2.2. I&lii0£itionaX Impetus
5 *2 . THE S C im riF IO  SOGIETm!) 58*
5*2.1* The Royal Society & Its Origins 
5*2.1*1* Praneis Bacon 
5*2.1*2* Greshem College 
5*2*1 *5# 'Puritanism 
5*2.2, The Royal Society
5.5. Timsis 62.
5*5.1. The Background to Merton^s Thesis
5.5.2. Merton's Thesis
5*4. EBOmr AS83!8S;''mTS 67.
5*4*1* Tîiree Viewpoints
5*4.1.1. Perspeotival 
5*4.1*2* Causal 
3.4*10-5a Disjunctive 
5*4.2« D« S. ICeBJsley
5.4.5. A. Bo Hall 
5*4*4. S. Mason
5.5* TŒWmS A GAHBAL - PER8PEGTIVAL IHTmPmi?ATIOH 71*
5*5*1, The Creatorship of God
5.5.2. The Glory of God 
5*5.5. The Cultural Mandate 
5.5*4» The Doctrine of Common Grace
5.5.5. The Pa:*iesthood of All Believers
11
3«3»6* Scripture 
3*5*7* General Ethos
3.5*7.1# A Love of Leaxning 
3*5»7#2, A Love of Mature 
3#5*8, Basic WealoiessQs 
3*6. REVIM 77«
79.
4.1. THE monmiOAL philosopibt 79«
4. 2.  D M o m œ  (159W 650)  81 .
4.3* imEOÏS BACÜM (1561-1626) 83.
4.4. RÜBÎ» BOYLE (1627-91) 84.
4.5. B O I W O T O  MEPHOBOLOGt 86.
4. 5. 1.  D escartes
4. 5.2.  BahOîx
4.5.3. teuton
4.6. ISAAC mWTOE (1642-1727) 88.
4.6.1,. The Prinoipia
4.6.2, Tho Laws 
4.6*3. Atoi'Jîiû Theory 
4*6,4. Hypotheses non fingo
4.6.5. teuton's Theology
4.6.6, Problems
4.7. 100.
102.
5.1. SOimCB Am) BELIEF IM THE 18th GPWIRY 102.
5.2. MAT'ORAL THEOLOGY 104*
5.2,1 * #iy Bid It Develop Ÿ 
5.2.2* The (toation of Design
5.2.2.I. Robert Boyle (1627-91 )
5.2,2.2* Isaac Bewton (1642-1727)
5.2.2.3. John Bay (1627-1705)
5.2.2.4. William Paley (1743-1805)
5*2.3. Two itether Ideas
5*2,3.1. The Mea of a Fixed Creation 
5.2.3*2. The :Pî?incipl© of Sufficient Reason
5.2.4. Deism
5*2,5. The Orthodox Reply
ill
5 .3 . THE M KJLIG m M «T 112. 
5.3*1* Boxuoh Spinosa (1632-77)
5.3.2. 338mard 1© Bovier de Foiitenello (1657-1757)
5.3.3. Francoi-s Marie Arouet (Voltaire) (l694-1778)
5.3.4. Denis Diderot (1713-84)
5.3.5. The Marquis de Candorcet (1743-94)
5.3.6. Pierre Simon Laplace (1749"1827)
5.4. OTHm mAGTIOBS 116. 
5*4.1. Matorialieni
5.4.2. David Bme (1711-76)
5.4.3. Immanuel Kant (1724—1804)
5.4.4. Romantioiem
5.5. Bimmî 120.
121.
6.1. FORCES IB IBBÏÏS'mALISÂTl'OM 121. 
6.1*1, Faotora of Growth
6.1.2. Miy Britain. ?
6.2. RELIGIOUS ÏBFLUiSîîCBS 123. 
6.2,1» How Interpret ?
6.2.2. The QuWmrs
6.3. THE IHBUSTIilAJi E3ÎV0LUTI0M 12?» 
6,3.1. Baelcground Phenomena
6.3.1.1. Teolmieal Experience 
6*3.1,2. Population libcpansion 
6*3.1.3. Fluidity of Social Milieu 
6*3.1.4# Technical Intent
6*3.2» Industrial Development
6.3.2.1. 1750 ™ 1815 
6.3.2.2m 1815 - 1870 
6*3*2»3o 1870 - 1900
6,3.3# The Industrialist g The Darby-Reynolds Bnpirs 
6.4* SOimfflFIC m D  TEOmiGAL ASPECTS 132,
6.4*1. The Steam !dngine 
6,4.2» Electricity 
6,4.3# Thermodynamico 
6,4.4» Ghemietacy 
6e4»5* The Lunar Society 
6*4 «6« Mathematics
6.5. THE neAOT OB' mOUSTRIALISATIOH 8 SECULARISATim 135.
XV'
6*6, RESPmSim TO JiOTSTRXALXBATIOB 130,
6 .7 . R gnm '! 139*
m s  pmMARWlHIM BOmB m  BIOIOGY AND QSOLOGY
140.
7.1. m s  pmMARWlHIM BOmB m  BIOIOGY AND QSOLOGY 140,
7*1 *1 @ MeohanisBî v* Vitalism 
7*1 The Bysteïiî“*BiiiXdo:es v» The Momenolateura 
7#1«3o The Heptiinist *- Vuloeniet Debate 
7o1o4& The Unitomsitsxian «> Catastrophe Debate 
7.1.4*1# Goorgcm Cuvier (1769-1832)
7.1.4.2c William Bucïd.and (1784-1856)
7 .1 .4 .3 . Mam Bedgwlok (1785-1873)
7 # 1 .4 .4  c Aseessment
7#1^5» The Development Hypothesis
7.1#5*1. Georges Buffon (1707-8O)
7*1.5.2, Jean Ba.ptist© Lamark (1742-1829)
7.1.5.3. Charles Lyell (1797-1075)
7#1#5*4# Robert Chambers (1802-71)
7*1.5#5« Hugh Miller (1802-56)
7.2, TÎÆ M M m m S  QOBTBJJmWim 151,
7.2*1. General Concept and Problem
7*2,2, Dasiwiiis Wallace g and the 'Origin of Bpeoies'
7.2*5. Basic Assumptions 
7*2,4. Basic Concept
7.205* Basic Mechanisms Watiueal Selection 
7,2*6. Review.
7.5, THE CHALMGE OF BAiMW 156.
7.5.1. To Scripture 
7.5.2* To Design 
7*5*5. To The Identity of Man 
7*3*4# To Society and Ethics
7.4. TUB REOiQWSE TO D A R Œ ' B  '01IGÏ1 OF SPECIES' 158.
7.4*1. The General Response 
7«4*2* The Scientific Respon.ee 
7.4.2*1# Various Views 
7.4.2*2, Lord Kelvin (1824-1907)
7*4i5. The Theological Reeponae 
7 *4*3.1, Henry Bnimmond 
7*4»3#2® George Matheeon 
7*4*3*5. Charles Hodge
V
7 ,4 «4® Review
7 ,5 , THE THECmYs ITS STATUS AM  PRQBLEm 166,
£ ! k i k S î iM „ m m Æ . a iS s a  168„
8 .1 . T#s la r o m m  BBEAim a# 168*
8 .2 . BliSTJOT AÏXD RELATIVITY 169*
8 ,2 ,1 . S p e c ia l R e la t iv ity
8.2.1,1, Simultaneity 
8 .2 .1 ,1» M aas-l& iergy EquivaXenoe 
8,2,1.3$ Geometry 
8,2,1,4• Four Important Features 
8,2*2, General Relativity
8 .3 . %UAMTO 176.
8.4. tbe » /  womm of atoiceo sthïïgtîxre 17b,
8.5. A ROTE OH t m  A M  SGXîMGE 185.
POSTSCRIPT TO PART I 187#
PART II 3 A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE OH THE FOWDATIOMS OF SOURCE 
P M jm M  188,
189,
9.1. BGimUB 3 ITS PROBimS 1894
9.1.1. The Collapse of Hewtoniasi Meohanios
9 .1.2* The Problem of Humber
9.1*5. The Problem of lediietioniam and Speolalism 
9*1*4. The Lack of Self-Criticism
9.2, OCTiWl 3 ITS l A M E  192,
9.2.1. An lïimian Aspiration for Order and Understanding
9.2.2. The Corporate Character of Scientific Inquiry 
9.2,5* Tentative îüiowledge
9.2.4. Comunicîab3.e Inowledge 
9*2.5. The Ato of the llnterprls©
9.5. APPROACHES IÎÎ BGimCB 197<
9.5.1. To the Mature of Theories 
9*5.2* To the Derivation of Theories
9*5.2*1* Bacon's Bucket (The tabula rasa)
9a5*2.2* Eddlngtom's Fiaîmet 
9*5*2,5. Popper's Searchlight
9.4. SCIIMGB AMD BBUIÏJF ? 199,
9*4.1* The Warfare Model
vi
9«4*2. The Divoro© Model 
9 •4 *3 * Til© S y m b io tic  M odel 
9*4.4* Attendant Problème 
9o5* REALITY g EKPLMATÏOM s KNOWLEDGE 204,
Gh.lO® m m  01#?OLOGY Aim BPISTSMOLOaY OP SClïiMCÏîî I
DIVERSE MSPECTIVES 208,
10.1 ® MAT IB A BCLIWXFIG THEORY ? 200»
10.2. Tmma imDimi posmimms 209*
10.2.1 » iSmet Mach (1858“»1916) and Poeltivlem
10.2.2. Karl Pearaon (1857-1956)
10è2.5* Pierre Duhem (1861-1916)
10.3. VŒ/S OF SOIMISTB 212.
10.3.1, Max Plasick (1858-194?)
10.3*2. P. Wo Bridgman (1882-1961) and Operationaliem 
10.3*3* Sir Arthur S. Eddington (1802-1944) and Idealloia 
10.3*4* Werner Heisenberg (1901- )
10.3,5. Albert Einstein (1879-1955)
10.4. VIEl'JS OF PHILOBOHmS 221.
10.4.1 « Stephen Toulmin and Instrumentalism 
10,4.2» Thomas S. llubn
10.4.3* Sir Karl E. Po;pper
228.
11.1. TWO M E I » 3  e BSS:®TIALIBM - BIBTRm«TALIBM 228»
11.2. THE GALILE# VIEW OF POPPER 229.
11.3. EssmeiALiSM 230.
11.4. IHBT3M«miBM 231.
11ù4*1. Réduction!8tic 
11*4*2. Ho VerisiîüilitiKle 
11i4.3* UseMness g Meaning 
1144*4* Testability
11.5* REALISM 2344
11.6, AH IMSMOLOaiOAL MOTE 236.
259.
12,1, IimiODïïÇTîOI . 239*
12*2. BxmisE.vmxpoiiœ of mmoRY c a e o m œ  239.
12.2 .1, p. M-iem
12.2.2, H.E, Omipbell
v l l
12»2»3« R. ïtere 
12»2*4« U » XjOsos 
12.2.5» B, Hagel
12»3. THEORY FORMATIOl AMD SGIMXFÏG KXPMATIOH 242»
12.3.1* Byetematisation 
12*3*2» CoaslBtency 
12;3  *3 o E xp la n a tio n e
12,3»3*1* ÂB P re d ic tiv e  D eductions 
12*3.5*24 Arc Limited 
12*3.3»3. Levels of E%p3.miatlon 
12.3*4# AiiaXoéîiea m Â  Models 
1243.3* Review
1 2 .4 . mmmi  247.
12.5. oimiBTim ppmBPEOTiw oe t e m  mi) thboeieb 247.
12.5.1» The Defioionciea of Hon-Theietic Ooncepte
12.5.2. Truth as a  Matrix 
12*5.3» Horlaone of Blowing 
12,5.4» Theistie 'A Prioris'
Ch*13. m m  MMODDLCGY OF BGÏ1MCE I s 'Tfflil' SCIM^TIFXC METHOD 253.
13.1. BCIïWXJi’IO E M O B  253. 
13*1.1» P. B» Weiss
13.1.2.» D. L» Dye 
13.1.3» Conclusion
13.2, AH HISTOE.ÏCAL ldk#lE 257* 
13.2*1. The Galilean Method
13*2*1,1* The Graft Component 
13*2*1*2, TÎ10 Specula,tlve Coi^ iponent 
13.2,2* Baconian Bnplricism 
13.2,3* Gerteolanlsm
13*3. m m  Hoth GM¥s\im 259.
13.3.1. B. Wilson 
13.3.2* K, ÎU Popper
13.3.3. M* Polanyi
13.4. DIVERSE mSTAHOEB OF TmOEY FOEMATim 262,
13*4.1» Theory Preceding Observation 
13*4.2. Oiieory from Breams 
13 *4®3» Theory from Accident 
13.4.4* 01a3?ifioation of Terms 
13.4*5. Elegance mid Beauty
viii
13.5. ASPECTS OF I«iiOB 265. 
15 * 5 » 1 o Prepararbion
13*5,2, Observation 
13«5.»3* Ejcperiment 
13*5*4* Failure
13.6. m s  MTIOHALITY OF BOIEHŒ 268.
1 3 .6 .1  y Analogy
13.6.2* Induction 
13*6 ,3 » Deduction 
1 3 *6 *4 . Hyjpothesis
13.7. 8TATIBTI0M, MEmODB 272.
275.
14.10 vlffPABSffl PiliADOXES 273.
14*1*1* Basic Gonmitment ir. Systematic Doubt 
14*1*2* Goamion-Sense v* Speculation 
14*1*3* Corroboration v. Openness 
14*1*4* Detachment v. Passion 
14*1*5* Imagisatlon/Intultimi v. ï'ixperienoe 
14*1.6, Objectivity v. Subjectivity 
14*2. TEB AESTBmiC E L m a T  278.
14*2*1* Elegance
14.2.2. Simplicity
14*2.2.1. Aspects of Simplicity 
14*2.2.2» Criteria of Simplicity 
14*2.2.3* Mature 'Is' Simple 
14.3* PïœOlAL REQUISITES 282.
14.4c SGimTIFIG MBTEOD REVISITED 28$.
14.5* WIE¥, 288.
290.
15.0 » IBlliODUGTIÜM 290.
15*1» SOCIAL CRITmiA 291*
15*2* I. G. BAEOOm 291.
15*2.1. Observational Fit 
15*2.2» Internal Helatione
15*2*2.1 » Consistency 
15*2,2.2» Coherence 
15*2* 2*3 * Siiaplioity
ix
15.2.3# Comprchonsivenoss
15.2.3*1» Initial Generality 
15*2.3*2. I’ruitfulness 
15*2 .4 * A d d itio n e ^  F ea tu res
15.3. K. R. POFPIIi 293. 
15.3*1* Fallibility
15*3*2* Relevance 
15*3*3* Content
15*3*3*1* Content and Probability 
15*3*3*2. Baaic Statements 
15*3.4.  TestednoBS 
15*3*5* 'Verlsimili'bude
15*3*5*1* VJîiat ie Truth ?
15*3.5*2* %:%th and Contents Verlsiirdlitude v. 
Probability
15.4. CE1MÏA 302. 
15*4*1* Testability
15*4*2. Safety § Strength $ Smjdioity 
15.4*3* Basic Criteria
15.5* ocmnjmoE cam 306.
15.6.  M î ï f î  PmFECTXOH 308.
15.7* RiWXIiW 309*
310.
 Ill : T m q w c i G #  m m m m G  smmiog
311.
Ch.l6. GIMSRAL BTÎÎWBY
16.0. ÏÎMOBUOTORT IWIEW 312,
16.1. DIVORCE DUALISMS 312, 
16,1*1. Heo-Orthodoxy
16.1.2. Seculm? Philosophies
16.2. BBBIGTIG QUEST 314*
16.3. m m  V/0B3B) oomraL of cituiiomss 315.
16.4* INADEQUATE UBSPOESES 317*
16.4.1* Positivism 
16,4*2. Eomariticiem
16.4.3. Status-Quo
16,4.4* The Hew Biblical Theology 
16,4.5* The Kemystification of Hatm?e
X
16o4»6«i Process Theology
16.5.  COHSmTATIVE -  EVmGHLIOM, RESPOHBKS; 321
16 , 5 a 1, I'hrolutloxi
16.5#1*1 # Anti-Bvoliition 
16 i* 5 »1 *2 »■ Pro«-l3volii1;ion 
1G»5#1 *3i* Jo E, van do Fliert 
l6o5r>'2» Worldview Crisis
16,5*2,1 , Tho Bussell Thesis 
l6»5o2o2cr Complementarity 
16*5*3® Evanf^ elical Motives in Sciene©
16*5*3*1* Eo E. D* Clark 
16*5*3*2* D* Alexander 
16*5*4* hVaJëîgelieals and P h ilosophy'
16*6* SEGULABISM
17*1* IAN G* B.AEBOUTi 334.
17*1*1* Issues In Bcienee And Religion 
17*1*2* %thsg Models and Paradigms 
17*1*2,1* Models 
17*1*2*2* Paradigm 
17*1.3. Boience and Religion 
17.1*3*1. Methods 
17*1*3*2* Models 
17*1.3.3® Critique
17*2, m R Y  M. M(mi8 346
17.2*1# The Bible &mi Boience 
17.2,2* The Bible *Ts* a Boientifie Textbook 
17 *2 *2,1  ^Astronomy 
17.2*2*2, l'ïyfîroXogy
17.2.2,3. Energy
17*2*2*4, Creation
17.2*2*5. Evolution and ThemodynaifllGS 
17*2,3. Critique
2)57.
18,0* IB1MUCTÏ0B 357.
16.1, HISTORICAL 0»lTO¥ 357*
18,1,1* The Hefo3?mation
18*1 *1.1 # Ghavige in the Doctrine of Ck
xi
1 8 . 1 . 1 The Mstinetion Between Mature and Grace 
18.1.1,3* Scientific Objectivity
18.1,2, Secularisation 
18,1,3# ICierkegaard Einstein
18.2, TOWAM) KHOMLEDGE 362.
18.2.1, Exletence and Coherence Statements
18.2.2, Miat Is Science Ÿ
18,2.3# Questions8 as lntesn?ogation end Problem
18.3, SGIENTIPIG mEOLOGY 366, 
1S,3#1« Scientific Method
18,3*2, Scientific Requirements of Theology
18.4, MOWLMDGE OF GOB 368, 
18,4*1, The Ultimate Source
16.4.2, The Word
18,4*3# Autonomy of Thougjit ?
18.5, THEOLOGY MU) B G X W B  373* 
18.5,1# Similarities Between Theology and Other Sciexioes 
18,3*2, Bifferences Between Theology and Other Soiences 
18,5*3» Einstein's %igraois
18.6, SOME GRITICAI, CAVEATS 376.
379.
19.1, XMOBUOTOEY BAGKGROmD 379,
19.2. mo piTOmsoEs OF c o m a  geace 38o.
19.2.1, John Galvin
19,2*2, Csuillame Groon van Prinsterer
19.5. jmnmm kuïp® (1857-1920) jaa.
19#3*1* Universal Faith 
19*3*2, Universal Sin 
19*3*3# Common Grace
19*3,3*1# Stage One 
19*3*3»2o Stage Two 
19»3*3*3* Stage Tteee 
19#3#3#4# Evaluation
19,4. KLAAS SOmCIBBR (1890-1952) 389*
19*5# i m m m  B o o i m m m  (1894-1977) 390.
19*6. m m  immmm - imm bi-bate 390.
19.7* P A i w a m s  moM Tim oosi»aao iBm 392,
19*7*1, The Religious-Faith Mature of Scientia
19.7.2, The Arche
x i l
19•7*3» P re -T h fâ o re tic a l Thought 
19*7»4* Law Spheres
19#7«4«1» Sphere Sovereignty 
19*7*4«2» Sphere Universality 
19«7*4»3* M^;apsl8 
19*7 #5® Ooimon Grace 
19.6® m m m  F m m m m  poihTs
19*8,1o Linguistic Analysis 
19*8#2, %mth 
19,8,3* Traditions
POSTSCRIPT TO FAXIT III 399*
400, 
401 •
20.1, mmT 18 BIMGIOl 7 401,
20.1.1, The MaÆure and Scope of Religious Life
20.1.1.1, Religion and Worship 
20.1*1,2, Religion and Faltii
20,1,1,3, Religion and Theology
20*1,2» Created Reality Is Hot Self-Sufficient 
20, 1, 3# Religious Starting Points
20.1.3.1, The Arche
20.1.3.2, The Arohimedlan Point 
20, 1, 3*3.  The Heart
20.2, wmc IS sciMas ? 410.
20,2,1» The Appeal To 'Pacts '
20.2.2, The Coherence of the Sciences 
20,2,3* The Abstract Xïature of Science 
20,2,4# The Faith of Science .
20,3# l-mT IS FHIL080FEY 7 413#
20,3#1* TXio X^atm’Q and Scope of Philosophy 
20,3*2, The Sooyeweerdiem Oritique 
20,3«3* The Pretended Autonomy of Theoretical Thougjit 
20,3,4* The Secular Philosophical Options 
20,3*5* Two Caveats
20,3*6, Towards A Christian Perspective 
20,4# PHOPOBXTIONS COlOMeXIG ItELIG-IOlg BOIFHCBs PHILOSOPHY 420.
20.4*1® Religion
xiii
20,4*2e Science
20 «.4 ® 3 e Philosophy
Ch.21» TlîE.HPïSTHlOLOaiCÂïi BASIS OF SOIEHOE 422,
21.1# SŒ # oF mowmBGE 422.
21*1*1# The Interaction of Knowex-g Knowing* Knoxmhle* 
and Kn.ow3,edge 
21.1,2# Transcendent and Transcendental Approaches 
21#1#3« The Importance of Revelation 
21*1,4® Theoretical and I=re-Theoretical Thought
21,1 *4*1 * The Validity of tîiis Distinction 
21.1,4*2# The Distinotion* and the Ghoraoter of 
AbBtractive Thought 
21 #1.4 #3* The Character of Pre-Ahstractive? Thought 
21*1.4,4* Summary
21.2, T m  ICHOWLEDGE OF GOD 450, 
21,2*1 « Only X3y God's Self-Dlsolosure
21.2.2# IH-fO Dispositions of the True Knowledge of God
21 *2,3* Several Points Brief3.y Stated
21.3, m m  imoimmGB of.self 432,
21*4# i m  KM0WBI-Ü3GE OF HMBXTY 433,
21 #4a1<^  Is Dependent on the Knowledge of God 
21«4*2o The Law of God 
21.4*3* The Meaning of Creation
21*4«3o1o The Analogical XMallsms of Cosraonomism 
21 #4,3*2# ®?.e Flan-Architect / Plan-Content 
Approach of Stoker
21o4»4# Bnlmpsis
21 #5# a m  IlFLUUMCE OF BASIC QOÎŒTÎMT (M BCIEMTIFIC ACTIVITY 440.
o m im c m i 442.
22.0, IiœODïïOTÏOH 442,
2 2 .1 . inSTQRICAI, PERSPECTIVE 442. 
22*1 *1. Ancient Western TXiougXit
22*1,2* Ancient Eastmzn Thought 
22*1*3* Biblical Perspective 
22«1,4# The Intervening Years 
22*1*5# Laplace's I'lehular Hypothesis 
22.2# MODim COSMOLOGIES 446.
XIV
22 ô 2 o1o Introduction
22ü2o2ü- The Big Bang/Superdense/or Evolutionary Model 
22.2*5, The Steady State or Contdmious Creation Theo3?y 
22.2.4* The Oscillating ïïnlveree
22.2.5. Genera]. Problems 
22.3* DOCMIISB OF CRIATXOH 450.
22 «3*1® The Literal-Haiv© View 
22.3*2. The Linguistic Solution
2243*3® The XdeeJL-TimQ or Pro-Chronic View
22.3*4* T.he Gx'eation-Eiiination-ltecreatio'n Theory
22.3*5* TXie Agé Day Theory
22.3*6, The Divine Bay Theory
22,3*7* Roman Catholic Views
22,3*0* Protestant Views
22.3*8*1* The 'feistential Impact 
22,3*8.2, Karl Barth 
22,3*0*3* Process Theology 
22«3*6,4* Francle Schaeffer
22.4. TOWilEDS A BIBLICAL BOGTRIHE OF CREATION 456,
22,4*1. The Universe Is Hot Eternal But Began To Be 
22,4*2, The Universe Was Mot Formed Out of
lb?e«*Eî£isting Material 
22,4*3* Creation Was Hot A necessity Imposed On God
2 2 .5 . P R E L iim m y c m o L im io m  461 ,
463.
23*1* IKTEOBÏÏGTIOH 463®
23.2, msTmiOAL m v i m  o? T m  ooMCEpr oF 'Mws oF mTUBB' 464.
23e2@1a Two Basic Soiozces 
23«2,2^  Law In Greek Thought 
23®2o3® The Reformation Basis 
23,2,4* The Absolutissgition of Law
23*2*4,1» Following Descartes and Hewton 
23*2,4*2a Follov?ing Deism and the Enlightenment 
23,2*4*3* In Theology 
23*3, GOMWOBART B M i m  OF THE STATUS OF 'LAWS OF MTUHE' 468, 
23*3»1, Various Viewpoints 
23.3*2. The iM'eeessity of Law
23 93,3* The Aübiguity of Today's Thought 
23,394. Sooîe Provisional Par'amo'bors
3mr
23*4« TIÜE idea 05? LAW IN THE GOSMOIŒ^IÎC PHILOSOPHY 472.
25«4,1o Sooyov;eerd*s Critique
23*4*2* Law ÂB Boimdaxy Between Creator* end Création 
23ô4«3« The ïlefeaeted Law Spheres
25*4=3.1 » Am IlluBtration of Sphere Umiversality/ 
Sphere Sovereignty 
25,4*5,2* The Aritlimetioal Sphere 
25,4,5*3, The Spatial Sphere 
25,4*3*4, The Kinematic Sphere
25,4 ,5,5, The Physloal Sphere 
25®4*4« Further Points
25,5, PRELDmmEY CONCLUSIONS 482,
Gh,24, THE THEOLOGICAL BASIS OF SCIENCE 2 LAW M B  CULTURALMaway«LvJW<i6ilK=5*£!»*sieBmw4’iitof4au«it«.«t6di?Dter4ËaH«ÿi5iMkiqBiaK.<*»;wj.i«yy«^
ACTIVITY
24,1* THE DOGTimm OF LAW 485.
24,1,1, The Bi’blioal Yiexf of Law
24,1,1,1, Mature Is Creatua:e 
24*1,1,2* Law Is Hot Creature
24.1.1.5, Creation Is Ojxlered 
24*1*1,4, Sorlpturo and Boience
24*1,2, Law and Providence
24*1,2*1* Law and Chance 
24,1*2*2* Law and Causality
24.1.2.5, La-w and Mraol©
24,2» TH33 DOCTRINE OF OULMlAL ACTIVITY 497*
24,2,1 « The Doetriiie of Oommon Grace
24*2,1 *1. Every Thought Captive 
24,2,1*2» A Negative and a Poeitive Side
(a) Common Grace Reetrains Bin
(b) Comon Grace Founds Culture
24.2.1.5, Gommom Grace and Particular Grace 
24,2,2* %io Cu3.tural Mandate
24,2â2»1* A Fourfold Motive 
24,2*2*2, The Place of Science/Technology 
24,2,5* Man — God's Office-Bearer
Ch*25* H]3SP]jiC;miG THE MVXROM«T 504,
25,1* n momcTim 504.
25*1 *1 * The Importmice of a Worldview
XVI
25»1«2® M m t Is  The lin T iro m ie n t ?
25*2® THE EOTï»iît«L BÏLÎMA 506.
25«2*1, 12 Pressure Points 
25.2*2, The Environment ojid. Economics 
25«2«5® The Dilemma In Perspective «- Vlhose Fault ?
25*5= Emipomsm to the 514,
25*3*1 o Xntrod£icto3?y Survey 
25*3.21* The Optimists 
25*3*3• John Frame 
25*3*4® The Pessimists
25*3*4*1* He he Heilbroner and E, 3?» Schumacher 
25*3*4,2» Homantieism and Pantheism 
25*3*4*3, The Qluh of Rome
25.4, Totmms A OHRISTI# Pï5ilSP.raiVE 521, 
25*4,1* The Meed of a Vfeltsnschamngslote©
25*4,2» Reality Is Relational 
25,4*3* What Is -Dominion ?
25,4*3*1, Dominion Is Creational 
25*4,3*2# Dominion Is Fallen 
25,4*3,3* Dominion Is Redeemed
25. 5,  PRBLHIINmY CmOLHSIOMS 529,
Gh.26# TECimiCS s.MAK'0 POWER FIAM'S POI«LESBMBBS 532»
26.1. THE mPOETAMCE OF TEGmCCS 532.
26.2. THE HISTORICAL BACKGBOBHD 532.
26.2.1. The PaleoteoMiic Period 
26.2.2# The leotecbnic Period
26.3. THE THREE POWMIS OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY -
The V m  BIESSm THESIS 534,
2603*1* Introduction g Science ^ Technics g Orgaxiisation 
26.3,2# Technics
26.3*2.1. Ellul 3 Five Features of 'Technique* 
26.3,2.2# Implications for Mm*s Work 
26.03,3» Organisation
26.3,3,1» The Law of Working Efficiency 
26.3*3,2# The Laws of Production (Henry)
26.4. TEOmiO IMDUOKD CRISIS 542.
26.4,1 • Loss of Keaning
26.4.2. Loss of Responsibility
26.4.3. L088 of Self
xvii
26.4®49 Loss of Identity
26.5, TOWARDS A RESOimim OF CRISIS 544^
26*5,1® The Heco^iition of a Orisis of Freedom mid Power 
26*5 «2. The Adoption of the Theistio .kn?Ghe end 
Arolxhaodiao- Point 
26»5o3® The Rea], lent ion of l#o Maxi Is
26*5o3®1* In Relation To God
26o5»3«2« Men In Eolation To Matnro
26 *5 *3 «3* Men In Relation To M e  Taak
26*5*4® The Crux of the Problem 
26*5*5* Ctelst Offers Restoration 
26*5,6* Christ Calls To Work 
26*6. OONGLUSIOM
555<
27*1* immODUCTION 
27*2* wmT IS  m iœ m im  7 553,
27*2*1* Hard 3]eteminiBm 
27*2*2* Soft Determinism 
27*2*3* The Prinoiple of Causality 
27*5,  DBTmmiawM is  wor m ouoH 556,
27*5*1® The Eeduetionistio Determinism' of Bkimier 
27*5*2* The Oedipus Problem
27*4* WHAT 18 i m m a m a s M  ? 560*
27*4*1 * The Uncertainty Relatione
27*4 *1*1 * Unoertaj-nty As IndeteiTmimanoy In 
Wa,tiLi?G
27*4*1 *2« Uncertainty As ]&rperlmmitM/
Conceptual Limitations 
27*4*1 *5* Uncertainty. As Temporary I^ gnoranoe 
27*4*2* Tow£i2’de A Cosraonomic View of Indeterminism 
27.50 IhMiOMmBISM IS.MOT ENOUGH 566.
27*5*1* The Mnd-aiid Indetexminism (after Mac'Kay)
27*5*2» Clvmce and Necessity (Honod)
27*5*5* Worlds-1 a 2 and 3 - Popper 
27*6* ATim»TH) RESOLUTIONS 570.
27*6»1® The Illusion Theory of Hume 
27*6.2» The Bual-World Theory 
27*6. 5* The Dual-Language Theory 
2 7 *6 .4 * )Jbcistentialism
xvlii
27,7» GOD # ] )  m  m  a m  pmspECTiVE oF pR oviom oE
27.8» TOWMDB aOl'ÎCLirSIOlB
Appmmix A 8 F» A. a c m w m ' 8  miALYsia o? m :  uioiioTOMY m
MAN'S THOÜGÎÎT
APPism ix B 9 A NOTE ON TIÜ3 sEomD IÆ  OF T u m m ïm iic smo>%mKci#KL#Kma#(nKR#aüPM
J g g f f lL i?  5 BOOB«®RD'S MW SPMIES 
ia>OTBIX D 3 u c m m  OF BOOTS/ffiHB'S COSMOI-(Xrï
9 BIAGWi SHOWING m S  irtBAHISTXC ARSOLUTIgATION 03?' 
Tins M3LATIVE
GLOSSARY OF T»IS
571,
573®
576.
577,
588,
589*
590,
591*
597»
DIAGRAI'I I § THEORY FOiMATÏOlrwauTja Ts-NviarzswcrmcM;
DIAGRAM II 9 AH EXTEmALISTIO MODELtK'«v«r«msdravJAU«.'«s3r«^ « ^
BIAGHAM III s ESSLWl'IAMSM , niS'i'SIJI-æWALISI.1 MOBEL 
BIAKEAÎÎ OT s B Œ  « A mTOîIAMST HOHMJVÏ»;
, iWi'i;■f .a...ti
g y O R A ^  8 DYE - A OmiSTIAH WORLDVimfKTR#})Wga#C»#R;im%K%#AaKMm.
vi & MY mrisiow OF DiAORAi^  v
DIAGRAM VII K STOKER'S SPljQIAL PE0B»1
m m m m x  g»csv^ya6iMxtfxjm:*mi>itcjxm*ixcxa
APPi m iX  D 
A ppm um  E«fU»1»r4S»3rti5»-Sl.Wi|!il«»S» •
195o
197»
229,
255»
255,
255,
437.
588,
589»
590.
timale aep&vee Aaom oaBBWl out %itbjLn the %oulty of 
Mvimlty at (QaBgmy UhlvezMalty m &  I extm,d my thmlm to I%s&o B. 
IWDouaM and h&@ 3e^ p@»tmmt o f PBaotloal %oolo@y fo r m%@Evi@lon 
aod. guldanoo <mw tho loot thaxao yoewa.* As le oleai? I owe an 
intellootuol debt to the movement knoKm oe t&u» 'Phlloeqphy of the 
Go8B3ongmlo Idea»' H i # ia t M reotlon appaepprlato zrefermoo© are made 
in the text to indiwldmol eoWlaKG* I was given t W  imltial iaqpatw 
to see the ImgNWtenoe of a Ghrletlan pem^otlve w  aolenoe by %B@no&8 
A» ^Ghaeffoa? end tM s imo fhrthoE' etlm ulntaâ by a  ^profeeelonol 
pW.Xo84J#hec^  ifho tme fo m erly  ^  Ikmibgik van Bleaæm#
Bohogt D irector o f the poatgenduato ^InetltutD  fo»
(h K le tla n  S tu d le o * 1%% %N@mto# m w lle d  a W o o , a&owmgpammt and 
nae&$% m ateriel fetm the In etltu te^  c h ile  in  th le  ooimtry lULoheasd 
B ueaell'e 'G brletim i Btudlee IM lt ' %me a fam ltfu l eouroe o f 
UM p^ntbllahed eateapiol* M aturely % am indebted to  the eervloee o f the 
IWwGirelty Mbseasy  ^ but mention should eleo be made o f %thenm3.% 
Publio Mbæary prqmrod bodoe for me at varioae otages* I 
e%tend a geram el thmke to  John Wllem#. feiend and montor» fo r mngr 
booko loaned end dleouaiu&ene mitered in to  over the yeere» The 
Soottleh !#uoatl(m  BepomrWent» by grafting  a zeeemioh solmlaroM#» 
made the la s t three yeare a  poeolb illtya F in a lly  I  mnet t#%@nh my 
w ife  end fa m ily  f o r  t k e lr  p n tle n o e * Its lp  and enoowBmgement*
43)8818 oGKmlnea th e  r e llg lo m  m d  theoZoglQ G l fo u n d a tlo n e  o f  
mgWrnS, solmoo* A mythology him erlesm,* both ;M!%3.@rïy md 
aeodOBdoally# 43mt looatos tho hletorlO Bl orlgixm of Golowo In  the 
gæ at bumEmlGtlo mwmmitG of tba Waaiaaæeo and
Omweraoly Galvialgm end Puritanism ore regaWed ae regeesslve fm%xea^ 
the onmilew of fKoodaai and progmea# Intoreeted only In r&^gorow 
BXKBollty m d  o43mE%oa&d3y ploty* $MloB<#KWolly there Is a %dde=» 
spread dlw m o betw m  &%lth md knotAedgei# re llg lm  and solenoeg 
nWlo 8ooW,osdoa33y Golmoe le eeen to Wwmoo dth the ^ Wslmg off 
o f the fb tte re  of roliglouo belief
The oXwloe o f ap^rmeh ime d iffic u lty  1 elected an mmrvlec 
ra th e r  43m% an esghg^mtlve d e ta i l o f  one aeg^eoty T lile  wae a  oho loe  
agelmet epoolallGatlm and # @  abstamotlm loaa of omoreto reality*
It alao^eeeme more omeoKumt with-the topic imdor ogmsMeratlw*
The major d lrie laoe are ae follows#
P a rt I&  An h ls to r lo a l a o o tla a  w5ildh o m W itu a llG o s  th e  e W Iy  m &  
IndlostoB orl@l»G and motlvatlmm of mo&eam Boltmoe In 
rellgloua Intexmete «* particularly Oalvlnlem* %  the 
imtmæ of euoh a etudy there le a degree of amhlmleBoe*
Part II( The thes&a la eatahllBhed hy a zevlQw and brief orl'&lque of 
aeooZar %d$llo8aghl@8 of eoleneo* This again la mhlwelent 
t W u ^  I harm amag^t to plant algnpwte to the (blearer 
atatement pmeaentad In Part IV*
Part HI* A aurvoy of (3%Bl&*tlan rmpcmaeo to the topic* WMlo 
remaining %?l#ln Proteotmt thou#%t I here tnled to do 
justice to aa many dlwamgent posltlana æ  le oonalotent 
%ilth overg^l oahere&ioe*
Part IV@ Thle eeako to eetahllah the zellg&oue and theological
fwodetlona of naiMnal aolenoe on Omlatlen penapoot&val 
gaBoWie »» viewing reZlglon as # @  orientation of the heart 
In a haolo ooamllmmt to the nnlverB@$ and seeing In the 
theoZogy of the aomnolgaty of God, Bin law* the dootrlnos 
of oregÿtlon and onltitEial cetivityp clear motlvatlone to 
aoAentlflo aotivlty* 8 0 this lo the orax of my theala*. I 
aZao give some practical application In tmam of the grdhlema 
of # 8  em^Aronment end teohnlo* and how the fUndamontal 
laauea pertain therein*
X believe the haaio to  the aiibjeot lo  aot» in  ilio
fl-ra t imatomoog detailQ d o M g iria lity  but ;ln oxi 0s?iglnal ayntlzoala o f 
moWBleZ* WtaiZed owtaplbutioaao ere
1» A  e rltio o i. intsfoâmotioB to  tîie  o f 'Gosiaoiioalaa' %'jho3?e th a t
'litXQMgoB BTf toplo® The atmdy^ y basoâ w ith in  the % a^mm@tera o f 
Docym-merd'a 'Oosmofiomio Idea'# seeks to  apply oosiaanomiem in  a 
more G G leatlflo  fie ld  than th a t in  tfhloh moat o f Ate proponenta
%f03?ïS*
2o U(me speaifioally  I  point to  my snggoated so M tto i of HacKay's 
o<mpl@%mtaKy model of ao&moe m d  reMglm#
3n %' aa%%8a&'»pe3Z8peotival intosj-peatation of the influence o f Ca3Lvin(iam) 
wbiah gooe fu^tW a than Mertoa, Hodkÿuaa or Tosmioof 
4* %  02^ tl#o of the theologiool -speotanm ** liberal and evaagellosA#
I point %)artl(m laRly to my enalya&e of evongelloale %-fho ere 
largely im criliicped frcm wl'hhin tbais? om  psxapeetlva ami ignomd 
by lib e ra ls  B despite th e ir vast amount of literature on scloaoo end 
b e lie f g aM
%  The egqpoeuro of a omfiw'lmi. between 'solonoe* and 'ooiemtia'g &md 
"bottmen 're lig io n '^  'theo logy' and 'fa ith '»
ny ooooluslono inolM o#  
la Bellglon end natural eelmse (but not theology m iû natural eolenoo) 
are not eoparatc? © ntities» fo r tho fo%3aor fcamdo aacl activâtes the 
lattor* The whole dieousolon of eoleno© 'end' roliglon/Wlief is
a false dIohotmiQF ami thorefom  a psmido^^rohloma
Pm> The selig io iio  foum latieai o f ccienco cloeo siot dlotatcs/oGoree
s o le n tlflo  theories* While i t  can give a d e fin ite  %io' to  some 
(^ gm only glim a ooWltlwal 'yes' to tMorloa*
5« e tr io tly  apeaklngB no 'tMolo(%y o f ocieuce' but a
theological f5?amewo5± w itM n \ i h io h  eeienee oaa be imderotoodo 
4a ImoQooamy omoeptual ^ mdblca^ o ham boon mzeated by seeing lawo 
of natmx) œ  mtommom fkm the law of God*
5* % 3o' G o io atiflo  method is  m yt3iolo#oalo
*  ^  ^
■v*
%3d.:&
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I M ! % a O D n C T I O M
We l iv e  in  a woælü doMlnateÆ by  eolenoe anâ teohno logyo 
Gont@mpora#y l l io * 8 t y le  ig  n n tb in k a b la  @0Q#t f#om th e  ^ re a t s tr id e s  
aoienoG and technology hove made* eapeolally in the laat century*
The Inevit&blG oonsequenoe of this &evGlopment hae been increasing 
specialisation which creates problems for a study such as this as to 
what aspects to focus upon* Although there ie a decided shift of 
interest to the life eclenoes today I have concentrated on the 
physical BOiencee* I have pursued this course because the physical 
Bolenoee have been crucial in forming wondvlowBg present fundamental 
problems that affect a wide arena of thoughtg and because they form my 
own background and I am therefore better equipped to work in that 
field* but even physical science is a wide field and little will be 
said about such topics as chemistryp thermodynamicsp eleotrlcityp 
materials^ structures or hydrodynamlcso To restrict my material in 
this way does not negate the Importance of other areas of scientific 
research* There is a wide range of scientific work that possesses 
great practical and ethical problems* In agriculture there are 
ecological problems stemming from the chemical control of the 
environment; there are moral and philosophical problems that medicine 
has given rise top such as abortion and euthanasia; in genetics there 
are ethical problems devolving from the ability to interfere with the 
control and creation of life; psychology throws up innumerable 
questions of si&ilar intent concerning the nature of mang there is 
the problem of using mind drugs to control mon*8 aggressive instincts* 
and the philosophic&l^ethical problem concerning the nature of the 
self and free-will in relation to the implantation of electrodes in 
the br&ing and there is a behaviourist problem in the endeavour to 
dissolve the mind^matter debate* This last point highlights 
reductionism and I will contend that the reductionistio approach 
which is widespread today is inadequate to answer the real questions 
concerning the nature and task of man in the world* Eeductlonlsm 
shall be indicated to be a deification of a modal aspect of reality 
and therefore a failure to appreciate the essential inner coherence 
of created reality*
It is now generally recognised that our culture is in crisis ™ a 
crisis not unconnected with cur scientific and technological powers*
#* de Bppp (l972p PP@ %i=%iiio) has suggested with a degree of
plausibility that the great scientific Prometheans have given way to 
the destructive tinkering of Ëpimetheans* Accepting the criBls 
theela* it Is imperative that msna recover# a stable philosophical 
and religion# platform for hie aspirations and calling to subdue and 
have dominion over oreatlong gaine a perspective that avoids naive 
reductlonlsmB spume a misplaced faith in the objectivity of 
*8olentlflc* knowledge a& attained through an ^Infallible* oclentlfle 
method; rejects the idea that more and more technology is the solution 
to our troubles; and realises that his problems ere not reducible to 
an error in brain™b&ilding* While it is common either to fall into 
a fatalistic pessimism or adopt a naive romanticism* I will contend 
that neither Is the appropriate reaction to the present crisis*
What is needed is an approach to the problems raised by science and 
technology which is firmly rooted in the Word of Godg in the being 
and nature of mang and which is therefore rooted in a comprehensive 
worldview which provides a stable religious and theological basis for 
life and scientific activity* It is virtually redundant to point 
out that such a worldview will be at variance with the current 
" Z e itg e is t '*
Before fixing on the present title « *The Religious and 
Theological foundations of Natural Science* ™ I was working within the 
umbrella of "The Interaction Between Science and Religion'* However 
I became increasingly unhappy with the denotation of this title and 
arrived at the view that strictly speaking there could be no 
conjunction of science "and* religion in this manner as though they 
were facets of a complementary approach to reality* each shedding 
their own light from a different perspective* Mhile recognising 
that such a complementary approach to science *and* religion is very 
popular 1 hope to show that religion in fact undergirds science which 
cannot exist apart from its religious foundations*
Perhaps this is on appropriate point to note a convention that I 
will use to distinguish science as referring to the natural sciences* 
Fully realising the root of science in "soientia* I have opted for the 
sake of clarity to use "science* when referring to the natural 
sciences* and "sclentia* when referring to the more general spectrum 
of knowledge* Thus in my convention "theology" is "scientia* but 
not "science"*
1 will also seek to moke clear distinction between "religion* and 
"theology*o I believe it proper to speak of "science* and
2
"thGology'p but I will hold to the view that there le no possibility 
of a "theology of solonoe* although we can talk of those aspects of 
theological concern which are conducive to scientific activity? that 
iBp of the theological framework (in distinction from the religlouB 
roots) within which science operates* It will be clear from thle 
that I wish to reject a disjunctive approach to science and religion 
as well as the conjunctive approach* In fact I will seek to 
promote a perspeotival understanding of science within the overall 
motive of czeatlono fall into sing and redemption In Jesus Christ*
Such an approach neede particular emphasis in our culture where the 
study of worldviews end ideologies has to some extent been bypassed 
- probably due to the influence of British empiricism and American 
pragmatism* Thus in presenting my thesis I acknowledge a bias to 
a more continontal-rationallst^Oartesian tradition although I 
certainly would not locate my thought here*
I would wish to locate my thought within a neo-Galvinlan framework
aa stimulated by the philosophy of the OoemonomiG Idea* This 
philosophy is in no way a settled school of thought os.its proponents 
have deep differences and emphases* ^y interest in this movement is 
through personal acquaintance with some of its leading figures ^ such 
as H* van Rlsseng J*B@ngerlnk and &*8ohuurman* The main ifounder of 
the Philosophy of the Cosmoaomic Idea is Herman Booyewgerd (1894™1977)
and some of his insights will be appealed to in developing my thesis*
But due to a traglo unfamiliarity In British thought concerning this 
philosophical movement I Lfeel unable to push through to a more 
developed critical discussion which would presuppose a fairly 
intimate awareness of the principal aspects of the philosophy* So
I have merely Bought to utilise the Oosmonomic Idea where it impinges 
in a profitable way on my thesis*
The structure of the themis is fourfold and I have given a 
preface and postscript to each part to provide orientation and 
integration of the diverse aspects*
Part I concerns the historical foundations of solencGp the 
religious and theological aspects of which are all too often passed 
over in haste by reputable historians of science* i^ or example 
Bernal (l954)o Ball (1970) and Kearney (l97l) have virtually nothing 
to say about the Reformation or Puritans* Borne scientific detail 
is included with this in order to contextuallse what is being said* 
Philosophical and theological comment on scientific matters often
seems to display a naive awareness of the aotuality of the history 
of science and consequently much mythology abonndso ( of, 2o2e5,3@ 
and 7o4«) Bo Part I seeke (a) to In its own right point out 
something of the rellglouB and theological foundatlona of the 
natural sciences; and (b) to provide an introduction to the 
rest of the thesis*
Part II seeks to provide a more theoretical approach to the 
nature of scientific aotivltyo Nhlle this is largely a review of 
secular philosophies I have sought to plant signposts for the 
development of an integral Christian approach to a philosophy of 
ecience* Today the secular philosophies of soionoep outside of 
instrumentalisme are helpful in pointing to the metaphysical basis 
of science which for my purposes can be developed with respect to 
the religious foundations of science* Part II may therefore 
profitably be seen as introductory to Part IV*
Part III is a brief review of stonces^that have been taken up 
by theologians or other non-professional theologians (chiefly 
scientists who Indulge in theological reflection)* Of the four 
parts in the thesis this is the only one which does not specifically 
point to either the religious or theological foundations of the 
natural sciences* Rather it indicates the confusion of Christian 
positions* A confusion I would venture to suggest which often stems 
from the synthesis of Christian ideas with humanistic philosophy* 
Nevertheless this is an important pert of my thesis as it provides 
the context for Pert IFp as well as a sounding board for my own 
position*
Part IV seeks to take steps towards formulating a Christian 
approach to the religious and theological foundations of natural 
science* I would not for one instant claim it as definitive or 
finalp but see it as a few faltering steps towards the development of 
"af possible Christian perspective* here I hope that what is 
implicit in Part II Is made more explicit with respect to the 
religious foundations of science* From there I move on to formulate 
the theological framework which I believe exists and which is 
conducive to science*
In writing an interdisciplinary thesis such as this it is 
necessary that many thinkers in the disparate fields of science and 
theology be left out and many books remain unread* I make no
apology for this as the number of hooka la legion, « for ezamplGp the 
ammal orop of evangelical hooka that are merely a superficial 
variation of the design argument* Having made this confession I
would add that I believe I have read extensively and covered @11 the 
critical work# ^  ae I hopo la door from the Bibliography*
Perhaps 1 should add here that one area I had hoped to Include ae 
a fifth party but which space precludedp was the sociological aspect 
of science = particularly with reference to the responsibility of 
science to society* B&ch useful material can be gleaned about this 
from Rose and Rose (1971)9 BoBames (l972)p Goodfield (1977) and 
lacBlo (1977),
The only field work done was in the form of a questionnaire 
concerning popular beliefs about science and religiono Thio ie 
oimitted as documentation and analysis would be prohibitive in 
lengtho In any case the results would not add significantly to the 
central theme of the thesis* Therefore I confine this thesis to my 
research within the corpus of material listed in the bibliography*
The Harvard system of referencingas recommended by the 
nniversity of Glasgow is adopted for this thesis* ( See the 
introduction to the bibliography for fbrther details*)
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It is not intended that Part I should be read as an history of 
solenoe or as an exhaustive treatment of the involvement of religion/ 
theology in the development of natural soienoeo The oonseguenoe of 
the development of BClenoe and technology has been increasing 
specialisation and hence a somewhat arbitrary selection of material 
has to be made* %hlle focusing on the physical sciences I 
recognise the importance of the life sciences and concentrate on the 
Darwinian controversy in chapter 7* But the main thrust of science/ 
technology in influencing world views and theology seems to me to 
reside in the physical ecienceso in the development from Ptolemy 
through Oopemious and Newton to Einstein» The basic thesis is 
to indicate the religious and theological foundations in soienoep not 
to give a general history»
A few introductory notes are in order* (a) To relteratep I am 
aware of selecting only a few episodes from the many available ™ for 
instance in considering only the evolutionary Issue in the 19th 
centuryo and even here my original notes were some two to three 
times the present chapter length# (b) I have sought to focus on 
aspects such as the attitude of Calvin and lutherg the Puritanso and 
the positive side of industrialisation rather than reiterate what 
is more commonly noted* (c) However a certain degree of simple 
history of science Is included in order to contextuallse the more 
abstract reflections» (d) Chapter 1 is crucial although It Is a 
very superficial spanning of more than 2@000 years* mainly outside 
the Bebraic-Christlan tradition; while chapter 8@ though not dealing 
to any extent with the religious or theological foundations of solencep 
is Included to give a, brief* but neoessaryg background to modem 
physios and indicate something of the philosophical basis underlying 
itp the problème it raises for epistemologyg and the attendant demise 
of positivism»
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Modem mon often regards the origin# of Weetem civilisation 
from Judalstlo and Hellenlatlo Boaroes as of little velue or 
Importance* The Bolentlflo theories of old are seen ae superstition 
or metaphysical speculation and therefore of no relevance today#
But the ancients who saw that everything was water, or atoms, or a 
void, or number were really in a comparable position to the modem 
advocates of cyberneticso negative feed-backs, entropy and mind 
theory# (Toulmln & Goodfield 1962* p#41#) Both involve the 
creative ideas of man in Interaction with his culture as he attempts 
to explain and understand the world*
What is remarkable in a survey of this ancient period is that 
the seeds of so many modern theories ere contained in Greekp or 
earlier, thought# Barwln is foreshadow^ in Anaximander's theory of 
development out of the sea* and in Empedocles* theory that the fittest 
survive; and we come across hellooentriclty and atomic theories*
Thus a legacy was formed that* even in its errors, had a great forming 
influence on later days* Aristotle exercised a virtuel 
stranglehold on science right up to the birth of modem science in the 
1?th century*
A study of the early civilisations of Mesopotamia and Egypt#,which 
in turn influenced Greece and Medieval Europe via Syria and Arabia* is 
therefore fundamental# But first a word concerning the other two 
great civilisations of old - China and India* Neither made major 
contributions to science basically because they failed tos (a) develop 
a theoretical geometry; (b) form a working scientific method; (o) and 
unite philosophy and religious belief with teohnigues, This* 
coupled with a Taoist return to nature and away from the city, the 
Gonfucian lack of interest in natural philosophyp and the absence of 
any divine law™giver (Needham 1956» p#25f») led to sterility of 
scientific thought in the lands of the East* The contribution of 
moat importance probably being the Hindu (under Babylonian influence) 
system of numerals and the multiplication of algebraic equations.
These were exceptionally high cultures, The royal cemetery at
nr* dating from early in the third millenium B*Ge reveals that all 
except a few of the metal working processes now in use were known; 
leaving open the possibility that other processes were also known* 
(Berry & Williams 1970* p»119«) The Egyptians were capable of 
tempering bronae to a degree where they were able to shave with it 
- a process that we cannot reproduce today. From 2*500 B.C. the 
Summerians had advanced multiplication tables and the Babylonians 
were In fact able to handle complicated linear equations in several 
unknowns* even going as far as to try and solve cubic end 
biquadratic equations. (Singer 19&2* p*7f*)
It is generally recognised that Mesopotamia led the way in 
mathematics and astronomy* while Egypt dominated in medicine and 
anatomy. (Mason 1962, p*17f*) hove a list of eclipses* dated
747 BeG.e from Babylon* while the mumifying procedures of Egypt 
necessitated medical and anatomical knowledge. Thus both in the 
arena of cosmology and technical crafts this period is significant.
An important point ie that these aspects of life were firmly in the 
hands of the priests#
"Archaeological evidence points to the growth of the 
Bummerion city round the temple; the surplus was brought 
to propitiate the god; the land was his land; his priests 
were the first leisured class and the crafts which did 
honour to the god marked the beginning of civilisation*"
(Berry & Williams 1970p Pe6o7»)
In late Babylon* Marduk was lord of Geld; Ea of Erdu was protector of
smiths; while the fire god Gibil was known os the 'divine smith**
The recipes of these artisans* working under the priests* involved
necessary incantations and rituals to assure the benignity of the
gods and spirits,
The history of cosmology tended to he the history of the calendar, 
The priest could and did make astronomical observations# but they were 
motivated by the needs for the prognostication of dates and seasons of 
religious significance* On the medical front the pursuit of medicine 
was a struggle against evil and possessing spirits with little room 
for the concept of natural causes* Again mention con be made of the 
Zlggurnouts of Mesopotamia (o* 2*000 B.C.}* the Great Pyramid of Egypt# 
and the recipes from the library of Assurbonipal (c* 700 B.C.) all of 
which reflect the interaction of technical skill and religious 
observances* (Gf* Mason 1962* #*29 S Toulmin & Goodfield 1962# p»36 5 
Bernal 1973^  p*67*) It seems clear that religioue belief was not 
merely neutral but was the guiding influence and control over science
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and technology*
Tha development of Greece stando In line with the culture# of 
Egypt and MoBopotamla* As Science developed its origins lay in two 
traditions « the technical and the spiritual* The experiences and 
skills of men to form and fashion were handed on and developed* and 
this coupled with the dreams and aspirations of creative thinkers 
furthered the scientific questo The Hellonlstio period was rich in 
skills and dreamers, hut there were several distinct periods and 
schools within this era which make generallsatlone dangerous*
It Is wrong to see a rationalistic Booratio influence sweeping 
aside the religions of Marduk and Zeus» Ehat was Involved was a 
reorientation of emphasis in an attempt to rationalise earlier thought. 
It was not an attempt to destroy earlier attempts at explaining the 
world but, following Thalesp the implementation of an attitude of 
critical argumentation instead of the blind acceptance of tradition ^
though the rigours of traditionalism would return* The desire to
1know and explain the world was joined by & desire to understand 
the self* As Mumford notes; "Know thyself runs through this whole 
culture; Thales utters It; Hippocrates formulates it; the Delphic 
Oracle has it written over the gates of the Temple; Socrates repeats 
ita" (1973# p,22*) Greek science is identifiable with Greek 
philosophy* Speculation^ not experiment# was the order of the day 
and while the social conditions and attitudes precluded experiment# 
theories still had to measure up at the bar of reason and justify the 
requirements of logico
After its early advances through the Ionian# Athenie and 
Alexandrian periods the Greek era succumbed to decay and traditionalism* 
Alexandria was the centre of decline due to the separation of science 
and philosophy which provided no basis for development and led to 
stagnation* This failure of nerve was followed by a lack of 
inspiration under the practical but unspeculative Romans# and so 
foundations for Medieval scientific sterility were ilaid*
la Of consuming interest to the Greeks was the cosmos — what was it 
made of# and how did it operate? This Involved a strong 
externalistic influence from cultural factors and it is interesting to 
note that the early meaning of the Greek word 'cause' - aitia — was 
in fact 'guilt'* This being a carry over from the Babylonian idea 
of retribution in natur@g derived from man in society# and the reading 
of an organic approach into nature*
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The Greeks developed general tools of Qeienoe but no real 
details; they had elaborate world-pleturee and founded several 
GGlentlfio dlBGipllneg* But their legacy was their attitude « a 
delfio&tion of nature# an overeetimatlon of reason and an uader^ 
estimation of technology* (Hookyaae 1973? Thle led to
two divergent vlewss an asoendl&g Epicurean uolveree based on 
progreseivep evolutionary premise#; and @ descending Platonic view 
which saw creation and a fall* (Koestler 197Dp
P
The basic motive of the period was *form* and "matter**
According to leloeBter (l971o p*18* of los&e 1972* P»7f#) the 
dlvlBlon of all Greek material objecte wae Into "form' and "matter* 
with the earlier Ionian thinkere emphoBiming 'matter' and the later 
Athenian thihkera stressing *fOrm* behind this "matter** But it is 
not 88 simple os this* In the pre-Homerlo era there was a clear 
religion of life and death where the amorphous deities had no 
Individual form and their exletence was limited and subject to fate 
and death (Gka Anangke)* Here we see the relevance of Anaxlmander'e 
setting the origin of all things in the 'apeiron* (the indefinite and 
infinite)* A Bhapele&s otream of life flowed through the process of 
birthg decline and death of all corporeal form which is easentlally 
the deification of the biotic gphere of existence before it returns 
to the chaos*
Then there was the later cultural religion of the Olympian gods 
which enshrined for Greece the deification of the cultural aspect of 
existence# The gods had left the earth and its limitations for 
Olympus p but they were still limited with no ultimate power over 
death and necessity# Dooyeweerd maintains that thece newer gods 
exercised their influence primarily in the polls and the public life 
of the communltyp whereas the country and individual private life 
remained centred on the more earthy gods of 'matter*# (l969, Vol*!# 
pp,85t,ei5665,1815 Tol.ïï» BP.SsSôs Vol.III, pp.7-15; 1972s p.38f.)
This meant that in later thought there was no clear distinction between 
'form* and 'matter'* but rather a dialectical ground^motive that 
became the religious otarting-point for all thought and determined 
their view of naturep and established the base of their metaphysical 
view of Being in opposition to the visible world of becoming and decline#
2# 1 wish to use the designation 'motive' throughout rather than the 
more common term motif as the idea of motive as direction-giving 
l8 much more expressive#
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The lonlanSp then# deified the "matter* motive* making no 
distinction between mental and physical npherea* In this nature™ 
philosophy time brought retribution aa "form" was ultimately 
di88olV0d back into "matter* and carried back to it8 formwlesa origin, 
Arietotleg however# deified the "form* motive an&e while having an 
animating view, reversed the Ionian procedure and saw the "psyche* as 
the form of the material body* Bla ooemonomic idea of nature 
entailed the domination of a dual teleology where all strove for 
perfection* Tbero are substantial forms arranged in an hierarchy# 
with "mottor* as the loweet and "form* an the higheet* Form has 
the baeio primacy and deity ie pure form# But thé deity is not the 
origin of matter which possessee blind arbitrary "anangko*» end thle 
permeates through the categories of Aristotle, Yet he was probably 
the firet to really try and synthesise the two motives# and "form* 
while not the origin is the cause of "matter", He abandoned Plato's 
separation of the noumenal world of "ousia"* the sensible world of 
decline and decay# and conceived of substance as the immanent point of 
reference in the process of change* "Ousla* for Aristotle always 
meant the primacy of the category of beings that is the thing in itself# 
and does not relate to sensory aspects* "Form* is therefore an 
immanent teleological principle*
The formMmatter motive therefore lies in the encounter between the 
pre-Homeric end the later cultural religions of Greece* The first 
deified the stream of life which was not fixed in any one form and is 
seen in the worship of Dionysus end the Orphic movement. The later 
"form" motive based on form, measure and harmony# became dominant 
over the matter motive and is seen in the Delphic Apollo as law-giver.
%
The.Ionian Period*" The philosophers of nature from Milos@ 
Elea and Gamos were concerned about the origin* evolution* structure* 
form* substance and laws of the universe* Their desire was to find 
some simple explanatory principle* Thus wo read of Thales who 
sought a unitary formula based on water; of Anaximander who saw the 
universe originating out of an indefinite* undifferentiated (apeiron) 
something* and the earth as suspended; of Pythagoras who sought a key 
in the numerical and concluded the earth to be a sphere; of Anaximenes 
with his "breath theory* where "pneuma" was the basic common substance*
5* Mogill (1968) provides many excellent summaries of various thinkers 
in this and the following sub^sections.
aaâ who employed atomism and continuum theory. Parmenides aaw 
form in metapbyBioal opposition to matter with the true Being 
analagouB to logical thought» Prom monistic premises he eaw 
reality as a solid homogeneous sphere with all appearance of change 
and motion as Illusion* Heraclitus posited a "logos* by which all 
things were one# claiming opposites the same; Empedocles formulated 
the classic structure of the world as baaed on earth# air# fire and 
water with these elements motivated by love and strife; Anaxagoras 
conceived an infinite number of minute particles (seeds) with a 
guiding "nous* behind them (which Empedocles rejected), Anaxagoras 
is famous for hie expulsion from Athens on the accusation of impiety 
for locating the sun and moon (gods) at a great distance from the 
earth* With Democritus the minute seeds became atoms (of* 
leucippus) which* though obviously not the atoms of modern physios* 
were In principle the same below-sensory concept of basic building 
blocks for reality*
The early lonlans accepted the idea of oroatloq/development by 
and large* and also the idea of some impersonal force outside which 
imposed order and justice on matter ^  nous* logos* etc** They saw 
nature In a, more impersonal light as they went on and the gods were 
removed from nature into the sphere of the abstract and spiritual. 
These* then* ere the first rational attempts to put science on a firm 
footing* but they did not constitute any attack on religion*
Indeed Heraclitus* though scornful of popular belief* advocated the 
reform of religion on a pantheistic basis*
1*3*2. The Athenian Period* HOre Hippocrates followed an 
inductive method and founded the first real religion of science in 
opposition to traditional religious beliefs* Socrates* however* 
was sceptical as regards scientific pursuits for cosmology did not 
advance the soul.
Plato* faced with a multiplicity of theories* was sceptical.
Was he to adopt Parmenides* Anaxagoras* Pythagoras* Democritus or 
Empedocles?; was he to follow the Ionian concept of raw material* the 
logical axioms of the Eleactics* the unity numbers of the 
Pythagoreans* the atomic theory of the four elements? He certainly 
was under the influence of the Pythagoreans* finding inspiration in 
geometry* but it was as a plausible and not a full mathematical 
certainty. Thus Plato developed the Pythagorean idea concerning
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the uniform olroular motion of the heavens end saw intelligent 
design. But the oreating 'demiourgoG' was no supreme god hut 
tied to follow the eternal Ideas# tied to trying to fashion the chaos 
as orderer* not creator. Nor does the demiourgos sustain the world 
and man ie further made by secondary gods in the image* not of 
themselvee* hut of the univerae* Plato rejected the blind neoeseity 
of snangke* and also Demboritue for having denied the existence of 
Mind* Mathematice alone does not change and they are therefore the 
true field of eoienoe* Even so it is the concept of saving the 
appearance that comes to the fore* the dlotlnguishing between physical 
truth end hypothesis which saves the appearance* Thus 'form* and 
'matter* are posited against each other and all we oan achieve is 
"a likely story in such matters*" (Plato 1971* p*41.)
His division of matter and soul* with the material body being the 
prison of the soul which longs for release* led to a separation of 
science into experimental and speculative aspects* Overall the 
philosophical-religious belief directs the trend in the scientific 
world for the soul is the place of 'forms** Contempt for the body 
led paradoxically to advances in anatomy as it freed the body for 
dissection* Therefore while seeking the ground of being in 
numbered and geometric figures* Plato tried to synthesise the Eleatic 
ever-resting ideal form of being and the Heraclitean flux* But he 
finished up in a dialectical idea of Being that led to a crisis in 
the doctrine of Ideals* (Booyewoerd 1969» Vol.Il p.9^*) His 
positive contribution to science was the establishment of mathematics 
in educationo and the ^ method of working back from an assumed solution 
to the original details#
Aristotle was not as speculative as Plato and stressed the visible 
Ideas as opposed to the abstract mathematical forms of Plato* He 
assumed that the heavens had @n eternal uniform circular motion round 
the earth. Aristotle writes; "The heaven* moreover* must be a 
sphere^ for this la the only form worthy of its essence* as it holds 
the first place in nature#***" (in Hurd & Kipling 19&4o Vol.I po29*) 
He further assumodg from Empedocles with a mixture of Pythagorean 
details, that the earth existed and consisted of the four elements# 
plus the ideal quintessence which had neither upward or downward 
tendencies.
Aristotle's method was to progress from observation to general 
principles and then back to observationg that is inductive-deductive.
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(losee 1972# oh,1*) He held the principle of demonstration to be 
that of Identity# Non-Oontradiotion# and the Exoluded Middle,
Further there were four ooueeB# or more correctly "beoauses'g namely 
the material out of which & thing come to be; the formal designs# 
patteme and form# impressed on matter; the efficient whereby design# 
were realleedg and the final purpose* In other words - from what?;
what was it?g by what?; and in aid of what? To these he added
change and spontaneity as oauaeB - though often overlooked a# they 
are not open to knowledge* The final cause was Important for him 
as he envisaged all scientific explanation having an account of the 
final *telo8** (Theophrastus maintained that the concern of science 
was with the efficient cause,)
Hie approach to the nature of the heavens was speculative in 
method and Budoxlon in content# The universe was seen as limited 
in space* but not in time* and the outermost sphere of the fixed 
stars was moved by the bhmoved Hover* This in turn governed all 
the other spheres* God was the Frimum Mobile# a final but not on 
efficient cause; he was not the creator j&r the Forms and the world
were eternal* So Aristotle established a break between
celestial and terrestrial physics (Pythagorean influence)*
Aristotle saw matter as potentiality and form as actuality*
The soul become the form or actuality in living things which were seen# 
not 08 substances but* as species# He divided creatures into three 
classess man* who had a rational soul; animal* i^hi&hi&oved'hy a 
sensitive soul; and vegetable# which grew by a vegetable soul* (Cf. 
the individuality structures of Dooyeweerd)* Within the change 
from potential to actual he Imposed a pneumo-theory on top of his 
matter-theory* with the heart os the true seat of life (Of* 
the centrality of the heart in the Cosmonomio Idea ™ 20*1*g*3#)
Opposing Democritus and siding with Goorates and Plato he sow matter 
as continuous* This was of significance for later ages as the
church's total rejection of the materialism of Eplcurus# who used
atomism as a weapon against religion# left the Aristotelian view as 
the only real alternative* Thus a worldview was given to 
following generations that became a creed to be adhered to with the 
strictest devotion - a legacy of vitalism and teleology* The idea 
of vitalism being the result of his biological work diffused through 
his thought* (He classified over 540 species* (Bemal 1973» P*91*3 
Hookyaos 1973o ##55*))
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became the great centre of learning in the ancient world* It owed 
ite rise to Alexander the Great ae did much of the scientific 
acqulGitions of the Greeks from the surrounding nations * the astronomy 
of conquered BOhylon# the algebra of Mesopotamia# the Idea of fate from 
Babylon which was to play & large role in Stoic philosophies* Bhder 
Eing Ftolemy the museum was founded at Alexandria employing over 100 
professorsg having half a million soroUs* a Boo# botanical gardens* an 
astronomical observatory and dissecting rooms* Thus Greek science 
from 500 B*0* Is Alexandrian science ^  though it was not the sole 
Important centre (cf. Rhodes and Pergamum). But it was here that 
science was to blossom and specialise and then to lose its general 
relation with philosophy end slide into decline.
Despite decline eventually setting in* the list of those who 
participated in the Alexandrian period is impressive* There were 
Strato* a disciple of Aristotle; E&clld and Aristarchus in mathematics; 
Galen in the medical field whose work was still standard in the 17th 
century; nerophlluB, Apollonluse Eratosthenesp ElpparohuB* Hero* 
Gleomedesp Diophantusg Hypatia* Mary the Jewess# and Zoslmus; the 
atomlst Erasistrates who held that the pneuma circulated in the body 
drawn from the pneuma of the world* There was also contact with 
AKhlmedesp who though not based at Alexandria evidently visited It.
He is of particular importance for his attempt to combine the 
Inductive method of Aristotle and the deductive method of Plato.
Here too Ptolemy formulated his influential cosmology* Debate 
would rage whether these theories were representations of reality or 
computational models. In the 'Almagest' he says his theories are 
only for computationg but by the time he writes *Hypothese8- 
Plonetarum* he claims to reveal theatruoture of physical reality*
Other influences were at work in Alexandria ™ social and religious* 
Mhile Athens had drawn its thinkers from the elite* who were suited to 
detached theoretical attitudes to lifé and society# this was not so at 
Alexandria where the patrons were the merchants and traders who wanted 
some return for the money they were investing. This is important 
for modem science did eventually arise in a commerce-orientated 
society. On the religious fronts several features are noteworthy*
In Athens there had been a certain scepticism towards the Olympian 
gods# but in Egypt the gods were far more central in the life of 
people* Here was the meeting place of Isis and MithraB# Jews and
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Christlana# Gnostics and neo-Platanlsts* 80 in Egypt the religious 
standing of the olergy was higher and tended to exeroiee a, monopoly 
over learning; they were the clerks as well as the clerics.
Thus there was pressure in the general climate of thought away 
from scientific endeavour to the mystical religione of the East and 
the rising influence of Gnosticism* The rational theorising of 
Athens gave way to the mystical guest of knowledge by initiation into 
religion* While in Athena the guest had been to free oneself from 
perplexity and gain rational understan&ingp it became to free oneself 
from sin and obtain salvation and blessedness*
Alexandria was at one and the same time the brigheet flower of 
ancient learning (the museum lasted over 6OO yeara) and the trap 
which sprang shut on scientific curiosity* (Toulmin 1974#) This 
being so it militates against any intemallstlo approach to science 
which ignores the cultural milieu (Gf*9*3*1#) It is difficult to 
explain the aridity of science from then until the 15th century apart 
from the powerful influence of social and religious factors that made 
up the worldview within which people lived. There was also the 
tacit canonisation of Aristotle which made any attack on his theories 
suspect in scientific circles (though not religious); and thus 
science became as sterile and hidebound as religion*
If any further nails in the coffin of solenoo were needed — Romo 
supplied them* Roman civilisation was based on the warrior-, 
agricultural communityo and lacked the quantitative and spatial 
concepts necessary for any fruitful advances in science* Rome had 
no astronomy of note or mathematics^ only a certain practical hygenlo 
approach to medicine* The strong thrust of Stoic philosophy 
further heightened this hiatus as it gave little stimulus to 
knowledge and research; it blurred the differences between structure 
and functionp seeing the universe possessing a world-soul which helped, 
to relate it to the Astral religions of Alexandria* Paradoxically 
itsmonotheistic premises and concept of providence gained a degree 
of acceptance in Christian circles. Epicureanism* if anything* 
gave less encouragement to science* Thus the old school was in 
decay and the field was left to the flux of Ohristian* Jewish and 
pagan elements* While the fight for supremacy raged there could be 
little concern givong cævorldview providedg for the mundaneness of 
scientific investigation*
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1 G -onolud.e that for this long period of solenoo the 'basic 
approach of science was a way of looking at the world and not 
primarily a way of dealing with? or trying to explain, it. iBy 
and large the theories were speculative, isolated from* or 
superimposed upon, observations*
%bî8 militated against any 
real aolentiflc advance* Here the motives of "matter* and "form*
come to the fore again* As Hookyaas (1973* p*76f*) points outg in
pre-^ocratic Greece the manual activities were seen in  favourable 
light# The crafts flourished around the time of Bolon (639-559 BoG*) 
who required each citizen to learn a trade and decreed (according to 
Plutarch) that a son need not support his father unless the father 
had taught him a trade* This is the period of Greek invention « 
the bellows, improved anchors, the potter's wheel, the level* sot 
square, lathe, ruler and key. "It was a time too," writes Mason 
(l962g p#35«)9 "when the Greek word 'sophia' still meant technical 
skill, and not intellectual wisdom*" At one level this tradition 
continued, and as late as Hero of Alexandria there was a strong 
technological interest, though with little civil application*
For Boorates the virtuo of temperance applied to workers meant 
they were to know their place and be satisfied# Plato had severe 
contempt for the manual aspects of life. He might have regarded 
agriculture as the basis of his ideal state, but the labour 
associated with this activity was to be left to slaves* Thus as 
long as the idea that a social stigma rested on the mechanical arts 
(Xenophon) there could be little advance in science, for without this 
science was shorn of the tools it needed ™ technologies that could 
have improved techniques and observationsg and experiments that could 
have been performed to investigate phenomenon under specific 
conditions# When experiments were used it was to demonstrate a 
hypothesis and not to discover. Only in medicine was work with 
the hands considered honoured.
Thus science was limited, not by skill, but the contempt of the 
manual. There were of course artisans and engineers who were 
involved at a practical level, but they did not have the speculative 
cosmologies or scientific curiosity to give science impetus# The 
,divorce, that resulted between philosophy and technology reached a. 
peak at Alexandria*
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In general this was a period where few diatingwiahed ultimately 
between religious aod natural knowledge for life we^ seen aa a whole* 
(Toulmin & Goodfield 1962* p«113e Hookyaaa 19739 #*1*) Oh the 
theoretical front If one theory above all othera had to be elngled 
out as retarding soienoe it muet be the triumph of hylo&oi8& 
(vitalism) over the atomism of the meGhanioal eohool* Thle led to 
the viewing of everything through an orgahio grid (ef* Aristotle's 
;%pplioatio& of biological .catégorie# to phyolcB); nature was alive 
and striving for perfection* Nature* immanent and divineg was a 
living organism full of reason and logical neceeeity which the gods 
had to obey* Indeed it produced all things ™ gods* meng animals 
and the inanimate by generation* The evidence suggests that
hyloBoiem succeeded because the atomistic view was ruled out on 
religious ground# because of its association withimaterialiem»
Atomism was Itself quite wrongs in the environment of more
eensitive Bculs it may have led science forward. As it wac 
sterility set in and lasted till the birth of modem science*
1*4* mELY &&A AND TEW DWGI$WE ÜFJgOiæmG#
After the disintegration of science at Alexandria» Greek ecience 
echoed on in Southern Italy and Byzantium before a small but 
important spread and revival under Islam brought it east to ^ Bagdad 
and west to Spain, Islam is a crucial link between Greek science 
and the _ ^ western revival of learning from the 12th century onwards* 
Yet the first thousand years of the Christian era has been 
characterised by linger (1962? ch*5*) a# *The Failure of Knowledge*; 
Hurd and Kipling see "discovery at alow ebb" (1964» Vdl.I p*55#); 
while Tculmin and Goodfield (1962» p*15?f*) see a prolifération of 
rival theories that are but variationa on the old themes of Greek 
thought* Despite this* and the lack of any coherent philosophical 
system ™ quite inconsistent beliefs being held by the some person 
without any qualms = there was nevertheless a number of fundamental 
Innovations in Europe through this period that helped to pave the way 
for the scientific reorientation when it came* Technology has had 
a steady development than science#
Through the break-up of the Roman Empire the church struggled to 
establish Itself* A struggle revolving primarily around 
theological questions and the acquisition of power ™ not on the
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validity or otherwise of aolemoe or technology# Theologians split 
into two camps over the question of the worlds
"A summary discussion of some characteristic authors 
sufficed to make olear that* on the wholeg two types of 
synthesis are involved in the Father#* critique of 
culture; namely; one favouring cultural solidarity and 
the other opposing it#" (popma 1973» p#112*)
Tertulllon spoke out fiercely against alchemy* seeing it as the 
corruption of men. hy fallen angels* Augustine denigrated "those 
imposters* the mathematlclans'e though he poeelbly meant astrologers» 
(cf* Singer 1962» p#l69*) Isidore however saw astrology in part at 
least as valid and dlgtingul&hed a natural and a BuperBtitdPUB 
version* Astrology and alchemy did indeed have pagan supera^^tlons 
attached and this association did not recommend itself to the church* 
The church In fact issued several condemning statements of these 
activities; not because they were 8cieace@ but because they were 
superstitiona* Nevertheless suspicion of science was present due 
to its concern with this world as opposed to the soul* and 
Bonoventura could comment that the "tree of science* was cheating men 
out of their inheritance in the "tree of life*# (Mason 1962» p*115*)
Ne&torlans were prominant in the translation of physios into 
Islam* F&em the 8yrlao speaking Nestorions at Gondlsapur science 
passed Into the Moslem world and from obcut 750 «" 1200 Islam was 
the cuBtodian of scientiflo activity* This heritage paased back 
to the West by ocAmmrcial contact frma the 12th century onwards »
Thus the InfluencG of Islsua is :3mportant; but swiftly fades after 
1500 A*D* and the history of modem science drmfs little from it or 
the East* The history of science becomes tî::^ hlBtojsy of westeam 
scfj^ nce*
The sources of the Med5.eval tradition are varied., % e  basic 
worldviei^  comes undoubtedly from the syntheslo of the Grecc-'Rcman 
traditions with the Hebrew-Chrlstian traditions of Glaristianlty*
But j,t was a synthesis full of antimonies that refused to be welded 
and finally split assmider during the revival of learning; artg 
religion and science* Oonfuslon arose from the failure to separate 
the reality of a worldvl@%f and a world—picture, The foirier gives a 
conceptual evaluation of the i^ rarld and 'Khe latter provides a physical 
model# In terms of the worldview the gulf betifeen biblical and
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Greek ims Immense* The Bible envisages a Creator God who
created external to himeelf» transoends reason and sustains the 
wor3.d In esdetential exletenee* The Greek view i^yas of a self- 
eufflolent creation end a self-gmpporting divine Nature* The 
synthesis of Aristotle end Plato wltli the church in terms of their 
scientific theories could never be more tlian uneasy*
3h the first instance the scientific works of Aristotle xmre 
lost and it was Plato» tïncou^ i Ptole%gr and Pliny» who influenced the 
early science of the Middle Ages* Pliny's work became a primer on
GreeKc science; while Ptolemy gave a universal cosmologloal theory 
based on epicycles, equants and exoentrics irrith an immobile earth*
This iÆieory was attractive to theologians and was ecoepted by Aquinas 
as a working hypothesis* Plato's 'Timmaeus' survived directly into 
this period and fitted imll ird-th the neo==Plat(mislng tendencies of 
Ghristian belief# But trouble was beiJig sown for much that was 
being adopted and canonised as Boienoe was inherited frora the period 
of olassioal d.eoline in Al^mndria*
Theology tended to the intellectual and abstract as opposed to 
ooncem for the practical affairs of life* This fitted the 
dominance of 'grace* over "nature*; grace being for the Aristotelian 
Ghristien (or Platonic) the equivalent of "form", and nature the 
loifer splie3?8 of "matter"* It was a world dominated by t M  eternal » 
heaven and hell were more rea3. than the immediate reality of nature* 
Man's spiritual destiny ruled over his teDgporal affairs and the 
religious meaning he gave to the world was the tool of interpretation. 
% e  world of mature was viewed as an organism ifhlch left the door open 
for the Greek demonisatiom of mature (the matter-motive), the 
pez'sonlficatlcm of the forces of mature and the hold of superstition* 
The motives of "grace" and "form" craved an ordered universe on am 
organic model; and imposed primarily mystical and symbolical methods 
of interprétation on the data available.
This ims a time #ien science really meant scientla* There was 
no discipline of science as such* Indeed science was often a by­
product of medicine; mag3.c or alchonQr» or self»tau0it in the pursuit 
of some career* But there was no systématisation, interaction or 
flow of science such 88 developed after Copomicus. Within what we 
now call physics 9 sound was tied to imslo xAlch in tum Tfao tied to 
mathematics; heat %ms tied to alchemy; and optics to geometry and 
perspective*
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Tims the pre-Renalssanoe world—ploturo ims dominated hy the 
redj.80overed Aristotelian cosmology and the astronomy of Plato 
developed through Ptolemy. Over all wae Aristotle's a^prlorllmT of 
Neoeseityg god had to follovr the natural law. This of oourse 
ocmflloted with the Ohrlstlan God and the church made move# to ccmdeim 
ouch thought (Tempier'o 219 theses of 1277). The Aristotelian 
world-pioture had its dleadventages for it could not accoimt for the 
observed IrregularltioB of the planets or eacplaln their varying 
dietance from earth* Yet mentally it irme aesthetically and 
psychologically attractive in its intema]. eimplicity and coherence. 
Indeed such was its hold that the great sceptic Pomptmazzig a 
rationalist denied, tWt pe3?sonal iimoortality could be proved, 
mocked traditicn end doubted prayer, a^ovortheleec meeldLy accepted 
tlie traditional cosmology and Interloclced man's destiny %jlth the stars. 
(iKto, 1971, 13.314.)
It is easy to loolc doirm on astrology, but it did serve to build 
up a body of astronomjlcal observations. Actually astronomy and 
astrology were still largely inseparable. Even ^ dien astrology was 
attacked the reaoone are interesting. Hirandola had many arguments 
against astrology Imt liis key one was that God had given man the 
ability to ohooso his ovm destiny and could not therefore be bound to 
the storcl
Astronomy iJaa of course at the centre of the scientific 
reorientation when it came and was the area of scionoe to alter end 
refocus the worldview and world«^icture of men. Through the Middle 
Ages astronomy was linked with religion for the determiination of 
dates for feasts and services» end for arranging the ecclesiastical 
calendar# The system of Ptolemy was not rigid and had undergone 
many modlfioationa and was beginning to reach a crisis. In fact 
the time of Copernicus was one %fhen sometliing needed to be done about 
the stars, reform was necessary to got 3!3a8tor back into place# 'Bms 
Copernicus and davlus were oalled in by Rome to help sort out the 
mesa that the Julian oalendar was in.
"Perhaps this is the place to mention the oommon misunderstanding 
that in the Mddle A^s men belloved that the earth was flat. 
True this was held by a sixth-century Byzantine eccentric, 
whose entearkaining figures are often reproduced# Nevertheless, 
his opinion can be discounted# For the Middle Ages « as for 
our own »' it would be hard to say what illiterates thought rni 
the matter - if they thought at all - but educated medieval men 
assumed the earth to be a sphere#" (Singer 1962gp.175@)
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Alobm y. This was an ismoaytaat facet o f medleiml science
i.-.i^s==fc;£3R-*cy tiï=ms^ a5ïsn,y s a æ ^
and divides roomily into two camps# Th03:!e were the practical 
dleooveriec of the craftsmen wlio did not theories; and the acholare 
who theorised but remained i^ gnoraat of practical advanoee# The 
former were often marred by cl^ iarlataacg the latter were more in line 
ifith the rational encyclopaedists who believed In imlBtotle and tlie 
transumtation of base metals, but who were gid.te opposed, to the 
trickery mid euperstltlon of some of the praotionerBo Attempting 
some sozrk of synthesis Pewacelsus helped efface the border beWeen 
art and nature, seeing all artificial procedures as founded on 
natural tmea* He brcm#it the change from animal eplrlte to 
latroohemls'kry* a sense he was the first aoekic^ lG to tales the
alchemieta side. With supreme confidence In his oim theories he
ceremoniously .burned the works of Galen end. Avlcemia» but he was still 
caug^ it :In a aiystical world of Aristotelian elements under the 
;%nflumice of astrology#
The discipline (chemistry) tfos advanced os it emerged out of the 
monastriea into the towns with 'the decline of feudalism and the rise 
of the new middle classes* Its iit^ ortance largely lies in 'khe 
development of gimpoWer smd the improved techniques of distillation # 
Here, too, we have In Agricola the gpreat foundation work of modenm 
minerolo(.iy (1546) as he "kums, in his mining environment, from the 
mysteries of the secret formula to the e]Q>@rlmental and detailed 
recording of obeeivatlons*
But do8i)lte some emerganoe of alchemy into a more modem approach, 
there was at heart ateignation and superstltiœi# Thus the general
lemming of the time by-passes this work, caught as it was in 
mystical religions and menu^ activity. Alchemy was forbidden by 
a bull of Rope John XKII in 1317*
1.5*2# Medicine# The great ifoiics are late and "ktjo stand out above
«Æir-cii7^i4K*Æ^Ï,'tiiC;sSïTÆFrT4ff5rcSX^TJflTVî^
al,l others* Tliere is the marvellous of Vesalius cujxdnating 
in "De Fabrloa Ooz^oris Humsml'» published interesting].y enoug)i in 
1543» SKud the breakthrou^ of WillisfA Harvey who at lost 3?evesled the 
secret of the flow of the blood, seeing the heart as a pump* These 
"tv)o are ac'kually linked in a direct pupil-teacher relationship 
Vosaliuss FallopiuB: Fabricus» Harvey* (Pledge 1966» p#28*)
Vesalius" break'khrough in his carefhl dissecbions# Up till 
now this liad been left to some menial while the doctor lectured the
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students; the dleseotlon merely illustration of the received 
dootrlnes of Galen. Indeed Vesallus, desi^ ite his fmatmdoal 
advanoes and care in dissection; was caa^t in Galen's web, claiming 
the blood paased through the septum of thé heart al.though the 
evidence before him denied this. But Galen eald it* therefore it 
must. 80 by eeeing i^ Aat he looked for he missed the point of the 
valves in the veine, and ifihen blood waa seen to flow t M  r^rong way 
it was singly asserted that the incision had caused it to flee in the 
opposite direction lilce a 'frightened hen". But if medicine ifcs 
guilty of dieeecting merely to illustrate, the church was guilty of 
opposing diesection on the basis that it was the 'shedding of blood".
Harvey, in "3)e Mo'tu. Cordis' (1628) set medicine on the right 
path by seeing the importance of the heart as a pump tliough it would 
be many years before hin theory was accepted. But the ana].ogy was 
at hand at thj.8 time for pumps were %fell îmoim through the 
dependence of areas in England and the Rowlands on hydraulic 
engineering* (Pledge I966, p29#)
 mthodplogy. Ill terms of scientific teo3miipies this period
shows little advance over Greelt science. (Van de laan 1973» p*74#)
It sou^t explanations» with little recourse to experiment, in terms 
of the true forms or essences of an object aa%d its purpose*
Causality was described in terms of future goals, the striving for 
actuality out of potentiality. % e  system was teleologicalp the 
iiTorld rational in structure and to be unfolded by reason; and the 
method therefore deductive. Tliis was too rationalistic for science 
to flourish. The only experience referred to was that found in 
books and there was a multiplication of theories with no attempt to 
decide between alternatives* Experiment was not yet part of the 
scientific scene*
Several methods of inquiry %mre posited such as ücotus" method of 
agreement; Occam's method of diffesrence» and Grosseteste's method of 
f^sification. (loses 197&» oh*5.) Oooam's itazor shifted the 
simplicity seen in nature and placed it as a requiremoht on theories. 
Grosseteste (1175^1253)» Bishop of lincoln» %jaa the first to anola/B® 
the problem of induction and verification, seeing induction as the 
resolution of a problem into its ocmstitutive elements and deduction 
as the composition back to the original phenomena. He ifent on to 
evaluate alternative explanations, and ivlth Roger Bacon, posited a 
third stage of a further induction and testing*
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1.5*4. Teolmico]. Progress. The later Middle Ages (115CK"1348) ssuffy?'to»s.v5svvsi»«T*'>is»5siHs«R»Hf-t<d5tfcKii^ i6esuy.67mw.fl-ti/KatïiS?ti3ïiîMCSA"syiEtiLUiCïï£33=jC!S -- ** f
rapid oomrieiD lal e3g)am8lon and population gro^ fth. Teohnloal aa^ ts 
developed, ProrA %yi)t end I#eopotemla there wez^ e "books on raising 
irater» ifater I'Aieels, belanoes and %fater olooks. (Of, "Book of 
Artifices' giving 100 teohnioa^ . devices, many of them praotloal - 
G* 060 A.D. (Sjjager 1962» p.152.) ) The Teutonio Barbarian 
izivaaion of the oreslcing Roman Bnpiro brouj^t advaaoes in the 
Gultivatioai of crops g the use of the etiirup and the heevy wheeled 
plou^. A further agrioulturel revolution in Lombardy in tlie 
1470"c saw cattle being kept alive throu^^ the winter, and the use 
of mmmre to improve orops. Again we have the new windmill designs; 
from China came tlio process of paper-making; the discoveries of the 
skempost and bowsprit and the development of astronomy for 
navigation. At a seemingly mundane level the invention of
spectacles was probably more signlfioant then we tend to think.
These technical innovations were oftmi on a i-d^de scale and 
generally associated with the religious life of the community. Lilce 
theoretical thou^t It was was boimd up in the religious outlook of 
the age. The guilds were often "pledged to the communal 
performances of religious duties." (Armytage 1970» p.50.) It 
has been estimated that the money spent on cathedrals in France 
betvToen 1170 and 1270 was the equivalent of 1,000 million dollars. 
(Mason 19629 p.106.)
Printing was a kf^ y facet in the Renaissance of learning. But 
the first instance it had little impact on scientific thou^t.
The first works to be printed were the Bible and the reooveaxad 
classics. Tims printing aided the Reformation more than it did
science* Even iiihere it impinged on science it would be in the 
printing of some classic teirk» so spreading errors and slowing 
8 peculation.
There was the fact of technical progrsss» » but it was not a 
general or correlated progress» but rather the jaolated breakthrough 
on many fronts with no uniflca,tion. Graftsman and scholar were 
divorced (of. 13#2#1.) The crafts and the academic world wore still 
apart and A.R.Mall (1959» p.80.) suggests a tiaie lag of some 250 years 
befo]?e science ceugîit up with the developments and problems raised 
by the crafts in this period.
It must be noted that the biblical view of man as it gained
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InfluenoG through the Reformation elevated the standing of the orafts 
and technologlool iiuiovations hy raising the status of the mamiol and 
the menial. But for most of the aoholastios there was; a clear 
divorce of nature and grace, coupled to a ratlonalistic epirit*
1.5#5* The Boholaetic Influence*
"The 8ituatj.on heeame quite different wlien the dialectical 
ground"motive of nature and grace made its entry into 
Ohrietian schola^tloiem* 'fhie occured in the period of 
Aristotelian Renoieeance, in which, after a hitter struggle » 
the AugUBtinian '» Platonic school was puGhed out of the 
dominating position that it had hitherto enjoyed.*..* The 
ttfo fundamental tenets of this system were the positing of 
the autonomy of natural reanon in the entire sphere of 
natural knowledge, and the thesis that nature is the 
underetructure of aupematural ^ace*"
(Dooyeweerd 1969, Tol#I p*179*)
For tïie church @%id hence for lesocning in general this wa8 of 
cn%cia3. forming power* With a twofold authority in reaaon and 
revelation the BcholasticB split into aohools of nomixialism and 
realiem. NominaliBtB held that all unlversals were hut names 
rather than real!ties, and that only a particular Individual object 
or event had reeility* Realists» derived from l^ lato, held the 
reverse*
In this setting we can thinlc of Thomas AguinaSg Occam and Jean 
Buridan* Aquinas held to a Christicmised Aristotelianism, to one 
finite universe witïi a hase motionless earth at centre with the 
celestial spheres arrmiged according to degrees of jjioreasing 
perfection and kept moving by angelic power* Occam revived the 
impetus theory of Philoponos that an arrow could fly a vaci%um 
and ad.vooat@d the nominalist idea of unlversa].s* Buridan advocated 
the alternative irf^ otus theory of Aristotle, where air rusMd round 
from front to back to push the arrow along, pointing out that it 
avoided the need for the angelic motive power in the heavens* This 
was the beginning of the end for the heavenly propelling agents*
Nicolas Oresme (c*1362 f*)» Bishop of IilBleux, advocated a moving 
earth and dropped the difference between the heavenly and 
terrestrial motions ™ an. Ijnportant step, for following Aristotle the 
earth and heavena were seen as two separate organisationa ifith their 
oim laifs* As well as reviving the idea that the eearkh revolved 
daily OÏ1 its aaciB» he re^wesented velocity grapMoally and set forth 
for the first time the rule for uniforaRi acceleration* He saif
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Bolenoe dealia^ only with probabilities and not oertaintioB aa 
nn&eratanâing depends on the seneea and these are not exhanative 
and cannot penetrate the immaterial* Thus he oonoerned himself 
with savin# the appearances and gives delightful expression to'the 
concept of pre-abstraotive thought (of«21*1.4«) (Rosa & Mchaughlln 
1972, 9.58^.)
Nicolas of Ousa (1401*64), Bishop of Brixen* marks* according to 
Singe# (1962, p*178.) the passage from scholasticism to science*
He saw that measurement implied discreteness and atomicity; held that 
the earth rotated due to an initial impetus; and that the heavens 
were not more perfect than the earth# As with Oresme, God was the 
centre of alls
"Except for God* one would not know how to find precise 
equidistance to diverse points* because Ee alone is 
infinite equality# Thus He who is the centre of the 
universeg namely God whose name is blessedg He is the 
centre of the earth and of all the spheres* and of 
everything in the universe*" ( In Boss & Molaughlin 
•J972, P.585»)
This of course utilised different spatial concepts from ours* like 
Oresme again* he writes (of* 19e7*2« and 21#1#4*)8
"And for this reason if someone finds himself on earth* in 
the sun* or another star* it will always seem to him that he 
is at the immobile centre and that all the other things are 
in motion.*oo*HenGG the machine of the universe has* so to 
apeakp its centre everywhere and its circumference nowhere 
because God is circumference and centre* He who is everywhere 
and nowhere." (In Hoss & McLaughlin 1972, 9*586,587#)
Thus for both these men scientific speculation was seen as 
profitable for the defence of the faith# But they .were still 
children of their time struggling within the variations possible 
within the Greek world^picture# The point of critlc&lity bad not 
yet been reached as far da the scientific reorientation was concerned#
1*6. THÜ IMPACT 0^ THE EB&AISSAHOB
This long period of history ends with a number of quite separate 
revivals# There was a, revival of leaming from the 18th century 
culminating in the work of Thomas Aquinas; there was the artl&tio 
revival of the 15th century onwards* commonly called The Renaissance; 
and there was the revival of religion in the Reformation, It is 
my contention that neither of the first two aided science as 
positively as the latter* though I note the move to read into the 
Renaissance the origins of the scientific revolutlono (Of« Kline
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1954a p.IBf.g Butterfield 1975/a, a#& Butterfield 1975/b p*vii,)
But 18 this attempt to elevate the soientifio achievements of 
the Renaissance justified? Certainly the artists left medical 
orthodoxy far behind in their penetrating anatomical studies (e«g# 
the dissection work of Leonardo)* but even here they did not 
establish or lead forward the science of anatomy# Their interest 
was artlstiOe not medical* and without medical interest as a primary 
concern there could be no advance# This I believe is generally 
true; science was brought in (especially geometry and mathematics as 
tools in perspective) but merely as tools to an end* There was:no 
committment to mathematics as mathematics, to unfold the secrets of 
the scientific disciplines.
The first renaissance of letters was mixed with occultism, magic 
and mysticism and evinced little sympathy at a general level for 
science, The second renaissance was primarily of art, not science. 
It had a scientific influence in the study of nature, anatomy* optics 
and mathematics, but led ultimately to little In the way of a 
scientific revolution* Again this Renaissance did little to stop 
the rot in the universities, an indication that the head and the 
hand were still separate (Kilsel 1975* p*94*)o This was the 
continuing problem for science and in a way the decisive and 
destructive separation in the history of science# !Ehus while the 
artist went some way to bringing head and hand together he still 
stood either in the stream of craftsmanship or of abstract thought# 
Alberti, the brilliant architect* showed disdain for the manual, 
noting tbats "the manual operator being no more than an instrument 
to the architect," (in Ross & McLaughlin 1972, p#528«) However 
the artist was generally a craftsman toiling in his workshop; 
essentially a "technician*. (Butterfield 1975/b$ p*38#)
Leonardo da Vinci (1452*1519) was the outstanding figur@a Hù 
saw the future of the flying machine, the helicopter, the parachute, 
the nature of flight, the parabolic compass, and the vertebrate 
skeleton# In his jottings there are tanks, submarines, looms, 
link chains, gears, screw^cutting machines* cranes, breach^loading 
and steam cannons, But this was engineering and not science#
He attacked the astrologers, maintaining that practice must be based 
on sound theory and iheld mathematics and mechanics in high esteem#
He even jumped forward to the concepts of Hewton*8 first and second 
laws, but as Pledge notess "without mathematicse he failed to develop
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them," (19669 p.15e) Like Alberti he denigrated the manual*
and poured scorn on the 'sweaty sculptor". Tkuo despite hie praise 
of experience* he failed to reconcile the varloue strands of thought 
In a unified picture, Though* to be fair, we must remember that 
for Leonardo "science* and "art* were distinctions he could not make. 
(Gombzich 1971s p.62»)
The RenalseanGe provided no scientific reorientation but merely 
continued within the Greek legacy. Therewae no new acientiflo 
concepts let loose* nor any general fundamental change of attitude 
within the scientific arena* The division of thought and craft* 
though partly overcome* remained strongs the theory of science a 
mixture of Greek thought.
1.7. j w i m
conclusions can be drawn? The scientific reorientation 
still lies in the future and Arlstotleg Ptolemy and Plato still reign 
supreme. But the hold they exercised was beginning to disintegrate 
under the pressure of time and change* Mew theories and methods 
were beginning to appear; the scientific view was changing from an 
examination of the ingredients of the universe to a quest to 
understand how it worked; spirits and potentialities were being 
replaced by corpuscles and attractions* though it must be noted with 
about as much scientific justification for the one as for tho other.
The method of experimentation may have been advocated by some but it 
was certainly '&ot implemented even by them in any rigorous way.
If the materials of modem science are to be found in the Greeks* 
then the vitamins are going to be found in the biblical tradition*
As yet the two have not come together* Thus the change from 
medieval to modem science is abrupt more in practice than in theory; 
more in worldview than world-picture; the methods were known but not 
used because of various cultural and religious judgements* The hold 
of Aristotle had to be overthrown rather than faLse cosmologies "per se"* 
and Italy* the home of the Renaissance* was especially loyal to 
Aristotle. (Of. Randall 1975* P*51f*)
It seems to me. that for the origins of modem science we have to 
look for the fusion of two quite separate traditions ™ the scholar 
end the craftsman within some suitable unitary worldview* This 
only could, and did* happen when the philosophical revolution had 
provided a framework in which it could occur. (Hall 1959* p.7&*81»)
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It was not just a simple matter of ozaft and theory coming together* 
there had to be fertile ground for any fruitful union, Thus a 
:new method of inquiry had to be linked with an intellectual 
transformation that would provide a new way of looking at the world. 
Mew woridmplotures and theories were In a void lùntil the general 
advent of a new worldview* A conceptual revolution was needed to 
break down the barriers between the two ingredients of "skill" and 
"concept"* There must be no doubt about the reality of the gulf 
that existed between these two areas; a deep dichotomy that had to 
be resolved before modem science could flourish; a separation of 
craftsman and scholar that was social* intellectual* teleologies! 
and educational, The first steps In this conceptual change were 
however beginning to break over Western Europee There was the 
beginning of the disintegration of the Greek traditions; the break 
from Galenic anatomy; the needed reform of the calendar indicating 
sericua faults in Ptolemy*8 system; and the ever present biblical 
view^ which after 1500 years of Ghristendomg was about to break with 
the Greek motive of form^matter and Its Christianised variation of 
graoe^nature *
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Gumi'm
THE RISE OF MODEBM SCIENCE
The scientific reorientation giving birth to modem science la 
the so-called "Copemlcan Revolution" @  ^ One of the 
considerations of thle study is the gueetion why such a 'revolution* 
took place at thle particular time and culture*
^The First Scientific Revolutlon*e*o,l8 also associated*.**, 
with the events of the time* It is a peculiarly 
European movement thoughp of course, it has now spread all 
over the world* One of the great historical problems, 
which has not yet been solved and may not yet be 
susceptible to solution, is  to find  out why this 
Revolution happened when and where it did.^
(Bemal 1973,'p.132.)
8
#5Ssta»K5=tSn n * J % @ _ W aa&jgSSËLS È a m m .  ®®£e ha?@ been many proposed 
solutions to this problem* Some see the key resting in the
individual genius of men like Leonardo, Copernicus and Galileo; others
point to a cru c ia l, but In ev itab le , moment In the evolutionary 
character of science; others emphasise the social and cultural 
background, (a) Koyre emphasises the scientific charisma of Galileo; 
(b) Santillana sees the importance of a new concept of space stemming' 
from the Renaissance artists; (c) Weberp Merton, Reid; Hdokyaas and
Oppenhelmer point to the influence of the Reformation; (d) Marxistsg
not unnaturally* point to the importance of the economic sub«8truoture; 
(@) while Koestler sees it as much an accident as anything else*
Some combination of these may be more convincing* and the above named 
combine secondary facets to their main emphasis*
Many commentators (e.g, (b)*(c)*(d) above) stress the importance 
of a conceptual change underlying the scientific theories* A*R*
H all notes that the scientific 'revolution® involved "the direct 
consequences of a philosophic revolution," (1959D p*76«) It not 
simply a matter of new theories and observations (Oopemlcus was new 
in neither)* but new perspectives* (Of* Butterfield 1975/b* po1«)
«sve;îr4:ïS=»toi‘tttcti:f3sr.7iwiM5i«»sasim-s»
1, In focusing on Copernicus I am well aware of the thesis of C* Raven 
(l955o p*7*) who argues that the history of science is not to be 
reduced to "a papal successlorn* Copernicus * Kepler* Galileo* Newtons*"
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Of course without new theories and data science could not develop*
80 the refinement of observation under Tycho Brahe was a key factor 
in driving Kepler on to his suggestion of ellipses » the crucial 
break f%om Aristotelian circles. But ae Butterfield pointe out* 
observations are not enough* (l973/b* p.4*)
This great reorientation of thought occurred only once* and it 
did 80 in a period of general cultural change# Culturally many 
faceta were involved in the new conceptual perspectives. (i)With 
the break from feudalism* society was fuming to a more rationally 
orientated life-style# (ii) There was the emergence of a 
quantitative approach* a "counting end calculating spirit" (Zllsel 
1975p #*#8b) typified by the first literary exposition af double-entry 
book-keeping in 1498# (iii) In a period of exploration and rising 
commercial Interests* the spirit of individual enterprise came to the 
fore* (&v) The rise of urban populations aided the development of 
technological inventions* such as the telescope and microscope.
Change was cultural * p o litic a l and religious as w ell as 
scientific. The rise of capitalism has been noted as a key feature. 
(Of. Bernal 1954* p#545f*) But a problem is encountered here for 
capitalism was based on free labour and the absence of elaves* yets
"In China* slave labour was not predominant* and money 
economy had existed since about 500 B.C. Also there were 
in China* on the one hand* highly skilled artisans and* on 
the other* scholar-offioials* approximately corresponding 
to the European humanists. Yet causal* experimental* and 
quantitative science not bound to authorities did not arise.
^hy this did not happen is as little explained as why 
capitalism did not develope in China." (Zilsel 1975* P*99«)
Clearly social conditions alone are not sufficient to explain the
Pscientific revolution. ' Similarly* to claim the origins of this 
reorientation in men of genius is inadequate for as Bernal* writing 
of India and China* notess "These areas had an abundance of extremely 
clever men* men of genius* and yet they did not make this particular 
step." (Bemal 19759 p*152.) It seems to me that the critical 
factor is the religious-philosophical perspective engendered in a 
culture - though this can never ^ be seen in isolation from social 
conditions or Intellectual leaders.
2. The label 'revolution* is one I dislike as it seems to carry 
connotations of 1789# There was no absolute switch in the I6th or 
17th centuries from old ways and methods to new. While some may 
contend that the new methodology in physics and astronomy can be seen 
as of general significance* science is not reducible to method#
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:sBVoluUm laîdoubteaiy 
started 1# the heavens and the field of physics* Chemistry* 
biology and other disciplinea were later in experiencing their own 
modem reorientationo The shift in physics and astronomy can be 
broken down into stages. (&) An early period of preparation up to 
Kepler where the old system of Ptolemy was found wanting* (b) a period 
from Kepler to Galileo which saw the impact of the Renaissance and 
Reformation at a general level of cultural life; and (c) from here up 
to the Newtonian formulation which, would last substantially for many 
yeors& There is no one critical figure or moment.
Observational astronomy began to revive in the 15th century under 
the stimulus of navigational needs and calendar reform* Among the 
precursors of Copernicus were George Furbach (1425*61) and Johannes 
Muller (1456=76)* Muller was the first to correct observations for 
atmospheric refraction and use mechanical clocks in connection with 
astronomy* His work was continued by Walther and Buror. Thus 
renewed observations and planetary tables were made prior to Copernicus 
who curiously tended to rely on the older observations of Ptolemy*
Of pressing need was the reform of the Julian calendar* The 
Egyptians, using the 'gnomon* (a, primitive device for measuring sun 
angles), had arrived at the length of year as 360 days, corrected to 
365 days = the five extra days being holy^days* However 365 days 
T#ne still too short and Julius Caesar reformed the calendar with 
astronomical advisers to 365& days# The Julian calendar was used 
from 45 B.C. right up to the time of Copernicus* By this time, 
however, problems had arisen for the seasonal year is 11* 14" shorter 
than 365& daysg which meant that the equinoxes were about ten days 
adrift. The call for reform was not simply a technical concern — 
Easter had slipped out of place and the need for reform was 
theological as well as scientific. Copernicus was called in by 
Rome but declared that the whole of astronomy needed reformed first. 
When the calendar was in foot reformed in 1582 (the Gregorian) it 
used the work of Copernicus in its calculations.
Two factors unite and separate at this point* namely astronomy 
0nd cosmology. Kuhn (1957* po103o) sees a bifurcation at Alexandria 
of these two into different strands of thought, while in the older 
Hellenic tradition they were held together. For the .Hellenics*
astronomy had to be true to the perceived cosmology; while for the 
Rellenistics this was not necessarily so and astronomy could be seen
as a mathematical device for saving appearances* a tool for 
calculation*
But observatione, on which astronomy are baaed* do not of 
thomselVBB give cosmologies. There is a conceptual etep between 
dbservatione and fitting them into a cosmological framework.
'SPSFiês. ËsmM-s. l«s t«
what happened at the time of Copernicus* for in terms of accuracy and 
prediction his system had little to offer over Ptolemy*
&,.l,A,1a.asoS§$lW.. % e  teadj-tional ooaoeptoaj. feastieworic prt the 
earth at the centre for various reasons# Aristotle's theory 
of motion necessitated a central earth, as did his basic division into 
terrestrial and celestial arenas; and the theory of a full universe 
also required an earth-centred finite system* The pri(iitive concept 
of space f^hioh smf it as up/down* east/west* also tended to put the 
earth at the centre* as does modem pre-theoretlcal thought wliich 
stands in opposition to the NoTfftonian concept of space as isatropio 
and homogeneous. Again there was the animlstio vleif of reality 
quite forel^ to a miodem adult thou^ found in primitives and young 
children* Finally in terms of tlieorys it firmly held that the 
stars influenced the life of men — hence the widespread practice of 
aatrology — and this became meaningless with the earth displaced from 
the centre. Interestinglyg Gppemicus appears to be one of the feif 
astronomers not to cast horoscopes.
Observational. Prom the vietmoint of common-senso 
observations it was obvious tliat the earbh did not move. It was 
clear that the earth was big and heavy, and therefore if rotated imuld 
tend to fly outwards to pieces as do large rotating objects on earth* 
Or if sometliing was dropped from a hi^ tower, the totyer would rotate 
aifsy from the object and leave it trailing westt/ards. (Of. Kuhn 1975: 
p.43#) Osn a more technical level there was the absence of parallax. 
If the earth moves, there should be a different view of the universe 
from the extremes of its orbit* But no change in the an(#e of the 
fixed stars was capab].e of being observed. The only out of this 
ifus to put the stars a long way away and this involved distances 
beyond the coinprehension of those early scientists. Parallax was 
not in fact dlscoveazed until 1838. Thus from the point of view of
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Gommon-sense and teohnloal astronomy* the earth ooneldered at rest*
There wae possibly some transference of 
thought from the earth being theologioally important as the home of 
the Inoamation to the pliyeioal realm. Thie, coupled with the 
Aristotelian outlook prior to Copemieua* created a powerful 
metaphysical perapeotive that militated against new theories* But
this aspect is often over-emphaalBeà.
2*1#4# The Ancient Theories# The ancient theories are not to be 
denigrated for they ifere perfectly reasonable to those who held them# 
(Of# Khhn 1957: P«5#) Of the basic ingredients eun, moon, fixed 
stars and planets - the planets were the real problem# The planets 
(derived from a Greek ^ jord for wanderer) poesess a westward diumal 
motion with the stare, also moving east through them until they return 
approximately to their original position# They also stay near the 
@].iptio - the apparent path of the sun in its annular motion through 
the eky# 91i@ir irregurality vrac noted early se 1$00 B#G# in 
Mesopotamia ifhere the appearance and dieapi^ earanoe of Venue wae 
recorded# The Maio problem was the apparent retrogression of the 
planets which interrupted the desired uniform circular motion that 
they were thou^t to possess# 'The endeavour to colve this led to 
the complicated epicycles, exoentrios end eguents of Ptolemy*
2*1#4*1» The Two«8phere IMlverse# This rested on the idea of an 
internal sphere of the earth for men, and an external sphere for the 
Gtars# Ite origins are gbscure but probably stem from the domed 
conceptions of the eky coming f^om the Egyptians and Ziabylonlans, plus 
the Pythagorean emphasie on circularity. Outside the sphere of the 
etars there was nothing no space or matter — while between the two 
spheres ijere the various secondary spheres (or paths) of the planets#
Aa this syctem developed it was able to explain and predict inqportant 
celestial phenomenon such os eclipses# Mor le it to be thou^t that 
thic la merely of historical interest for this la still the perspective 
used in navigation and surveying# (Cf# IWm 1957: P*57»)
One of the earliest attempts to derive an explanation of uniform 
and ordered movements among the planets was by Eudoxus (c# 408 — 355 
B.Go), a ptipil of Plato. lie placed each planet on the inner sphere 
of a group of two or more interconnected and concentric sphereo.
These spheres rotated simultaneously on different axis and gave the 
observed motion of a planet# This was soon abandoned, but the
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iioportmiGe of Eudoxus goes beyond his aotual theory, for his 
homooentrio spheres beoame a key footer in the development of 
oosmologioal thought* The reason being that hie eystem was prcmiinent 
during the lifetime of Aristotle.
Aristotle held to a motionless spherieal earth at the oentre of a 
finite universe, He divided motion into two roaln^ and two types. 
There was the break between terrestrial motion (up/do^m in rootilinear 
form) and celestial motion (uniformly oiroular). On earth motion 
oould be natural (the flame going up, the stone doim) or unnatural 
(the fli^t of an arrow). The heavens, on the other hand, were 
divine and unohaaiging, consisting not of the four elements of earth 
but one, t W  aether or quintessence.
By the end of the Middle Ages this view was seen to fall to 
aocoimt for planetary irregularities and the varying distances of the 
planets from the earth. It was further under attack from the dmrch 
for its teaohing that an aspeot of creation was eternal and 
unchanging* Nevertheless belief in the difference of celestial and 
terrestrial composition was not fully abandoned until spectroscopy 
developed in the 19th oentury.
There were several alternatives to this in Greek thought, and It 
was the recovery of tlie ancient texts setting these out that helped 
stimulate the search for a new end better theory, By Gopomicus ' 
time it ims no longer a matter of Aristotle and Ptolemy; now there 
were the theories of Philolaus* Eeraclldesp Aristarchus and the atomlsts, 
The atomists did not hold to the earth as the centre and am; no 
uniqueness!) rest or centre anywhere for all Idas a flux of changing 
atoms in an Infinite universe; with Philolaus the earth revolved 
round a central fire; ^raclides suggested that Mercury end Venus 
circled the sung while Aristarchus had posited the idea of a greatly 
increased universe in which the earth travelled round the sun in a 
circle* Apdlonius and Hipparchus suggested the use of deferents 
and epicycles to e](plain the motion of the planets with respect to the 
stars. But most of these ideas were rejected (of,2,1#3»)
2,1 *4#2* Ptolenur* Ptolemy did in fact consider a moving earth but 
rejected it as inadequate because it did not square iflth Aristotle or 
reason. Thus he utilised epicycles and excentrios aa previously 
posited* and added the equant. The epicycles kept Mercury and Venus 
close to the sun and provided the necessary mechanism for loops of 
retrogression. The excentric helped to explain the varying bri^itness
of planets (l.@* disteaoe fTkaa eartii)» The equmit prevMod foe an 
apparmkt variation, ia  the speed o f the aim which rotainad tmifoaaa 
angular velocity aJbout #%} eqiumt poMt. Hlo aohlevemont was 
sign ifioant mad hie 'Almagest' was the f lr a t  systomatlo mathematloal 
work to "give a omW.etOg Aetgll^ smd aoGoimt of all
the o e lee tia l motima*" (K#W 1957# p«72o) Bat as time passed» as 
eployole was added to epioyole» exceatrlo to oxoaatrio» the t&iole 
system beoamo ovezM3o%%lic@ted* The eadoavoor to  get preolee 'f i t *  
tms deetroylns the sim plicity md hoaaty the heavems were held to  
poasesa# Indeed by keoplmg adding on and aeearMmging the sises of 
the above devioos» v irtu a lly  any motion om% be explttiaed*
Boam Ih Polmd» Gopgssaileus a student at Cracmf» Bologxmp
Ferrara mid Fadua» end tliereafter oaaon at irauenberg till hie death*
A typloal rmaissmoe aoholar iflth interests la ooonomii^g medloiee» 
maWiomatioe» law» politics m d  the ohsroh» as well as astaxmany» he 
was influenced at GBaeow by Drsdsewskl (a critic of Ptolemy) aad at 
Bologoa by Pomaalco Mowaro (pKofeaaor of matWmatlOG and astrmmy)* 
Novaro wros a Eythagoreen la his belief in the simplioity and hmamony 
of %0 universe* and critical of Ptolemyg ho (mcom%@8d Gopemioos to 
study the olassios and note the alteamotives to the standard dootaKhie 
of Ptolemyg probably taught him techniques of observation# ami 
encoaragad him in a resargant neo-Platonism» Bospite this apparently 
critical bs&okgrcand mi Ptolegqr» Gopeznlcus became rocogniaed aa m e  of 
the great men of cmtronomy with an unrivalled gmsp of Ptdmioio 
doctrine# His intorost in this field being linihed with navigation *» 
a main stimihig for as'trmomy# 80 he was faaoas quite epaet frm
'3)0 Bovolntionibas* whio3i ims pablisWd as 3% lay dying in 1543#
His emethpŒoving views had been held for many years pawviously and he 
had oircnlated m m g  friends a short version of his theories in about 
1530 3iis '(kmoenteriolns ' # %)is was followed 3n 1540 by the 
%a3RBatio Priam' of Rheticus* a protestent fBŒ@ Wittenberg*
he mts deeply dissatisfied with ftolemy# bat tM@ is not to be 
omstamod as dissatisfaction with #%G past ganamlly* Those was no 
"wild apirit of rebellim#" (Tmlmln & Goodfield 1961* p«164«>)
Ihdeed he had great rsvoranoe for the past* quoting 3!ythagoms» 
Hipparchus, j^ildans and Hw%clides in M s  defence# (Gf# G#3mssell 
197^0'» p#41*) he saw the inaocmxicies of Mole*f%r roflectod in the
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calendar; regarded him as poaltiog oplcyolee and exoentrlcs that upset
the homooentriGl"^ of Aristotle; as being too ocmplloatedg positing a
separate aoheme for eaoh planet; and as rejeotjijog the premise of
%
imlfozm olreular motion about the earth in the equant# To this irms 
added the problemg of tlie recent dlsoovery by Oolnmbne of the New 
Worldo lAloh atruok a blow at Ptolesiy's geograpl^ rg and of 'preoeaelon' 
lihioh tms extremely dlffioiilt to explain on a static earth# Hence 
the factors Involved wre aetrcmomloal (preGeaelon)^ social {GolnrAbna)^  
and aesthetic (eongilexlty)^  going far beyond a mere evolutlmary step 
within a solentlflo discipline, But despite hie dlssatisfaction 
with Ptolemy* Oopemious faithfully adhered to his observations#
Ptolemy's star catalogues le^ r before him as he worlced and if Ptolemy 
mered on some point the chances were that Gopemicus too would err*
Wethoaology of Oopt-aaiieus Is Jaterestiag 
for he failed to adopt sn experimental approach* and where he did 
enter the field of ob8ervatlo%i=maklng was not very accurate# Gillespie
(1967: p*22*) notes that he "studied the figures not the stars*"
Singer (1962* p*212*) comments that he was "not at all active as a 
practical astronamer#" His results '&rere attained in his study and 
involved a rearrangement of the PtolemalG data* a slmffllng of his 
system* and a search for a better point 'to hold' familiar to anyone 
who has ever worlced with problems of eplcycllo gearing* Indeed he 
used the methods end the 'facts' of Ptolemy to such an extent that 
Kepler could accuse him of Interpreting Ptolemy* not nature# The
method of Oopemioi^ was based on economy * better* mathematics* and 
symmetry — typical ]E^hagorean characteristics#
At root* however* his method end motivation were governed by his 
metaphysical outlook «= an outlook that fitted his cultural milieu* 
"Gqpemicus ims doubtless w(m over to the new point of view by its 
greater symmetry end coherence* These virtues wcu3.d appeal to one 
Imbued ird,th Neo-Pytliagorean ideas#" (ifolf 1965@ P*187«) He clung 
tenaciously to the Platonlc-Pythagorean notion that immobility was a 
nobler thing than movement* and that the sphere was tlie perfect shape* 
confidently writing that:
"First of all we assert that the universe is spherical g partly 
because this form* being a complete whole* needing no joints* 
is the most perPeot of all»" ( In Hurd & Kipling 1964: Vol.l p*99«)
3* For a discussion of whether Oopeamious was atfmre of Aristarchus' 
heliocentric theory of# OoRussell (1972/a* P#45 sxid Hoolqraas 1974: P*63#)
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This fits Into the neo^Platonlo tradition tjhioh was to reaoh Its 
height in the %foz?k of Kepler. The o<mtrallty gmd Importance of the 
Sim in this scheme of thoizght bad various aspects that would liave 
suggested themselves to Gopemious. "There were good Henalssenoe 
reasons* emotional rather than Intelleotual reasons* that made hiaii 
ohoqse the gold^m sun as the other plaoo#" (Bronowski 1975@ P*196,} 
Note here his association with Italy where the sun was a centre of 
thought at that time* tying in ifith renaissance art and literature* 
Thus it is not sur%*rl8ing to find Gopemicus liziting in poetic imagerys
®'In the middle of all sits sim enthroned...*,He is ri^tly 
oalltÿd the Lamp* the Mindg the Ruler of the ijhiverse... 
the Sun sits as upon a royal throne amling his children 
the planets irAiich circle round him.®' (in IWm 1957» p*179«)
2._2.2*_ms_2memy. What then were his reasons for transposing m m  
and earth? To start withs m u 4 . %
centre of the imlvorse# Certainly the earth moved in a circle 
round the sun* but the sun was not the centre of that clrolG.
While the sun ims given the central role* the 'true' centre became 
the centre of the earth's orbit. Remember that he did not deduce 
from observations the centrality of the sun; rather he shifted 
(a priori) the centrality of the earth to the sun and then modified 
this to fit the observations ho Imd. The if&ole exercise being an 
attendit to get back to a truer uniformly circular motion# Thus 
the reason for the transposition was aesthetic raWier than pragmatic* 
a matter of personal predilection* of taste.
This allegiance to the received doctrine of the necessity of 
circular motion has to be bome in mind when assessing Gopemicus#
]&yom Book III* chapter four* of the original manuscript* the 
following quotation was later omitted# (From Koestler 1970: p#218.)
"It should be noticed* by the way* tliat if the two circles 
have different diameters* other conditions remaining 
unchanged* then the resulting movement will not be a 
strai^t line but##..what mathematicians call an ellipse#®®
Actually it was not an ellipse but a cycloid@ but the point is that
he rejected it as it did not conform to Aristotelian motion#
bhat* then* of his system? Its basic thrust was to impart a
threefold motion to the earth. Be gave the earth a diumal axial
rotation* a daily spin on its axis; an annular orbital motion round 
the sung and an annular conical motion of its own axis* a gyration# 
TW.S enabled Copernicus to develop a model of the heavens in which he
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could dispense with Ptolemy's eqaaat#
Hoi'îever his system is more complex thma It seems fcxr he had to 
Introduee minor eployoleo to provide aoeuaTacy and greatly inorease 
the slKo of the He still imed excea&ta^ es and assimed
the universe finite* terminating in the sphere of the fixed stare#
It ±8 fair to say that hia slmplioity la "more apparent timn rea!#®® 
(singer 1962» po214o) Els system I'jas not regemiod aa basically 
new and was oalled 'Pythagorean' or 'Arietarchan^  by hio 
Gontemporariee# (Cf* jWm 1957: p*169*) The simple fact was 
tlmt his
generations made It out to he, a feature noted by oountleas
Kcs^ trsK> fS-cra tSiST» <%= tcae» Kca «Udl» eüï»- c&iw*'' ^
hietorlGns of aeienoe#
This is where it is neoeesary to distinguish hettzeen the' 
Oopemioan theory and the Gopemioan system. The theory which 
placed the eartli into oa^it round a fixed point (not the sun) was 
taken up and i-mo of dramatic oonsequenoe for aoie&ioe even if it had 
been arrived at for purely metaphyBloal reaaono. M e  system Itself 
was a patolied up Ptolemaio ploture Wiich sou^t to reoover tlie 
pristine purity of Aristotelian metaphyalos via the aid of 
Pythagoras and the resurgent neo^ P^latonlsm#
The title of his hook 'Be Revolutionihus Orbium Goelestlum Lihri 
Sex' (The Eevolutlon of the Spheres) ie interesting for it implies 
spheres in wMoti the planets and a tara are imbedded ^ rather than free 
movement tîirough empty space# Gopemicug viewed the tradition as 
having hecome 'monstrous' and aet out to improve it, But lAiat was 
he Improving? It Tjas not the philosophy or oosmologioal framework 
— these he accepted = hut the mathematice that lisd become 'monstrcme'* 
and it was tliie 'khat 3ze set out to reform# As ]Wm notes s "it was 
the reform of imthematieal astronomy that alone compelled him to move 
the earth#" (1957» p.142,)
IWioe the purpose of 'Be Revolutionibus' is open to debate.
There was the difference between the phi].o8op}%ical and matWmatioal 
approaches 8 the first ccmtemplated the 'phyeiG'» the true nature of 
things; idaile the 'art' of astronomy concerned itself with hypotheses 
that worked* Oeiander* in his preface* folloirfed the mathematical 
approach* but Gopemicua seems to be looking for a phyoical reality. 
But it waa a physical reality that would not infringe Pythagoras and 
concentrated tm aaving the appearanoeB, (Gf* Mason 1962* p#126@) 
Astronomy had returned from Ale^ candria to Athene i
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"The superiority of the Gopemiomi system * therefore* was 
conceptual rather than aotuol#®® (Gillespie 1967» p*25#) Only 
future adaptation end improvement involving a total hreaJc with 
Aristotle and Ptolemy would vindioate the sim^ cesitred imlverse.
There were in the final anal.yBi8 some advantages over Ptolemy in 
that the periods of revolution of the planets followed the same 
order as their distances from the oentre ™ the bigger the circle the 
longer the year» Among other plus marks were the more natural 
explanation of idiy the sun and moon never reverse dlreotion along 
the Bo&'laG* and a more rational use of epicycles# 33ut he failed 
to eee the importance in his theory of the fact that in it the planes 
of @11 the $0.anet@ry orbits pass Wirou^ the centre of the sun w 
perhaps its greatest advantage# Kepler was left to discover this# 
The whole enterprise highli^ted the basic problem of tdiat in fact 
moved the earth and planets* and Gopemicus gave no answer*
Was there a 'revolution ' ? Was Gopemicus the last in the 
Ptolemaic line or the first of the modems? It Is not an easy 
question to answer* and historians have argued both ways* but on 
balance I thihic Gopemicus can only be understood In the tradition 
of Ptolemy. To treat him as a modezn leaves him open to savage* 
and valid* criticism on the basis of his lack of observation and 
blind acceptance of traditional doctrines# PesAmps a handy way to 
view him may be as IWm suggests & to see him on the comer from the 
old to the new by virtue of the fact that if he did not* in hzls 
system* revolutionise astronomical thou^t* then nevertheless as the 
sun-centred universe developed* climaxing in Neifrbon» a new framoTrmrk 
of thought was instituted# Toulmin and Gcodfield (I96I) pointedly 
deal with him in a chapter entitled 'Interregnum'# Butterfield 
comments that 3 "He closes an old epodi much more clearly than he 
opens any neirf one#®® (l975/b* p#52#) Hookyaas writess "The 
Gopemloan 'Revolution' was no revolution." (1974» p«58#) Only a 
few such as Gillespie tend to treat him as a true revolutionary* 
claiming that "his ideas had to swim upstream agaimst the tide of 
common sense.®' (1967» p#19«) Tills may be true* but it does not 
make him revolutionary!, for as Gillespie himself notes s
®'It was not by eliminating epicycles that he thought to 
simplify and ratimalisG the prooedures of astronomy; rather* 
it was by discerning the structure of things wMch befits 
the foundation of order# That foundation was the circle * 
the perfect figure# And it is the principle of circularity 
rather than of economy which conveys the im-mrdness of his 
vision of the world#" (1967» p#24#)
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But where In this have we advanced algnifiomitly beyond Aristotle 
or Pykhagoras?
The more I study Gopeamlous* the less of a revolution there 
appears to be in his work or in his hmedlato impact# If the event 
itself ifoa not of great slgnifioanGe* then the influence of it on the 
life and culture of the tiaie cannot be of tremendous i%>ortEmce*
This is of particular note for the question of the religious reaction# 
idiere mythology has accumulated g izhere there is a remarlcable lade of 
consistent scholarship; and iiîhere reputable historians repeat facile 
speculations.
The revolution is supposed to be a 8un«-oentred universe with a 
spherical and moving earth. But the classic objections to 
rotating and spherical earths Imd long since been countered* thus 
militating against the 'nei-mess' of Copernicus ( though cf. 2*1.3«2o). 
Copernicus' 'neimess' rested priB^ arily in reaching back beyond 
Ptolemy to the purer strands of Greek thought. Certainly he
attacked Ptolengr for his inaccuracy* complexity and inconsis t ency* 
but 'Be Revolutionibus' is open to criticism precisely at these 
points# Thus thou#i he might fear scom for his 'nei-mess' (jEh?<m 
whom?)g hé in essence returns to the ancients* His system is a 
restoration rather than a revolution* end his style is marked by a 
conservative rather than a progressive attitude. Hence ICuhn
comments that 8 ®®lh an age marlced by such obvious upheavals in 
political* social* and religious life* an innovation in planetaiy 
astronomy could at first seem no innovation at all." (1957» p#124«^)
Thou^ his ideas were not novel he confounded the popular 
Aristotelian idea that the heavens were divine and changeless witl% 
the earth the corrupt and imperfect centre, But the church could 
hardly object to this as it was one of the facets of Aristotle that 
did not square with biblical teachiaig* An attack on the eternity 
of the heavens would hardly cause a worried frown in Rome* It is 
therefore probably true to say that the geographical discoveries of 
the period had far greater impact on popular cosmology; wMle on the 
technical front, the appearance of the net; star of 1572 was a far 
more shattering event theui any theory of Oopemicus, But whatever 
the itnadequacies of Oope3m^ .cu8g, from tMs point in time* the 
heliocentric universe was to become part of the cosmological scene 
and not merely a piece of speculation* "Gopemious eventually 
succeeded where Aristarchus had fazlled, beoause he was fortunate in
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hla sucoesGors.®® (Toulmln & Goodfield I96I* p»l64#) It moy 
safely be conoluded that8 ®®The Gepemican Revolution, as we know It, 
is soaroely to be foimâ in the Be Eevolutionibus." (Kulm 1957» P@154*)
ÂBtrŒiomers did not take readily 
to the new theory and 'jf'yoho Brahe returned to an earth-oentred model 
based on a more observational approaoh* Most astronomers sinmly
iSffltKn B.ÏCS KÆfa «3-» pauj e.-^ tao r?;r3- «%:-» ssio efts» 4iEr* *a*s5 »niS3 «•*«» c-m traa ”
adhered to a central earth* and, while adopting parts of the 
Gopemiean model* either ignored the movement of the earth or 
dismissed it as absurd. Rarely did they mention hie baeio thesis
with respect and even those who were more favourable tended to 
regard his liypothesis as false.
3iefore 1620 there were few Oopemicsns even in the field of 
astronomy. His hypothesis was ®®regard@d by all but a, few 
enthusiast8 as fantastioally absurd*®® (Hall 197G* p*14») As late 
as 1623 ii:! lyanoe* Marin Mersenne could publish a work izt which he 
set out the wealmesses of the Gopernioan system ( lie beoame a 
Gopemioan about I630)* In 3h:]^ land* Wil].iam Gilbert made the
rotation of the earth a central facet in his imgnetioal philosophy 
but refrained from letting the earth go free to revolve round the 
smi* There sound soiontifio reason for this reluotanoe to 
aooept the new theory for g "klhen Gopeiaiious moved the Earth he 
knocked the bottom out of the old doctrine of lightness emd 
heaviness ; if bod:le8 continued to foil they did so without rational 
reason for their behaviour.®® (Hall 1970* p#285.) Therefore* while 
Oopemious' theory waa used for conrputational purposes* hj.s basic 
thesis was n()t generally accepted. (Of# 2.1.3.)
Rzasmus Eeinhold (l^H-^S^) was the first to do service for the 
new theory. Bi^it years after 'Be Revolutionlbus' he issued a new 
set of astronomical tables based on Oopemicus' work - the Prutenio 
Tables. Ttiese ta3)les were not very accurate and the length of 
year determined from them was further out than in tlie older tables* 
but most factors gave an advantage and the tables swiftly became an 
astronomical prerequisite of the time. Oopemicus' reputation 
correspondingly advanced. In 1576» Thomas Bigges aided the spread 
of Oopemioanism by ivriting a popular defence of the system; while 
the chair of astronomy founded in 1619 at Oxford stipulated that 
Gopemicus and Ftolemy should be tou<^t side by side. Bigges if as 
the first to actually tzy and describe an infinite Copemican
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wïivorae - a step ivhloh Gopemlous had not reaohod,
âmâA3.T&f,ÆjP,, Franoio Baom opposed msmy of the
chief trends In ooienoo of the period and notably that stemming frcmi 
the wcn^ of Oopemlcas. Opposition also came from the fomouG 
political philosopher Jeon Bodln lAio was radical and atheistic 
enough to find himself on the Index twelve years after Copemious 
hod been placed there (i.e. in 1628). Of opecial importsnco woe 
the reaction of the poetc tmd populoricers* for most people did not 
come in contact ^ fith scientific treatises but were influenced more 
through the arts. (Cf. Kuhn 1957» PPB189-194#) Milton included 
a lengthy description of the Oopemioan and Ptolemaic eye toms in 
'Paradise Lost' end though not taking sides worked out the details 
of his poem using the older, traditional frameworlc of reference. 
Previously* in 1611* John Bmme had conceded in the poŒQ 'ÏThe 
Anatomy of the World' that the Oc^ernicanB ml#it be right but all 
he could see coming out of this ivas evlll In the I6th century 
there were few nonf^ ostroncmiical reaeticms* and those tWt did 
respond were sceptical.
The reason for this opposition is not hard to find for at root 
it was not a clash of scientific theories but a confrontation of 
two vmrldvieim.
*®It is safe to soy tlmt even hod there been no religious 
scruples whatever against the Oopemican ostrcmomy, 
sensible men all over Europe » especially the most 
empirically minded* would have pronounced it a wild appeal 
to accept the premature fruits of an uncontrolled 
imagination, in preference to the solid inductions» built 
up gradually through the ages* of men's confirmed smme 
experience....'® (Burtt 1951» p625*)
Ik is popiüsïrly bellevea 
there ifas a strong and violent reaction to Copernicus from the church 
which smr in his theories a destruction of God's universe; the earth's 
uniqueness; end the demotion of man to the role of a spectator.
In general» Protestants ore seen as leading opponents of Gopemious 
and Luther* Calvin and Melenchthon ore quoted as typical examples. 
Prom the Catholic side there was no great opposition and Copernicus 
stayed respectable down to 1615 before the Catholio church tïiought 
there ifas oi%rthing amiss. Indeed there is a letter from Nicolaus 
Bchoenbergg Cardinal of Capua* to Copernicus in 1556 which* in: full 
mforeness of his theories, encourages hiai to go oliead and publish. 
(L.B.Youi3g 1965» PP*111»112.) This is in no way surprising irdien
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it is bome in mind that the church was not uncritical of the 
traditional vieif of the hemrems#
It is nGGGE)sary to note the historical fallacy of %aG.Barbour 
(1968/b» p22f.) ifhon he seoG Oopemicus representing an attack on 
the church by displacing man from tho central and inq^ortant 3?ole cm 
the stage of life. This has been admirably countered by hookyaas 
(1974 9 p»67o) %bo points out that theology smr Bian as insignificaDt 
end lost*
The Protestant opposition to Oopernlcus is generally seen as 
bitter and basic. I vjlll concentrate on Kuhn's presentaticm* but 
similar semtlmentB are found in Butterfield (l975/b, p»56#% Gil3.espie 
(1967» P.22.)g) Keamey (1971, pp.101-103.) emd Reid (1966» p#19#).
The heart of the matter rests on tvjo oft repeated quotations frora 
Luther and Galvin wlilch Kuhn uses in a manner that seems determined 
to paint them in the blackest possible scientific lig^ it# 1 ifill 
return to t M s  in a moment. Kuhn* to attack Protestantism, cites 
arguments from Reinhold's silence; Oslander's preface; and the fact 
that Rheticus %fas mray from Wittenberg when he m?ote his 'Narratio 
Ihrima'. (Kuhn 1957» p*196«) As for Eeinhold's silence I can but 
note that many astronomers ifere silent on the matter and Reinhold 
did in fact utilise Copernicus in M s  computations, and as a 
convinced Copomican continued to teach at Wittenberg. Osiander's 
preface may be an attempt to cover up some supposed opposition* but 
it can equally end validly be the approach of one working from a 
(different methodological stream from that of Gopomiousg tliat is* one 
who sees the whole exercise as mathematical. Gopemicus too may be 
considered this %imy$ On the basis that Osiander iifrote the preface 
to gain acceptance for \dzat followed, it is difficult to tar liim M t h  
anti-GopemiGonism# It seems to me that Kuhn's argument is weak 
here for the fact remains that these three Protestants were 
instrumental in furthering Gopemicus' system and are hardly f^ruitful 
ground csi ifhich to build a theory of general Protestant opposition.
To return to Luther, Galvin and Melenchthon* Kuhn cites Luthers
,%uote, A s "People give ear to an upstart astrologer who strove to 
show that the earth revolves, not the heavens or the 
firmament* the sun and the moŒi.*.*.This fool wishes to 
reverse the entire soiree of astronoRQrg but sac3:ed 
Beripture tells us (Joshim 10; 13s) that Joshua 
commanded the sun to stand still* and not the earthJ 
(Kuhn 1957e p*191«)
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Next Kuhn cites Melanehthon as writings
Quote Bs^The eyes are wltnesaes that the heavens revolife in the 
epaoe of timnty^ f^our hours* But oertain mem, either 
from the love of %iovelty@ or to make a display of 
lngenui.typ have eonoluded that the earth moves; and 
they maintain that neither the elghtli sphere nor t W  
sun revolves***«Now, it is a want of honeety and 
deoenoy to assert auoh notions publioly, and the 
example is pemiolouQ* It is the part of a good mind 
to aooopt the truth as reveaJ.ed. God and to 
aoquleeoe in It." (Kuhn 1957# p191#)
Then, in moat misleading fashion he oontinuess
Quote G Brother Protestant leaders soon joined in the rejection of 
Gopemlotua. Galvin* in his 'Gomientary on Genesis'* 
cited the opening veree of the Ninety-third Poalm - 
"The earth is eetabllehed» tlmt It cannot he moved" — 
and he demanded, "I'Jho will venture to place the 
authority of Gopemlous above that of the holy Spirit.""
(Eata 1957- p»T92o)
flBfffeilLMlte?.» It oan in .fact Tje qpBeUaaeâ .if these worclB were 
actually uttered by Wkher. The phrase first appeared in 
Aurifaber'e version of the 'Table Talk'» wliile %ie earlier and 
general].y more reliable Iiautorbaoh notes for 1539 containing the 
same genera], passage omits the pertinent phrases. These accounte 
include tho notes of othero ®®and in this instance, irm Imow that 
Aurifaher definitely did.'® (Billenherger 1961» The phrase
itself, unpublished until ti^ renty yeare aftæ? Luther died* does not 
square %flth "aimilar views elemdiere in Luther's wrltin#3®® (C.A.
Eueeell 1972/a* p#52«); while the attributed date of 1539 ic 
eignlficantly four yeore prior to the publication of '3)e RevoJntionihuB' 
'= though that does not necessarily mean that Imther had not heæ^d 
the vimifB of Gopomlcus. But frœi the dates and the fact that 
Luther died in 1546» it can hardly he the case that he mounted any 
eystematio oppositicm to the new theories*
Assuming that Imther did utter the above phrase it can be 
construed as no more than an offhand remark by a rather volatile 
personality* As such it would seem umfiae to t::y and build a case 
for general Protestant opposition to Copernicus from it. Indeed 
Luther ifritess like astronomy and mathematics, which rely upo%% 
demonstrations and sure proofs. As to astrology, 'tls notiiing.®® 
(18700 p.341.)
Quote Gs Galvin,# Galvin has suffered strong accusations of anti— 
Ocq)emicanism by many modem au'Waors and the above quotation is often 
cited as a case in point* Certainly Calvin wrote in many places»
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Psalms 19 BUd 93 for example, in a mozmer that asBumed the 
oorreetnesa of the Ptolemaic ays tern# But then for a theologian* 
this . ime but the equivalent of a oonteroporary theologian assuming 
the oorreotnese of Einstein's theory of relativity* Calvin ims 
simply operating witliin the sonBeneus of astronomioaJ. belief for his 
age. In Psalm 19 he points out that we have not a soientifie 
statement but one of God's aooommodation!
ICohn is in fact not quite fair for the above quotation, tdien 
lodlcecL up in his references* is foimd to be from lielanchthon's 
'lîïitia Doetrinae Physieae' and not from Calvin at all& Indeed 
Calvin in all pertinent passages writes quite simply end calmly and 
there ®'l,s no evidence tïmt he was defendiï^ it from vehement 
attadks#" (Blllehberger 1961, pp.38-39#) Billenberger notes 
that he cazi find, no szeferenoe to Gopemioas at all in the works of 
Calvin (I96I* p<^ 39*) T3ms haviiig failed to mention hii& tlie c^mrge 
that he led a bitter opposition to Oopemious falls to tho gromid.
In fact Lather and Galvin adopted a positive ag,)proach to science by 
using an embr^ ronlc principle of 'sphere-sovereignty' (of*19.7*4*1 
and glossary), thus distinguishing betirmen the disciplines and 
maintaining that each had its oivn sphere of investigation* Science 
and Scripture were sovereign within their oTm province. This ties 
in with "bhe use of theaoooimodation principle, the insistence that 
the Bible i^ as witten for the laymen from a pro—theoretical 
standpoint and ims not a scientific textbook even if it did contain 
scientific truths. Thus Galvin can write concerning astronomy g
®®lWvert}ieles8» this study is not to be reprobated, nor this 
science to be condemned, because some frantic persons are 
wont boldly to reject whatever is unknown to them. For 
astrcncmy Is not only pleasant* but also very useful to be 
knoim; it cannot be denied that this art unfolds tho 
admirable wisdom of God." (1554: PP»86,87#)
Luther and Galvin had a positive view of science. Luther 
distinguished clearly betizeen astronomy and astrolo^* accepting the 
former and rejecting the latter. Calvin likewise wrote his 
'Adsrionitlon against the Astrology that is called Judicial'; whi].e in 
the Institutes (igSgS.) he assertss
"To investigate the motions of the heavenly bodies* to 
determine tWir positions » measure their distances, and. 
ascertain the;lr prpperbies» demands skill, and a more 
careful examination; and where these are so employed* as 
the providence of God is thereby more fully unfolded* so 
it is reasonable to suppose that the mind takes a loftier
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and obtains bri^iter viewe of his glory*"
(I560g p*l6.)
Melanohthon more negative but M s  
background as a humanist entrusted with #io ednoationol ospeot of 
the newly bom ïtefomation needs to be remembered^ Bs believed 
the decay of the ohuroh wne tied to the breakMap of the 
Arietotellan system end tho,t only a return to Aristotle oould unite 
the sclenoea smd revive the olmrch* Not eur^ nrisingly he opposed 
neo-JPlatonimi. '^ Henoe, Melanchthon's problem irfas not so much 
scientific or Biblical as it waa philosophical*®* (hillenbergor 1961» 
p*41«) Yet while he has negative comments there are also 
favourable references to Gopemicua - hardly epitomiging a crusade 
agalnat soienoe* Further * Molanchihon I'^ rote letters of introduction
for Bheticua» praising him, and thou^ one of them holds reaervationa 
concerning his Oopemicaniem It aleo points :out how Rheticus Is 
mieeed at Wittenberg* Again he helped Reinhold in publishing 
works of Gopemloan nature — all of which gives little support to 
Kuhn's argument*
'Thus of three key figures* only î^lanchthon actively smites 
agai.nst Gopemicua end even here it omt hardly be construed as a 
general étttack en eolence or aatronoiiQr» OMs episode provides a 
good example of the mytliology that can arise, depicting a ccnfllot 
situation between ecience and religlop^ * (Of* 0*A*Ru8sell 1972/a 
pp*52—54#) In the li#it of the reaction among scientists there
was little for theologians to attack* As yet Copernicus had no 
evidential support, nor offered any speoifio theclogioal challenge*
2*3. ÎWfYHB OF SCimCE?jCSf5s#.4.^iaïîT'ïyîst«is:.«rfî5:fi^s3JWî:^-ïr;civ«.-î\ïï:7î3'^s«s^
In the search for martyrs of science in the face of intolerant 
religious dc^a three victims have been put fom/ard - Servetus, Bruno 
and Galileo# (Of# Singer 1926, p,122*) With the first two the 
matter is theological and ^lilosophical and not scientific; while 
Galileo can be claimed to be not altogether innocent hiJDself*
Bruno (1548="16(K)) did maZce specifio scientific contributions » but in 
the final analysis it ifas theologioal reasons, totMly removed from 
the arena of science tliat ccmdemned him* He denied particular 
providence in the acts of God and the possibility of miracles; 
claimed that prayer was a uBoloss exercise; and implied that liberty 
was equivalent to neoesslty* üThls was oompounded by the 
identifioation of God with the 'universal substance'» thus binding
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^od to the imiVGZBe In & pantheistic ma&mer ï:Aiioh deizled. Him as 
heiog over and above creation* (Of. Giiieapie 1967: p#67*; IhW. & 
Kipling 1964@ Vol.Z p.135*s Kuhn 1957, p.199.)
The next giant In the development of astzzonwy wtua hostile to 
Oopomious» rejected the srni-ceaitred system and devised a coimpromise 
oyetem of the univeree idiich retained the hamony of the circle in 
the best Pythagorean manner i-diile keeping the earth at tlie centre 
of the stellar sphere* In hie eyetem the five planets Heronry» 
Venus» i^ Iare» Jupiter end Saturn — revolved rotmd the sun while the 
sun and moon rotated annually about a stationary earth# By 
including eplcyclee the three featuree of planetary motion trere 
accounted for — that le loops of retrogreosion, variation of distance» 
and irregularity of motion with respect to the fixed etarg* Thie 
may aeem a backward step, but in the absence of observations to the 
contrary it was perfectly adéquate* Khhn comments that "judged 
purely by technical proficiency, Brahe wae tlie greater man*'® (1957, 
p*200*) In esaence the choice of earth or m m  was a question of 
taste and8 ®*The Tychoziio oystem le» in fact, precisely equivalent 
matematically to Oopemlcuo'e oyetem*" (Kuhn 1957, P«202*} The 
only possible mathematical difference being that of parallactic 
motion which Brahe had searched fcKr and not found* It woe on t$ie 
basis of observations that the earth was reinetated at the centre*
His ctmtributi<m, however, went beyond hie gyetem and im order 
of priority can be arranged aa folloim - regular observations of the 
planete; obeervatifm of the new star of 1572; observation of comete; 
compilaticm of a star catalogue; hie searoh for stellar parallax; 
hie building of new instrumente of observation; and his syston Itself* 
It was his observations that were cruoial» rather than the system he 
formulated* It Is interesting to note, however, that ho denied the 
possibility of making observations without some hypotliesls to guide 
and direct those observations»
The discovery of the new star of 1572 undermined belief in the 
iiicorruptibilil:^ f of the heavens in a far more 3?adi.ca]. way than did 
Oopemious' putting the earth into orbit in the heavens* This 
observation waa so a?evolutionary that Brahe noted s ®*I so 
astonished at this sight that I was not ashamed to doubt the 
trustworthiness of my o;m eyes*®® (1573, P<^ 594*) Here was Iiard data
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as opposed to Qosmologioal apeoulatimio IrAien this was followed 
by the observation of oometa In 1577: 15#0p 1585$ 1590* 1595 
1596, which were clearly seen to have parallax that put them beyond 
the eub-limar sphere, then the old Arletotellan ooemology was under 
eevere otraln* Thus Brahe was able to suggest that the path of a 
comet may be obl(mg - the first suggestion tlmt celestial movements 
Mght not be olrcnlar# This was the legacy he gave to Kepler.
Two basic aspects, the solentifio and religious, combined to drive 
Kepler on In the face of Immense difficulties* On the solentlflo 
side he was a oonvlnced Oopomlcsn, one of the first to embrace this 
idea at a teclmloal level, noting that ®®Emong the mass of students 
the Idea is still imfamlllar*®® (Keplers In Hurd & Kipling 1964* Vol.I 
p.122.) Also on a technical level he had the accurate observations 
of Brahe lAloh were to play a oruolal role* ^  On the religloug 
side he was influenced by the neo«u?latonlc and Pythagorean, themes on 
the harmony of the spheres and the music of mathematlosl formulas* . 
He also, though a Lutheran, had strong leanings to>fards Oalvlnlsm#
5^ hls religious aspect imc Important and Kepler himself made much of 
it* "Indeed the entirety of Kepler's momentous eatrcno&oioal work 
was Inspired by a fervant desire to disoover the divine %)laa of "Ihe 
universe." (h.O.Goodman 1974/^* pp*101»102.) Kepler imites in a 
letter to Johann Hervmrt, dated March 16, 1598*
®®But I think in this way; since astronomers are priests 
of the Biost high God with respect to the book of nature, it 
behoves us not to think of the praise of our abilities» but 
above all of the glo3:y of God.*o#.Enougl;i for me is tlie honour 
of guarding» iflth my discovery » the door of God's temple. In. 
which Copernicus serves before the Mgh altar.®' (1598* p.603#)
His mystical search for mathematical harmony and single numerical 
relaticms runs through his work# This if^as coupled to an
adu3.ati(m of the sun lihlch (of# Copernicus) had roots in the neo-
4# He we^ in feiot Brahe's literary legatee#
5# In his 'Epitome Asizeonomiae Copomioae' (l6l8"^ 2l) Kepler outlines 
M s  concept of astronŒoloal method# He envisages five basic aspeotsg 
(a) the observation of the heavens; (b) the formulation of hypothesis 
to explain (a); (c) tlEie physios oa? metaphysics of cosmology; (d) the 
requlTimaont to compute past end fuinrpe poslticais of the heavenly 
bodlesg azid (e) the technical aspect of meohanlos with resj^ oot to 
instruments for observation etc.. Of these he held that (c) was 
not essential#
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Platonism of the Renalseanoe# This laystloaL quality l0 well 
characterised In one of hie early woadm, *%8terlum Ooemogüïephlcum', 
which appeared In 1596* 80» looking ftxr a pattern whloh the
Oreator mig^t have ucod, Kepler csme up with the idea with which he 
remained enamoured all hie life, that the planetary epherea were in 
order proceeding (mtifards the oircumaerlhed and laiBcrihed spheaies 
of the five r0gu].ar solid fi^zrea — cube, tetrahedron, dodecahedron» 
icooaheâron» and octahedron*
Aomming two conditions @ a géométrie aspect that the planes of 
the earth and I%ra orbits inters cot in the sun; and an aspect of 
physios g that the m m  appears to have a poivrer to move the planets 
Kepler ims ready to work out hie Bialn contribution in the field#
After years of worZc ho ceme up with a theory, but found that Xrihen he 
checked with Brahe's observations there i^jas a disoi^pancy of ei#it 
minutes of arc, a disorepanoy irihlch before would have be^m quite 
acceptable# Bo he sacrificed another six years to solving the 
problem of the missing eight aiinutes# The way was open for Kepler's 
lazffs to be formulated $ the first two published in 'Astronomia Nova' 
in 1609; and the third in Harmonloe Mimdi' in 1619# ^ These 
wre the first natural lacrfs in. the modem sense precise, vGr:lfiable 
statements about universal relationships betifeen phenomena given in 
mathematical terms# These laws were not ^solutely precise althou^ 
they stood the test of observation for two hundred years before any 
error was found# Nor must it be thou^it that Kepler presented them 
as the final ultimate answer, for these la^ js were but ®%natches of 
melody in search of a symphoziy#" (Gillespie 196?, p*37*) however 
for the first time a neat explanation was EuvMlable, and reduced the 
34 circles of Gopemlcus to 7 ellipses. Planets obeying these laws 
could be seen as incurring chaziges in speed, direction and curvature 
at e8,oh %)o.lnt of their orbit — changes which need to be explained by 
physical means* Kspler himself formulated 'Wo aapecbs of thiss the 
'anima mo'brix' whereby the influence of 'bhe sun ifeakens at a linear 
rate with dlstmioe in pushing zzoimd 'bhe planets; and (from Gilbert) 
the theory of the earth's magtietism# The former imparted circular
6# The laws ares (a) That planets move round the sim in ellipses, not 
ojrc3.es, and that the smi is one of 'bhe fooig (b) That planets do not 
move uniformly but in suoh a way tl:iat the line joining planets and 
m m  sweeps out equa3. areas in equal times; (c) The squares of the 
periods of the planets are as the cubes of their mean distanoes 
from the sim#
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motion ancl the latter aoooimteâ for the elliptical motion*
W88 a new step for no one before had thought of the planets as driven, 
or of some force aotlng bett;een the Bun and the planets*
Hence we find a bringing together in a modern way the two eepeote 
of observation and computation, combined with the sun^centred universe* 
Yet clearly hie hypothesis and computation were guided and directed by 
his neo-Platonio guesses; while only his firm conviction in the 
worthwhilenoss of his task could have driven him on through the 
disappointments and frustrations he endured* His great achievement 
was to breech the Aristotelian circle and introduce tlie ellipse as 
part of a mechanical system that called for physical explanation*
$he stage was being set for Newton* (Cf* Keplers In Hurd & Kipling 
19649 Vol*I p123*; Butterfield ISYS/b, p.&6.)
2*_W. m s  Scientific OŒ]^^ Galileo brought to a head several
strands in the scientific world and provided the final juagping off 
point for Newton; he was a, key figure in the popularising of science; 
and on the religious front there was his famous clash with the Homan 
authorities* Several commentators see In him the true break with the 
past* (e*g* Singer 1962g #*249*) b%t he is not to be seen solely in 
the lig h t of hie astronomical work for his contribution to dynamics wag? 
probably more Important* He laid dynamics out on an experimental 
basis of careful measurement which excluded all teleological factorsg 
making the distinction between primary (dynamic) and secondary 
qualities* His work in dynamics was not entirely original for 
Stevinsg in the lowlands^ had prefigured quite a lot of the work for 
which Galileo is now famous# (Of* Pledge 19&6o p*59«)
However Galileo did establish the science of dynamics on a 
scientific basis and broke from the statics of the ancients* He 
actually got as far as the principles of the Differential Calculus but
ctîSSîraii/.ïwr44ï3sf£îi«c^ is«mÆOs:
Y* By 1590 Galileo had come to several objections against Aristotle 
in conneotion xvith felling bodies* %iere was the femous experiment 
where he dropped two different weights from the top of tlie leaning 
tower of Pisa and noted their identical rate of fall tlius disproving 
Aristotle that they should fall at rates proportional to their weig^ its* 
The theory may be sound, but the story is igtythlcal and if carried out 
f^ould not Imve yielded the }?equired results* Another myth is the 
claim that he discovered the laif of pendulum motion by watching the 
motion of the candelabra in Pisa cathedral* The cathedral did not 
have a candelabra at that time*
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failed to unfold It; while in his work are foimd in embryo fashion 
the three laws of motlon(Newton) ; but Galileo did not have the 
mathematical genius to develop either of these facets, There is 
no apace here to include details of his importent work in the theory 
of acoeleration, but suffice it to say that for the first time the 
dimension of time was included within the scientific structure* (Cf* 
Gillespie I96Y, p#42*) The meohemioal world^ p^ioture was 
beginning to take shape*
The area where he is best knoim and which caused his clash with 
the ecclesiastical authorities was Oopemicanism* He was a 
convinced Gopemloen from early years but failed to make his position 
fully loiown for fear of soom and ridicule* But like OopeznicuB
aCs£“ K_%oa 1%. #lalol3&iaL.%sgomio8_% 
2g4vesj,iti.es_and_of Sms we
find Kepler writing to hims
**You advise us@ by your personal escample, and in discreetly 
veiled fashion, to retreat before the general ignorance 
and not to o3cpose ourselves or needlessly to oppose the 
violent attacks of the mob of scholars*" (1597a P*599*)
Kepler then goes on to encourage 3aim to make his views public#
Eventually his position csme out and this turned out to be of 
Grucial iB^ortmice for he KKrote to the layman, often leaving the 
technical arguments aside* This aided the popular acceptance of the 
new theory of the earth^s motion* Interestin^y he ignored the %mrk 
of Kepler and stuck rigidly to the theory of pure circular motion*
But having rejected any possibility of heavenly intelligence or prime= 
movers, he began to move close to later ideas of inertia* bike 
Gopemious and Kepler there was in his thought an element of sun-» 
worship* Yet he failed to produce demonstrable proof of the earth*s 
motion, for his discoveries Tilth the telescope, while falsifying 
Htolemy and Aristotle, did not prove Oopemious*
In ccmnection with his ei^hasls on experiments it is Important to 
note t^ iat many of his experiments are more correot3.y described as 
*thou#it experiments'* Experiments lære valid. It Tiould seem, cmly 
as long as they agreed Tilth M s  theories and he would have little 
hesitation in rejecting experimental evidence if it seemed to count 
against his theories* (Cf* Butterfield 1975/b p*85g losee 1972, p*57=)
The observations that he made with the telescope were swiftly 
published in a little work of 24 lesves called 'Bidëreus nuntius' «
The Starry Kessenger — in 1610* This did not procure Copemleias 
but struck a mortal blow at the theories of Aristotle and Ptolemy*
His obaervaticma of contlnual.ly narrowing eunspote led to the 
euggeetion that tïie eim's orbit ifae itself rotating; turning to the 
moon it now appeared that its surface was pitted with craters, azid he 
calculated heights of four miles for its mountaine which out right 
across the Aristotelian idea of perfection and smoothness in the 
heavenly bodies * Thue Tfhere CopemicuB had put the earth In tlie 
eame order as the heavens; Galileo made the heavens of the same order 
as the earth,
%he clash between Galileo and the 
Roman Catholic Church is one which is still far from settled. It 
is often regarded as a brutal hounding of the man of science who stood 
firm for truth until forced into submission by intolerant religious 
fanatics* Even in his submission it is said that he arose, defiant 
to the end, imttering the famous words: 'And yet it moves,' Hoimver 
from the 191:h century historian, Karl von Gebler (of, D,C,Goodman 
1974/&, p.91f«)a to more recently Arthur Koestler (1961, p,426,) there 
has been a move to present the church in a better li^t*
It is ingportant to realise that the movement against Galileo was 
not simply a question of a clash between scientific theories and 
church doctrine. Pledge notes thatg "The Aristotelian universities 
moved the Ohurch to action" (I966, p,62«); others note the rivalry of 
a powerful Jesuit competitor in the area of observational priority; 
and yet others note the outraging of general public opinion at the 
concept of a plurality of worlds* It was not si38Q[)ly a case of 
dogmatic opposition from "fools and rogues" (Ginger 1962, p,252,) 
and many Intelligent men were opposed to the new theories for (to 
them) reasonable reasons,
Up to this point Gopemicanism had been treated as a minor facet 
of astronomical speculation and the church had not felt constrained 
to take serious thou^t of the matter, But with the observational 
backing of Galileo's telescope, plus the popularising works he wrote, 
the matter Tias brought to the fore, Bote should also be made of 
his attitude to the Bible which he regarded as primarily a book 
concerned with the salvation of souls not science, and could remark 
that tlie Scriptures tell us "how to go to heaven, not how the heavens 
go," (In Goodman ISTd/e-apalO^ #) But unlilce men such as Galvin,
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Kepler and Wllldns, he looked for veiled statements to baolc up the 
Oopemioan system*
l^^ls Be visits Home and enjoys 'great suooess' (Goodman, D*0, 
1974/a,p p*99«)* Be is well received and has a cordial interview 
with the Pope* Cardinal Bellarmine asks Jesuit mathematiolana for 
their opinion on Galileo's discoveries and is told that they are more 
or less confirmed. For Galileo the problem is still the 
Aristotellanism of the universities, not the dogma of the chi%roh.
The first recorded criticism lùizom within the church, made 
by a Dominoan monlc, Lorlnip Tiho tms not sure of Copemious' rigg^ it 
name. The criticism was however made only in private conversation 
end not in public.
A discussion at the dinner table of the Grand Bulce 
Oosmlno II leads to a letter to Gastelli by Galileo, and then a longer 
clarifying statement under the title 'better to the Grand Duchess 
Christina'. Despite Lorini's protest to the ihaquisltion little 
in fact comes of the matter* However it is still true that 
theological interest had been connected to the theories of Oopemicus 
and the Inquisition is not happy.
GaJ.ileo goes to Home to . defend himself and while 
able to counter the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic argiments, fails to 
convince of the correotness of the Copeniieasi system. Pope Paul 7 
asks for an official statement on the subject and on the 24th February 
1616 the Oongregarkion of the Index decrees that the idea of a oentral 
stationary sun is 'foolish and absurd. ' The works of Gopemicus 
are not oondemnded but are to be oorrected. Other works of this 
nature (e.g. Posoarini) are put on the Index.
(e) D&c. ^6l6s Galileo is hardly yet under ohuroh perseoution for 
on the 21st December a fiery sermon preached against him brings forth 
an apology from the Mastea^^General of the Domlnicmi Order in Rome# 
Gaccini, who preached the sermon, had previously been disciplined for 
unethioEtl behaviourQ and appears throughout the Galileo affair as 
"an arohp-villian." (DeC.Goodman 1974/{&e P#105«) Galileo had been 
told not to discuss his theories except as a mathŒiatioal device or 
caprloe, But in his 'Dialogue Concerning the Two Principal Systems 
of the World', published in 16^ 12, it is plain that he takes the 
Copemican side beoause he believes it ie physically true. lot 
uimaturelly the Pope is angry at this flaunting of authority.
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: IHs trial duly begins on 12th April* Galileo, now
almost 70 and ill, la allowod to stay In comfortable quartos 
throughout, rather than being confined to the prisons of the Holy 
Office which could quite well have been poseible if the authoritiee 
ao wished* Debate centres over a suspect aiiimte f±?om I6I6*
Galileo maintains that he had been told not to hold or defend the 
Oopemioan opinion, but the Inquisitor produces a Vatican file 
which states that he was not to teach or defend in any way this view* 
Everything turns on this and Galileo is finally manoeuvred into making 
an insincere conoession, found guilty and sentenced*
It la safe to say that the affair retarded soienoe in the Homem 
Catholic Churoh and Galileo's 'Dialogue' was not talcen off the Index 
until I83I* But the fault of the clash was not entirely due to the 
striotures of an intolerant clmroh* Galileo must take his share of 
the guilt as well, thou^ this in zio way mitigates the action of the 
ohurcho Whatever the truth of the suspeot minute, it is fair to 
say that Galileo had knowingly flaunted an injunction from his ohuroh 
superiors and displayed throu^out "no humility". (Gillespie I967, 
p«49«) He was oondemned eventually, not for his scientific theories, 
but for failing to obey authority*
In oonolusion it can be claimed that Galileo was less original 
than appears in terms of details, but led "in a polioy of 
simultaneous attack on the whole front" (Butterfield 1975/b, p.68*) 
against the Aristotelian synthesis* But it was an attaok that as 
yet could not achieve a decisive break with the past for Galileo was 
constrained by the ancient oonoepts of circular motion* His ideas 
were hampered by his knowing neglect of the crucial work of Kepler* 
Tills failure ims critical for it would only be when the mechanios of 
Galileo beoame wedded to the astronozBy of Kepler that the nm; 
scientific order would be fiamily established*
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3p1@1*.%l0w _DitG:]^ 3%t? The rWpetua of "Mie Reformation to eoienoe is 
often ignored or denied. linger olslms that: "The reforming leaders 
were. If miythlng, less sympathetic to eole&tlfie investigation than 
the Catholic leaders*" (1926, p@122.) Merton olaime that Calvin 
depreciated oolenoe (1957@ p»26o)@ Many tjritero conetruot complex 
argumenta to avoid attributing plus marks to the Reformation, getting 
themselves into aoademlo contortions due to antipathy to what the 
Reformers clearly said and believed* (of* 5o4*2*)
The qi^ eotion is: the general Protestant attitude to solence
hostilee neutral, or conducive to the purmilt of scientific activitiesŸ
there, or lyas there not, a dependent linlt bettzeen Galvinlem and 
science; and if so, was it direct or indirect? It ie wrong to 
diemies the Befoaanation when in fact science blossomed exactly in those 
geographical areas which wore the home of the Reformation «« the 
Lowlands, England and Scotland* This does not detract from, or 
denigrate, any positive attitude in the Eom^m Catholic Church up to the 
end of the I6 th  century* Only w ith the philosophioal reluctance to 
abandmi Aristotle, and the Galileo affair, did Rome set horeelf 
against any positive approach to science*
3h%ring the Middle Ages the dcmlnEmce of Aristotle and Plato led to 
the split motive of 'nature«and'=^aGe ' t)hioh through time hed hardened 
into 'nature«ggai%ist«»graoo' (of* Appendix A)* By 1500 this dualismzczcciaæaaaA » •?*-£• v v  #
led to ccmfc^ion in scientific method* Fully fledged Aristotelians 
followed a deductive metliodg Nominalists tended to the study and 
classification of phenomenon; while practical scientists assumed a 
working uniformitarianism* But noifdiere was the%?e a rational, 
integrated worldview* This was impossible because of the immr 
antimonies of the dualistic motive* It is my contention that the 
Reformatimi (not only in ethos) brought stability to this situation 
stability in that Galvin brou^t to the scene a unified philosophical 
motive of oreationp f^l and redemption idiich provided a solid 
doctriyial and metaphysical baais for study of all aspects of life* 
It brou^t all the individual particularB of creation together and 
envisaged a coherent, oareated cosmos irjhere na'&ure and ggace wre 
intezrwovon instead of dualistically separated* (Of* Dooyeweerd 1969p
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Volol po5l6.)
The work of many Metorlane (e*g« Candolle, 
Merton end Hooïqraas) Indicates a Gorrelaklcm between the rise of the 
scientific oommmlties and the worldview engendered by Protestantlem, 
especially the Calvlnlctlc and PmdLten streams * Prior to the reign 
of Elizabeth I, scl^ce in En^and iffos generally at a low ebb; ifiille 
from 1560 omyards Puritanism began to develop (parallel to eoience) 
dlatinctive features* These features must not be oonfueed as simply 
anti^etsbllGhimnt; nor muat it be thou^t that the term 'Puritan' can 
be confined to non«c(mformlng elements outside the Ghuroh of Ebiiglando 
Indeed doctrinally there was little divergence In the initial stages 
between the nœiMxonformers end the (Smcch of Englond, both being 
basically Galvinistic in tlieolo^* Under Elizabeth the church was, 
generally speaking, Celvlnistieg under Charles I the Puritana tended 
to Celvinlam In opposition to estoblioMient Ai^ ninianismg while in the 
Commommalth there existed many non^GalvinistlG Puritans* The 
problem of designation is compounded by the fact that at least fom? 
disparate oreaa wore viewed aa Puritan « chm?oh polioy, theology, 
state, and morality* But it was not necessary to hold a 'Puritan' 
position in all four to be regarded @a such* John Milton, for 
instance, was an g&itl=*Armj,nian Puritan in politics and clmroh polioy, 
but an Anainian Puritan in theology (of* Ilookyaas & I^;less 1974/&» 
Po19o}
"Even Francis Bacon, thou^i frma some points of view clearly 
no Puritan, shared many of the characteristic features denoted 
by the term* In his personal confession of faith, os %f@ll as 
in his advice to king James I, he clearly testifies to 
Puritan convictions* (hookyaas & Lawless 1974/a^ p»11$)
ïteltEKiB Bteessed that man 
vas to ^ orlfy God, but do oo by working to the 'good of their brethz^ en*' 
This carried politlool overtones and meant that Puritan sympathies lay 
from the beginning with parliamentary democracy over against the Groifm 
and church absolutism^ !Hiey defended the civil rl^its of the 
individus]., and political rl^its of Parliament, against the concept of 
the divine rl#it of kings and church* Thus a practical, political 
and social outworking ensued from their basic theologioal tenets o 
In London they instituted mathematical lectures for the benefit of 
captains of 'trained hands' to counter the threat of the Ar^mdag and 
when peace returned, redirected this to more simple nautical pursuits* 
They ifore to the fore in givizug their blessing to voyages of di.socvez.y 
and in ^ iriting for the artieana
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Thomas Dlggea (1545-95) was a typical Puritan* Engineer and 
astronomer, he was erne of the first to emhraoe the Gopemioan system, 
emd la doing so found no iaccanpatlhlllty iffith hie faith* Lllte his 
father, Leonard Digges the imthematiolan, he was as hie epitaph puts 
it 'Zeâloue for true religion*' Digges epitomleee the new 
exparlmental approaoh to scienee, boasting that he spent fifteen weeks 
at sea in order to teat navigational theories* In Parliament he 
defended Eltohoook's Political Plat, a typical Puritan propos!tlgai 
involving the need for good preaching (to uplift the morality^ vision 
and responsibility of fishermen) as an integral facet of in^roving the 
English fisheries against the Netherlands*
laleSogA ^ m ^ t lonal Iiimetu^ . The only university to be founded in 
En^and be Ween the Middle Ages and the 19th century was by Croamell 
Durham IMiversity which ifss 'for all the sciences*' The traditional 
universities were slow to adopt the teaching of science @8 a subject in 
its OTrjn right, but not so the dissenting academies* These academies, 
founded by non^^onformists forced out of the universities by tlielr 
refusal to suWait to the Œiurch of En^.and, liad a broader vision than 
the traditional institutions of learning* Simllorly in France the 
Protestant acMemles wero more scientiflG and utllitm?imi in outlook 
than their Catholic counterparts* l^ jhlle in America:
"Correspondents and members of the Royal Society who lived 
jju Mew Ihgland were 'oil trained in Calvinistio thinlcing'*
The founders of Harvard sprang from this Calvinlstio 
culture, not from the literm?y era of the Renaissance or 
ftxm the scientific movement of the seventeenth century*"
(Mbrton 1957o P=55o)
Prom this general ethos of the Puritan life^gtyle, Merton (1957)» 
Btimson (1955) others have ar^ed for a positive correlation 
bet{«men religious belief and scientific endeavour in this crucial 
foraning period of the scientific tradition, Stimson (l955g 
554*) argues forcefully that Puritanism provided the favourable 
conditions In likigland for the grmjth of modem science, especially 
throu^ the emphases on the ri^t of private judgement, a critical 
spirit, an insistence upon knowledge and reason, independence, 
uprightness of character, and the need for mmi to spend his time in 
a profitable mmmer*
3,2. m  aoaiTiPio socimim
The 17th century sa%f the rise of the great scientific societies 
specifically the Royal Society of London in 1662, and the l^ lrench
58
Aoademy of Soience in Paris in 1666* These eooletieG arose beoanee 
of the need fors cooperation betirfeen Bolentiste; oomnmleatlon of 
findings to follow workers and the public at large; mid patronage*
In France the Academy ifse a profess iosWl body with statutory 
responsibilities for technological supervielon and ia^ovement of 
induGtry. Offlclsl appointments were made and pensions paid the 
orwm* This s p ir it d iffered  markedly fkum the 'hcmeet 
amateurlshnese' of the Royal Society* By constitution the Academy 
had three pensioners and three etudente for each of Its six soctiona » 
geometry, aatronomy, mechanics, anatomy, chsmietry and botany =» whereas 
In the Royal Society tho only qualification for membership was a 
^peraonaL undertaking to be intereeted*" (Gillespie 1967o pa111*)
Yet it tms the Royal Society rather than the more Instituticaaallged 
Academy that %f8S to dominate throng the crucial forming period of 
the 17 th century#
3.2ol* The._Roys&__8^  Origins* This reeidee in the following.
(Of* 5*5.2#g 4*5e) His influence is
testified to from the beginning by members of the Society; it was the 
spirit of his empirical method lAioh they liore to fo3.1ow@ Baccm saw 
progress for man tlnzou^ science and art that recovered his rightful 
dominlcm over nature, and throng religion as the way back to God*
Both of these aspects r^ere derivative of a deeply held faith Ih God, 
and it is quite erroneous to posit t}mt because he kept the two 
activities separate that helhought of them as independent* The 
Book of Nature and the 33ook of Scripture were complementary, not 
sepaz'ate, avenues of knowledge*
feosi 1620 ara-;aras this todœi ooUego 
omi@ to oGcni)y an impo3r*:@nt role in üie histo3:y of soimioeg providing 
'the venue for Informal meetings of interested parties* hhlle stme 
(e*g* Hall and Eemaleyg of* 5*4»8« and 5*4»5o) aee this as a secular 
influence, it should be noted that:
"Like most lK%3doners@ the founders and supervisors, as tmll 
as moat of the professors, were in favour of Puritanism 
which in those days was the parallel 'modem' movement in 
politics and religion*" (Eooiqraas & Lawless 1974/^p Po19o)
Henry Brlgggs, first professor of geome-kryg was strendy influenced by 
Puritan theology ;and vma a friend of James bssher and Theodore Haak* 
Like other Puritans he was keen ozi vo^ iages of discovery and 
Golonialisatlon*
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ThlB developed Into tlie 'Invisible College' of Boyle. Stimson 
suggests that of the ten who oonetituted tMs group in 1645 only one, 
Ooarborougii, was evidently non^ 'Puritane (Cf* I^rkon 1957 a p.^lo)
The fact that tliie group excluded religion in their dieousBion ie sn 
im?eleV8nt objection @a they met to dlGcuas ecience* This feature 
ie indicative of religions moderation, not indifference.
We see the development of thle during the Civil War* The 
eoholare at the Oxford Colleges were loyal to the king, but when the 
Puritans gained the asemidemcy they were replaced by scholaz^ from the 
more Puritan Cambridge Ihiiversity. "Then for a short period of 
about ten years Bclence flourished at Oxford and it flourished in a 
big vmy. The new scient is te or virtuoel met in each other'e rooiDs 
and discussed tilings»" (Bemal 1975, P»192«) Among those involved 
were Boyle, Hooke, lih?en, Willis, Wilkine and Bprat. That this 
ahould have happened in tliia particular setting is an hiatorical fact 
requiring explanation, not glossed over aa ineignifleant in the 
ocientiflG tradtion
13*2.1 #5# Puritanism. IrThile the contribution of an individual la 
not neceeoarlly marked by Puritan theology; it is my contention that 
the Puritan spirit, in the widest senee of the term, gave a general 
environment and set of mind that permeated through the science of 
Shg;land«, Sclcmce was regarded as an aid for faith and there is 
little to suggest that religion was at fundamental variance with 
science or that both tiere independent developments of some common 
origin (such as a revoluticnory spirit (cf. Barber 1952, p.58@) )@
It remains clear that, despite recent attempts to disprove any 
CŒmection, the Puritan ethos was coziduoive to the pursuit of science # 
How else can I t  be readily explained that the origins of the Royal 
Society lie in t W  group meeting from Gresham College and subsequently 
at (bEfordp when these groups were dominated by atsn who were either 
Puritans, or had Puritan sympathies»^
1. For a modern reinstatement of the Puritans which demolishes mioh 
of modem mythology concerning them, consul t Fraser (1975)@
2* It is further clear that Oomenius and Haak were influential in 
initiating the Society, and many commentators accord to Haalc the role 
of prime mover in instigating the Society* Barnett (of. Kemsley 
1968, Po79«) ehows Haalc as envisaging the Society going beyond the 
pursuit of scientific studies and deep^ing an understsmdiaag of 
others and the Creator through the progress of soleziceo
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lloI).Bt:iJiison (ISSU)» to her e:ts3!itostîon
of the founding 119 meiabors of the Eoyal Soole'ky at its legal
incorporation :m 1662, concluded tWt nearly half of the 8? for whom
%
there is relevant Inf ozonation had a l=urltan experience* The 
Royal Society set the tone of science for many years and its origins 
were impozrtant. It developed, not frœa brilliant diaooveriec of 
ifhich there %mre many, but through the honest and opezi dlBCUseion of 
men eager to coi%)rehend and further the scientific quest. Yet also
eager to  "further those dleooveriee in their bearing on godlineae, 
learning, and hrnianity*" (Gillespie 196?, p*112@) To tills end 
they started pz'oduoing in 1665 the 'Philosophical Transaction' a 
record of their work and endeavours. In the early days it ran izito 
controversy over its tendency to indulge any theory no matter how 
frivolous* 'This no doubt stemmed from the Baocmigm tradition of 
gathering all the available data, and soon replaced by a more 
rigorong approach to scientific questiona* Those involved were,
however, essentially religious iT%sn trying as beet they could to 
further science ^ id r'eligion*
The fact tliat in the Royal Society, as in the Invisible College, 
religion and politico were not discussed does not obviate the 
underlying religious motivation and environment* This principle 
had already been presented in 162? by iGaac Beekmem, a Btaamoh 
Calviniet 1:% Rotterdam; while Thomas Sprat, the first hietorian of 
the Society, who clearly Indioatee that religion not to interfere 
in Bcientific wmic, nevertheless sees soienoe as a, valuetble aid to 
religion and poeits an essential llalsŒi bettmen them# (Sprat 166?, pp, 
57W-372.)
A fu3?th@a? feature in favour of a firm connection between ecience 
and Purltazilmi ie that both the Royal Society and Gresham Oollego were 
attacked in the 17th century because of their Puritan origins, 
especially by the conservative universities* This charge can be 
Been as a reason for excluding religious controversy from the formal 
discuBsion of those groups as they endeavoured to become established 
in the academic world* They existed prinmrily for acienoe not to 
feed the extremes of religious enthusiasm*
5* Turner (of Komeley 1968, p#80*) extended Stimson'e approach to 
cover the whole centiucy, and fitted Boyle, Ray, Willis, Wilkins 
and even Neifton In the 'puritan type'; largely based on their 
approach to the importance of the Bible.
Ho the virtuosi, the foundors of the Sooiotyg weszo by and largo 
deeply religious men of Puritan baokgroimd* The Charter of the 
Society i^ jnotnicto its mend)er8 to pursue their studiee "to the ^ory 
of God and the benefit of the human race." Both these terms were 
strongly emphasised in the Calviniatle^'Puritan stream of thought, 
and, i#zile not denying their use on a wider front, became within 
Calvinism of particular sl^ificanoe# A man like Robert Boyle was 
deeply religious faz' beyond the bouzids of mere convontion and clearly 
envisaged science as a religious task itself* (Ofo4o4«)
The connection bettreen faith azid science is tmll put by Gillespie 
even if his oonclusion can be questioned *
correlation of Galvinlst behaviour patterns =" hostility 
to tradition, utilitarianism, calculating self^denial, a 
calling to work in this world, rationality and the individual 
interpretation of experience ™ the oorrelatioKz of these 
qualities ifith practical business and s c i e n c e i s  a very 
general feature of Western cultural history* There can 
ghiq^ ly be no doubt that protestant and bourgeois milieux 
have encouraged talent and ambition to rise throu#i scienGe, 
and that catholic end aristocratic milieux have inliibited the 
development of scientists @ Scotsmen and Dutclmen flock 
through the Mstory of science; Irishmen azid Spaniards are 
scarcely to be found*" (19&70 p*114o)
But then Gillespie dissociates all tills from belief and claims thaÿ
"the forces are sooiologioalB not doctrinal#" (ibid p#115o) Surely
the very facets he has enumerated as the Galvlnistlc behaviour
patteums cannot be dlssooiated from the tSieological doctrizies froni
whioh they derived? Gillespie here follows a common tendency = to
see the comtection, and then assert that it is but the sociological
forces of the time at imrk* This avoids the need to ansifer the
question as to where these sooiologicsl forces originated; for do not
they thanselves depend on the philosophical, theological and cultural
spirit of the age? And. in times such as the I6tli and 17"*^  centuries,
religion was a domiyiantg if not the doxninant, cultural facet forming
the tmrld'^ spirit of the age*
3*3o marm's TmKfis
i^Uf®«7r-=s2^ tïfinz5sas»u'«
3*5,1 f The %tckground_ to Merton's Thesis* The connection between 
Calvinism and western culture has been olassically formulated by 
Weber (1905)* suggested that the Galvinistic stream of the
Reformation i-ms conducive to, end nourished, the spirit of o^ apitalism* 
He did not sugg^ est a causal relationship, but that Calvinism gave an
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Intellectual snd ethloal baokbone to a featm?e that existed long 
befo3ee the Reformation* In hlo thesig, Weber does not use the 
word 'Gapltallsm' In any pejorative sense, but eli^ xly a 
designation for a cultural and sooial movement tlmt actively 
pursued a profit motive from woz'k baaed on the rational organisation 
of free labour*
Thus While religious ethios influenced the cultural setting end. 
the economic structure of society, the culture end economics in turn 
inf].uenoed the religious structures of the day# This tvfo^ 'way 
influence tezids to militate against ^%y simple analysis and the 
picture becomes difficult to untangle* The issue is a complex one 
involving economic, ecclesisl, social, scientific and political 
factors* It is therefore difficult to come to concrete ccmclusiozis, 
cpiite apart from the personal bias that distorts investigation#
Investigations on this topic date from 18?5 %'fhen Alphonse de 
Candolle published a statistlOEl analysis of historical 
development of science# (Cf* Kemsley 1968, ppoGI'^ B?) This 
classified leading scientists of international reputatioai who were 
mesibers of the Academy of Science bo'Ween 1666 and 1869* He
determined that 71 out of 92 foreign members of the Aoedeay were non» 
Catholic, whioh lie labelled Protestent; 16 were Catholic; end tlie 
remaining five Jewish or indetez^ ninate* Of 22 British members, 
none were Catholic * These figures have to be set alongside the
general population totals outside of ZTrence ifhich in 1873 were 107 
million Catholics and 68 million Protestants* 8o there ifere 3 
Catholics for every 2 Protestants in the general population; ifhile 
in science there ivere 4 Protestants for every 1 Catholic# These 
figures, hotyever, take no account of French scientists and Candolle 
extended his studies to examine the background of forei^ meDibers of 
the Royal Society in 1829 1869 ysars when French members in the
Society were high* Bo found that in both years forel^ members of 
the Society were rou^üy divided bet^ yeen Catholics and non^Catholiosg 
yet the general population outside of the "United Kingdom if/aa 139 
million Catholics and only 44 million Protestants* That iss iWle 
there was a 4si ratio of Catholics to l^otestants in tlie general 
population^ there was a 1s1 ratio in the Society.
JaPelseneer (of# liall 1963/b, ppo69e70g Kemsley 1968, p@82o) 
in 'L'Origine Protestante de la Soienee Moderne' - published in 1946 « 
extended this study of religious affiliations back into the I6th
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century and shoiffeJ that of 250 Individuals respcmslhle for over 
300 important golentlflo puhlioationa (from ISSI-^ léGO) the majmzlty 
were either Protestent or sympathetic to the Protestant movement#
For the last 20 years of this period the ratio of Protestant to
Oatholie authors beoame as high 6:1# Thus he oonoluded that
Âmodem solenoe bom of the Reformation#
3#3.2# Merton's Thesis# Merkon ifrltess
"It is the thesis of this study that the Puritan ethic, as 
an ideal*»typloal expression of the value««attitude8 basic to 
asoetio Protestantism generally, so oanaliaed the interests 
of 8eventeenthf«oentury Englishmen as to constitute one 
important elexiu^ t in the ehhanoed cultivation of science #
The deep-rooted religious interests of the day demanded in.t- •'»■•' x^ :X3415SX«.-æT^ yVr4Ht-nMÎ^  W
their forceful implications the systomatio, rational, and 
empirical study of Nature for the glorification of God in 
His works and for the control of the corrupt world*"
(1957» pp.20«21.)
The basis of his thesis is the belief that the main influence of
Puritanism for science was t^ iat the natural world, should be studied,
in order to glorify God. Other features aiding this were the 
acceptance of Baconiazi rational mapiriolsm, and hence the utility of 
inquiry; the quest to imgprove social t-Telforeg the Puritan stress on 
Hiethodical industry; the use of zeason to curb the passlozis %Y^hi(^ji 
led to rlgoT'cus thought conducive to science; and the belief that 
creati.on possessed an order which inquiry would reveal. These had 
existed before isolated features, but the Pizritans brought them 
together and gave them a new and forceful emphasis* Merton claims 
to hove shown the close association between Puri'banism and 
scientific inquiry; and while conceding that Purittmism and science 
were seporato systtms of development, argues that there z^ ere sets of 
va3,ues beliind both iixhich were congenial and supportive#
Like Weber, Merton does not posit a C8.U8G3. c^imection; he does 
not claim that Calvinism or Puritanism brou^t forth science, only 
that the spirit of both was congenial, so forming a favourable climate 
for tûiem to Interact. The thesis itself is amply supported by the
factual basis on which It is built# There are "bjo questions that 
have to be answered s (a) why. did scientific progress occur in 17th
4* Interestingly a survey concerning the background of Aaerioan 
scientists points to their coming predominantly fcom the sm^l 
denominational colleges of the Middle West# Of. Gillespie (19&7) 
p*115; Knapp and Goodrich (1952) p@274a
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century end (b) why was this largely in the phyalca]. and
astronomical eolenoes? The anewer of Merton lie s  In  the crose- 
fertlllsatlcm betxfeen science and ascetic Protestantism, and he 
estahlishes this fï?om the etatlatlos available alcmg with the 
testimony of other Turrit ere from within tlmt period* Time hie 
argument revolves round the provision of a change in values 
aaooclated id.'kh Puritanism that ime crucial for the develo]ment of 
modem soiezicG#
While tlie motives indicated by 'khe virtuosi may be 
s^ ationalisationa, the list of names who provide testimony is 
formidable »= Boyle g 3layg Willug^yg John Wilkins, <me of the leading 
personalities of the Invisible College, who mmried Cromwell'e sister 
and later became an jhiglican bishop; Wallis: haakg Papin, a French 
Calvinietg Sydenham and Petty, both followez^ of Crom-rellg and Sir 
Robert Moray ( or î%rr@y), described by Huygens the 'Soul of the 
Royal Society', of whom it could be said "religion was the mainspring 
of his life, sad amidst courts and ooRips he spent many hours a day in 
devotion*" (Dictionary of National Biography , XIII, p#1299«) Those 
men were religious iz% a rellgicus age, but it would be tendencious to 
Buggest that they were only so out of customary usage when they talk 
piously and worshipfully of the 'glozy of God.'
"(In the contrary, it is more often necessary to resiind 
omzselveB that these words were then seldom used without 
their accompaniment of meaning, and that their use did 
generally innply a, heightened intensity of feeling*"
(GcNoOlark 1929, 9*323.)
It becomes clear that some element of Protestantism pervadel 
science and mo titivated men to pursue the study of nature * There
& ctmcem for social welfare, furthered aa ma%i, throu^ science 
and teclmology, learned to have dtminion over the 3?est of creation. 
Labour and diligence tfere features of Puritan life-style, and os 
8prat indicated the 'Art of Experiment' was aZdhi to this in the 
province of science. In the Ihariton spirit 'there was a blending 
of reason and proctical usefulness# The basic values of diligence 
in one's calling and systematic lol)our imre combined with a rational 
approach cultivated in order to remove eamess passion. So in a 
real t'jay the values of raticmali-igr and empirical need wezze brought 
together#
The Puritan attitude to the church involvtxl the ne^tlon of the 
divine right of kings; "the va3.1dlty of lay pârtloipation; and an
appeal to Sorlpture rather tïmn eoclealal authority# Parallel 
with thio In solenoa there the rejeotlcm of eocloelal 
interferenoe In a sphere that not its conoeam; a oall for the 
lower ranks of society to he izwolved In a blending of orafte and 
theory (of* Ramm and Boyle); aaid an appeal to the book of nature 
ratîier then received dockrines# But perhaps over all there Tzas 
the comnon rejeotlcn of authoritarianism « tïiere to he an equal 
priesthood before God and before nature (Hooke stresses this)#
In religion there was to he a retmm to the Book of Scripture; in 
soienoe a return to the Book of Nature*
"What was needed was a constant interest in searching for
this order in nature in an empirioo-raticmal fashion, 
that is, an active interest jn this world and its 
coonrrences pins a specific frame of mincl* With 
Protestantism, religion provided this interest s it 
actually inposed obligations of intense concentration 
upon Beoular activity wi'kh mi emphasis eaqperience and 
reason as bases for motion and belief»" (Merton 1957p p.SS.)
Merton (ibid p»37*) then tume to the more general ooneideration of 
the 'Value Integration of Pietism and Science', and notee that 
pietist leaders such as Francke and Comenius emphasl8«sd the new 
science* Francise end Thomasiue built the foimd-ations of the 
"UhiverBi'ty of Halle, 'the first German university to introduce a 
thorou^ training in the sciences Likewise the universities of 
KonigBbcrg, Gottingen, Heidelberg and Altdorf all reflect the ascetic 
Protestant interest in scientific endeavour#
In M s  1957 revision of his thesis Mer-kon concludes with four 
points* (a) I'Jhile Luther and Galvin were indifferent and 
ambivalent to science, nevertheless there was deriving from Galvin 
a religious ethic ^ Aich produced a mentality and val^ ue-^ o^rlentati.on 
congenial 'bo the pursuit of science# (b) As time passed the 
valueN)rlentation "develops some degree of fimctional. autonomy#"
(ibid p#54*) (o) Ethic and mentality can be effective even when
"below the threshold of awareness of many of those Involved in it»" 
(ibid pa54#) (d) The 1$th century clash bet^ reen Bolence and
religion tende to obscure the less visible, but perhqps more 
si^ifican'^ relationship outlined above*
Before turning to recent intmqiretatlons of i^ lerton, several 
problems should be noted* The fact of a high number of religiously 
orientated people ifithi&i the Royal Society does not indicate ner ^  
that this involvement stemmed froan a religious ethic* The question
Is blurred by the additional foctm? that the Gonameroial and 
Industrial Glasses tended to Protestantism and aolenoeg lAile the 
more résistant fWdal seotlcms of society 'lended to Gathollolsmo
S!hero ie no general Gonseneue ocmoeming 
the relatlcmehlp of Puritanim^Oalvinlem to eoienoe#
PerepeGt;lval* Soholare like Kerton(l957)e Boo&yaaa (1975)
and Dlllenberger (I96I) point to some form of parallel eplrlt in the 
t%fo enterprises but reih?aln from drm^lhg osusal inferenoes# They 
see the Piiritmi etiilo (derived f^om Galviniem) creating a miitable 
environment for soienee end refrain from developing this point# (Of# 
3*5*) Oertainly this adequately aoooimts fora the mmber of 
Protestonta Involved la the soienoesg tlie general look of interest in 
the Lu'theran stremi of the keformationg and the u^ )@urge of intereet 
in I&iglandp Scotland, the Netherlands and the Protestant aectore of 
France#
«, at%/j.« 3.4*4* onA 3*5*) Others, such as Ma8om (1953)
go further and indioate a more oaimal Influeztoe stemming from 
Eefoszmed theology. There was "a certain ooogcuity heti'ieen the more 
abstract elements of the Protestant theologies and the theories of 
modezgz eoienoe." (Masm 1953@ P*101#) points epecifioally to
the Goinoidenco of oentres of European scientific activity being 
oonBietezitly contrée of Celvinistio eccleelaétical reform "» such as 
the Puritans in England, the Ilugenots in l^ eance, ezid Dutch Galvinlam#
5*4*1*3* DisjwiGtivBo (Cf. 3*4*2» and 3*4»3*) The third position 
rejects any firm cmmection (of. Singer 1926, ilsbb
(Xemsley 1968, 9*86.), for example, euggeatg that both elements 
science and religion »' stem from a 17th century epirit of revolution#
.leAa&A DoB.iWoley (19689 pp.74-102.) Beviewing the evidence of
Merton etc., he cmicedes that a general Protestant predilection for 
ooienoo seems incontrovertible# However he goes on to disengage any 
firm oorrelatlcm aud enumerate areas wM.ch undermine Merton#
(a) He argues tliat Mason is erroneous in attributing the principle of 
a non«llteral approach to Scripture (necesgary for compatibility of 
science and rellgicm) as a midi^ seventeenth century phenomentm#
Kemaley adaiite this approach was used 1%r Galvin, mad pz'eviously by 
others like -John Oolet and John Ghryaostom* He goes on:
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"In general. It cannot be eald timt oolentlflc theories 
or discoveries were either retarded by one "understanding 
of partioular biblical texts ref earring to nature, or,
Qonvemely, em^led to develop tlirough a eupixaged 
enlightenment and emEmoipatlon from the lalble of 
'eolentifieellyk.mlnded' men." (ibid 9p@89o9G#)
I notes (a) that l^ tason ie oorreet "that while this tradition of 
interpretation under preaaure from literal approaches it did 
ooaitinue into the 1?th oentury (b) Horton does ziot
argue from tex"buol materials but from the general spirit of Calvinism *
(b) Kemsley then points to the eonfuslcm of terms ™ betweim 
'Protestant', 'Calvinistio' and 'Puritanism'# It is "true tlmt for 
Candolle 'protestant' is a gg^ neral category to cover non—GatWlics 
and in this way it is fairer to tall^  of Pro'kestsnt and not Puritan 
involvement* But here he himself confuses the use of the word
Puritan o He ins tances Bprat as the propoimder of "quite definite 
enti^ -Puritan statements" and attacks Herton, Hoo&yeas and others 
because they "neither refer to nor discuss Sprat's remarks," (ibid 
p#92m) But Hookyaas does discuss 8;prat and sees a quite different 
pictured (Hbdkyaas 19730 p#144fo) Kemsley is in faot guil'ky of a 
restrictive usage of the word 'Puritan' when, for the post^-Bestoration 
period he is discussing, he should be allowing a more general usage 
of the term* Perhaps the designation of Calvinism is more precise
than Purj.tane But the fact la that generally those involved stand 
in the non-Lu'bhoran aide of "kho Reformation» There is a distinctive 
Calviniatio eulturo, but no equally diatinotive I^ itheran culture*
(o) Next he attacks "the wel^it plax^ ed cm the of 'the
glory of God' and 'the benefit of man'» Neither, he claims, is 
indicative of Protestantism or Puritanlem^ (Kemaley I968, p»93«)
From this I conclude that he either hae not read, or read without any 
empathy, such works as Calvin's 'Institutes' or the xwitings of a 
Puritan like Boy3.e# The fact that he instances usage of these terms 
prior to the Reformation is irrelevant — it waa after all a re— 
formation g whioh Implies a going back to the oa?igizial sources, namely 
the book of Scripture and the book of nature*
He criticises the argument that drmm on the volume of literature
concerning gcionoe produced during the Puritan era* Be quotes 
figures (ibid p#95&) which show a percent age drop of scientific imrks 
between 1490 aaid 1640* If tMe means anything it ommts not only 
against Puritanism's iü^act on ecience, but militates against the rise
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of science Itself*
(e) Kemwley then pointe out that Marton's thesis plays down the 
positive role of oilier aspects of the Ohristlaa fai'k&i — 'Uhe role of 
the Oathollo ohuroh up to Galileo and the non—sectarian nakure of 
solenoe* But it does not alter #ie fact that 1,t wfU3 not until the 
17th omitmy, and pa^ lmarlly in reformed areas of Europe, that modem 
gcien.oe bloseomeda These foots require adequate explanation, not 
explaining mfay by raielDg different and more nelm].o%8 faotora» On 
the secular side he appeala to Greeliam Oollege, the Baoonian Influenoe 
and Bprat'o hletosi^ y* But these features imre themselves hound up 
with the general lUrl'ben worldview (of# 3*2*1*) They therefore 
hardly oomit as seoular, as opposed to religions groimda. Kemeley 
notes the diotlnotioh by Daoon of a Book of Nature and a Book of 
Boripture, and euggesto this revoola that religion Izas %zo Interest
in solence. But to dlotinguioh botwoeo the ophoroB of theology and 
the natural oolenoeB la not to negate the guiding- priuolples of faith 
over both spheres. Indeed Baoon could write:
"The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason æ  
to the will of man; so ümt as fare to obey M.e low, though 
W0 find a relimtatlon Izi' our will, eo are to believe his 
word, thou^ we fl%id a z^ eluotatlon in our reaooa# For if we 
believe only that irjhioh le agreeable to our sense, we give 
oonsent to the matter, and not to the author*#*»"
(1974., P.2OÜ3)
(f) 'She failiiïs of '!3ie olcleï? scisjissa wis the lack of ampirlaal 
asaeesment of primory evidence and It woe the pursuit of this, 
he argils, that led to the nm-y science* But this leaves tlie 
question of wliy there should be tlzle eni^ hasig at this time*
Lastly he extensively utilises Sprat to show that there is a
dlohotmgy between aolence and religion # Be goes on to conclude 
that: "Religious denominational labels are 8lHg)ly not sufficient to 
explain all known aspects of the phenomenon." (op olt p#102.) But 
I#rtong Hookyaas and I-ïascm do not claim that such a lM)el ie the sole 
explanatory agent# It is a %ei'%elet engendered by spécifie 
worldvleTfîo that le crucial, not their denominational label*
Kemeley'c argumente seem to reveal a predisposition against 
religion and are an izzconcluslve discrediting of the thesis under 
consideration# The choice is to accept the etatistlcal approach 
eonjojued with the testimony of the scientlgte themgelveg, or a more 
complicated argument which atrlvee for a diejunotive view.
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3*4*3* AeRoHall, In 'I'Herton Revisited' (1963) he attacks Merton'B 
theeie in a poeitlvo philoeopïiioal way* Perhaps it lo indicative 
of the approach of Mall that in hie hooli: 'Fb^ om Galile to Newton'
(1970) he attriTmtes rnily about five pages (pp*344-349) out of 379 
tliB topic of 'religion and science'. Clearly he doee not otmeider 
religion a eignifleant feature and tMe is in fact a necessary 
corollary of his 'intemalistio' approach to tlie history of science 
(of# 9*3*1*) Merton envisages science as a cultural artifact in 
need of sociological explanation* Mall, however, clainis that idiile 
this 'exteamolistio' approach was popular in the 1920's and 1930^8, it 
is not so today* "Clearlyhe imites, "externalist explanations 
of the history of science have lost their interest as w ell as their 
interpretative capacity." ( Mall 1963/h@ p*71*) This is a sweeping 
generalisation flatly denied by the recent Open Mniversity course on 
'Science and Belief* ifhioh followed an extemalistic approach*
Mall, by virtue of his intemolistic framework, finds little time 
for religious or other cultural features. With appeal to counter- 
instances to Protestant involvement (which involves dairying that 
Bacon and Boyle were not Puritan in aa%r sense of the word!) he argues 
that the link proposed by Morton is  not essential to the development 
of science, (ibid p.59*) But he fails to make distinction between 
an efficient/sufficient agency, and a necessary cause. Like Kemsley, 
he is intent on underpinning the thesis of Merton and does not seem to 
appreciate the role of overfall iTorldviews or paradigms as recepticles 
neoeesary to contain a l l  facets of thought, and whioh must be conducive 
to the flourishing of particular lines of thought before they w ill 
develop in a comprehensive and coherent manner. Hall 
compartmentalises thou^t and criticises Merton for not doing so; but 
iforldvie^ m must be looked at on a brood front and not as exclusive to 
some discipline.
Mall claims that Merton summed up the era of the socio-economic 
historian and that Koyre opened that of the intellectual historiozi*
In arguing for the validity of the internal is tic approach, H all notes 
that "the history of science is strictly onalogous to the history of 
philosophy. I t  is  no accident tliat Koyre himself is  a philosopher*" 
Me continues 8 "modem science is of its oim intellectual right 
fundamental and absolute; i t  is not derivative from some other 
displacement in civilisation as the reformation or the rise of 
capitalism." (ibid pp*68,69*) This is a philosophical premise I
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find imacoeptable as It presupposes that phllosopl:^  Itself Is 
neutral to oulturel forces and takes place within an intellectual 
vacuum» (Of» lleô; 18»5; 20a3o)
3p4*4% B.Maagn (1953) argues for a positive appreciation of the role 
of religiouo belief in the rise of modem science » 3Ie notes the 
benefit of no Inquisition in Pz^ otestant circles, whioh removed fear 
of reprisal and opened the door to free ei^onlation ccmceming 
acientifio xoatters» More germane, however, wae the congmence of 
Protestant theology and ethics with scientific activity; the 
utiilieing of soience for religious ends g and the agreement bettmen tlie 
cosmic theories of modem science mid Protestant theology» For 
]i%8on both Luther and Calvin set the tone for a more rational 
experimental approach to reality in their rejection of authoritarianism» 
Friestly authority was rejected as were the received traditions in the 
field of science (Galen and Aristotle)» The Puritans stressed the 
religioue obligation of "doing good wo:dm' and placed scientific
activity in tMs category» Mason glvës the exmiple of John Cotton
q
whzm he quotes as limiting:
"To study t W  nature, and course, and use of all God's worïœ 
is a duty isgposed by God on all sorts of meng from the King
that sitteth upon the 'j^ hmne to the Artificer
(Cottons In Mason 1953* po103*)
80 I^^cm contends that a religious orientation permeated the 
consciousness of those that comprised the Eoyal Society at its 
inception, emd concludes a more causal iDiplication tlian %#rt(m»
"The anti«^thoritarianlsm and en^irlcal individualism common 
to the early Protestant end modern scientist gave at best a 
relation of congruity, lAiile the later Oâlvinist promotion 
cf good works gave a positive impulse to scientific activity»' 
(Mason 1953o po103o)
5» TOMABBS A 0AU8AM#apmril^ iie#p]mwoN
hi-.astMig^ rriS?JBgam.wo3?a«^ aE;4T5arg:i'£UEagyjjtyrrei;>rag^’yjM^^
I4uoh confusion abounds concerning this topic, but those who oppose 
the thesis of OŒmection fail to provide adequate alternatives» (Of* 
Eookyaas 1974/8.* p»25o) Gare has to be talcen over terms lilce 
'Puritan* and 'Golvinism', but in general it con be said that those 
of this disposition were inclined, more than others, to take an active 
interest in science» Further, it was an interest that sotf in science
5» Of» DillenT^ erger (196I) p»129» Here he envisages Cotton a; 
opposed to science»
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mi added to faith In God» But It ïmd not yet beoome, as
it would with DeiE#g a fotmdation for faith,
t?SîAr.U54sriS33Ui3!H
1)0 suggest that the oonnoGtlan between soieiioe and 
religlcm Is more GEmsal tlrian Merton allmm* It seems to me i\o?on@ 
to reduce the influence of the Reformation to a mere ethos, for 
there were positive elements in its theology that require to be given 
their place# To this theolo^ we con ce3?tainly add the general 
spirit of freedom and Individualism and deep love of nature aa God's 
creatlan» IVhatever the view from our century, there were tliose 
twitizAg in the 1?th century who saw a positive benefit aodz^ iing to 
science from the Reforaiation. Richard bostooke could claim that 
the Reformation of religion was Indispensible to the reforxaation of 
medicine; iiAiile John Gotten, a puritan divine, oould see the study 
of nature as a positive Ghrletion duty. (Of* Mason 19530 ppo100,103*)
The followers of Calvin reveal a positive, if sommjhat minced 
attitude towards science » Zanohe maintained that theology should 
not be separated from physios and defended the PtolŒaaic system 
against CopernicuB - this in 1$97« But not @11 theologimm were 
t^ms inclined and s "In the Netherlands the most influential Eeformed 
theologian of the beginning of the seventeenth century, André Rivet, 
was favourably inclined towards Oopemicanism." (Hookyaas 1973* p»131o) 
Van Lansbergen also propo^ted Gopemican theories, pointing out that 
Scripture was not "acewding to the real situation Imt aooordlng to 
appearances»" (ibid p.lS)#)^ ' 5oripture mig^t be the text for 
instruction in doctrine and righteousness, but not geometry and 
astronomy# In this conteact Kepler commented that "our senses,too, 
have their own Iciad of truth»" (Kepler 1609, p*21f#) There was a 
recognised modal diversity of truths, poetio and aesthetic as well as 
scientific and dootrinal# Today we seem to have lost this and 
became enmeshed in a net of Euclidean propositions - the enshrinement 
of rationalised scientific propositions of one fozmi or a^ iother ag the 
only possible trutli»
There ore diverse doctrines and attitudes flmjing from Galvin 
which may be construed as giving positive iogpetus to science.
3#5»1o The GreatoTGhip of God» (Cf ohSoSS and 23) Firm belief in the
t5S23ï2sC£xr^ r===CM-K2;ieyiB«irp™:»$sv.is*?^ B5s3::>itiiüSfcasx:05isyr55z.^  ^ ^ p
6o Hookyaas (1973) p=133f points to: "The relatively strong position 
of Gopemiosnism and New Philosophy in general in the Protestant 
countries is emphasised by the tendxmcy of Rommi Catholics.#ooto 
identify Copemlcanism end Protestentism##.»"
72
of God led to firm belief In natural physical law.
No longer was nature againet grace, or under It, as loifer to higher» 
Nature was not the h*me of the demonlo but the oreature of God#
Thezxa was under Galvin a restoration of the î^dieval Im^Midea (minus 
any ocmoept of autonomy). Perhaps the lœy ims the new motive of 
'oreation, fall into sin, and redemption in Jesus Christ' whioh 
replaced iÆie dualistio motives# (Cf#18#1*1#2; Appendix A#) Instead 
of reality viewed as split into realms of nature and grace there was 
one unified structure of nature which grace permeated and 
penetrated in the sustaining activity of the Greatcw# (Gf# Wolters 
1975/b) Within this motive law was seen, in all aspects, as 
derivative from God. Ryen the fall into sin could not obliterate 
the lawk=8tructure of the cosmos within wMch man must live and worlc# 
Law was tlie basic foundation for the realil^p and an understanding 
by man, of the unity and diversity that existed in the created cosmos# 
(Gfo Reid 1966, ppoGOgGio)
3j95s.8».JteÆi>Æ_o£JMo Some claim that iMs eoaoopt is not 
gecaliaz' to Oalvim (ef« Kemsley)o Indeed it ifoiiM be straiijc^  if it 
were; but tlmt does not obviate the fact that Galvin took this 
concept and mode it the foimtainhead of his thought» The 'glory of 
God* was revealed in nature as well as Scripture # He wrlteaa
"Meanwhile, being placed in this most beautiful theatre, let us not 
decline to take a pious delight in tlie clear and manifest works of 
God#" (inst# 1.14«20 - I960, p#83*) Man, by understanding this 
creation, was more able to praise and glorify God in this life»
The theme of the ^ory of God expressly revealed in nature was 
utilised by Kepler who was himself accused of orypto-Galvinismo
"I am speakizig of the Book of Nature, wïilch is so hi^s^y 
es-Wemed in the Holy Scriptures# 8t# Paul admonished the 
Heathens to reflect on God within themselves as they would 
Wi til® 81m  in the water or in a mirror. l^ %y then should 
we Christians delight the less in this reflection, seeizig 
that it is our proper t^k to honour, to revere and to admire 
God in the true i%y? Our piety in this is the deeper the 
greater is our awareness of creation and of its grandeur#
Truly, how many hymns of praise did not David, His faithful 
servant, sing to the (bmator, i^ ho is none but God aloneS 
In this his mind dwelled reverently on the contemplation of 
the Heavens# . The Ileaviaas, he sings, declare the glory of 
God.000 Thus, in what follows, let us free the very tongxies 
of the heavens and of nature so that their voices may resound 
all the louder; and when we do so let no one accuse us of 
vain and useless efforts#" (Kepler 1996 * ppe7g8«)
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8o there ifere t^ ;o books t&mt revealed the glory of God Soripture
Tand nature» Since God Is Creator and Suetainer man o@a, and le '
Galled to, rniderstand all the works of God# But Calvia clearly 
aaw tlmt man was never oap^le of esdmustlve ImowlWge# The Imr 
of nature "because of Its divine origin lo never wholly subject to 
human rational anslysls." (Reid 1966, pp.66,67a) (Cfo InstltuteB 
1,5,9s a-,2,l3ff,)
(c.f,24,2,8, ) it is in this setting
that the call to work is to be oeen. The mythology foigted on 
Calvin and hie followers le that they emz themselveo elected to 
selvatlon and hence woaiced hard eo se to prosper and gain 
reaaeurance# Nothing could dloplay a more fundamental lack of
mideretanding of 3Wormed theology# The very suggestion smaclica of 
'galvetion by works' == a theme which Luther and Calvin were totally 
opposed to* To read their iforka, or any of the great Eefozmed 
confeaeionsp is to find a different concept of work# Eooltyaae,
Gcmmenting on the 'Netherlands Oonfeggion', notes that what is there 
enshrined is the reality of woa±8 as a fruit, not an exercise in
^  •GsœOjensîKi'ÆS::» ^
self^reassurance. "These are not the words of tortured souls, but 
of those that ham achieved libes^ atimi." (lïookyaas 1973* p»104#) 
There was a positive attititde to work — all work# G^uowledge and 
ability imre gifts from God# In fact there a strong 
utilitarian emphasis llmt created empathy with the Grafts and also 
united with theoretical aspects# ]}^)lere was a worldview that at last 
united theory and crafts (of. 1o5»4; 1*5o4; 1@6§ 1o7#) Whether
minister or cobbler, preacher or magistrate, all were called by Gkid 
to imrk within their oim sphere of calling to the glory of God# (Cf* 
Institutes 5o10*6o) This is illustrated in the life of Oalviti 
himself i^ iere there is a broad spectrum of cultural involvement#
"he lent the aoumen of his mind and legal training to a 
codification of the city's 1mm, and to the best adjustment 
of its tæmsoo.oTho city's health was the better for his 
aid in construotion of sewers and the erection of hospitals»
He concerned himself with the methods of heating and 
protection against fire; throu#% him tjifie weaving industry 
was zzevived#" (H=0.Taylor 1920, Tol@I pp#423*4240)
% Note the repeated usage by a modem refoznned thinker like 
Schaeffer of the Baconian statement that men "fell at the same time 
his state of iimocenoy end from his dominion over creation»
Both these losses, oan even in tMs life be in smte part repaired; 
the fprmer by religion and faith, the latter by arts and sciences#" 
(This quotation from Eemsley 1968, p,97=)
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Oaonected to the mythology of work Is the mythology of 
prodestination# Thle is Interpreted as providing a determinative 
oausallty In the mrea of man's relationship with God that had 
parallels with the rising meohanletlo oauaallty in Boienoe# (Gf. 
Hookyaaa 19739 pp«107—1Ü9& Mason 1962e P0I8I#) This will not 
do# For Galvia predestination ifas under the area of salvation, not 
provideaoe# There was in foot little temdenoy to detemiinism in 
Galvin and in  th is he was oloaer to Sootiam and Oresmo» Nor can 
this he seen as a restoration of Greek atomism, for the mechmilstic 
philosophy that arising emphasised the olever machinery of God 
lAo controlled all a haoio belief that was diametrically opposed 
to the blixid fate of the atomicts# God, not fate, sailed# This 
ZFule ifas now seen as direct smd absolute; gone were the older 
hierarchies of power by idiich a series of intermediaries (ongels) 
stood between man and God*
(of, 19.3.5; 24.2.1.) %hl8
dootrinc saw truth and value in the wodcs and thought of all men,
Œmistian or not, at all levels of cultural life» The Fall was
extensivon not intensive, iai its effect# Here again one feels at
times that Calvin's doctrine of the Fall is not fully understood.
Galvin can write that still have:
"some residue of intelligence and judgcDient as well as will# 
#ae»To charge the intellect with perp@tue3. blindness so as 
to leave it no intelligence of any description whatever. Is 
repugnant not only to the Word of Gcd@ but to common 
@3[perlen.ceaQ#QThereforep in re^jzig profane (mthors, the 
admirable li^t of truth displayed in them should remind us, 
t)iat the human mind, however much fallŒi and perverted fTtm 
its original integrity, is still adorned and invested with 
admlrabie gifts fr<m its Creator»" (Ihst. 2#2o12fo -1560* 
PP.131-133»)
Thus C^vln I'iss willing to leam from the pagan end had a
8remarkably open attitude to many phases of thought»
cioe-fetae wipea to
further a spirit conducive to soiree, for hero the individual was 
responsible for reading the Book of Scripture and the Book of Nature 
by himself# Each was to find the truth and not to rely on external 
authority of elmroh or tradition# It ims in the application of 
this that the unlearned began to be utilised in the collection of
8» Indeed John Donne praised him, for whereas Melanchthon would 
assert 'it can be no otbertfise@..'g Calvin wuld say 'it scans 'bo 
be thu8»oo* (Ebdkyaas p*120»)
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data foæ some of the botanical and Boolo^ical soionoeoo (Of*
Hookyaaa 1973^ #*110*) Aspoots that do not sg&aæe with the 
'rroteetant Ethic**
RcæiptMæe* iHaoy have claimed that the Reformers were tied 
to a literalistic view that demanded a trenchant defence against 
the new science* $hl8 coold not be farther from the tratho 
Indeed in the ^7th Gentnr#* Voetina recommended a Roman Catholic 
commentary on GeneciR rather then Calvin*8 because he thought Calvin 
was too loose in his approach to Scripture via the principle of 
accommodation* %he charge of literalism is "not borne out by the 
facts*" (ibid p*115*) Typically Wilkins claimed in the 17th 
century that we can derive neither ArletotelianlGm nor OopemlcanlGm 
from the Bible as it was written in ordinary language* Be used 
Calvln*8 eMGgetlcal principles and quoted him eoteneively* The 
Bible was only Infallible from the pre^theoretical viewpoint; the 
truths of which were not to be confused with the truths of 
theoretical thoughf* A typical example is Kepler's explanation 
of Joshua commanding the sun to be still ™ from the pre"theoretical 
viewpoint it Is the sun that moves* (Kepler I609e ppo21*&5o)
Calvin's approach was an empirical one centred on a simple 
grammatioomhistorical exegesis over against the tendencies to 
spiritualise and allegorise* (Cf* Packer 19749 P«95ffa) #h@ Bible 
was to be taken as meaning simply what It said from the perspective 
of the ordinary person* So when Joshua talked of the sun standing
still it was quite simple what scientist refrains from talking of 
a mmset* Of importanoeg however^ was Calvin's method which was 
essentially empirical and bad therefore obvious affinities with the 
methods of the new sclenc@e
a«aÆ»jgSBa^3LBttsa»
rnSosmers like CalTla saâ aw* axe 
renowned for their educational vision* An important oonnoction 
between education and science can be "braced tlirou^ i PaRaimzs (of* Reid 
1966g p*62ff*)e a Oopemlcang w W  claimed that the experienoe of the 
unlearned was wort3i more than the authority of the ancients; stressed 
the need to gather facts and not gtiake speoulative hypotheses; and 
noted that at Basle the interest in science was due to the 
Reformation 0 thou^ he could point to economic factors (mining) in 
Germany* Eamus helped to further the unifying of head and hendg 
end this Influence on the Puritans was crucial*
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"Ga^ eehsm College in E^ iglendg BdixaWcgh Qhiveralty in 
Sootland end IWvarâ College 1%% I'WeaGhusetts @11 begsm 
their exlstenoe primarily as Ramiat Institutions* Mded 
to thle Rmrns received much attention lii the Retherlsaide 
and Germsmy*" (Reid 1966g ppa76g77*)
A of Slatyre* Along with the spirit of freedom that 
prevailed there was awakened a love for nature In many Protestant 
Bclentlsts# TMo tme a corollaKy of the doctrine that all should 
leem to reed the hook of nature* An exenqplo wae when Bernard 
Pallesyg a Ruguenotg haoame angry with woa&men heoanae of tlielr 
maltreatment of trees*
Prom these seven aspeots it seems wrong to charge Oalvin(iaa)
^^th a negative or destructive attitude to eoience for Wth his o»m 
wtxdce and the spirit he a&venoed i;ere oondueive to the pureuit of 
eoience* Calvin's stress on the objeotlvity of nature and the need 
to acquire the facts pertaining to the world are indicative of the 
basic roles that the eeientiet \m8 to eaeimeo But if Galvin 
streesea. the need to read the hook of nature^ he was also clear in 
pointing out that there always a surd which wae beyond anslysie* 
"This does not result from somo obduracy of nature g but rather from 
the mystery of God the creator and upholder of all things (Reid 
1966g p*75«) 3h other wordsg tdiile true knowledge was poeclble 
for man and should be sou^tg it ims nevertheless not exhaustive 
knowledge* Today it is iB^ Kxrtmit to see tMs emphasis that 
knowledge does not need to be exhaustive to be true* Theoretical 
t^ ioug^ t is by nature an ^stractlcn from reality and ac such can 
never be exhaustive*
3*5A&L Bmio j^aZmeesee* There were however weaknesses in the 
Galvinictic position which must not be jessed over* Tiie essential 
thrust was tliat of teaching^ not researchg and the Impetus to science 
ims left to the individual genius with little encoursigement coming 
frcm the choroh* This was compounded by a failure to utilise 
mathematics and an eB^haeis on the qualitative as composed to the 
quantitative with respect to natural phenomena* These features 
meant that the latent potential of the Galvinietlo rjorldviow 
never fully r@ali.8ed* Indeed as the Reformation became dissipated 
in the humsnlsm of the age (involving a regression to Aristotellanism) 
Galvinism became a diluted force in society*
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3.^ ,,
la ctmoluslon of tills brief review of the Immediate Importmioe 
of the Reformation to sGieaoe it is iforth noting that a modem 
scientist of the mputatioa of OppŒiheimer oan olaim that without 
the Refo&matlcn worldview sGitmcog as we know it g would not haws 
arisen; and he goes on to claim that the ^ jorldview of today could 
not ham given birth to modem soience* (Of* Oppenheimer 1962*)
At a fmadomental %ÆiilosophiG@l level Ga].vla eppealed to the 
"philoBophically homeless students of nature" because of his basic 
rejection of A ristotle'and scholastic dualism* (Reid 1966g pa98$)
He ifas the first to really offer any ohange on a systematic basis 
and this could not be lost even idien BeB&@ lik e  IWlenChthoug trie d  
to reinstate Aristotle» Thus msm like Ramus g Palissyg Parcg 
Kepler end Baeoup as well as the Puritans p transmitted a positive 
stimUluB to scientj«fic endeavour»
But the in it ia l tlirust was lost g the unified motive dissipated^ 
and the scholastic d ie leo tio a l motive o f nature^grace ' a^instated» 
(Of# Booyeweerd 1969g Vol»Ig p»511») Thus I  conclude that the 
influence of Calvinism on science is indirect if we are refeasring 
to specific s c ie n tific  doctrines; but d irect i f  we aaee referring  to  
the general culture created which g^ve birth to modem science»
(This indir@Gt=direot tension is  as i t  should be within the doctrine 
of ephereM3mrereignty «= of» It is here %?ith the
emphasis cn a Im-p-giver (necessary fo r the concept of Im-fs of 
nature »:= o f*1 »1 and oh»2^»); the divine ca llin g  to unfold creation; 
and the bzdnglng together of head end haaadg that we find the 
of modeazn soienoe»
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CRAPTm .. 4 
THE EI8E OP THE UORLDVimf
4 # j^  Trns mmmiiOM, PiaiosopnYctÆ!f.^ Baja:itajtj7ïvy^ jÆiKi'jÆy.fr::rjBr:aj^ yjrcj;CTia3iaaaCTVr^ ffT.ravjaxLJs^ v3:kL.ÿjCTîi»3Ej>cfc^
The 17th century eaw the estabXleliaient of mathematieo end phyoicBo 
I t  was a century of creative insight w ith Isaac Bewton providmg the 
crowning syntheeie. But though Kewton's achievement stands out 9 i t  
does not detract from the genius o f others such as Pascal p Hooke and 
IMygensu In  fact Europe was c le arly  divided in to  two s c ie n tific  
and pMlosophical GOïimunities B rita iii &md the contMent -  the one 
under the influence of Bacon and the other of Bescarteso On the 
continent s c ie n tific  work was centred geographically in  the countries 
of the Reformation •=- Alphonse Boree'lli ‘being the la a t of the great 
Ita lia n  scientists o f the period* In  Holland and Prance the 
phllosopliy of Descartes held sway and i-ms one of the reasons that tlie 
c r it ic a l problem of g rav ity  returned to England* Varions s c ie n tific  
models fo r the structure o f the milverse were being put fonward as 
serious challengers to the trad itio ns of Plato and A ris to tle*
Descartes end B o ro lli tr ie d  to explain e ll  animal activityr, as w ell as 
physical9 on the basis of mechanistic models; Paracelsus, van Helmont 
and i/’ranois tie la. Boo thought the key lay  in  chemical aspects ; while 
Btahl sought a soliition in  a fosri o f vite lioü i* But the key was to 
he the jaochanioel philosophy*
However there was no easy transfer from 1;he thought o f the 16th 
to the 17th  century0 The hold of A ris to tle  and PybhagoroB was s t i l l  
strong and encisted in  tension w ith the rising- atom istic doctrines »
Tims G ilb ert g fo r example 9 could remain caught in  em Avristotellan 
world o f organic structures* P ierre Gassendlp a convinced 
Epicurean9 held that nature was not completely 'transparent to reason9 
and promoted the old atom istic id eal* He brought LDemocri'tus and 
Bpioimis before the 'Republic of Betters* and ensured its  integration  
in to  the increasingly mechanical outlook. The mechanical approach 
was not confined to pliysies Eind astronomy but involved a general 
s p ir it  o f the age which spread across the discip lines* I t  was the 
greatness of Hewtoii to resolve the tension between the Pythagorean 
tra d itio n  of ïiiatîwmatical description and the atom istic mechanical 
philosophy.
A great 'm rie ty  of reasons combined to fa c ilita te  'bh© acceptance 
of the mechanical pMlosophy. (a ) There was the rediscovery of
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Buerotills ' fajnous 'Be Herura Hetiira* in  the previous century#
Despite the a th e is tic  tag that was attached to euoh speculations p i t  
waa read ily  adapted 'by Christian thinkers lik e  Boyle end Oherleton 
who Iiarmoniaed i t  with th e ir  fa ith  in  a positive æid creative manner# 
This new meohanieal way of looking a t things was simpler and clearer 
than the tra iit io n a l 'sympathies' and 'harmonies* -  i t  was easier to 
visualisio and therefore easier to accept# %ie oorpusole could thus 
become p under someone lik e  Boyle g a basic hiiildilng block of matter g 
capable of e:scplalning " a ll the phenomena of things eo3f^poreal." (Brooke 
1974/ a 9 p»70*) (b) Another facet was that western c iv ilis a tio n  was
moving in to  a mechemical age# This was the period of rapid 
development of machines clocks 9 wateri-yorksy vrater and air-pumps 9 
eto.o Here9 toop was the invention of the telescope and ïïiioroscoiJCj, 
both of which were to play important roles in  reduc;lng the observable 
world to meehfcmieal constructs#
(c ) Blit i f  tho' factors influGaoJng the new philosophy were 
practica l and speculative9 they were also re lig io n s . The influence 
of Galvin mediated ‘through KGplea?^  Bacon and Boyle was s i^yiifleant, 
(Of# B u tterfie ld  1973/by p*'î20#) There was a quest to show the 
greatness and orderliness of the Creator's creation* Science fo r  
many was prlmmzily a relig ious aspiration# Brooke claims 3 " I t  is  
impossible to discuss the efstablishment of the mechanical philosophV’
q%53+zïK73»tf.t*iÆSftqï.»:-'Sîï«iiï;Mi*y3jt<.,fi^ i,E^ -tasB2SSiîM'!îiC=::£.ÎA
without reference to theological issues#" (l974/a@ p#50e) Boyle 
could pic'bure the universe as analogous to the gpzeat clock a t 
Strasbourg#
"mfXueneed by the reformed theology of the C alvinists i t  wao 
’ therefore possible fo r Boylo to present the meehanieal 
philosophy as an expression of the Christian philosophy of 
im'biire which stressed the primacy of God's sovereign w ill#"  
(Brooke 1974/&S p»90e)
Hence by l66p when Hooke came to w rite his 'MicrograpMa' he could 
confidently asssert that there Xfss only one philosophy of nature which 
was based on eneperienee and was sGlf-e'vlclently true# The mechanical 
philosophy had come to ru le the thought and labour of men -  and 
despite the breakdoi-m of the Newtonian framework and the advent of 'khe 
new pliysicsy i t  s t i l l  does*
5?he eacaot cm notation of the mechanical philosophy is  open to  
question# At least three positions were posited# (a ) I t  was seen 
as a new concept of causality requiring the re a lity  of meohsmioal
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oontaot and Impact which ruled out occult ocmoepts such as actionnât" 
gWllstanoe» This belief ^ miüLôl be a stumbling block for Garteoiane 
la their acceptance of Nexii'ton's ocaoept of gravity ifhloh apparently 
necessitated aotl<m^ at«a'''dl8tance» (h) It could he a new concent 
of matter. Boyle emphaeleed the corpuscularlty of matter ae the 
haalo structure of the material world « thue negating the older 'forme*, 
'oplrlte* and 'principles'. (o) It could he viewed as a new 
sclentlflo methods the search for plausible medianioal models by 
lAlch to explain phenomena.
The problem of the mechanical pMloaopby was that It siflftly lost 
sight of its theoretlcel abstraction frcm the real world and became 
autonomous. Thus helhnl%g following and developing Descartes g could 
envisage the human body as equivalent to a watch. !5ila particular 
line of thougiit finished up with the logical conoluslcm of Diderot 
that there tms no essential difference between men$ animals @ plants 
and tilings. The old ways of thinking were disappearing and in their 
place there was "a structure of farces and masses rather than a 
hierarchy of purposes." (Barbour 1968/hg p.35#)
Today philosophy has often become derivative of science g a 
reversal of roles from the time of Descartes* GjAlespie claimss 
"Descartes was the last of the gEreat systematic philosophers to make 
integral contributions to science directly out of metaphysics."
(1967» P#94a) Descartes was a convinced Oopemloan but g shocked by
2the (kalileo affair g refused to publish his controversial 'De Monde' 
for fear of trouble with the church authorities «" though sl^iiflcantly 
he did not seem to consider omitting the offending passages* He was 
notg hmfeverg a 'fees tliihker' standing over against the ohurchg but a 
devout man %Ao was deepl^ r disturbed by the difference bet%;een the 
biblical and his own aooount of creation. %iis disagreement of
sequence led him to ctmclude that Genesis could not be understood 
literally. At the heart of his meohsnioal philoGopIiy wan the 
principle of inertia. All phenomena^ he maintained, were caused by
1* As shall be made clearer in Parts II and IT such a disjunction as 
this is open to debate altliough tlm general sentiment Gillespie is 
voicing is  valid.
2. Published in 1662#
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particles :m motion and this led him to examine the cause imd 
rasintainanoe of motion^ and the study of impact# île derived^ from 
the homogeneity of the sta^aight line and the immtability of God* a 
valid principle of inertia. (cf@ Descartes 1970% p*2l6ff*) But even
man hogan to he seen as fimctioning mechanically a.t the o:egan:!.o level 9 
while animale became little more than complicated machines «
"The only difference I.can see between machines and natural 
objects is that the workings of raf^ chines ere mostly caerled 
out by apparatus large enough to be readily perceptible by 
the senses*#.*«g whereas natural processes almost always 
depend on parts eo email that they utterly elude our sense*" 
(Descartess In Orosland 1971 p*70e)
Yet It was no simple meohanlool picture « It wais not atoms that
Descartes believed in but a oomtlnuous 9 though infinitely divlBiblOe
form# (Cf# Cropland 1971g p#67ff.)
Bio method was essentially an application of geometry
fraîned in rectangular (Osirtesian) co-ordinates «« algebra applied to
%
spatial relationships # So Desoartes formed his model of the
uniwrse as a series of GOïinected vortices *• But it was a theory 
that the intrusion of comets destroyed* Nevertheless his theory was
held in general 9 along with his methods g by many continental thMkers 
right :hato the 18th century and vortices were defended as late as 
1752 by Fontesielle#
Descartes 9 In his raclioal reduction of doubt9 had been forced to 
introduce God into his thought via the ontologies! argument in order 
to avoid a solipsism* Xüj'aploying the concept of an infinitely good 
and perfect God he endeavom?ed to el;m:?nate any discussion concerning 
final causes from science he would restrict himself to the question 
how? instead of the more general and fundamental why? While many 
saw in him incipient atheismp Boyle pointed out tJmi; God was at the 
foundation of his thought (of* Goodman g D*G* 1974/bg p*37w) even if 
not introduced into his argument in a satisfactory manner. It was 
iîomorality and unbelief tha1; led to atheism^ not meehanioal philosophyt 
Descartes had in fact conceded that some of the pirqposes of God might 
be known by supernatural revelation and it was because of this that g 
in controversy with Gsrtesiansj? Boyle could argue on the basis of
3* Mathematics has, of cours a 9 been a t the root of all styles of 
analysis* "In  each case g the crucial step forward from A ris to tle  
involved a mathematical Idealisation *" (Toulmin & Goodfield 1961g 
p«24B#)
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8 or ip  time pointless i f  'Wie source was no1; aooepted by both sMes»
Deocsmtes supposed that God ruled the miiverse by mesne of 'laws 
of nature® la id  dovm from the begiiming» Whatever the sooiological
roots o f th is  te.m (o f* 2g*2#} i t  im p llo ltly  carried w ith i t  the 
concept of a divine Creator who was alone supreme and above nature#
So Deisoaxtes could refuse to  ta !k  o f 'in f in ity ' except as applied to  
God and warn of the danger o f mclerestimatrlng God and overestimating 
s e lf* (Cfo Goodmang D.C# 1974/bp p»20#) This rests im easily on the
shoulders of his a th e is tic  followers* Perhaps in  terms of s tr ic t  
logics he broU;^it God in  by the backdoor^ Im t he s t i l l  believed In  H;!me
The topiioations of Descartes* teaching were probably more c r it ic a l 
than those of Gopernlcusg fo r here was a new worldview as opposed to  
merely a new worlcV^pic'ture* The tmrld was reduced to a piece of 
macliino3?y which le f t  mmig w ith his ra tio nal soul g isolated from the 
rest of creation# I t  was a worldview that would b© attacked on 
s c ie n tific  and theological grounds® Newton did both# (Off Koyrs 
1965a PPe93g94*) He attacked the whole vortex system of Descartes 
and demonstrated mathematically tha,t the planets could not sw irl in  
the vortices la id  out as th is  would tofringe Kepler's laws of planetary 
motion — though others such as Huygens held to the vortex theory»
A&.  (or. 4.5.2.)
I f  Descartes is  considered as the founder o f modern rationalisme
i t  is  not unreasonable to take Bacon as the founder- o f modem 
empiricism 9 even I f  he did l i t t l e  In  the s c ie n tific  f ie ld  and 
performed few experiments (though iro n ic a lly  he died of a. cold caught 
during one). He possessed prophetic power mid la id  out hie vision  
of a new s c ie n tific  method in  'Novum tegmmi' (l620)o While his 
method centred on gatliering data 9 from wliioh should stand out the 
'tru ths of nature's i t  is  too g lib  to accuse îiim  ^ as is  often done9 of 
St simple 'bucket' approach (o f* 9*3*2.1#) However he certa in ly  
helped to set fo rth  the widening in te lle c -to l gu lf between the Mdd‘.Le 
âges and the new em pirical scientj.fio  method* Yet he saw the 
d iffic u ltie s  of actually  asceietatolng 1;he facto of nature smd posited 
the need fo r c r it ic a l discussion# Unfortunately he missed the 
necessity to -lie observation and discussion together# Thus while he 
advocated an em pirical approach g he did not escape the re a lity  that 
empiricism must be guided by some m otivation9 must choose which facts  
to study9 and nmst from 'bheso facts form some Î'iyjîothesis which can be
tested against phenomena. To be to ld  eimply to 'observe' is  
meejafngless «
4*4, R C B K  BOYUg (1627-91)
Boyle is  typioa.1 of the M iglish preoccupa.tion w ith cm em^iirical 
approaoh which endeavoured to re la te  s c ie n tific  and Christian though'k 
to a creative and constructive mannero lie made an imx^ortant
contribution i;o science andp though there is  l i t t l e  to hia work that 
is  o rig in a l, exercised an immediate influence on Newton concerning 
'i*.he struetiH;© of matter by espousing a thoroughly corpuscular concept* 
(Cfo G illespie 196?, Pe105«) This was an atomissa free frosi the
'w ild  fancies ' of the Greeks « Indeed to  his most famous work -  'The
Sceptical Chemist ' ( l66l ) ,  wliich e ffe c tiv e ly  opened the modern period 
fo r chemistry methodologically i f  not th eo retica lly  -  he destroyed the 
old concepts of the four Aristotelian elements* He is , o f course, 
noted fo r his famous law which states that i f  the temperature remains 
constant, the volm e of a gas varies inversely with the pressure; 
while the vacuum produced by an air^pimip bears his name 'vacuimi 
Boyliemuii'o His method was one of patient observation, careful
manipu3,ation and long exposition# We can safely claim that to him 
the escperlBiental procedure came in to  its  own, though iro n ic a lly  he was 
g u ilty  o f the very use of escperlmen'b-as^wlGmonstr'ation w ith which he 
charged others* (Of Butterfield 1973/bg p.131*)
In  Boyle we have a rigorous interaction of science and theology* 
his b e lie f to God lay  a t the heart of e l l  his s c ie n tific  endeavourc 
which he saw to a positive Christian lig h t* The practising  
soient is  t  was called to master the to;lricacies of God's universe and 
was actually best o ff, when ho had done bo, to appreciate end praise 
God's work# (Of* Brooke 1974/a, p«77*) The contemplation of nature 
was an apiropriabe prepeiration fo r tlie contemplation of God, not a 
substituteo Bo he could agree, to part, with the mechanical
philosophy of Descartes but c ritic is e d  him fo r going to the opposite 
extreme of A ris to tle  to negating fin a l purposive causes* (Cf* Goodman, 
BoC* 1974/bs p#36.) This ifas an im portait issue fo r Boyle*
" f ir s t , there may be some grand and general ends of the whole 
world, such as the exorcising tmd displaying the creator's  
immense power end admirable wiedoM, the comrmnlcat 1 cm of his 
goodness p and the admiration and thanlcs due to him from his 
in te llig e n t creatures, for those his divine excellencies, 
whose productions manifest his glory* And those ends, 
because they regard the cx^eation of the whole universe, I
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call the universal ends of God or nature * 
(Boyle I688p pa106@)
ee
Boyle's piety was no sojj to ecoleslal authority» To a man who 
liberally sup^ joarbed missionary causes; lAiOg though no linguist, went 
to the trouble to leam the original languages of tlie Bible to 
imderatand it better; and who inaugurated the Boyle lecture ™ sermons 
for the prorogation of G&irlstlen lnto3:?e8t in solence to such a man 
faith was parmioimt, esipedlency ifas not®
Nor had Boyle time for those ifho tended to pantheism, for lAile 
natinm may be viewed as a machine it was in no irjay to be identified 
with the God who czreated it* In this he offered prophetic warning, 
fox' nature was to be increasingly deified and even today in laany books 
is seen as ^ ture» Nature was a machine, but for Boyle It was not
autonmiGUs and ifhile he appealed to the analogy of the mechanical 
clook one feels timt the analogy of an electric clock %fould liave better 
suited his vieifs» Boyle was not so simpllstlo to evince that every 
object in nature revealed design; nor that all had been created for the 
benefit of mum alone; nor that mmi could plum&all the mysteries of God® 
But he xfos clear that there was dcsljg^  in the universe and that it 
pointed to God® (Of* Boyle g In Grosland 1971, po121@)
his twrk therefore reveals no division of science and theolo^ 
such as in the Baconian tradition» (Bacon was not a Baconian*)
The tim books «= scripture and nature were intimately and harmoniously 
related for Boyle» "I am persuaded, tliat nature will be found very
loyal to her author»»»" (Boyle I69O, p«,123*) ^ his faith
stood at the heart of all his scientific speculations and 
experimentations as well as in his personal devotional life» All 
was for the find glory and praise of God»
"I tliink it my duty to prefer an important truth before my 
respect to any man, how eminent soever, that opposes it, and 
to Consider more the glory of the great Author of nature, 
than the reputation of any <me of her interpreters."
(Bbyie 16Q8, P*109.)
But for all this Boyle hod set problems which could not be easily
4o The following quotation from Boyle is significant. I am imable 
to locate the source. "...if we lay aside all irrational opinions, 
that m?e unreasonably fathered on the Gliristien religion, and all 
erroneous conceits repu^ant to Christianity, ifhich have been 
groundlessly fathered upon Philosophy, tlie seeming contradictions 
betwixt Divinity and true Phllosop^, will be but few, and the real 
ones none at all."
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roaolvedo I n  a eloola-iork im iverse, what was le f t  fo r God to da?
¥hat was happening to  the Immanenoe o f God? He was slowly hut 
surely being shut up to the trazasoendeato
4 .5 . GGimTIPIO mnODOIiOGY
From the foregoing i t  is  read ily  noticeable that the 17th century 
was dominated by two co n flic tin g  pMlosophica3,«>'Scieîitifie approaches 
the one InductiTe^em pirlcal, based on 'veracitas natu3?eie®; the other 
deductive^-ratlonal, based on 'veracitas clei®. The former was
B ritis h  ;md Baconian, the la t te r  European mid Cartesian® The former 
led to a rash of eicperimentation (under the Royal Society) which was 
often friv ilo u s  and highly questionable; while the la tte r  led to an 
au sterity  and economy of tliought that did much to fa c ilita te  success®
A*5.*j.*_.BGSC8rte8 (o f* 4»2*)» He followed the Arehimedioji id eal of a 
deductive heirarehy of propositions combined with Pythagorean and 
atorcsistlG elements « I'bmmi th is  basis Descartes had a vision of a 
single universal science that would cover and esrplain E tll. Like 
Bacon, the ïaïowleâge he posited was conjectural and not oortain; but, 
whereas fo r Bacon pure mtod could correctly read the book of nature, 
fo r Descartes i t  was God alone that gaa3?anteed such; truth# God was 
the f ir s t  mover# This ilnverted Baconian procedure and made 
esqieriment an aid to explanation rather than a way of discovery or 
tenting of hypotheses# Descartes "fcried to derive basic physical 
laws from purely metapïysical p rin cip les. A hypothesis was 
vaXidatod by its  a b ility  to explain phenojuena w ithin the framework of 
the basic laws of the mechanical system#
A»3-.>2.JBacQ|| (cf# 4 *3 *)* His central thesis was that to acquire 
îmowledge about the world one must in terp ret the particulars of sense 
experience# The method was that of discovery, investigation and 
Gscplanation of the properties o f substances by means o f controlled  
G)3cperimentation, using tables of instances from which inductive 
generalisations could be made# Popper suggests that the thrust of 
in terprétation  here is  that o f "spelling out the book of Haturo" which 
leads inductively, not to  conjectuK-es about re a lity , but to certa in ty . 
(Popper 1972/a ,  p#14*) ¥e are to  prepare our minds to read the 
book of nature by purging them from preconceived prejudices, guesses
5* Another popular method of the period which X sh all not discuss 
was that o f Bawus who advocated the study of nature via, the best 
w riters# (Cf# B u tte rfie ld  1973/^j) P*98*)
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or an'bioix^atioBS. This was the process fo r the philosophical 
fomidation of knowledge. In  th is  setting Bacon was o r itio a l of 
A ris to tle  as w ell as various fa lse  Meas which htoderecl true 
iiw etigatio n  of nature»  ^ The only true démonstrations were 
escperimental B But not by careless or wearily re p ltitio u s
esqaerlmentB,- ra th er by controlled and planned osgorimentation. ■ The 
man of science needed his mind 'washed clean of optoions® and freed 
to gather data» Though Bacon f e l l  in to  a 'cataloguing of fa c ts ' 
methodology M s was no dead empiricism that negated the place and use 
of hypotheses» He sa,w the need fo r d irection and organisation in
what was to  he done and thus a modem commentator w rites 8
"hhat we obtain hy th is  process, however, is  only the 
'Obmmencement o f In terp reta tion  ' or the 'F irs t Vintage» '
Bacon premmahly means hy th is  what pr@sent«day scientists  
would c a ll a 'hyi)othesis * ; th at is , a tentative  
in terpretation  which we enjoy as a guide to the selection  
of fu rther Instances." (M ogill ed, 1968, pa379o)
I t  is  only th is that makea his c ritic ism  of A ris to tle  (fo r an 
u n c ritic a l co llection of data and overhaety generalisation) mean 
anything» (Cf« Loses 1972, p#63o)
4#3«3* - Newton# He affirm ed the A rls to te llo ii method of 'Analysis and 
Synthesis' (ib id  p .O lf.) end stressed the need to be rooted in  a 
careful examination of phenomena# He m?ote, against am?tGslemisms
" o o .although the a:cguing from Il^epertoents and Observations 
by Induction be no Demonstration of general. Oonclusions, yet 
i t  is  tho beet way of arguJjig which the Nature o f Things 
admits of#" (Newton 1952, p»404»)
This f its  roughly, as would, be eocpected, toto the Baconian tradition®
He goes on to distinguish principles derived, from expexdmentation and
from in tu itio n ; and sets out to  p rim arily  e^qilMn what happens -  to
describe rather than explain# Thus in  opposition to Des cartes he
specified that i t  was the obsmzved effects and laws of meclianical
motion that should be the s ta rtin g  point fo r msthematicM
demonstrations in  science# He sets out his rules fo r reasontogg
" 1® ¥e m?e to admit no more causes of natural things than
such as are both true and su ffic ien t to explain th e ir  
appearances o
6# The id o l of the tribes the dominance of emotion over X'ea,soiio 
The id o l o f "khe eaves the attl'kude due ko cu ltu ra l conditioning# 
The ido l o f the market places distortions due to  abstract words# 
The ido l o f the theatres received dogmas and methods#
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" II» Therefore to the some natural effects we imet, aa far ae 
possible 9 assign the same OEmses.
Ill# The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification 
nor reioiasion of degrees, and which are foimd to belong to 
all bodies w ithin the reach of our experiments g are to be 
esteemed the universal qualities of ail bodies %diatsoever* 
IV. In experimental philosophy arc to look upon propositions 
Inferred by general induction from phencmena as accurately 
or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary 
hypotheses that may be Imagined, till such time as other 
phenomena occurs by whioh they may either be made moaze 
aocurate, or liable to exceptions."
(Newton 1g62g Vol.II pp*398=^00.)
4.6* ISAAC (1642-172%)
Classical mechanics is often referred to as Newtonian mechanics, 
but this is only a portion of the contribution of Mewton to the 
soientiflo woa&d* He is extremely important in the fields of 
mathematics and optics# Today some theologians a%id philosophers 
talk as thou^ Newton was old hat@ now irrelevant and effectively 
replaced by the theories of Einstein# But this is a simplisitio 
view for as a standard contemporary teactbook puts its
"Newixm's laws are 'true' because tliey are consistent with 
experiment* They successfully describe the motions of objects 
as small as molecules#*#and as large as galaxies##. Thus, 
newtpnian mechanics has an enormous range of applicability.
Only for the submioroscopic world of the atom and nucleus and 
for speeds approaching that, of light must the classical laws 
of mechanics W  supplanted by the more nearly correot meohonlos 
of the quantum theory and the theory of relativity."
Sells 1975e P*96*)
Newton formulated the differential ^ d  integral calculus, the 
binomial theorem^ showed that colour was an intrinsic property of 
ll(^t end not of the refracting medium, invented the reflecting' 
telescope, and observed the phenom^on known as Newton's Rings* he 
also did some work in the field of chemistry mid though he lias been 
accused of alchmiy thi.s does not seem proved# He did all this apart 
from his most well known contribution in the field of mechanics# In 
the pursuit of his mechanics = the Imfs of motlcm and gravity « %i^e are 
faced by the majostic ability of Netrkon to invent casually as he goes 
alrnigp mathematical tool after mathematical tool, in order to 
facilitate the ease and rapidity of his vrork. These tools of 
calculus hove become tlie mathematical backbone of applied science#
As he himself remarked ho was indebted to those who had gone 
before, breaking the new ground end indicating the patW to be 
followed# He drew on Galileo for the mathematising of kinematics.
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the 3.aw of acceleration and the concept of in e rtia ; Kepler fo r the 
o riîc ia l lawo of p3.ane'ka}:y motion; Descartee fo r many of his early  
sxjecnlatione and his c lear statement of re c tilin e a r in ertia , (ïCoyre 
even argues that Mewton derived from Descartes a theological, Impetus 
(cfo Goodman g D.Co 1974/h , p ,23o )j);  B o re lli fo r M s theory of 
centripeta l a ttractio n  between mm and planets; Bacon fo r his 
methodological d istrust in  natural philosophy that excluded 
02cperimentation§ ïïook® (though reînictant to aclmow3.edg@ th is ) and 
others that the law of attrac tio n  was an Inverse square one; and on 
Boyle fo r his conception of the structure of matter®
Cm icislly he followed Descartes in  accepting the ideal o f 
JikiGlidean stra ight lin e  iraotion, as opposed to c ircu la r concepts y which 
posited that no object was to have a privileged place in  the universe 
no centre of the universe round which a ll  else n a tu ra lly  c irc led , 
Tims he was a,ble to teke the hypothesis of a.ttraetion suggested by 
B o re lli and Hookey s t i l l  to the form of a driven macMne and 
mathematlse i t  on the basis of the free spin of plmiets#
The laws he formulated were care fu lly  derived from the phenomena 
by means of mathemai;iea! reasoning* But behind the mathematical 
generalisations i t  needed creative imagtoation to  synthesise the 
d iffe rin g  aspectss to un ite  the abstract and continuous conception of 
space with the concrete and atom istic conception of m atter; to bring  
together theory and experiment g physloB and astronomy; physics and 
mathematics® (Of® H all 1970g p»289«)
Yet to the final onalyBis i t  was no simple mathematical synthesis,
mo mechanistic world th at Bewton postulated g fo r the ultin îate forces
were sp iritu a l#  Meither g rav ity  nor matter were u ltim ate ly
independent of the God who had created all things and whose sustatoing
power alone ke'pt them to  existence® This tied  science and theology
7to an unacceptable way fo r manjo I t  is  slg^ificem t that the
OartealanB found d iffic u ltie s  rig h t in to  the 18th century to accepting 
the s c ie n tific  theories o f Newton because of th e ir theological and 
philosophical premises and impllcEitions® Important figures lik e  
Leibnisî and Huygens were implaccably opposed to the philosophy that 
was thus tied  to the general theories of Newton.
wsrs3«;^*ca
7# However i t  should be noted that lewton said th at "the laws of God 
and the laws of men, are to be kept d is tin c t."  (Newton 1958, p .49*)
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However § "The mind of Sir Isaac was (me of the glorlea of
the hmasm race, and (me of Its myaterlea*" (Gillespie 196?, P*117*)
Thle Is even more foroefolly hrou^t home when we reallee that W  did 
most of M s  0]zeatlv@ woaAc in two periods (1665-66 and l685'-86) whioh 
together miounted to a mere three years (of. Newton undated®) It 
waa in these three years, linked by long years of study and refleotiong 
that the Imowledge of heaven and earth i-me united in the mathematloal 
etmoture of olasaioal pliyeios. It was Lagrange tdio is mipposed to 
have said; 'There oonld only be one Newton, there was only one 
world to discover.'
4»6o1« The Prlncinia. It ifas 1687 when the world first emi? theii;32j;rîi33î;r3‘Eîtïïa£r!S5iÆsa3LS •
decisive 'Hiilosophiae Naturalls Principia Mathematioa', noamally 
refer%'ed to as 'the' Prinoipia as if there were no other principles 
for phyeioB. Gillespie notes that in a sense this is tziie. "For 
that boolc contaiym all that is classical in classical physios.
There is no work in science ifith which it may be ooi,Tipared." (1967, 
p*137*) Remarlcably, it was writeen in about 18 months. No other 
scientific work equals It in "originality and power of thought, or in 
the majesty of its achievement." (Hall 1970, p«306.) No other book 
so clienged the whole edifice of science or approached its authoi'ity in 
justifying the mechanical picture of the universe. It ims a synthesis 
that couM cmly be wrou^it once in the history of science.
The crux of the problem revolved roimd the necessity to show that 
motion in an ellipse, Mth speed varying so that the instantaneous 
acceleration is at all times directed to one focus of the ellipse, 
necessitated an inverse«*8gnare law of acceleration as the determining 
condition. This ims the stumbling block up to Newkon. Tlie older 
theories had simply held that bodies fell to the centre of the universe 
(the earth) or followed perfect circular moticm ™ here gravity ifas 
considered to be a propmzty of positicm opposed to a property of 
matter. With the breaZcdown of the Aristotelian worldview the scene 
wms open to neif theor'ies. Gilbert posited the magnetic attraction 
of tho earth and attacked the concept of the geographical point of 
matter as BignificQn.tp holding that gravity tfas Indeed a chsracteristic 
of matter. Kepler turned the problem into one of attraction and 
posited his tîiree laws round which any future explanation would have 
to be formed. His theories were revived to 1666 by ^ phonse Dorelll 
(the smiiie date as Neifton's first creative period) w&io su^^sted ttiat 
the elliptical o3^1t of a planet was the resultant of a belonce
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between op;postog forces the fo:eee of gravity between p"iaaet and smi, 
and a oentritogM  force whioh tended to move a planet sway from the 
sun. Humana had a3.:eeady discovered in  1659 that a centrifugal 
force was needed to maintain a ‘body in  c ircu ler motion but fa ile d  to  
make the transfer from te rre s tria l, to c e le s tia l mechanics® Huygens' 
work was not published u n til 1679s and Newton seems to have carried on 
hie omi work quite independently® Moberval was to fa c t the f ir s t  to 
point to  the theor^r of universal g rav itation , but, lik e  those other 
advocates who fol3.owed him, could not derive any proof fo r tM s theory 
that had. to await Newton®
Assuming G alileo 's  princip le o f in e rtia , that the unimpeded motion 
of a body ie  unifoimi speed in  a, stra ight lin e , the problem of 
e^qilatoing the heavenly oiovenients to  mechanical termii'wlogy resolved 
intos (a ) the derivation of a law governing the centripetal force 
needed to bend linear motion under in e rtia  in to  e llip t ic a l motions ; 
and (b) the demonstration that grswity could pro'ylde the required 
force to constrain the planets in  closed orbits® This whole problem 
of the totescpretation of Kepler's 3.aws had become i;he intense 
préoccupât 1 on of the Royal Bociety® Involved in  depth were such 
giants as Wren, Hooke and Hal3.ey® Eventually in  1684 Hooke claimed 
to have a complete mcplanatlon but fa ile d  to brtog forward proof to 
back th is  up® Part o f the problem was that the e llip s e  seemed too 
neat an answer® Both Kepler and Hooke tliou^^ht a t f ir s t  that the 
o rb it would be more complex than that of a perfect ellipse® The 
f ir s t  two laws of Kepler were however perfectly  exact dynamically «- 
not approzcimatlons as Hooke took them to be®
Oo Hailey journeyed from London to Cambridge to consult Newton. 
Without mentioning his omi, Hooke's or Wren's, speculation on the 
subject3 he asked Mewton what cinzve the planets should describe on the 
supposition that gravity diminished by the square of the distance »
He was amazed when ibmiediately to ld  -  on e llip s e . Newton said he 
had worked i t  out, but could not find the necessary ealcula.tion to his 
jmpersw "While others were looking fo r the law of g rav ity , Newton 
had lo s t ite "  (G illesp ie  1967? p»137*) But under the stimulus" of 
Hailey he 3?eeons true ted his proof and forwarded i t  to h im  to November® 
Itoom here g under the goadtogs of Hailey who u ltim ately  provided the 
ftoance to publish, the 'P rinc ip la * began to be formulated*
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In  the oontroversy between Hooke and Hewton over th is  top ic, 
liooke'e s c ie n tific  statmze has risen during the la s t few years, 
though th is  in  no way diminishes the achievement of Mewtoîi. Wiereas 
Descartes claimed that the planets were pushed round by some form of 
corporeal impact, and B o re lli claimed that the planets hac!. a natural 
tendency to move round the sun; in  Hooke the esrplanation of planetar^r 
motion becsune a problem of applied mechaaioB equivalent to the 
principles Involved in  te rre s tr ia l problems such as the pendulim and 
projectile®  Therefore Hooke and Hewton both made the .’kiportant step 
of suggesting that the force dra,vjing planets to the sim, and the moon 
to the earth g was the saisie as that which caused things to f a l l  on 
eartho
.Despite the insight of Hooke, the master stroke belonged 
exclusively to Newton. I t  was he who solved the fundamental probleat
eoîieerntog the force which keeps the planets in  th e ir  e llip t ic a l orbits  
and derived the mathematical relationship between sun and planets which 
yielded the force of a t1;raction varying; as the inverse square of the 
distance between theiB* He showed that one universal force kept the
planets In  the orbits; held the s a te llite s  in  th e ir  orbits ( i .e ,  moon, 
s a te llite s  of Jupiter etc»)# caused objecte to fa l l  as observed and 
also held objects on the earth; and fin a lly  caused the tides® This 
was the law o f m iiversal gpzavita.tlon (F ^ Newton had
succeeded in  doing what his contemporaries could not — namely the 
provision of a mathematical deduction which pr o ved the ii'imerse square 
law® The breealc with A ris to tle  was complete » Instead of natural 
circu lar motion there was lin e a r; instead of one law fo r the terreotrieü, 
and another fo r the c e le s tia l, both were brought under one universal 
set o f laws; instead, of .force yie ld ing constant speed i t  wao seen to  
give constant acceleration# Hut g "There is  no mathematics -  whether?
,‘algebra,, geometry, or the calculus to ju s tify  tk ls  bold step# One 
can say of i t  only khat i t  is  one of those triwaphs t'lmt humble 
ordinary Bien in  the presence of genius*" (Oohen 1961, p#110#)
liais was a •fcremendous advance in  the range of encplanation and the 
degi?ee of prediction® Astronomical predictions became in te llig e n t 
an.d led to the discovery of other planets such as Neptune (sought to  
account fo r what would otherwise have been irre g u la ritie s )#  (Cf# Kuhn 
195?o p262e) I t  explained the necessity to shorten the length of a 
pendulum nearer the equator to  order fo r i t  to s t i l l  beat seconds; and 
so to the predlotion that the shape of the earth is  an oblate spheroid.
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ï t  also affected other scienees giving now B iipifioeaco to the concept 
of weight wMeh lay  a t the heart of chemistry# But as wel3. eiB these 
'teeSmieaX' influences 9 his theoazy had the resu lt o f mechanising the 
worlctoplcture and worldview w ith dieasitrous e ffe c t, opening the door 
to natmzallsm imd deism in  a way quite a lien  to his own beliefs #
But care in  in terpreting  Newton is  necessary and one feels that 
some have not exercised a req u is ite  balance in  pi?esenting his views# 
Hewton himself did not fommlate an autonomous mechanical worldview*
He cantionsly refrained from mechanic5n.g his own g rav itational force 
and th is  is  crucial in  understandIng his theological perspective #
For Hewbon, lik e  Boyle imder the Oslvlnian influence, the very ooxicept 
of laws of nature presupposed a divine law-»giver. Thus Me 
development of a mechanical philosophy must be seen w ithin the frimie- 
work of Christian thought which stressed the primacy of the sovereign 
w ill o f the Creator® Indeed aspects of Mewbon's thought were not ;h:i 
the f ir s t  instance id e n tifia b le  w ith mechcmical philosophy# His 
concept of gravity seemed to posit the existence of some form of action- 
at'^ ar-dis'banoe» Thie smacked of occult properties residing in  matter 
and was token th is  way and rejected because of th is  by Casztesians 0 
There was also the problem of the vacuum or void which seemed to posit 
the philosophical problem of the existence of nothingl Hewton in  
fa c t B 'po lie  very care fu lly  o f g rav ity  and while a t times positing the 
influence of some 'a e th e r', in  general tended to hesitate to make any 
positive statement as to its  cause* He refreiJied from hyx^othesio 
where he had in s u ffic ie n t data. (Of» ICubrln 196?? ;p*l60f# )
2* ,T h e . T u r n i n g  to his famous laws 9 the statements he 
called ’.âxiomazfea slve Legiis Motus', we find  the basic statements which 
are reproduced in  the textbooks of today. These lai-js ho saw, not as 
H ew ton1m m , but na'bmze' s or more correctly God's® The three 
statements should not however be divorced from the eight defin itions  
with which he proceeded them in  the o rig inal version of his work*
(O f. Hurd & K ipling 1964g V o l.l pp»180ff.)
"Law 1 » Everybody preserves in  its  state of re s t, or of 
uniform motion in  a r l# i t  lin e , unless i t  is  compelled to  
change that state by forces .'Impressed thereon.
Lai-y 2» The a lte ra tio n  of motion is  ever proportional to ‘bhe 
motive force iivpressed; and is  made in  the direction of the 
rig h t lin e  in  which that force is  impressed*
Law 5# To every section there is  always op'posed cm equal 
reactions or the mutual actions o.f two bodies upon each
other are always equal, ©nd directed to contrary parts»"
(Newtons In  Itecl & I± p J :M g  1964$ 1o l« I p<,193«)
The f ir s t  law is  G alileo 's  law of in e rtia  defiaitog bxl r tie r tia l feaiie *=« 
a refercxioo system to  which an isolated body moves with constant 
velocity* The second law applies fo r observers in  in e rtia l, frajnes 
Qhd gives a procedure fo r measuring an mteuown force# Xn other 
words g 'law 1 is  the law of in e rtia ; law 8 gives that acceleration is  
proportional to force® Law 3 is  the princip le o f the equivalence 
o f action and reaction . This raised the question of abBo3.n.t© and 
re la tiv e  time and space o f which lewton I'jrotes
"X# Absolute, tru e , and mathemmtloal tim e, of its e lf ,  and 
from its  owi nature flows equably without regard to anything 
oxtem al, and by another name is  called durations re la tiv e , 
apparent, and common tim e, is  some sensible end extem M  
(whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the 
means of motion, which is  commonly need instead o f true time; 
such as an hour, a day, a month, a year,
II, Absolute space3 to its  owi naturo, without regard to 
anything external g romains alweyo sim ilar and Immovable®
Relative apace is  some movable dimension or measure of the 
absolute spc?ces| whioh our senses determine by its  position  
to bodies; and which is  vu lgarly 'Ween fo r immovable space; 
such is  ‘bhe dimension of a sub'lejrcgmGous, an aoreal, or 
c e le s tia l space, cletermatoed by its  position to  rerspeot of 
the earth *.# . (ib id  p*185f * )
This d isttoction  between absolute and re la tiv e  time and space would 
be the metaphysical chinlc in to  which la te r  critic ism  would bore,
The d is tin ctio n  between 'tame motions' of bodies to absolute space 
and time from the 'sensible measures' o f 'khese motions suggests a 
separation of re a lity  and appearance, wliieh to toroeting ly provided 
a bridge from Plato to Kant, But core must be tslcen not to derive 
from lewkcm claims of absolute certato ty idmre he to  fa c t makes 
careful reseszvations *
Thus, while he adduces theological end ;pî)ysie©l arguments fo r the 
existence of absolute space, he was imeertato of locating bodies to  
that space# lïis  arguments .stomned from the concept of creation  
'ex nihiXo® which posited fo r him a recep'bicle w ithin which created 
matter was distributed® (Of® Torvzaace 1969/ao ) On 'the pliysical side 
he advanced his famous 'bucket' ezEperimmit, But he "admitted that 
there may be no stogie body which is  a t rest with respect to Absolute 
Space, and which may serve as a reference point fo r m.oasurtog 
distances to th is  space," (Xosee 1972% p»86„) Whatever his 
reservations h e  la id  out space and time to some form of obeclut© gr'ld
asid gave aa unreal, s im p lic ity  to auœ peszceptions of tilings « ^ I t  
would not be fo r atiotlior two hundred years tlia t Hewtaa's fem ulation  
would begto to go awry#
IW ftoato basic oonoeption o f matter xmg 
corpuscular, G alileo had made the dlsttootion between primary and 
secondary properties; Descaaztes reduced matter to the équivalant of 
03ctend©d "being® However Hewton, mailing the d is tin ctio n  of primary 
and secondary, emphasised, the concept of force as the key rather than 
m itte r, and saw matter as c h ie fly  consisting of extension, mass, 
m obility , in e rtia ,, hardness smd impenetrability® Again M s s tartin g  
premise was the eaclstonoe of the Creator and hence m atter depended, 
fo r Mm, as in  M l things, on God® God was the creator o f matter in  
the f ir s t  instance and His w ill was necessary fo r its  continnanee in  
existence (cf® Hewtong In  Orosland 1971, p*Y6* )
4*6*4* liypothesGS non fingo® hewton was not a lewtonian -  his 
followers wore» I t  is  perhaps a feature o f great thinkers that they 
do not conform neatly to the aystmWrnllders tliat fo llow  them. The 
pazoblem with Hewton was th a t, whil,e he started from God in  M s thouglrit 
(as w ell as the free w ill o f the huBisn s p ir it ) , his method of 
matheme/bicai^meclianical analysis s w iftly  hecame a metaphysical construct 
of reality®  "A -keclmigue o f investiga.tio,i'i was on its  way to 
'beooxfifmg a to ta l account of the world; a method was being tumod .into 
a metaphysics®" (Barbour 1968/b , p .36») Thus while HoMon might 
say he did not deal w ith absolutes "many of his followers did. not 
•possess such modesty" as they carried his models and techniques in to  
every ooncei-vable sphere of study® (Held I 966, pp.^lg^S») Yet 
Mew ton *8 attempt to dist:mguish a body of d e fin ite  objective science 
from the areas of speculative thought where he held reservations is  
d if f ic u lt  to maintain in  practice. All thought must s ta rt from 
in i t ia l  meta-plysioal prosuppositiona whether conscious or uneonsclous ®
The change in  method th at %?as being introduced in to  the f ie ld  of 
s c ie n tific  work and avtendeci through the whole range of theoretical 
thought ie  obscured by the use or misuse o.f certain  phrases from 
Hewtono Oentring roimd hia supposed claim to linvent no hypothesis', 
I t  3s. claimed that he advocated a purely empiricM approach and th a t.
As Bronowski coMaents, the projzhetic irords were le f t  fo r Leibnis 
to utters " I hold space to be something purely re la tiv e , as time is ."  
(1973a P.H41.)
whereas his foremmiers tried to describe the motions of 'bhe heavens, 
he became the first to explain them# To a certain extent this is 
time, but the view is propogated without qualification by scholars 
who should know bettes?» Bronowskl, for instance, states that while 
Hewton could speculate in private concerning the Bible he stuck to 
his theme of '.no hypotheses® in public, ( 1973s? pe234*)
But if attention is given to the words of Hewton the picture 
becomes somewhat different# Hoiten and Boiler quote Newton's 
'General Bchollum' for the second edition of the ®Principia' «» 
published :lii 1713*
"But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of 
those properties of gravity from phenomena (observation and 
experimentation), and Ï frame no Iiypotheses « * » .And to us it 
io enough that gravity does really exist and act according 
to the laws which we have eacplained, and abundantly serves 
to accK)unt for a!l the motions of the celestial bodies# and 
of our sea»" (I'ei-rkms In Holton d; Boiler 1958$ p«205*j
They rightly point out that Newton ie here simply rejecting the 
totroduction of a/iditional opeoulation Into a theory thak already 
had a great deal, of experimental and predictive corrob oration ® hMle
agreeing that the fundamental cause of gravity might well plumb 
greater depths, they were no concern of Hevrlon a'k that time for he had 
no ability or necessity to go deeper into the problem*
"Bor did he feel that his theory suffered by this inability,
The purpose of p%'sioal theory per se is  not to ftod ultim ate  
causes but to esEplain obsejrvables in  terms of a consistent 
and fr u it fu l scheme of concepts and derivations based on 
observationp  and jihat. he had done," (Holton & R oller 1958$ po205o 
of# G illespie 196?, p#126 and Crosiaiid 197% po6l f , )
It thus becomes nonsense to attribute ®IiyjpothesGs non fingo' as a
vague genera!! sat ion to whioh Bewton adhered in all si'kuations,
Indeed his usage of the term 'hypotheses' does not conform to modem
usage# loB* Gohen (1966, pp,13CM40o) has suggested that he uses
nine meanings of the termi Inter alia the 'hypotheses® as at'backed
by Bewton are what might be considered 'occult qualities'# In an
era rife with speculation Bewton had no desire to tie his empirical
and mathematical work to speculations for which there was no
measurable procedure Imown# He seems to have particularly abhorred
the use of ad hoc hyDothesee# He saw Descartes ' theory of vortices
in such light# (Cf, Prosoh 1966, p.75#)
In the famous phrase 'I frame no hypotheses* at the end of the
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*PrinGipis,% Singer suggests that Hewton was retmmtog to the
orlgineil meaning of the word (1962, p»295®) In Plato and
HipXiooratee it was used as a poo'bulatecl scheme to he accexited in order
for discussion to start (Gks hypo-thesis - a thing placed under)®
Here hypotheses were merely fictions, examples of which are constantly 
used in legal circles, or 'convenient presentations of remote 
possibilities « ' In fact Bewton does not hesitate to use the tern; 
in a positive way making nonsense of the cliarge against him* Ills 
use of hypotheses is haizdly surpris tog in one of the p^zeat 
speculative thinkers of all time g he framed countless hypotheses#
Tims tdiile M s  aphorism is quoted freely it should not be taken 
as an absolute statement that characterises his attitudeo His own
rules of reasoning (of, 4»5*3«) were after all rules concerning how to 
form sufficient scientific liypothesea* . Molten and Boiler paraphrase 
the first rules "Mature is simx^ lG, therefore we should not introduce 
any more hypotheses then are necessary to explato the observed 
phenomena." (1958$ p*l69,) In the final smalysis the empiricists 
of the day îmew that Hewfeon feijgned liypotheses and were unhappy about 
ito
.4.6.5«.-.agirtnn'e aawolwor.
"It wou3.d be a mistoke to think of Bewton as a brilliant 
scientist who happened to be a Christiaïi, o3? who made 
eactensive contributions to natuizM. philosophy deopite his 
eccentricity as a theologian»»»».his Christian faith had. a 
considerable bearing on the way to which he interpreted his 
scientific discoveries* H© was even described by one 
bishox) as 'knowing more of the Scriptures than them all*"
(Brooke 1974/a, p*87*-)
Bewton spent a great deal of time studying and writing comientarieo
on Bcripture, especially to apocalyptic areas.» lie did not keep his 
science and faith in sepmzate compartments *>" they fertilised each other 
to a positive- manner » ^ Some certainly (©og® Blot and Laplace) tried 
to separate hie science and theology but this cannot be done to any 
fair treatïïient of M s  vnzittogs, Hewton actua3.1y tended, to give 
X)rimary place to his religious activities anil looked on many of his 
scientific endeavours as a spare time oooupatlonS
9® I a^n well aware that IMewfcon Mso said8 "That religion and 
Ihilosophy are to be preserved distinct, VJg are not to introduce 
divine revelation into Philosophy nor philosophical opinion into 
religion," (Hewton 1950, p,58*)
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The problera was that Hewton called on God to solve what tuizned 
out to he scientifically solvable prbblemEi# But once again care ie 
needed or we will misunderstand the true position of Hewton* ïïio 
.stance was not etoply a 'Gocl^ of-^ the-^ gaps® mentality, though this has 
often been foisted on him» Nevertheless the tendency to introduce 
into explanation the reality of God, led to suggestions that fall 
strangely on modern ears, 8ug/^)stions that if God had not given the 
planets their tangential velocity then their" orbits would have been 
less harsûoiiious thssi they were; or where (so it is claimed) God is the 
true Agent of gravity in the ' Prtoeipia® — though this viewpotot needs 
eaj?© for in a sense God as Creator is the sustaining agent and 
ultimate source of all for lewton»
hhile Hewton was intensely interested in the realms of science and 
religion it is clear that he did not see the object and method of the 
two as similar* Although "for Hewton in the last analysis, the 
realm of science was dependent on the God of religion»" (Bvrtt 1932, 
p«151*) Thus behind the scientific phenomena the primajzy 
explanation for the order, simplicity and beauty in the world was a 
religious one, Even the *Pr:lncipia', in tMs light, was seen by 
him as having apologetic value. (Of* 3tett 1932, p*135#)
Hevrbon did not restrict em.piriea3. objectivity to .science and see 
religion as an area for frultilil hyriotheses concerning ultimate 
oxplanations© God was neither hypothesis nor object of science, but
the ultimate ground of all® God. was, as Creator, a necessity, not 
Bxi interesting sirldition to science; and God, as the foundation of all 
in M s  creating and sustaining work, could not be reduced to a gap#
"lewton's God was certainly not a mere god of the gaps; he was
V  rsasrjr.taAi=iM*» '-•••£. */
not deftoed by his scientific functions. He was the God of 
radioaji. Ohristiasi theism. ¥hen there wsis a phenomenon like 
gTavitational a,ttre-otion which Hewton could not explain, he 
Imew that it must have its origins in God, since in the last 
analysis everything; did." (Brooke 1974/a, p.93*)
It is therefore against this backcloth th.a'k Hewton ®e remaries to 
Bentley should be read©
"¥hy there is one '.Body in our System qualified to give Light 
and Heat to all the restg I know no Reason, but because the 
Author of the System thought it convenient# # # .the Motions 
which the Planets now have oould not spring from any natural. 
Cause alone, but we.ro impressed by an intelligent Agent*
(Newton 1756, p.133*)
9$
In these letters to Bentley, Hewton argued that the whole frame of 
nature implied the existence of God and îiis continual work in 
providence* For Hewton noth:hig happened by chance, nothing was 
arbitrary, nothing was a lem unto itself outside the control of God, 
Both the 'Frineipia' and the 'Opticks ' Insist that, despite the 
Sipparent diversity of nature, all was ‘bracaahle to a few fundmiental 
Im-m of nature. But these laws were not innate in nature for they 
were only so because God had willed them, Thus 8 "The perfection of 
the laws implied for him a lawgiver, as the perfection of the 
architecture of the imiverse implied a, cosmic design*" (îfell 19?0, 
p ,:508#) Like Descartes and Boyle g he saw the mechanical structure 
of the imlverse as an arguraent against atheism, not for it, The 
universe was not the result of blind unreasoning evolutionary chance 
but "the Effect of Choice rather than Chance," (Hewton 1756, po136,)
Here was where pMlosophic and theological controversy were 
joined, especially with the Cartesians, For Descartes, Boyle,More* 
and Hewton, God wêis seen to work in creation _#id providence g it was 
not a, question of God setting the machine in motion and then leaving' 
it to run itself, Interestrmgly, to guard ogainst a loss of 
providence Boyle even objected to the term 'laws of nature* as tills 
implied some sort of autonomy in nslure. But others, like Huygens 
and LeibniSg saw the work of God only In creation, Leibnis aszgued 
that the need for God to interfere implied that he had not done £i good 
enough job in the first place, Hewton's position waa that the world 
was in a state of decay g a theme which he tied bo his cosmogony that 
the world was not eternal « It was probably in part to counter the 
accusation of Leibniz and for fear of incipient atheism that he went 
on to talk of the periodic reform of God :ln ordering the universe,
Thus while acts of free creation end continuing providence were a 
s'kruo'bural whole for HewboUg it was not easy to set this out in a 
neat and logical fashion,
The conclusion is that whsttever else Hewton was he was not a 
mechanical philosopher per se. If Leibnia pointed to a choice 
between ©very ©vent as 'xaechsnically caused® or a 'perpetual miracle * % 
Hewton rejected this as a pseudo-antithesis, His world wont far 
beyond the stopXe materialism of a mechanical universe©
"One often reads in intellectual histories about the 
'Hewtonimi World'^ Maehlno ®, The world«macM.ne was no such
thing. I'i; was Gartesian, It was only the science of
mechanics 0 a far more restricted topic %  wïiioh was Newtonian,"
(Gillospie 196?y p*92#)
But if this wae so of Newton it was not so of M s  followers # Many
(e*g, Bentley g Xtay$ Berham) held to the reality of God in His works of 
Great ion g but as thought developed there was a boosierang effect on 
Hewton who came to be seen as the champion and founder of the 
iæehanical world % reducing al! to ffiatherftata,Gally understsndable laws * 
Els followers "began to milk a simple materialism" out of him% and 
banished any ghosts from the intriGacies of 'fche maohlnory of the 
universe a (ProEich 1966 g p,63e) The fact that Mex-rkon had pointedly 
drawl differing .'Iiiferenoee was ignored. In time God would be 
bmiished entirely from the universe and the soul of man© (Of* 5*4*1*)
4o6,6, Problems, Hewtonsuccess and achievement were 
considerable but not without problems, By and large his theories 
rest on the 'ideal® case* Take the pendulum, The law here states 
that the period of swing is proportional to the square root of the
length. If the weight of the bob is unevenly displaced round its
centre the law breaJcs doim, The law to faot assuiaes a homogeneous 
bob g weight Gyametrically distributed along a3! Eoces; that the 
pendulum swtogj-s on a tensionless string; and that there is a friction-^  
lees axiso ■ In reality there is no pendulum thsit conforms 1;o the 
maidieïHatlcal requisites© If there are no tostances wMb':; does a 
verification mean? Is it a veriflcatimi of the motion or of how we
define a force? Whatever position is held the door is open to
philosophy and moves siway from any siiiiply empirical, reduction. It 
is interesting to remember that to each case "the crucial step forward 
from toistotle involved a mathematical Idealisation®" (Toulmto & 
Goodfield 1961$ p«248,) But this is not equatable with reality©
It may be a mode of reality@ but mathematics io not the Integrated 
wholeness of reality, Feather (1970$ p#104f®) points out the very 
définiticais from which Hewton starts are misleading for they are not$ 
as appears@ independent, statements, His technical critique ie 
beyond my scope hereg but note that as an e^ cample Law 1 is simply a 
special case of Law 2,
Hewton set science on its modem foottog of empirical toquixy.
10, "In this senseg claasioal physios was an application of Euclidean 
geometry to space % general .relativity a spatialisafcion of Eiemann's 
ourviltoear geometry $ and quantum mechanics a naturalisation of 
statistical probability," (Gillespie 1967$ p»87*)
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He3?G b.e typifioG the C3?itioal GCieatifle tradition of the 17th
%A.ere to q%ote Emthozdty waa by itself useless in scientifio 
matters.. ®B\iliiis in verba* (^0>i the words of no man*) stands on the 
crest of the Royal Societye Abstract dediietiono divorced from
practical observations and experiment were no longer to be tolerated «,
ïïndoubtedly this laid the seeds for determinlom and materlallsmp 
even if in the first Instance the aiiest for law stemmed from a 
religions motivation « Philosophically the atomists hacl trlimiphed 
over the Aristotelians^ bat it was not without significance that the 
atomists of old had been deemed atheistic and materialistic«, I'his 
was the very trend that history would see once more as men lost sight 
of the religions foundation on which modem science was built#
Kei-rkon*s followers would eventually abdicate faith to the supremacy 
of the mechanical.* The scone was being set for the coming 
opposition of science to faithg but the clash did not yet exist#
In concluding this chapter let it once more be noted that we live 
today primarily in the worl&«picture of Newtonian mechanics^ not that 
of 3Dinstelnia)i relativity ^ Today Newton is still relevant ^ and our 
very consciousness has been shaped by his legacy# While the 
structure of the Newtonian model is questionedp much, remains# It is 
a testimony to id,s stature,, and the ^Principia*^ that though much has 
altered and improved9 the problems of celestial mechanics and gross 
bodies are still solved essentially as he did in the 17th century,
A high point of our technology was the landing of men on the moon 
it was Newtonian mechanics that engineered theit feat®
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^HMb might have earpeeted^  after lew ton 9 a great burst of 
diecoveries» Itot eaiie was a long period of sliglitly 
stiimied asshimlation#^  ^ (Pledge 19^6, p»100«)
Pollowin.g the sGlentifio brealcthrough of the 17th century there 
waa a period of eonsolidation in which ecience grow internally by 
specialism and concentration of study9 and exteimally tkxmigh the 
growth of periodicals and lemmed societies« Science was also 
popularised (of© Pontenelle*s *Science for the Ladies* in 1686)0 
The IMighteoffiontg with its fai.th in reason and increasing scepticism 
towards religion9 was not essentially scientific but literary and 9 
like the Renaissance 9 tried to reoa.pture the glories of the ancient 
world# (Of. Gay 1973/^5 Gay 1973/b; Harris 1960 )^ The science 
of the 18th century could only be Newtonian but 9 transformed by the 
varying ideologies of the 3hil Ightemaent ^ it was gsnerally :mclusive of 
something mime than Newton*s views» Newton was reinterpreted 
throuf^ * the eyes of either Bacon or 3)eeeartes# There ims also the 
attea%pt to e^ ctrapolate from the realm of physical law into social 
scionoe (of* Benth.am*s *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation* in 1789)* This censed fundamental oonfusion between 
declarative and normative aspects of laWg between *is® and "ought*«
There was change from the worldview of the virtuosi as God and 
revelation came increasingly under attack from Leism^ Materialism end 
Atheism though not from science per so* The correlation of science 
and belief still held firm* '^ Swi'fe^ erland became mi Important centre 
of scientific activity during the eighteenth century g probably because 
it was the refuge of so many Protestant scientists who had left 
Catholic lands." (Mason 1962^ po283e) Many of the leading figures 
were devout men -=• Joseph ^ iostly a ïïnitariaaf, John Hal ton a %ualcer; 
Michael Facaday^ who continued Dolton's irork into the nesct century9 
wae a Bmidemanlan# Thomas Yomig^ who revived the wav’o theory of lights 
was a Quaker. This was the period of strength for the dissenting 
aeadeEiies end many Anglicans choose to go there rather than the 
universities as more modem subjects9 especially science^ were tau4#it» 
Though in Scotland the univoreities were noted for the teaching of the 
sciences9 with Bdlhbirrgh becoming famous for her medlc£tl school#
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The virtuosi were in fact the escempl-ars of reSrlgious orthodoxy®
They had opposed Hobbes in eoa'cenfl:mg’ for the creation of the universe 
by an intelligent purpose instead of the random production of chaos g 
Leibnif^  in stressing creation out of the free will of God and not from 
rational necessity g creation wb-s contingent on the will of God not a 
necessary consequence of first prhaciplesg Bpinosa in stressing the 
transeendonea of God as well as M e  ability?- to work into création#
The doctrine of creation at the same time provided the mandate for the 
investigation of nature. Sorip'kire was clearly seen to affirm naturep
but it oer"balnly did not deify it9 02? identify it with God»
I'Jhile the 17th century saw a reorientation in the concept of 
motion9 the first scientific tkmis'b of the next century saw an 
attempted retma, in ohemlstry to oommmion wlbh nature an attempt to 
deepen concept of matter that is "rightly forgotten#" (Gillespie
19^7 9 p*174») Oombufatlon was still associated with spirits and 
respiration emd moat cheaiiste of the early 18th century had little or 
no cosiCG’ptlon of the change that h*ad been I'jrought in physios » (Cf# 
Pledge 19669 p.107.) Not till maok (1728-99) would craft mid 
chemical theory come together giving birth to the doctrme of the 
latent heat of freesïlng and vapourisation a coalition mxfUgbt about 
in part by tho booming distillery Industry of Scotland# Mot until 
Prieetl^ r "unmasked the phlogiston mystery5, mid his discovery of oxygen 
was developed by Lavolslerg would chemistry be put on a firm basis®
Generally there was little theoretical interaction between science 
and industry in specific details# But the transfer from science to 
industry of a scientific method was important the assmiption to the 
crafts of a systematic description^ classification mid study of 
processes and principles# The metal Industries ^ for instance g did 
not change to any great extent but came to be imderstood. Bpteiing 
off feom this was the automation of machinery and the primsny of 
Invention over discovery#
On the religious front there was growing estrangement between 
autonomous man and revelation# The study of nature oame to replace
hlsto3?ieal truths as the key to mide2?stEmding God and the quest for 
rational order In nature became the preoccupying force in man's 
encoimter wi'bh the mysterious @ But while this divorce was
X^ ropoimded by many the distinction was not so evident among scientists# 
"Nothing is easier than to omasa evidence for this continuing
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asBociation of science and religion 9 both in Britaki and on the 
Continent#" (Gay 1973/a9 p*>315»} te:impe so,, but this is all too 
of ton Ig&iored in accounts of the history of ideas#
In the late 17th century it heoeme fashionable to demonstrate the 
roa£ion£il>leneos of Gl-iristianity and hence natural theology came to the 
fore® Natural theology can he siaiply defined as theology based on 
what may he rationally demonetra/bedg though tMs definition is ‘by no 
means the sole one end debate will obviously exist as to what log and 
what is not9 rationally demonstrable# Locke's 'Jieasonableness of 
Ol'o?istiani'ï:.y* and Blount's 'The Oracles of Reason' are topical works# 
But the difference between natural theology in its early fomnat and 
its end product is considerable ® With Boyle 9 Neircon and Ray a close
alliance was forged between natural theology and natural pMlosopIjy 
which was productive and creative 9 aa well as integral and Imsie to 
their thought® (indeed It was often closer to a theologÿ’ of nature 
kian natural theology a) However by the 1$th century natural 
theology had developed into an autonomous province of study a3:?.cl 
someone like Baden .Powell could separate the physics,! and moral g 
assigning the former to science and the latter to theology# (Of®
Brooke 1974/bg p.52.)
ÂB natural theology developed it implicitly assumed an area, of 
religious concern autonomous from revelation® This was its 
distinctive feature® There is a discernible historical flow from 
(a) reve3.ation over reason; to (b) the two comp].ementary and 
Interacting; to (c) independence of each other; until finally (d) 
reason caiEs to lord it over revelation. Thus reaaon/natoral theology 
moved from a persuasive prelude to revealed theology to a rsubstitute 
for it® For men like Berhmip Burnet3 Ray end Paley natural theology, 
tïiougli made much of and seen as independent9 was essentially a prelude 
to the study of revelation» The orthodoxe apologists in their 
approach simply defermred their appeal to revelation to a. later point in 
their argument; but the. Deists allowed natural religion to take over 
and displace revelation#
5 3 2 # 1 e _ DM_, I t  „ The exact reasons fo r the ris e  of
natural theology are varied and complex® Brooke (ib id  p d4e) 
suggests seven «« the need fo r some natural theology fo r those who 
liv ed  befo3?e Clarist; to  reconcile the la te s t s c ie n tific  theories w ith
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Seri}pture; a. convioticai that non-beliG'if'ors had to he shoim as 
* foolish*' the increasing emphasis on the tlesigïi(er) of the miiverse 
that science now unfolded; to defend the reaBonahleness of belief; 
the quest fore a universal religion which was oompelling to all and 
'Which would unite all men (re# the recent geographical disooveriea)g 
and finally the need to justify science :m religious terms aa a 
means of worship^ duty9 and a method of cultivating virtue®
The upsurge of natural theology was not without biblical support® 
Passages such Romans 1@w#18-219 and the Nature Pseilms seemed to 
po:lnt to the possibility of a natural Isnowledge of God apart from 
revelation®(Of# Berkouwer 1971 a oha.^gY.) %ider Aquinas reason 
mid revelation hcjd ‘been du„alistioally assigned their respective spheres 
of investigation » On the other hand Oalvm had maintsiisieci tliat such 
passages suggested that man@ bÿ' himself 9 had a clear enough tonowledge 
to condemn him, enough, knowledge to be inexcusable before God3 while 
the biblical revelation wae absolutely necessary for salvation# But 
the general drift of thought was to see natural theology as a noceesmcy 
aid for revelation instead of comple.ment@ry to see the Bible as 
merely magnifÿ'lng the timths Imowa to reason# A move from God the 
Redeemer to God the Creator and the ingtsullment of IJIb works over- His 
word®
But the root problem was that 3 in emphasising the creator ship of 
God cmd the goodness of His oroationg sight was lost of the reality 
that the world was fallen# The strong motive of Galvin (creation 
fall and redem^tioh) was overcome by the relIgico-hummiistie dualism 
of iiatore-gmceo It was against tliis dualistic motive that tho
paradi^Hs of this age must be seen3 clianging as they did into a 
motive of natu3?e«=»freedoM (Kant)# So it is in the loss of the Fell 
that Ütubbé (tenclenoiously?) accuses Sprat of reducing the Fall to 
meszely a failure to cultivate the Garden of KcienS (Brooke 1974/bg Po13©]
gestion of I)esi,m« The argument from design has a long 
and contizdveszaiaX history® Despite its obvious limitations it was 9 
and is 9 one of the most persuassive arguments for the rea3.ity and 
existence of God (of#l6.5«3»1«) though it can never logically be a 
proof, Boyle argued that as science advanced it furthered the 
eloquence of the argument for here was revealed a world of 
mathematical law and harmony3 of macroscopic and rfticroseopic beauty 
and simplicity s Fur ther g the works of nature were seen luider the
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rigours of solantiflo Investigation to be far superior to the 
artlfaots of msm# Tlm^ î the transeendent desigu of the Grea,torg
along with the priiioiples of a fixed  cjzeation and the siiffio iency of 
reason ( o f b e c a m e  eo:merstonGS in  the apologetics of the 
virtuosi and ocher 'bheologlans #
Design was seen with respect to foiu? categories® It was seen in 
living things; in the la,wj that governed, natural phenomena; In those 
facets that seemed scientifically inexplicable without God's activity g 
and in the inconsistencies of those who rejected design# Borne
reason Imd to be given for the design of the wox'lcl aroiuidg it could 
not just be Ignored and it was here tliat the last point was forcefully 
utilised# But natural theology and design were imwisely used as 
means of escplsiiiiing gaps in the scientific account# Newton faced
with certain irregulerities in the heavens could (seemingly) appeal to 
God for their adjustment to keep things goingy but then Lapl.ace worïced 
out that these irregu3.arlties 3 instead of accumulating^ can.eeiled out 
and therefore excluded God# Again with respect to the o^ zderliness 
of uatuT'Op lew ton had appealed to Clod as the reason for the co-planar 
orbits of the planets which appoxzentlry defied .exploration# This i-tbb 
seen as God's creative activity until Laplace came along with his 
nebular hypothesis (22,1 *5®) and pjzovided a reasonable ©xplfmation as 
to I’/hy the planets went round in the same direction# Thus God's
activity was increasingly removed from acting i?rito hie’fcory to that of 
the divine legislator3 reduced to pregervlng the cosmic order® As 
natural theology developed even, this would come under preessure#
Paley le probably the best Isiom
p5?opounder o f design^ though his presentation is  pedestrian alongside 
tha'b of Ray's® Boyle is famous fo r his analogy of creation with  
that of a  clock and the design o f the eye® The clock analogy le f t  
questions against the susta:lning a c tiv ity  o f God in  creation3 but th is  
was for Boyle email price to pay against the objective o f securing the 
reality of the Creator and the mandate to research In to  the worlcings 
of creation B Tims aa far as he was concerned the analogy between
nature and a himan contrivasiee was ji^ s tifia b le  in  coming; to the 
emphasis on the wisdom and beneficence of God. The paradoxes of 
providence were of no immediate concern fo r him# It was not the 
individual parts as such but the whole tha,t pointed to the goodness of 
God and there were w ithin the parts levels of tru th  that had to be
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clistingiiished.® Boyle olaruiied it was pro sump tiious to seek knowledge
of a purpose for each mid every .facet of nature; tîiat it was likewise 
presumiptaous to claiiXi ïoiowledge of all the purposes of an^ ' one facet; 
ai'id that it was presumptuous to see all as designed solely for the 
benefit of man# Yet he goes 'beyond Descartea in stressing’ the need
to seek divine ends In nature # Descartes argued that we only know
such ends if God chooses to x'eveal them to us 3 but for Boyle this was
not so and final ends could be derived f:com investigation of the world#
5 , 2 , 2 Xsaax,Mewt^ Like Boyle he gave a pOEiitive
impetus to 'Fbysioo—theology * # In his work 9 and in his criticism of
Descartes g his feiith was always pszesent#
"Mi83?eas Descartes had postulated the development of solar 
systei'is of matter :m motion^ Newton heid to deny the 
sufficiency of such an account# The only satisfying 
e:q>lanation for the present structure of our solar system 
was that God created it more 02? less as it now ls««oe 
This was one of Newton's most cherished assumptions and it 
was shared by almost all who expounded his scientific works
in defence of their faith#" (Brooke 1974/h3 p»20@)
For Ne^-j'ton the emphasis was on the general physical laws rather than 
the question of biological adaptions (of, Boyle)® Si this he was 
followed by Bentley^ while Boyle was followed by Ray@ though both 
streams could readily utilise argiMents from either position* Thus 
Newton ni M s  'Gptl,cks* appealed to the design of the eye®
But in fostering the argimeM from design controversy arose as to 
its benefits to izellgion* In the Glarke—Leibnlg deb ate 3 Clarke saw 
gra'id.tational forces evincing the activity of God while Leibniz 
protested that noiE^ ’iaeolmuical forces were unintelligent; Clarke 
affirmed3 and Leibnig; denied9 that space could be ©eon as analogous 
with the sengoriim of God; Clarke saw constant preservation by God3 
wMXe Leibniz maintained constant production by the Deitÿ'® Thus 
while for many in Aigland Mevrbon fmzthe^ zed religion in his scientific 
work and the argumenta he presented g Leibniz contended, that lewtoii had 
.fostered the decay of natural 3?eligion@ (ibid pc,25o)
g Perhaps the best encponent of 
biological design was Say® Ordained in I66O3 he resigned his 
fellowship at Tszinity College Gamb:eidge in 1662 because of his 
opposition to the Act of Uniformity® He is regarded as the founder 
of modérai botany and his work is full of referenoe to biological design.
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GharactoriÊitic of liio thought i/ms the idea of a. full and perfect 
universe and a pervading optimisms whereby the Fall was virtually 
i-neonsequential o But basically there was the assujiiption of 
transcendent desig-ft# Say was influenced by the Cambridge Platonists 
and it was psnzt of h.is strategy to stress biological facets which could 
not readily be 02t;p3.ained on a mechanical basis» It should be noted 
that this was an assimptlong not a proof - as is gene.rally the ease 
with the argument from design. He pointed to the vast diffeizence 
between the works of man and the superior works of nature» But there 
was £i problem here for if the difference between the works of man and 
na’ta’e was stressedg how did the analogy bear up3 and how could 
extrapolation be made to the absolute properties of God? (Of# Hay I69I; 
Hay 1693*)
3 #2,2g4f WillimyPaloy ^ost far«ou8 work in this area
is by I'aley* In hie *A View of the hVidonooB of Christiauity® he 
argued that either no religion was true or Christianity was true cmd 
suporior* He contended that 3 granted the aesivtiption of Godp miracles 
were oretdible and that the revelation of the Bible was eueh a miraole 
which made ’mown the will of God® He a^ zguod from the historicstl 
evidencQ contained in both pagan and Gkristicm writings to the truth 
of Christianity* Auxiliary?' evidences were s ought in the prophecies 
of the Old and New Testaments3 the mora3.1ty of the gospels 3 aaid the 
rapid growth of the faith* This wa,s a typical apologetical reaction 
to the Enlightenment and Deism# Eight years later he argued isi his 
'Natural Theology* that by examining such diverse things as teeth and 
watches we could arrive at the Creator God* ('Paley 16029 p*319ff)
5«&«&bJ&gLlSgSaaEjg98R»
.âsâsJ,?J„s»StJLfe%J>ilJLl43M.JiSeajilon. ï'iiis held that the sorlcl v»as
now substantia3.1y the world as i t  had always been 3 the world in  fa c t 
ifhieh God created* This had several advantages from the point of 
the inner conslstency of the argximentg animals were seen as pre-» 
adapted to pre«-ade;pted conditions; th is  e^ctended read ily  to the cycles 
of nature ; i t  entailed th at n o  species had ever become extinct thus 
revealing the excellence of the provision of God fo r a l l  eroa/biozes *
But there were serious disadvantages species were being discovered 
which were extinct (of# Buffon) and therefore e ith er conditions 
eîiaiîged or creatures were not properly adapted* Also mzising at 
th is  time was the question of the dynamic relationship between
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o re a tu re s  and t h e i r  e n v lro m ie n t#
asserted that God neither did or omitted aiiytlrkig exoopt for some 
rational and good roason --- even if man could not understand it#
®ms Dei'hsmi utilised Paul to point out that mem was not to guestlom 
the doings of God3 though this tacitly undercut the design argument 
aa a rational proof# ïlore^  as elsewhere^ he was aasmning God's 
exlstoKioe end tWn pointing to dosigno rather than arguing from design 
to God* For Bey the p5?:Lnoi.plG meant that all x-fss pe:e.feet in the 
world; instead of the later concept of 'red in tooth and claw® hie 
worldview was that liiere was perfection in tooth and claw# Palm 
and Buffering were negotiated by various means — rattlesnake© gave 
warning before they btruck (Serham); disease necosiciled laan to death 
(Paloy)# (Cfo Dlllonhergor I36I9 p#152«) At tld,s points of eomzsep
the became tenuous plugging of holes in tlie idea of desl^x,
Aloo there was the problem of the 'uselossness of the starts which
we;fX5 not visible to the naked eye — though the answer given was the 
plurality of worlds o
 Deism# VJMle many contained this predilection for natural
theology within a conventional Clrris'tian fi?asiswo2?k others did not* 
Deism arose eaid su‘bf:3'bi'l*'irued natural, theology fo3Z revelatiozi,
Typically3 Toland in hist 'Chxdstiimity not tarions® (a revealing
title) noted the past assent to God's word and then went on to strip 
Obristlmilty of all rovelationy leaving only that which was solidly 
bashed on rationelistio thought# (Gf# Gay 1973/^3 pa37<3o)
Utilising the argument of dosigo he rejected the Epiouzzegm atomism of 
liiiü3zet:liis bu'î; kept the Epiouzzemi concept of eteznally moving matter* 
T;Inda3. <=^’> :m 'Christianity as Old as the Creatioiig or itio Gqb})o1 as a 
Republioation of i:he Religion of Natmze' saw ‘.revelation adding 
nothing to reaBon» Thlo domotlon of revelation departed a long way
from osrbhodoxyy especially when in the %mrsuit of soieni;ifie reason
they attacked the eosiGepts of the Trrlnlty-g olergyg ee^ zemoniesg the 
doctrine of the z^esmzreotion etc*# (Of* Goodman^ DoCk-, 1974/©o po42o)
5 «2 *5» The Orthodox Reply«, Peley provides a basic outlrlne of the
apologetical approach of orthodosqy to the delstie challengee Four 
points were concentrated oai -  miracles g  prophecy g  creation g  oad "khe 
analogy of the two books* The fxizst two area.s were subject to 
empirical confirmationo ZilSâ^ JltS wore to be confirmed by the
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senses; they had to he publie to he allowed as real; customs had to 
flow from them and men were on their heWlf 'ko s3uffer for their iXiith* 
Ihme was sceptical of miracles birfc allowed to
owr'-rulG mij possibility of ompirioal evidence# Thus he finished 
up getting 3?ict of science and the laws of na'tnize at the same time»
The Deists presented, the most consistent attack cm Biiracles as eontrary 
to reason* 'While most theo3.ogdans (and scientists) accepted the laws 
of nature and the fact of miraolea g the Deists accepted only the order 
of nature In a quite materialistic and hnmanistie maimer* ,^ ?ophecy 
in a sense is a special case of miracle. It was stressed by a man 
like Ralph Gudworth* (Cf* Dillenhergor 19613 p#145#)
The wisdom of God .in ^ creatimi, tended to revolve oroimd some 
presentation of design, though not necessarily as a 'proof® of God.
God wae to he better understood by tunzav’elling the depths and 
mys'teries of nature -•= rightly seen as resting on a firm biblical 
foundation * Creation was argued against concepts o.f fate and chance
(wh.ic!i could he affirmed by the same person)* Giidworth contended
against any meohanloal interpretatlcm of the world* fie calling that 
.Miaxafcras had commented that man merely 'olmnced® to have hands lie 
suggested this was sheer nonsense and devoid of meaning for hands were 
obvious3.3Z‘ designed with sped fl.c purposes in ra:lnci» Blmilarly, Bay 
pointed to the immense size of the universe and the smallness of 
certain species ; Derham pointed to Gistroraorclcal immensity; while Paleyg 
doubting the iiseMmess of astronomy^ pointed to the watch and biology* 
liNren the more im%)leaoant aspects of l.ifa were ln.oln.ded in th.e overall 
purposes of God as worked out .In na'knral theology Insects spread 
disease but were also the source of medicine^ while locusts were often 
used by God to bring judgement,
Lastly there wag the (of. bacon, Boyle).
This was developed by Butler who pointed out that nature, .lilco Scripture, 
had depths which man could not hope to plumb. Di].lemborger is
rather harsh on Butler at this juncture for 'his asialogy was not in fact 
between nature and Scripture per use,, but between our comiEon experience 
of nature and the Bible# (ibid p»154e) Thus he constructed his 
@218,logy g moving from the authority of nature to the authority of 
Bcripture# But the problem arising was that as the author of 
Scszipture came into question, so also did the author of nature «
In the elei/’atioB of reason over revelation, the problem for
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natural theology îms that It did not deveilop any roal bihlioal view 
of mature (of* oh.25#) The Bible clearly has mioh to teach on the 
Christias'J, attitude to the vrcnzld but tliis \ms negleoted in favour of 
imtuto3zed reason. Ho reading of Genesis 1-“3 or Rommis 1<-2 omi fall 
to realise that crucial to the Christian approach is the reality of a 
fal'len world, Bui; this was neglected in favour of an oi^ tiiiiiotic— 
p^rogressive view of natmze* Ken like Berham mid PaJ.ey failed to 
sense i;he reality of a 'broken globe® or ime 'pangs of sorrow® in this 
present condition* (Of* Brooke 1974/bg p.36y)
But the rise of reason within orthodoxy siast be^ placed Ita context, 
for although the rejection of revelation came from -unorthodox 
quarters there wais witMn, the main stream of Glnzistlen. thoii^jdi'fc a strong 
ejsplmsis on the reasonableness of the faith* This was inevitable 
when the charge began to bo made that religion was a mystical^ 
irra'b-ioiial belief, beneath the dignity of e:oJ,ightened man* The only 
answer to such a charge wag "bo show that the faith \ma pe:efoci;ly 
reasonable within Christian parameters. Bo the response of natural 
theology was correct in principle {aa @21 attempt to stand for the 
rationality of the faith) if wrong methodologiogHy (in accepting the 
ground of the oppoaiti(m) » A presuppositional cri,tiqiie may have been 
Eiore fru.itful *
ïhœzG was also zlnevitably an orthodox response that endoeivoured 
to balanoe reax-jon and revolatiw! in harisonlous relationship within a 
d'ualistic motive* Buoh rêïspoBse was found in men like Buddetie, 
Kosheim, Baungaten fmd Plaff who maintaiaied tluit revelation did mot 
OA'jsfvlradiot the light of reason* These thinkers tended to move 
towgnzds a position of ®plillosophla anoilla tlieologiae ® ; their defence 
of revelation being an attempt to reinstate grace over nature*
C ertain ly DmddeuB saw natural 'theology in  an- In'termediate position 
somewhere between reasoAi and revelation* Natural theology was 
neither independent nor bound to revelation* Baimgaten clistlnguished 
between revelation and the B ib le , arguing that the Wo were not 
equacable; while M ehaelia contended that piiysios was quite 
independcMt of theology*. (Of# Dillenbex’ger 1961, Pn179«) Butler 
saw revislabiim as ;?:ntlispmisi'ble fo:c several roaoo.ns§ i t  was necessary 
to make p la in  what xms only dimly ciiscesmible in  nature; as giving the 
dispensation o f providence ; and fo r setting fo rth  the conditions 
necessary fo r salva-tion* The ,gesio:ea3. drlf'k was however to enthrone 
reason as lord of a3.1, and tM.s was c learly  seen in  the Iihili.ghtenmento
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Tho irony of tîiQ JükilIghtenmmnt, with its radiosLlly anti-.»Ghristion 
worldview, was that it was often forwarded by Ghristlam involvement in 
science# (Of. G@y 1973/a, ppo22,23s Gay 1973/h,pp. 140ff. ) Often
called the 'Age of Reason' this appellation has to he trea/bed with 
care, for while this was certainly a dominant thread in the spirit of 
the age it eaxinot he an imqualified description.
"The philoBophes* glorification of criticism and their 
qualified repudiation of ^ metaphysics miake ii; obvions that 
the Enlighteament xms not an Age of Reason hut a Revolt 
against Rationolism. This revol t took two closely related 
formes it rejected the assertion that reason is the sole, or 
even dominsmt, spring of action; and it denied that all 
mysteries in the i^ /orld can he penetrated hy itnquiry*"
(Gay 1973/a» p.141.)
Old values and holiofs were up for question. God Eiay have been an
assumption of basic Importance for Newton, hut for the philosophes He
was merely a dehatahle hypothesis# Likewise wi'bh Scriptures
DeaoarteG may have set limits to reason and granted revealed religion
a province only accessible to faith, 1mt for men like Oondoreet and
Spinoza the text of Sorlp'bure was to he fully enqposed and ouhjected to
the light of rational criticism. The theme of the I'Mlightenment was
that 'You shall know the truth end the truth shall set you free®, but
it was the tni'bhs of reason enlightened, at least in the early 18th
century, by science. But dogma based on science had its problems
and it was manifestly absmzd to set forth a x*ational position as the
final absolute truth even if it had scientific backing. In the
early half of the eentuizy Descartes and Newton both reigned — giving
two opposing scientific worldviews. The problem was to choose but
how? Ill the end the lewtonian view prevailed and the porfocticm of
man embraced ijithin that frsa'aework. Tuxzgot i-rrites in 1750 s
"At last all the clouds are dissipated. What a glorious 
light is east on all sides I %'Jiiat a crowd of great men on 
all paths of knowledge I Maat perfocbion of huimn reason^
One man g Newton, has submitted the infinite to the calculus | 
has unveiled the nature end properties of light, which, tjhile 
revealing to us eves^bhing else, had concealed itself g he has 
placed in his balance the stars, the earth, and all the forces 
of Nature." (1750s p»219«)
Yet Turgot oou3.d still see this wi'bhin the context of orthodoxy, (ibid
p.aao.)
SîJriî..5SBi&,-MKhlSBa.i.lâ3i^5ll" He foEesjîiaclovîea the milightenmeiit.
For him, God was identifiable with nature and could therefore be lmo#i
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apart, from Sorlp'kmze if man was :Uito3„ligent eziough* The Bcripturos
were merely a facility for controlling the ignorant masseG of the
■aiilefmiod, while, on the othejz hand, the learned who £irrived at 'true
conceptions ® hy reason were 'altogether more blessed * ' (Cf# Goodman,
IDoO# 1974/0p pp«38’^40e) Lawn of nature %jer@ viewed as autcmomoim
smd necessitated the iaipossihility of miracles if they in any way
transgreBsed these laws. Thus his umprecedented criticism of the
Bible, his rejection of ceremonial g his free-tliinlclng philosophy, and
1pantheism all influenced the philosophes*
thoK# Bsoseissy
of the *Aoacl&ie des Soiencea* fx'om 1699 to 1741p was eoeontially a
man of .letters* While he xnzote some mathematical works, his 
importance lies :ln forging a liWc between the scientific 'revolution® 
mid pMlosopliya It m s  he who helped to fomiiMate the new 
scientific worldview* "As a man of the world he saw what was 
fashionable and x>rodiieed what was wanted»" (Butterfield 1973/h, pol65»' 
He produced his popular 'The Plurality of the Worlds' in 1686, two years 
before the 'Prikioipla® @ But it Would he thoughtless to see him as 
a philosopher imawaro of the sciences around h;m, fo3? in fact as 
secretary of the AoBÂem'le he was in touch with all the differing 
fields ï?nd haci a hettes? general lüiowledge than many of the fron'L^ » , 
running specialists» For any worldview to grip its ciilturo it is 
essential that it have its popularisera and Fonteiiell© perfoxmied this 
function for the new soiexitifie outlook. The clahn can he suude tha,t 
the new worldview was forged hasically, not hy the scientists, hut hy 
the I'jriters and philosophers of the time»
5»3.3* manooia m r iQ_Arj3u^t_(V^^ A l-renoh Deist
who drew heavily on the thou#it of Hewton, as well as John Locke, 
Yoltaiz'0 was in fact the continental populariser of Newton thnzougii his 
•Elements of the Philosophy of Newton* 1738» He started where 
Newton left off» In no sense did he Wee up the cudgels of science 
and reason in blind opposition to "belief; rather, like Newton hut 
against Descartes, he began with the liberty of God to create as H© 
saw fit» Rejecting Epicurean atomism, he contended that Newton led 
men closer to God while Des dart© s led men aifey froia the Creator * (Cfo
1 # Part o f th is  thesis shall draw heavily on HoBooyeweerd» I t  
has "been said of him by one who does not eharo his viewpoint that he 
"cam bo called the most o rig in a l philosopher Holland has ever 
produced, even Spinoza not oxoopted," (Leiigeoieijer 1964, p»10»)
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Gay 1973/ 0*9 Pa158«) Newton, Locke and Bacon were thus seen as the 
precu3?sora of the IM lightem ient through th e ir stress on careful 
e2?perimentatioîi Instead of w ild conjecture. Hence V o lta ire 's  
'Candide ' ( I966) is  a dramatised reconstruction of the Newtonimi 
approach to the world •« thou^di i t  goes beyond what Newton himself 
held* (Of* Gay 1973/&P p®200.) In  coEzmon with the period V o lta ire  
u tilis e d  the idea of désigna, claiming that Newton's in te llig ence  
could only come from a higher in te llig en ce# (Of* Goodman, 1974/0
p*43®) He was no upholder o f orthodox re lig io n , however, and 
unequivocahly enthroned philosophy and reason above a l l  else* But
he carefullÿ' delim ited boundaries beyond which reason could not go, 
fo r there was a mysterious residue in  l i f e  which could not be plumbed 
and which lim ited  any search fo r ultim ate causes * True wisdom lay  
in  recognising .the ignorance of man® He could look a t the m ilky way 
and the ®a,tom% but he did not laiow what matter was; he saw by the aid  
o f lig h t, but he Imew not what lig h t was. On o i l  sides he was lim ited  
by his ignoranceo (ibid po46*) Thus far and no further (Job 38g11#) 
was the calling of reason.
Denis mderot  ^ Gnoyolopaedlstg materialistio
philosopher, novelist, satirist, dramatist, art critic and scientistg 
he is most famous for having, along with d’Mernbert and otheszs, 
compiled and edited 'the I^Vacsyclopldi© ou Dictionnaire raisonncf des 
sciences, des arts et des metiœzs. ® Many strands of the
Enlightenment come to a head in Diderot, who in I746 was still dels tie 
in outlook, but by 1749 had elemzly moved to a Biore radical 
materialism (ibid p*60«) Bis position diangod from a dels tie out­
look, from looking at God in nature, to excluding God and confining 
hie discussion to matter and motion, finally portraying an active and 
sensitive matter as the cause of all things (re* spontaneous 
gene3?ation and huge time scales ixi nature)* (ibid p*65#) In bis 
'Pensees Philosophiques' the Deist had triumphed over the atheist, 
but he moved on to the failure of a blind .man (Nicholas Baimdorsoii? ) 
to be convinced by the wonders of nature» (ibid p»64«)
All was to be equally subject to the Giziticism of reason* (Of* Gay 
1973/u, p»149e) But his position was not as scientific as might be 
expected» He rejected mathematics and M.s rejection wab b. 
fimdemiental critique of the 'tmregil idealization of the discipline# (Of. 
Gillespie 1967s? p»187@) But Diderot was no fool at mathematics and 
could szeadily utilise it at a. secondary level; his indictment wen
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against a, science of finite intelligence which endeavoured to plmib 
the infinite. His approach ims a more eæzthy one than that of the 
pmze rationalist and he actually reversed the Cartesicm procédure (of
studying self to know nature) by s'kudylng nature to know himself.
It was a study through the craft tradition rather than abstract theory; 
matter rather than form was the key# (Cf« Gillespie 196?j> p*191 «)
CW Gondormt s philosophe and
mathematician, he advocated the "infinite perfeotihility" of man in 
M s  'Esquisse B'mi tableau historique des progrès de 1 'espizit hvjaaln* 
(of, Oondoroet 1794e p,235») Here he traced the development of 
monîcind throu^ 4% nine epochs and foicetold. that would become perfect 
in the tenth. He confidently asserted the supremacy of the lawe of 
nature,' the perfectibility of mim and the reality of science as 
opposed, to the illusion of religion# From the *Ten.th Stage® he 
m ’itos s
"o.owe shall find in the expeszienoe of the past, in the 
observation of the progress that the sciences and 
civilisation have already made, in the analysis of the 
progress of the human mind and of -bhe development of its 
faculties, the strongest îzeasons for believing that nature 
has set no limit to the realization of our hopes.«««The 
time will therefore some when the sun. will elime only on 
free men who îaïow no other master but their reason;»#,"
(ib id  pp«223s?S26o)
s is famous for his remark to 
Napoleon that he had no need of the hypothesis of God, having 
deteriEined that the planetary irre^ pilaritles cancelled out, and that 
the co"plemar orbits could be explained by the nebulas? hypothesis, God 
became redundcmt as a 'staffer of holes » ' Thus he developed the 
Newtonian world into one that was aolf«*su,ffie.ient and Impersonally 
mechtuiical, subject only to a strictly detovtzministic sequence of cause 
mid effect. It ie Laplace who formulates the Newtonian world= 
machine,
"We ought then to regm?d the present state of the universe as 
the effect of its antoazior state and as the cause of the one 
which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence 
I'zhieh could comprehend all the forces by wlâeh nature is 
mi:?JBatod and the respective situation of the beings who compose 
it -■=» an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to 
analysis <=• it would embrace in the same foundation the 
movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of 
the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be unoertain and the 
future, as^  the past, would be preaent to its eyes»" (Laplace 
1961, p«4«)
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This is  reduotionisai on two levels g epistemologically in  the 
eonviotion that a l l  w ill u ltim ate ly  he oapable of Gxp3.aiia/hion on the 
basis of physical laws; and metaphyeloally in  the idea, that m atter- 
in-4aotion constitutes szoality.
Space forbids d e ta ils  o f the c lass ifica tio n  methodology of 
Condillac, extended hy Linnaeus; or of Goethe, who despite "malting a 
fool of himself" (G illesp ie  196?, p,196#) ms nevertheless an 
important figure* But enough has been given to indicate the d r if t  
of th is  period as a movement fo r reanon against the coneeptra of 
revealed szeligion» The Milightonrnent gave the f ir s t  real and 
serious evidence o f a divergence between science and b e lie f, thougti 
the picture is  confused by the ambivalent attitu d e  to science by many 
o f the philosophes. Like the HenBissaîice i t  tended to be a movement. 
back to the p ris tin e  clarity of the ancients# They could therefore 
t ie  reason to science, but equally reason could bo against science, or 
in d iffe re n t to it. 31i tliis the formulation of reason and philosophy 
were quite at variance with Newton and the other v irtu o s i «
S_«4«1e_ Mat^i’ialisme La Mettrle caused a seasidal with M b 
uncompromising materialism in the middle of the 18th century 'L'Eomme 
Machine ® « Baron Pierre=4Iem?i d'Holbach, un3.ike many of the others 
mentioned in this chapter, readily adopted an Epicurean position 
concerning the state of motion; all was in flux mid there was no rest 
anywhere in the univ©3?se. But nature was ultimately governed by 
determinism, not chance, by the inevitable chain of cause and effect, 
holding' this, he contended that creation was unreasonable as a doctrine 
and spaatmieous generation quite feasibleJ In the 1740's there had 
been repoîzted the observed regeneration of the polyp or I'lydra by 
Abraliam Trombley, subsequently confirmed by Reaumur. This wae of 
tremendous si^ iifieanoe., especially when cou|)led with the apparent 
spontemeouB generation of life in the sealed flasks of J.T«Needham*
The latter was an erroneous conclusion as the preparations of î^ eeàîic-m 
wore not storile, but it would be nearly a century before they were 
disproved# The point was that both these incidente pointed to 'active 
matter®, the ability to regenerate and bzeisag forth life from 'khat 
which was dead and isimiimate. Thus materiMis'm was furthered in 
exc'J.iiding God. But with these early pioneers of strict
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materialism it should be noted that lihey were not neoessarlly denying 
the ©Kioteïioe of God *« soEie did, some did not. The point wae the 
thorough exeluoion of God from paaztioipatlon in the procès ses of 
nature* (Cf. Goodman, 3)«Go 1974/09 P*49f*3
 ^ embodied a soeptioal approach to all 
of reality and brought everything ;hito question re lig io n , science 
and even the princip le o f cause and e ffe c t. Descartes, Leibniz mid 
Spinoza had argued for the Innato q u alities  of the mind, and Locke fo r  
the 'tabula ra s a '. For the former, true Icnowledge consisted in  the 
mind's grasp of innate ideas, w ith mathematics as a prototype of 
teîowlcdge, its  reasoning ce rta in , universal and a p r io ri; fo r Locke, 
ideas were em pirical in  orig in  and were b u ilt up from sense imipression 
and therefore not universal 5n form or struetmze. Hume clearly held 
to the view that the only reliable knowledge msn can possess was 
based on d iscrete senseM-rapressians.
The idea of discreteness of sensoMmpressions led to Hume'e 
radical view of causality® He refused to accept any a.priori idea 
of a rational, order wliich was j^ ooged on the natural world, and 
causality was theazefore viewed primarily as something necessitating 
constant conjmiction* Our ideas of cause and effect were, he 
maintarmedg habits of escpectation and no cause coiü.d be Iniown from its 
effect aloneo The idea of constant conjunction was obviously 
Inadequate &MÜ he had to•reinforce it with two additional concepts 8 
(a) that 'à® would only produce if 'B® could not oceuj? without 
; end (b) tliat spatio-temporal contiguity was neoossary* This 
still left him with serious problems as gravity clearly violated the 
latter point.
Hume ranged himself implaooobly against the argument from design 
and gave one of the clsnsioM C3?itiques of it» He argued that no 
man had witnessed creation^, and there was therefore nothing in the 
w&jy of proof that could be extrapolated frora the observed creative 
acts of man to the unobserved acts of God; there were evils in the 
world, therefore God could not be the benevolent God that He was 
claimed to be; that to argue to a first cause only logically allowed 
us to say 'It ie a cause*; that all effects are finite and therefore 
fail lamentably in establishing an infinitely good, wise and laving 
God; and finally that the analogy of a seed or egg would provide an 
equally’ valid analogy fos? the argument of design* The first point 
is eignificant for h© employed the scientific a jqpsteriorla But
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God cannot be time dealt with; iThlle desigs:i is mi a pripM argmtien'k.
However his c ritiq u e  exposed the haslo fact that the argument was 
esseaitially mot a proof o f God, hut followed om froîa the assumptlom 
tliat* God had oreated* I f  we try  to deduce the mature o f God fazom 
the ohmzaoterlstios o f the m ilverse, viewed as Hie created order,
Hume deelmoed that He must then he frlnite, imperfect and :hacompetento
It would he wrong to see Hmie aa a champion, of science against 
religion as has been suggested « Indeed such was the close tie 
between science and orthodox "belief that for Huvae to attack the 
religious "beliefs of hie time he had also to "impeach the rationality
of their science"' as well. (Brooke ‘1974/b, p»45f«)
There were various responses to Mumc fo r his arguments were 
Jncisive, al.tliougii in  the lï-imediate context not treated as seriously 
as they warranted. P rie s tly  dismissed Hume as Irresponsible, 
olaiming that his analysis o f causality was defective fo r P .rlestly , 
the practising s c ie n tis t, causality was a rea l phenomena,® At 
another lev e l -Ihere was the coamon^ s^ense i>hilosophy o f Thomas Reid 
who suggested tïm t Xhuao's analysis was in su ffic ie n t as an explanation 
of e ffie ie s it causality -  such as in  the moiring of a l;bnb loy an 
exercise of will, ' A th ird  response can he seen in  Hugh M ille r ,
©vangelieaX preacher and diotingitiohed geologist, who argued tlia t the
progress of geology refuted Hujae in  tliat the diocontin iiity of the 
d iffe rin g  strata, (orea,tionaJ overtujzned the basis of the f ir s t  point 
of his critique of design. M ille r 's  position would, o f couraop 
soon "be challenged hy Îlarvîin who undercut the idea of disconkinuity 
in  the development o f the species,
s 3.S a lsa*,iaz-k in westoïii tho%ht
in M b  attempt to precisely define the domain of szational 
under81miding. He rejected Hume's scepticism and challenged the 
lünli^tenmGnt 'a faith in the unlimited scope of reason® His thought 
was caught however in the duelistlc formulation of the science-ideal 
and pe.rFjonalityMcleal, (Cf, Dooyewoerd I969, Tolel, p,386,) (ki the 
on© hand there was determinism, the autonomous machine which was the 
province of science and theoretical thought; and on the othea? hand 
there was a certain quality of freedom inlaerent in the idea of ethics, 
(Ofo Appendix E) Thus science was limited and room made for religious 
faith* There is reMly a trifism in his thought, for in the lower 
storey (of* Appendix a) of the science-ideal there were ' things^ i^n-
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tîiemselvQS.® Newton had suggested that thing's oould never be feiown 
by themselves in isolation# Tlrls oonstriict of ICant of a realm of 
deterîiîinistio science and a realm of moral obligation was one ;In 
which the two realms of science and belief could not clash, for they 
were contained :ln separate compartments of reality* But the 
question must he asked If his philosophical system is true to reality, 
and if science and religion are Independent in this ifey? It Is the 
contention of this study that they do Intora-ct, that there is a 
foundation of belief in science that requires explanation - not 
exp3.ained avray®
Knowledge, fo r IQmt, was the combination, of sensory m aterial with  
the otîTiieture of consciousness wMoh organises and in terprets data by 
its  own forms of comprehension ® Among these forms of s e n s ih illty
were the basic ones of space and time; seen as 'id e a l' as opposed to  
re a l, they were the spectacles through which vro porcelve. Only In  
the ©iq^erionoe of duration do we? have an idea of tim e, and only .in the 
eneomiter with 'things* do we reeog^iise the eacls'ke.nce of sp atia l 
Xiossibilitieso "Space Ernst, thereforeg he a pure (a  p r io r i) fozm 
of our in tu itio n , making the e^rpezeiaiice o f ex te rn a b ility  possible#" 
(Prosch 1966g p«117) B ija ila rly , causality was seen as a form of 
understanding by xfhich the mind un ified  the chaos of discrete datao
5»4»‘4« Romanticism * Inevitably there arose a movement back to
Ut:»s-.,'AasTai.w'a?rff;.vr^ Nrac,?iifg7jT2:.-ma.'SSCJA.i<SjJ!tr«:aga«^ Vw* ^
primitive nature as a reaction against the detenmulnistie abstractions 
of seientiste and philosophers. (Of. Harris 1968.) It was seen 
more in the art and litora/ture of the period, than in the sciences 8 
though it was here that Goethe got his science and romanticism miaced
up. Jm  art and litera'ture there was an exaltation of freedom, the
individual and wholeness over against the unchangilng laws of nature 9 
imiversals, absluzactionB and atoïnising tendencies of the scientists. 
Inevitably perhaps the movement, wishing to reinstate the glories of 
nature, tended to pantheism® (Of* Gillespie 196?3 pa198f#) So it 
tended to replace physics x^ jith biology (note the comparison with the
move from physics to the hi«nan. science after 1945 e®gt Bronoxvski);
from mechanical models to o^ zgonicg from objective and rigorous 
research to "pathetic subjectivisin®" (ibid p»199«) Under this the
philosophes could turn imprecision Into a virtue a thou^it well 
llluBtrated when Rousseau, in the winter of 1750a threw away M s  
watch® (Cf. Gay 1973/s, p«245a) With this act he had overthroim 
the tyranny of absolute g objective Newtonian time* It was no doubt
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s, rebellious roDimitle mood, lm.t it was deemed necoBSsry
to escape the claustrophobie oppress:lo:a of a science which denied 
freedoBi to inaxi*
Certain streams of pietistic thought will obviously fit into the 
general mood of this reaction® Though men like vfesley and Edwarde 
"had a sense for the central, csliristologleai core :la Ohriatian,ity but 
also for the now eoienceo"’ (Xllllenherger 1961, p*l6l; eit pa156f.)
The 16th and 17th centuries were unquestionably doBilnated by 
Christian belief. The popular beliefs were Gliristian, while the 
great selentlsts weaze consciously Gînziatian both in their pious 
devotimi and scientific work® The 18th century, which saw the 
establishment of the ïiiechanical worldview, was a, period of transition 
away from the traditional OMistian beliefs by a free-thinking 
spsculation that led ultimately to the extremes of ©xistentialispa and 
positivism* This was a period for assimilatisig the determimistie 
stimcture of science that would rule substantially down to the present, 
despite the Mtrmeicn of its tlieoratical die integration*
Nature], theology, once a positive ivfipetus to sciencG, gradually 
beoame an eEbemzassment to science and theology as it developed through 
Deism omi critiqued by Hivae and the philosophes* Internally witîiiïi 
theology there was the theological shift of Stcbliermacher which 
insisted that theological language should be concersied with the 
aicperience of Divine activity, not the concept of it® DiscuBsion 
of the evidences for Cisristionity was on the way out emd new patM 
would have to be trod* (of* Chalmers 1833»)
Perhaps t:he period is smmed up in its swing away from religion 
and revelation in the phrase which Voltaire, according to Gay, set 
great store by g "Reason and conscience are perfectly adequate for man's 
conduct©" (Voltaires In Gay 1973/s-, Po384®} This stood In. 
opposition to the traditlonaS. acoeptance of revelation as found In the 
virtuosi, and tersely put, if I remember correctly, by Kierkegaards 
"There is only one relation to revealed truths believing it," Or, we 
might well add, disbelieving it!
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OmPTER 6
<aiuiJtjai-;caîïCç:aX"ffi’Wi3>N'!ir-WiSsSi?5arSi:ï^ïîî'^ïi^:3£S3:-îiw
This chapter follows a more practical outworking of the mechanical 
worldview parallel, if slightly later, to the previous chapter»
The Enlightmment wae pa^ zalloled by the rising confidence man began to 
have In hie powers ejcience, technics and organisation* Thus 
Joseph Wright (1734“"’9?) painted a whole series of pictures in the late 
16th century that depicted scientific activity after the classical 
manner of nativity scenes. Science was the now mes slab #
IN imUS%aALI8#im
The early impetus in industrialisation, as ;in science, came from 
lands that were xxuedominanily (t-alv5nistxo® Thus Christopher hill,
■Î
a former self-^confessed communiste can x-jrites
"Calvinism liberated those 'who believed themselves to be the 
elect from a sense of sin, of helplessness; it encouraged 
effort. Industry, rrludy, a sense of purpose» It prepared 
the way for modem science».»" (Hill 1*961, p»92»)
llhile 1;he religious stimulus is undeniable, the period was 
nevertheless characterised by an increasing secularisation that oaw a 
decline of religious Influence and a rise of material self'^ ltiteresto 
Science may have been the awaited messiah for Mankin.dfj but the gospel 
of Balvation was work conjoined to material progress; and the religious 
dogma of the age revolved round the increasing wcmts which would lead 
to a multiplication of the powers of production and a necessity to 
increase the capacity for coîisumptiori» It is of in'lsrest to note 
that in Goethe's 'Faust®, Faust is tempted :m Part I (1808) by the 
classical temptations of Imowledge and woman's beauty wMlo in Part II 
(I832) ho ie caught in a increasing tempo of work» The period can 
only bo seen in rolatio&i to the new spirit of industrialisation, an 
increasing mechanical, efficiency that paradoxically provided the 
possibility for the romantics and middle classes to 'burn their backs 
OB the machine and escape into the fantasy of nature and ?ictorisn.a»
It would be quite w3?ong to thlnli: only
teoliiiologieal innovations and their impact need be considered - theaze 
x-rere wider and deeper influeïxces at work stemming from the Ke-wtonlen
1» One of the best accounts of the d ignity  and degradation of work in  
th is  period which I  have read is  .loL»H»Taylo:e (19?0) -  oh* 2s 'The 
Degradation of ¥ork In  Modem Society» *
121
worlvlew of the IMllghtemaent ® The grox-;th of technology can 
therefore 'be a misleading oonoept if considered in isolation for there 
were hound up with technical development a complex of social, and 
economic changes that were not reducihl-e to the technlcsal® (Of*> Ooley,
LawloFJs & Roberts 1974, p«74«) In our century it is undoubtedly
t:me that science ha© increasingly come under the dominance of 
technical capability, but In  the 19th oentury, and earlier, ecienoe 
was more,detonaina.te of toclmical progress# It is therefore fair to 
say tha,t most 'neat' esiplenations are s 3mplis "klc/redact ionis tic *
M13,u1®b 'La Technique ' (1964) gets behind the neat lines of 
development mid continuité' and points to the s p ir it  o f teeliiiiqiie which 
motivated the teohnioal revolution# This s p ir it  of technique on 
which the mechenical age rested was active In  many spheres o.f life #  
In te r a lias i t  was found at. the heart of the m ilita ry  campalms of ' 
Frederick the Great and Napoleon as they worked out th e ir  strateg ies, 
organisations on.d lo g is tic s ; i t  xms found in  the rationalis:hig of 
economic structures; and i t  \m B  found in  the provision of integrated  
police forces# E llu l argues8 "This systematisatipn, ■u.nifieation and. 
e la rific a tio B  was applied to everything." (1964, p .43#) He goes on 
to show the a ff in ity  o f teolmiquoe w ith the Ib lig jitem ent#
« it might 'be said 'felia'fc technique is the translation into
action of man's concern to master things by means of reason, 
to aceoimt for wlmt is subconscious, make quantitative what 
is qualitative, malœ clear and. precise the oirblisies of 
nature, take hold of chaos and put order into it»" (ibid po43@)
Though of coirrse not all the %)hllosophes would agree (o#g. "Voltaire)#
Tho'ugh I disagree "with the unrosolved dialectic which Ellul thus
posits between mm  and his powers (cf* 26»3®2# and 26*5»)s it must be
conceded that -bliis is an appropriate warning of sin'iplistle explanations
that fail to acocnmt for the prevailing Zeitgeist*
There is, then, a complex of factors that consti'bu'be the Industrial 
Revolution# There were tho mat erial Is tic, utilitarian, and pragjnatie 
spirits that pervaded the period and confined life to the material#
The optimistic atmosphere engendered in the 18th century provided the 
general climate for man's drive to produce and dominate his 
environment — a domination that often included men® There were the 
forces of rising population, of war, and of availability of capital# 
Another expect was the 'Enclosure Act® of the T/th and 18th centuries 
when landlords, wi'bh the approval of Parliazient, begem to enclose 
their landliolcl'lnge and re«<l.ivide their proper'by into a feif huge farms*
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As a result peasants became laxidless and penniless, and drifted to the 
towns and cities in soar oh of work, providing a cheap labour pool#
6*1*2* _¥hy Britaiix? ¥h.y should Britain have led the Industrial 
Revolution? l^ zeneh techniques vrere superior; Sweden and Russia 
x-jere smelting more iron ore g and Holland was the main creditor nextlon# 
The supremacy of France is ea^ aily seen. «= her ships were considered 
far sîdvanoed on their British eounterparts ; in the modem control of 
machines by punched cards as divised by J#M*Jacquard about I8O4 for 
the sil.k weaving looms of Lyons# But supremacy had to be cashed :ln 
on, and Britain ■emphasised the immediate usefulness of technologi.es 
while the Continent tended to restrict technical esipabiiities to 
making toys and Intricacies for the rich an.d royals#
But again s why B rita in  when the bsaio established educational 
system xms not geared to a technical society? Tliere was in  England 
nothing to compare w ith the German in s titu te  of technical tra in in g  
the “Borga-kademie® -  or with, the educational revision follow ing the 
French revolution which saw the b irth  o f the 'Ecole Polytechnique  ^
(e s ta l)ll8lied ;ln 1795) and a revived Academy® The ]?olytech;iiqne was 
s w iftly  copied .in Prague g Vieima, StocMiolai, and other Continental 
countries but not in  IMgland, Hob'sbawm, pointing to th is , gives 
part o f tlie answer in  the strong O alvin iatic emphasis on a gzeneral and 
practica l education iii the Non^-Oonforiiiist tradition®
"English education was a joke In poor taste, though its 
deficiencies were somewhat offset by the dour vi'llsge 
schools and the austere, turbulent, démocratie universities 
of Calvinist Scotland which sent a stream of bazilliantg 
liard-’Worldng;, career-seeking, and rationalist young men 
into the south country# ® " (Hbbsbaxvfi 1962, p©47*)
Industry was empirical and Britain was the empirical centre of 
Ttozope» There was also the contributory .feainiszes. of its unique 
Island geography which facilitated easy and cheap viater tronspork; the 
ready supply of water power and mineral resources (90)6 of world output 
of coal in IOOO); emd a maritime policy involving overseas domination»
6»2* HI3LIGI0UB imLHmom
In the m.idst of changes what part did religious belief play? 
I'Umtever expla.na.tion is given the fact remains that many deeply 
committed Christians, especially lon-Gonformists, were bound up in the 
activities of the Industrial Revolution» The Hon-Gonfoxmxists had 
been banned from holding municipal office by the Corporation Act of
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16611 from olerical office by the Act of Uniformity In 1662; and 
"barred from teilclng degrees at Oxford and Ganibridge by the Testa Act 
of 1673# The social eonsequeiice of these obotriictions wae to direct 
some of the talents of Noii'-Oonformlsts into areas of industry and 
commerce » The Hon«»Oonformists were not, of course, a unified body 
Xvithin themselves, being composed of differing streams of Protestent 
thought - Presbyterians, Indépendants, Baptists, Quakers, Unitarian.s 
and Methoflia'ks * But despite differing theological emphases they had 
in common a general belief in the freedom mid responsibil.lty of the 
Individual before God - & belief sîiared by many in the established 
church as well#
6_»2»1#„  ^Bow__^terpret? As with Protestant .'Involvement In the
theoretical scientific re-orientation, so also there was a relationship 
x-îith technological, developments » Tecimology and noiv-oonfoszmity 
©jqianded and spread through J&iglanci together* This, by itself, 
tells nothing of the relationship between the two* (Cfo 3o1e1»g 3«4®1y 
and 9fi4«)
(a) It could be argued that technology spurred the growth of non™ 
conformity through the manifest wesdmess of the established ehitroh in 
the industrial areas; or that it looked for a justificatory area for 
its emphases end found this :ln t;he sphere of non-=conformityo
Perhaps a third factor lay behind tGCimological growth end 
religious involvement g in 'lhat both relied heavily on a eocio- 
poyohologicaJ- ability of individuals to imiovate the one to forge 
now paths in religion, the other in practical inventions * There are 
many possible comb.1n9;l;ioîis of socic-cul'tiiral influences mid it xjoiild 
be foolish to say that any on© was an adequate ezglanation by itself* 
(Of* ilbbertaon 1970, p»170a)
(e) There is another possibility that non-conformity did in fact 
spur the development of teohnical growth - which does not negate 
divergent factors* There xme the positive thrust of a doctrine that 
accepted the eul'to’al mmdate to subdue 'the earth; but there were also 
the social conditions already noted which must imve facilitated, 
without dootrina]. impulse, a non-=^ oonforming Interest in this area*
The Non"“OonforiBists were obviously at serious disadvantage in the 
arena of politics and cîrcDzch life and vjoiild .find natural outlet for 
their abilities in the fields that science and •keelmiology were 
opening up
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The social struotmze in which 'bhe Non-Gonfoxmists livecl was 
conducive to the exivaxtce of coHrmerce mid :u:idustry# It had a strong 
emphasis on modem education which, when joined with a desire for 
achievement and kxiowledge, was highl.y akin to the seientifio spirit »
To this can he added their democratic outlook xAich gave scope to the 
individual and stimulated Innovation# Again they were closely knit 
comtiiunities, tending to intermarry, which led to social and business 
netimrks at national level » Thus when the Quaker baiter Samel 
Pease wanted to proïiiote the Stockton and Darlington railway in the 
early 1820's he was able to call on '‘friends' in Norwi.ch and London 
for finonolal assistance»
This Mon-'^ Confoizmist Involvement in industry is no smal.l matter 
for their contribution was quite out of proportion to their strength 
in the general, population
"The most striking contribution to the number of entrepreneurs 
that of the English B'oneonfoimiistEu In contrast to 
their 7 pez cent of the population of Eug].and and haies, they 
contributed 41 per cent of the lixglish and Welsh 
entrepreneurs whose religion is known, while the Anglicans, 
who constituted almost all of the remaining population, 
contributed only 58 per cent* The Nonconformists 
contributed about nine times as many entrepreneurs, relative 
to their total number :m the population, as did the 
Anglicanso" (Hagen 1962, po29T«)
6.2a2@ The Quakers* The Quaker contribution to 18th century 
■Technology is a good example of the positive Impetus given to 
industrialisation from such sources # George Fox (1624—91 )o bom the 
son of a weaver, taught timt it was essential to bring all of life, 
including trade, under the influence and standards of the s%)lritual 
life# There was an intrinsic need to practice a. strict, peraonM 
religious code in daily life# The OWMmr ethic centred round the 
'inner light® that each person hod within, and the tenet that all men 
x-jore equal before Clod# The emzly GHxakers were draxifn largely from 
the fields of agriculture, oraifts and trades @ and. it was not imtil 
later in the 18th century that the proportion of professional and self- 
employed began to show significant Increase a By the end of the 
century, however, they were tending to become middle class largely 
clue to their success in business and their emYxhases on the zlmportance 
of education and self-improvement. Education liad played ©n 
iîTiportant role from the begi.%mlng ?and from the 1680's onwards there 
were smrtll schools for Quaker children xAieh stressed subjects of
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olwioiiB or wbloh hacl foroeeable potential in the l%ht of
developing sooietyo
These schools take their place alongside the 3)issent:lng Academies
2as ail important factor in shaping industrial lAiglgmd* It was
religions belief that led to separation from the establi-shiient hy the 
dissenters j and it w&is within that frmnework of belief that they 
found the incentive to jairsiie Gclucational^  ocmmercial, and industrial 
interests o It was not education that was oxucial but beliefo
®hfhy was it that many of 'the most im%)ortant contributions to 
liinglish medicine and science in the 18th century came frmi 
a rather restricted geographical district in and about the 
county of Lancashire? qooo I believe that the secret lies 
not in the Wa'mringrton Academy@ but In the great wave of 
religious unrest that brought it into being®” (Pulton 1953 g 
PP*51o52o)
The Quakers fitted in well with the scientific ethic o Their 
religious motivation to seek after truth (inner by means of
reason was analogous to the scientific menteulityi their integrity and 
honesty g even when dis tasteful g was a necessary featur’e in the 
objective reporting of scientific observations g in both fields there 
waa the prerequisite emphasis on primary sources g and their roots from 
artisan stock meant a high respect for practical elements® Their 
conscientiousness and precision led to prominence in m:;t%iy fields «
In o].ooIC'=miQlcing they were noted for their careful worlaiiensliip mid 'îiie 
accurajoy of their instruments features which were the key to 
esperimen'bal scienceo Many of the famous cloclonakers were Quakers^  
men like Thomas Tomion (165B™1713) who was commissioned to build two 
clocks for the Royal Observatory in 1679% Daniel tiuare (1648-’1?24) 
whom the King wanted to appoint as his personal watchmaker in TJ14 at
a salary of &30Ü per minujng George Grahmi (1673*^ 1751) who also made
impo'rtant steps forward in astronoioy and navigation g constructing the 
mural are at Greenwich in 1729 which recorded star positions with great 
accuracy g end developing- the transit telescope ©aid zenith sector®
Graham eiotually advised JoHarrisong the first to design a truly 
accurate chronome'fcerg and even siaj)plied the finance for 'bhe 
construction of the first model©
Quakers g while often not in the front ranlCg were influential on
2o The Dissentin.g Aoademies were critical in educating many in the
I'jays of scienceo A s'budy of 'Miem and thtrb? timetables is revelatory
of a wide iixterest wider than the universities ® Unfortunately 
space precludes any examines,'bion of them©
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those who wore - mioh ao Harrison © There wore also the Influences 
of Bo Alexander on Priestly; and that of the blind Quaker JoGough and 
the fflatheraatieiaii EoEobinson on the life and wo^ i’k of J©Dalton who 
oonotruoted the first truly modern theory of the atomic stauetirre of 
matter® (Of® Ooley 1974» PPo73"109o)
The Industrial Eevolution is difficult to date but can be talcen as
that period between 1750 and I9OO though there were important changes
end forming influences prior to 1750© It has been claimed that tîie
Industrial Revolution waii in fact the British equivalent of the French
and .ksieriean revolutions (eogo Bronowski 1975» pa299o)G but though
there may be elements of truth in this it should, not be pressed too 
3far® Political revo3.utions were relatively short encl. trmmatio
experiences in the lives of their respective countries g while the 
industrlallsatiozi of Britain was much more diffuse and lacked precise 
form 01? focus a It also occurred In 'bhose countries wMch had 
political revolutions & Mo doubt in Britain there x-jer@ sudden
changes In life«styleg but in general before 1760 most work was talnen 
to the villagG3?8 in 'bheir homes g while after about 1820 workers began 
to be brought laito factories and have their work supervised®
Miat did the Industrial devolution b&ualCEilly mean? Essentially 
it meant that the shackles were tàlEen off the productive power of 
homsm societies and led to the constant „ rapid and apparently limitless 
multiplication of men g goods and services o The key was not in the 
first imstance automation or technologies g though these j)layod their 
partp but production the siahmissioii of men to on apparently 
autonomous power that stood over against them in domination®
Phenpraena® In looking at the Industrial Revolution
several phenomena, need to be borne isi mind©
» The developmento that occured in.
production were the fsmi'b of long teoMiical experience®
TecWol ogical chaiige does not occur overflight g even today g and "every 
invention has its roots in a preceding technical period©” (Ellul 1964e 
■po47o) There is ^collective ineubationl where every new teclvLique
3o Perhaps the seiee misapplication of the term ’revolution® is made 
here as in the ’Gopesxiiea^ i Revolution’® The non—scientific denotation 
of revolution is j)olitieal not industrial or Gopernicano
grows out of the experimen’hs and failures of the past* Mow g wlille 
the teeïmologieavl inventions of the Industrial Revolution were modest 
compared with our centuryg industrialisation only became possible 
•bhrough a nmnber of reïnaxicable inventions© The development of water 
power,ojid commimicatioiAs by a man like James Brindley; the wa/ber frane 
1769% the oplzming jenny - 1770; Crompton’s mule - 1779% the self-­
acting mule — 1792% the power loom 1785; and of course the steam 
engine. From these it oeua be reaciily seen that the main thrust of 
the early period was In the textile Industry ™ the important cotton 
indutrbry be:lng a by-product of overseas trading# The steajii engine 
was largely confined to mining at first and this was where its early 
development took place# Interestingly ’bhe steam engine required no 
more knowledge of physics than had been available for meny years «« an 
indication of a time lag between science and technology®
second phenomenon was the population 
e^ epansion which led to the growth of needs g as well as providing cheap 
labour# The rising population was not g as sometimes thought» the 
result of the Industrial Itevolution© This would not escpleiin the 
large population increase in a coimtr^ y like Ireland which ha/1 
subsequently to shed much of this increase abroad» But the increase 
of populati(Vi did have significant effeetB it meant improved 
agrlcul'bure in order to feed the growing masses# as well as added 
incentive to industries in terns of labour resources and home inarketa. 
Hungry mou'khs could only be fed if hands were employed in manufactures 
wliichg through improved technologies» could be exehengvkl abroad for 
adequate supplies of ra,w materials and foodstuffs#
6»3#1#3« Fluidity of Social Milieu© Eoonomioally there is in times 
of chang'je a need for a stable situation as well as potential for 
development# Btability is necessary for primary technical research» 
wMle opemaindedneBS is required if that research is going; to be 
translated into reality# Economically there was tïiroughout this 
period the accumulation and interna.tional tivailability of capital as 
never before# TM.s was furthered by the improved methods of 
transport and oomTaunication systems # ¥arg too» was an important 
factor» neoGSsitîiitiAig the increased production of certain key fivirkets® 
At a more mundane level» the patent laws helped promote innovations 
and fiATther teclmioal mastery jj?. ;hidustry# In general there was a 
spirit of freedom (political and personal) in Britian as a result of 
its religlco-political heritage#
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6# 3 g 1.4. Intent © Lastly there was a clear technical
intosit an. overruling search for the ’one best way’ which when found 
heoame self-^lireeting® This had the unfortiaiate result of putting 
many entrepreneurs in the position where they pul; the Interests of 
technique above that of employees» leading in timx to a reaction 
against the age of the machine* A reaction championed by General 
ïiudd and ’Captain Bwing® in textiles and agriculture respectively#
There has been furious debate as to which factors were the crucial 
ones# Mot unnaturally Hobsbawm (1962)» a Marudstp stresses the 
productive eleiiientsg war and the rigjrbness of the social conditions#
On the other hand Ashton (1968) looks to the rates of interest on 
government stocks » "bhe stimulus to economic growth steimning' from non™ 
political factors such as the nonoonfomiists » and individual 
contributions in the face of little direct government interference in 
industry© (Of© Ifeïrvie 1972» pp.Bff#)
6j»3.2. Industrial Development# This was neither linear nor siiople
to ojifiilyoeo Derry and Williams (1970g oh® 10#) depict three basic 
divisions within the period x-jliich ere as good as any© From 1750— 
1815» a period which enoompassed two revolutions and throe wars» and 
saw the impact of men like Arlaœightg Wedgewood» Boulton and Watt# 
from 1815*^ 1^870» a period characterised by the explosion of the railway 
system; and from 1870-1900» a period when power began to shift from 
Brita-in©
î-ÜO-rr 18,15A There was a basic increasing tempo of
indus'brialisatioB from 1750 to 1792 which saw the development of 
spinning and the improvement of the steam engine by liatt# But the 
impact of the steam engltie» though significant» must not be over^ 
estimated in the 18th century# The first '=» Iîï 1774 — was used to 
drain a colliery» and khe second» built the same year» was used to 
work a blast furnace© Yet by the end of the century less than 508 
had been built under Watt’s patent©
Frooî 1792 to 1815 the history of Europe was dominated by the Ibxmch 
Wars and it should be noted that not all the suffering attributed to 
industrialisation is justified# Suffering abounded» but often
because of war and not because of teotoologioal changes# However »
the Industrial .Bevolirbion was oppressive and trade unions were 
suppreoBod in 1799% being outlawed until 1825 when the Oomb:lna,tion Act 
was repealed; though even this did not mean unions were recognised in
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the way they are today. At the end of the wars the Induetrlal
scene was marked by the luddite response ©
6#3«2#2« 181,5 IB7O0 The period following the wars up to the Great
çtüj^ jrr^ alCisrcjarK nTiïa:'-ii5ï'CS3?aKïSi'iti^ irMTO'a^ :^ u»Wi!raB.it3s,-ji -*■* Ju
Ihchibition of 1851 saw Brltajn excell *•« she was foremost in 
agriculture g ;ln the e^cpansion of railways» and in her cotton treide©
Here too was the rapid growth of the mach±n0««making industry based on 
the development of mach;me««toolBe By the middle of the eenti?ry 
France was producing an approximate total of 67»GOO h.p# of steam 
power ^  less than was being used in Britain for cotton alone. But 
other countries were coming to the fore. A notable student of 
Britain’s steel production in IO38 was Alfred ICrupp» heir to a s»sall 
ironworks in Essen it vms an empire that would not remain sma.ll for 
long® By the 1040’s Germany was beginning to forge edieavl in the art» 
design and application of fabrics» as well sa establishing her 
reputation for fine metal-work end a broad educational system© At 
the Great Esdiibition the young America oap'tured the technological 
imagination with machines like McCormacko labour saving reaper» the 
sewing lasichino and the colt revolver» But Britain still dominated 
both in trade and skill» and indeed many of the skilled workers on "bhe
continent and in America were British©
From the ïfcEhibit3.on to the end of the century there was a period 
of nationalistic wars and the increasing dominance of a matoriallGtio 
outlook© In teres t ingly by the end of the 1860’s the acreage under
î)lough (and in wheat) in Britain reached new maximums» a testimony to
high efficiences© Thus the 1850*s often saw workers^  better off than 
before.
".©©.from the 1850*8 onwards@ with sustained employment and 
with wages rising faster than prices» it became
dGmonot:f?ably tame ''chat the industrial ■ worker in Britain was
a gainer by the industrial revolution® He could afford to
eat meat and whoaten bread produced "by the improved
agricultiD?e#«©.o a great increase in the cleanliness of his 
person» clothes» and home.” (Berry & Williams 1970» p®300,)
The picture was not one of simple oppression^ of uorelieved gloom©
It was at this time that the Saturday half^holiday become a feature of 
life in l%)glish factory districts Imown ahroaxl the ’semaine 
anglaise©*
6#3e2»5o IB70 — 1900® Britain began to lose her lead© She had 
developed the steam engine &md was stuck with it when others changed 
more rapidly to electrical power £md the internal combustion engine©
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ImiuB trial. Is t 8 The Barbj-Jleynollcls Biipire© The
entrepreneurs were not all hard» :hitolera:at biislnessiiKen in the ruthlesB 
pursuit of maxiimim profit© Despite the evils and Injustices tha'b 
abounded it is faLIacioiwi to generalise end. cla:lm that all the leaders 
of the cosmiieroial ami industrial, fields tra'npled workers into bhe 
groimd,
®^ The men who made the Industrial Revolution, are usually 
pictured as hartlfacsd businessmen with no other motive than 
self-interest. That is certainly wrong© For one thlng@ 
many of them were inventors who had come Iniîo business that 
way. And for another» a majority of them we;æ not members 
of the Church of England but belonged to a Puritan tradition 
in the IFni’barian and similar movements #" (Bronoweki 1973» 
p»274«}
Soîïiething of the positive influence of religion on industry can be 
seen In the fields of iron and steel© The field of iron was perhaps 
the area of most significance in the Qimker contribution in the 18th 
century when they constituted 'bhe mainstay of that Industry® (Of.
Coley 1974s j?.05.)
Atesliam  D arby (1678-1717) foaneâ the  B r ia to l y ir o  GoiTnKSOjr abo ttt
1702 and soon 'began cnqjerinien'fcing with the substitution of cast iron 
for brass. In the pursuit of this a small iron«»worke was added to 
the ;pla;at and out of *bhe Integrated plant » and over the next een'buxy» 
the Darby empire contributed significantly to the iron indust%y@
From it flowed many Important innovations such as using coke for 
smelting; linîcing processes hj iron-railed wag’on-ways; and social 
measures for the welfare of workers. In I7OI Darby went to Holland 
to study methods mid brought back new procédures and some Dutch 
workmen® By 1707 he had discovered that he could replace charcoal 
with coke which led to more contiimoue production runs a He developed 
new processes of casting iron articles* There was» in fact g great 
outlet in the domestic market for iron pots and pane» but the now 
processes would play an importmit role in. the j>roduetion of parts for 
steam engines « In 1709 he took over» with two partners» a lease on 
the iron furnace at Go£jlbrookdal© which was to become the classical 
centre of the iron industry for many years «
In 1742 àbraliam Darby II introduced a stemn engine to iiuprove the 
efficiency of the works and replaced the old bellows by wooden blowing 
machines which provided a more uniform blast© 2Mt it was the next 
in line» smother Quaker» Hiehaxxl Reynolds who imtrodu.oed the most 
overall startling innovations. liarried to the daughter of Darby II»
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he becsjiie a partner in the fim in 1756 and aseissted in the 
progTaiffiiie of expansion 1763 when he hiiiieelf "became manager#
He introduced the conversion of plg'-iron to wrought iron without 
oherooal in a revorberatoxy fitxnaoe# In the pursuit of this 
Boynolds displayed a considerable loiowledge of chemistry and of the 
actual iron-'-'-malcivig process» and a'b the sasiQ time a willingness to 
leam from his workers from j^hom several Important ideas stemmed.
Again he allowed experimentation to take place using up the companies ’ 
resources®. In 1749 wooden rails had been introduced to facilitate 
the movement of mo.terials within the integrated plant» and these 
Reynolds roplaood with superior iron rails*
Social concern was high on Reynolds priorities « All the 
i'jiaterlalB coming into the plant were brought via the Sevoasi ;m barges 
towed by gangs of men, This Reynolds held to bo demeaaiiig end 
degrading emd worked harcl to obtain land by the river side In order to 
provide tow paths for horses, That an interest in social welzCaro 
shoxd.d occur is not surprising vAien it is remembered that the Quelcer 
integrated the whole of life before God and held human equality dear 
to his heart*
"From the beginning the Darbys were concerned that their 
workpeople should be properly housed and the works estate 
contained worlsnen’s cottages as well ao the Darby’s own 
house® The latter included offices mid a large room where 
meetings could be held» although a separate Meeting House 
was soon built as part of the general plan, The unification 
of the religious and business aspects of life %fere well 
exemplified in the !D£i3?by family® They maintained a true 
Qualcer home with simplicity and sincerity and the same spirit 
pervaded 'bhe works» where there was to be foxmd little or no 
evidence of 'brouble over wages or prices, The furnaces were 
always shut down on Sundays» despite losses arising from 
Goolidg the melt and the technical difficulties 'bhis caused.
The company preferred to lose something in order to give their 
workpeople a free day for recreation and worship," (Ooley
i m l  p.89.)
Continuing in this tradition Reynolds purchased land and laid out 
walks for his employees so that they could enjoy the woods and 
sux’Tounding beauty spots; he built schools; and in time of food 
shortages bought :în bulk in Liverpool and sold in turn to 'bhe work­
people at cost price or less,
Â-An-!,.JikS^^*SmÆS-Mæ.« Po^hapo the two iMst flrasiiatio îsmovatiosis
TTero the advent of the steam engine and subsequently the railway.
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The rrfcea?a engine was the most sophisticated product of the earlier 
period and has been seen as the pivot of the whole perJ.od (Toynbee)#
Blit its initial imipaot W£is largely confined to the inining industry 
where it wao first developed# levertheless it soon spread to othax' 
areas and possessed am Intoxicating and dramatic effect on the life of 
Britain# The steam engine symbolised the new drives for power imd 
domination» and Boulton could remark that ha sold what all the world 
desired power I (Of* Bronowski 1973% p#280#) Power could be seen 
tangibly in the railway# It was Richard Trevlkhick who turned the 
steawi engine into a mobile power pack, though the main development 
lies in the hands of Watt and Stephenson# The railway was matched by- 
no o'bher Mventicm of the period in terms of publie impact© It alone 
dlsplaysd for a3.1 to see the power and speed of the new ago — the early 
eng:mes were soon capable of 60 miles per hour (by IBJO)* Thus it 
was this aspect of the revolution tlmt came home to the layman In 
dramatic fashion witness the literatiïre and poetry stemming from the 
railway# Ye‘<j the domination of steam in industry itself was not so 
drainatio® The largest Boul’bon and Watt steaia engine bul,lt by 1800 
was capable ©f only about 80 li.p»» whereas 3.arge water wheels could 
easily produce anything up to 150 h#p##
6,4*2* Sleotrieity# .Despite the technical changeE5 it is essential to 
realise that there was no basic shift in the scientific world 
comparable with the change from Medieval to Mewtonian woxldvlews (at 
least in the physloal sciences#) But there was an in‘bensiiMca.tion 
and extension of ’bhe mechonioal outlook© It was a "Wme irlien science 
and tecimology moved closer toge’iiier and industrial innovation and 
scientific theory began to be integrated# There was an interaction 
that occured in both directionss thus the new science of electricity 
led to a corresponding; industry; wM.le the industry associated with 
•fche development of the steam engixie led back to the theory and 
development of thermodynamics® (Gf# Pledge 1966» p#149»)
If there no shift in perspective there were new fields being 
opened up in electricity» thermodynamlos, chemistry imd mathematics# 
Electricity was importmt in forming our modem society and life today 
is unthiTiîcable without the benefits of our eloctrie teclmology* But
it was developed largely abroad due to the strangling Influence of 
steam on the British situation though British scientisfcs played 
crucial, roles in its development # The basic steps of the new field 
of ©leetromagne-fcism were Sn 17B6 when Galvani discovered *bhe electric
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eurrent; 1799 when Volta constructed the first battery; 1800 when 
eloctrolyciB was discovered; 1820 when Oerstad saw the connection 
between electricity and magnet lara» thus opening vast new possibilities 
and reshaping the theory of the new science; and f:lnally in 1831 when 
the devoutly motivated Faraday provided, the necessary synthesis to 
bring the various faco'bs of theory together end set forth mi Integrated 
end consistent theory*
,6 B4 * 5 e Thermodimemlcs * Electricity would revolutionise the life­
style of man and so too would the new science of therniodyna^ nicBo The
two laws of thermodyaamics beesaie the most isiportant theoretical 
discoveries of the period mad are still regarded by many as the most 
’certain* of all scientific laws* By 1824 the steasi engine had led 
Bidi Oaznot to the fimdamental insights necessary to comstzuct the two 
laws - which subsequently received various formulations © The first
law is that of the conservation of energy; and tîie second states that a
"Heat cannot be converted, complo'toly and continuously into work," 
(Montgomery» B,IU 1966» p*106«) The key is not the first but the 
second law which deals with direction» and utilises the analytical 
concept of reversibility abstracted from 'bhe caloric theory of heat 
flow© The first law is historically « attributable to the notion of 
heat SB a sxxbstance» and depended on the demonstration of 
convertibility of heat to powers?® But conversion is not the same as 
reversibility an.d here Gamot was i-nrong heat does not just flow» it 
is d.egraded ibi any conversion, What is conserved is energy*® This 
concept of reversibility was the essential parameter which led
Clausius on to the theory of entropy, (Of# Appendix B®)
It is interesting to note the 'basic Gbriatian framework in which 
most of these scientists st3.ll operated® A framework .in which 
mechanical models predominated but still found a reference point in 
the Creator?, Bo Gillespie tells of J®3?oJoule» who cuqporhaented to 
try end find the mechanical equ.ivalent of heat» and who could write» 
after a failure at the Chamonix waterfall — an e^ qperxmient conduoted 
on his honeymoon: "I shall lose no time in repeating and extending 
these experiments » being satislfed that the grand, agents of nature 
are by the Creator’s .fiat i^de^^uctib^,,," (Joules In Gillespie
1967, p.371.)
This was often the closest of the seiencos to 
Industzy in practical. t©?mis in the bleaching and dyeing processes of
the tesctile industries® Again religious figures such as Priestly 
and Dalton were prominent; Priestly in turn advising the Gliristian 
Industriallst » Josiiah Wedgewood *
6©4o5o The Lunar Society© Many of those so far mentioned ««
Priestly» Viedgewoodp Boulton and Matt and others such as Ifilkinson 
and E® Dan-;in belonged to the Limar Society which evidenced the aooial 
awareness of scientists and industrieilistso This society» ].ike others 
of its Idndg was based on the simple belief that life was much more 
than material success and decency» but tlmt material decency was a 
base on which the spiritual should rest®
was another important area of development» 
though it did not filter tlu^ ough to the general consciousness as 
readily as other facets® , (Of® Pledge 1966» chs# 12 m 13*) But this 
area did have revolutionary impact in the theoretical world# Here 
was the thoo3?y of i'lmctions of complete variables as developed by Gauss» 
Oauohy» Abel and Jacobi ; the theory of groups by Gauss and Gsiuohy; and 
the conceptual overthrow of Euclidean geome'fcry :m the work of 
Lobachevsky and Bolyai ( Of* Boyer 1968» e.li«23«) Mo longer did 
parallels never meet» and the world as a globe isi fact conforms to 
Rlemannian and not Euclidean geometry# But to make these assujstptions 
:iu the early 19th century was the theoretical daring that h©i put the 
sun at the contre of the universe and developed the laws of planetary 
motion*
But it was not all progressive in tîio world of the sciences and 
technology# There was a swing sifay from the mechanical monster into 
the éorotis of nature and romanticiom» a reboiml from the machine to 
biological interests # Her© was the rise of Schelling’s
’Maturphilosophle’ from 1779 on; and the rise of the human and social 
sciences sociology coming out of Comte’s critique of capitalism# 
Itether» there tms creeping' into life an element of philosophical 
irra1;ionality under the dominance of the machine age* "Technioisa 
leads directly to irrationality " claims Mmiford (19Î3» P«375o) ia a 
sentiment echoed by such diverse writers as Mllul» Fromm and 
Kierlcegsard#
6.5. TEE m A C T  OF mDHSTinALISATIOM e SaOBMEIFJATim
Adas'û Smith in his *¥ea3.th of Mations’ gave prophetic warning 
concerning the issues that would arise out of the industrial process#
135
Long before the pbraBe ’industrial revolution’ cejne into eosMoii usage g 
the process was de scribed by oontlnenkal comientators as the ’Ihigllsh 
Bystera% as they discussed the new forces of legal individualism end 
economise® But crucial to the force of impact is the question 
as to whether the changes in society wore slow or ahriiptj# Hohshavmi 
(1962» po46a) maintains that the changes were sudden» qualitative and 
fundamental ; and Mishet mal tes tha;b "to intellectuals of that age» 
radical and conservative alike» the changes were of almost milleaial 
abruptness»" (1970» p«22».) However it seems to me that there is a, 
fallacy stemming from en equation of the ’French Revolution’ with 
Industrial processes» Technical changes were no doubt traumatic ;m 
the life of the nations» ’but it can hardly ho compared with the 
political revolutions in Sh?snee or America# X contend that British 
society was much more mixed thon is often suggested® It was not just 
a question of caplt calls tic oppression, for as we have seen this was 
mixed with positive religious doctrines* The folly of advocating* an 
abrupt change seems to me evident when we eonsidoi? the debate as to 
when 'bhe Industrial Revolution in fact began» and that to talk 
sensibly of it we require to consider some I50 years »
Yet the period was transforming in a radical way» and a new 
voca’foularly itself indicates this* Among the words invented or 
given their present meaning were - Industzy» democracy» class» 
ideo].ogy» humanitarian» masses» commercialism» proletariat» libéral, 
collectivism» conservative, scientist» capitaJisra and 'bureaucracy» 
(lis'bet 1970s po23«) At another level» words which were 
Increasingly descriptive of the times were ’mechanical’s ’disintegrated’ 
and ’asîorphous’ - keywords as Milliems (lU I96I» p»201«) points out 
in desorihing the effect of industrial priorities over individttals and
society*
The basic impact wasi the increasing and unprecedented 
secularisation of the masses® The 19th century^ with increasing
Jndus'cry and 'ur’bcmisatioiis created a situation whore the established 
churches could no longer cope 'bhe parish system fell apart at the 
eeamso The result was an upturn in the fortunes of Protestant sects 
— a feature not unconnected with their more relevant stance yls a vis 
societyp as even the llarxist Hobsbawaa notes (1962» p«264f®) By 
1851 approximately half of the Protestant imrshippers in làigland and 
hales l'ïere oxrtwith the established olmroh. But despite 'the 
expansion of the Hon-Oonforaiists in 3&iglond and 'bhe despe:i?ate 8,ttem%)t
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at eonsolMstion by the ohioi’cli in Beotlandg 'bhe working olassoB were 
:l5acrea/aingXy out off from religious influenees* A trend not 
Qlgnlflogmtly altered by the many revivsO.s of the 19th century which 
tended to a pietistic xjitMrawaJ from the ’world’»
In tereetingly» the Protestant Eon«O(mformimt0 were found 
attracti'V ’e to the ris in g  entrepreneurs who found there an emphasis on 
eiîcel'asiviBKip Individual oommnioatlon between man and God» and a moral 
au sterity  that equated w ell w ith th e ir  outlook on l i f e .  I t  meant a 
blmm'ing of the religious .Influenoes and a move to a mich more 
ju B tlfig a to ry  position from the motivato ry one of the eaxilier 
Boientists and ind uB tria lis ts  -  eiioh as the v irtu o s i end Quakers *
If secularism was the baoie Impact g the forces leading to it were 
not 80 much from industry qua industrjf» aa from the attendant 
U5?banisation and the conditions imposed on laboixi?, The Indus'brial 
Revolution saw the rise of %ahat Germans have designated the ’Grosstadt’ 
(the city which is purely a product of Industry) ae opposed to the 
cmcient centres of commerce and the modem meghLopolis which was 
founded on the toim/ledg'e worker® (Of* Brucker 1969% Yet
this was often urbaxiisa.tion without community; agglonjeration without 
integration*
Much of course has been a raid about the evils of working conditions 
£md the domination by the pace of the machlme* Domination by 
machinery first in the as?eas of dexrterity and skill » and appasjently 
extending into the very ability of intelligence* This is ifhero we 
f±ad the pungent criticisms of Gobbett and Huskin and of the val.idity 
of this there can be little question* (Cf« Hawie» Martin & ^charf 
1970p pp.110o111o115s Wllliamap R© 1961§ Hlebet 1970, p.25*)
Yet having taken note of this it would be xœong to envisage a 
xmilversal. mass oppression© Indeed as late as 1860 the majority of 
workG328 were still employed In concerns of seven or less; a feature 
which sits unegisily w3.th the tendency to view a rapid and traujüatie 
masBxfication of life and industry at the onset of the industrial 
reevolution© (Of* Harvie 1972g p«09*) It can thus be contended that 
working conditions rose in general along with the standard of living* 
Recent scholarship has si?ggested that the conditions of the working 
classes in the early period of Industrialisation was better than in 
the immediate past of our century, (Of, Harvie, Martin & Scharf 1970, 
p.118.)
There was in the Q9Jï:1j stages of indus5trial.i.sation almost a 
liiessianie hope in the new technologies® This is echoed in the 
phrase of V/il]J,aia IVlake tlmt ’Ener^' is Eternal lj©lâ,ght’ (in 
Bronowski 1973% p.285*), and in the thought of ïürasmus Darwin who 
found In the machine an intriguing and ingenious artifact which had 
not yet become €i driving obsession® (Of* Harvie, Martin & Oeharf 1970, 
#,46#) But by and large there arose an intellectugtl opposition to 
the new machine age# The conservatives distrusted the factory end 
Its artificial division of laho'ur» seeing therejji that which was 
calculated to destroy the peasant, the artisan, t'lio family and the 
compiunity# It was easy to read into the workings of the machine 
that which was deguadilig for creatures mads in the image of Ck3d« So 
from the satirical Butlor in ’Erewhon’ (I872) to the criticism of 
GanlylSg a whole literature arose which saw the latent potentiel for 
destroying all that had h©an held dear to man - his uniqueness in 
creation, his individual value and role in society* All that was 
left was dominion and that was turning out to he domination without 
responsibility or stswardsh1.p« Ma'bthsw Arnold X'/scitess
"Faith ïaacîiixiery is» X said, our "besetting danger; often 
in machrhiery most a*)sm?dly disprcportioned to the end which 
this HiÊtchinery if it is to do any good at all, is to serve; 
but al.ways 3n machinery» as if it had a. value in and for 
itself» Mmt le freedom but macdiinery? what is population 
but machinery? what :1s coal but machinery? what ere railroads 
but machinesîy-? vjhat is wealth but machinery? what are, even, 
religious organisations but maohineryf^ (1869, p.174*)
The problerc was that industrialisatIon was taking: over the whole 
of life, all else was being subjected to theihythj/m of the machine 
and the consequences ifould be profound# Perhaps the greatest 
criticism eaine from the pen of Carlyle, especially in his essay ’Signs 
of the TSiaes' where he clearly foreE^ ai-T the dangerous conséquences of 
the new era» the domination of mechanism and the spiritual cniptineBe 
this engendered®
"Were we required to characteriso this &ige of ours by any 
single epithet, we should be tem%)ted to call it, not an 
Heroicalg Devotional, Philosophical.» or Morel Age, but, above 
all others, the Mechanical âge# It is the Ago of îlaeliinery» 
in every outward and ;hïwæ:d sense of that word; the age which, 
with its whole undivided might, fonwards, 'beaches and 
prcaotises the great art of adapting means to ends » Nothing 
is now done dlrecbly, or hy hand; all is by rule and 
calculated con'brivance# ” (1829% p*21«)
■ Such criticism did not deter others projecting the meolianical 
pM/iosophy into other realms ;in an affirmative manner® T olhEmcley 
argued that animale were only maclri'nes» and from there it was Imt a 
short step to humans# "It :la quite true»" he writes, "that, to the 
best of my judgement» the argumenta’bion which applies to brutes holds
equally good of men* © « We are eons clous autoinata©(1B74% #*212*)
Likewise Clifford posited man as a dual.istic being imdex- the impckus 
of maohanism© "Thus we ore to regard the body as a physical
machine 3 which goes by itself according to a physical, law, that is to
say, is autornatiee" (1874% p«217®) He continues in the same essays
"II; is idle to set bounds to the purifying and oxyj’ana.eing 
\fork of Science» Without mercy and withcub resentment she 
ploughs up weed and briar; from her footsteps behind her grow 
up corn and hesillng flowers; and no comer is far enough to 
escape her fujcrow* Provided only that we take as our motto 
and oujr rule of action, Man speed the plough®" (ibid p»282ft)
This was undiluted teclmologlcal romanticismS 
6*7a. . HML'W
In drawing this brief survey of Indus trial! sa,t ion to a close it 
should be home ±n mind that we are still, in a reel sense, in the 
middle of the industrial revolution, or at least its immédiate 
developments* But the Industrialisation of society was not itself
the cause of crisis, rather it was the misapireopriation of power by 
the rising entrepreneurs » the evils of a system that necessitated 
either conformity or exclusion * 3o while there was no basic clash 
between teohnolpgical development and religious belief, it must be 
said that the fail'ixre of Christian.8 to develop intelle.ctual 
structures, within which to contain the new powers of mankind (science, 
technics and organisation) would lead to an apparently insolvable 
dialectic between man and his powers» As Eobsba.wm concludess "The 
gods and kings of the past were powerless before the businessmen and 
steam engines of the present»” (1962, #*73.) But this is, as we 
shall see, a pseudO'dlolectio#
This chapter is in a sense continued directly in chapter? 26,
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piiAPTm
Œ  19th o m T u m  woimimARY omTaovœy
7.1. 33Œ  somB m  moLooY mo GsoioGY
To imclerstasid th© debate over rDasji-jin’e ’Origin of Bpecies* it is 
neoGssary to examine the history of geology and biology* prior to 1859# 
0}iiere was little eonsensua of opinion concerning basic thinking In 
these fields, and several concep'buaX frasiieworks were firmly adhered to 
before, during, emd after 1859#
7*1*1# Mechanism v. Vitalism© The fosmier was traditionally strong
tii£— £^-CUCuyj»=:5fcï«jyd4.s2LeiKis®ckM»ï=aai*iTs*«*i«:ï?îB'Vni<«ia.2;«rwï5t5aixi«-»i.‘-3j*j=r£ïBtisy*J» t/ W.'
in France, the ].ati:er in Germany# The ’mechanist’ believed tha'b 
biology would eventually 'be reduced to the plisysieal sciences so that 
there i-muld be no myster^ y* to be faced in life# The ’vitalist® held 
to the belief of an organic residue in the eonatitiionce of life which 
required some non-j>hysica,l organising power or force# It has been 
suggested 'Idiat in time there was a gradual triumph of ’mechanistic® 
views over ’vitalistlc’g but this is not clear cut as there has always 
been propoîients of both views, while the act*ual dominance swings from 
one to the other® (Cf© Brooke 1974/0% p#11e)
7#1#2# The System-Builders v« The Nomenclateurs * This is a further 
division on a methodological level# Following Newton the 
construction of tight and elaborate sye;terns was in the air© Voltaire
pcomplæjied that science was being bedeviled by a ’mass of systems 
while Buff on saw "khls ae nothing but fll^ #its of fancy# The alter- 
native to systems was to embark on classification .'mto families rather 
than into rigorous hierarchical systems# This latter view was 
developed by Linnaeus in botony, Lavoisier in chemistry, end t oo de 
Lisle in crystallogrsiphy# Both aj^proaches have histories going back 
to the Greeks# Indeed Aristotle posited both - arrgmging organic 
species in a Merarchy with large discontinuities; and seeing creatures 
in a great continuous lin'king chain of being# The division into 
discontinuous groups has been categorised as an ’artificial® method, 
while the arratigiïig of diverse species within families as a ’natural ® 
method# (Of# Mason 1962, pp.331-335#)
a great issue from
1790 to 1020 and the basic positions were *bhat the rock strrata had been 
suddenly formed (Neptunist) or that they had been gradually developed
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(Vuloanlet)# The former view waa readily faoilitated by studying 
the seâimemtary rodœ, while the latter was enhanoed by the study of 
volcanoes and basalt rook stinctures.
Of patrierohal stature for Neptimists w ^  the German geologist 
Abrahmi Wemer (1749"1817) d^io unfortwmtely built his theories on the 
basis of his local knoifledge and did not consider other evidenoe such 
as the overthrust formations which exhibited older strata above the 
younger# Such objections were bypassed and adherence given to the 
precipitation of rook forms, either by chemioal or mechanical processes % 
from some aqueous solution* But despite the apparent problems this 
view ims deeply ^ trenched end respectable In scientifie circles for 
it possessod great explanatory poifer* Many noted geologists 
supported the vlmz such as IClrwin, Deluc and Jameson; It was accepted 
by other scientists like Davy and Watt; and it reigned in the 
Tmiversities of Scotland. (Cf* Gillespie 1959, p»68.) Kirvfin 
violently opposed the altezsxative view being postulated by Eutton, but 
his views tended to degenerate into wild polemic* Fiiaily adliering 
to the Mosaic account he attacked anyone who seeaied to stray frcm 
tills, including ])elue» For Kirwin science was closely integrated 
with religimi and he displays more the langue^ of natural theology 
than objective science* Deluo, cm the other hand, i-Jos much more 
restrained thou#i ad"vooatlng a similar view* Hoses was still 
finmly seen as a reliable scientific authority.^ (Of* ibid p*50fo)
Robert Jaiveson (1774*"1854)» professor of natural history at 
Bdinbur^g led the l/femerlan forces in their almost a?eligious 
adulation of the founder of their school* On the opposing side was 
another Scottish scientist, James Hutton (1726™97)@ who was perhaps 
the clilef proponent of the Vuleanist vieif, as well as the principle 
of imiformi'ly# The whole conflict came to a head in tlie Scottish 
setting and the story is raeoimted of a play i-Jritton by an ardent 
Ihittonian being hissed off the boards of an Edinburg theatre by a 
house apparently packed by Neptunists3
Ihitton wras restrained in speculation and under the influence of 
Deism# He stressed the geological activity of the ititemal heat of 
the earthg thou^ also aooepting the formative pm;er of water* His
1. One of the deli^tfully naive charaoteristics of this debate tfas 
the manner in lAich evesi^ one seemed able to accuse others of forcing 
the facts to fit tlieir theories, while they tlieiaselves were free from 
STioh subjective delusions*
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vieim were largely based on the as swaption of the eoiieteiie-y of the 
forces of nature and a general %}ictur'e of Btability, which was in 
effect imiforfflitaxianisra being utilised to account for the past events 
Ixi the structuration of the earth's eriiGt© However he divorced thl.s 
from the question of origins ® Hutton was ably assisted by Sir James 
Hall and John Playfair, two more Edinbiirgh men© (Of# Mason 1962, |>o404e)
This debate
intezucted with the above controversy, though by no means followed 
pa:ea3.1©l lines* These debates were of intense .general interest and 
this is indicated in the high popular standing of geology - which was 
one of the first sciences thought suitable for ladies# This 
popular?!ty is seen, for escample, in the mass g:?itliering in the Dudley 
Oavems near Birmingham in 1839 ^ an episode recounted by a rather 
bewildered Geamien chemist, Herr Schonbein who had had more than 
enough after first Buokland, then I-Turchison, spoke for over an hour 
each® (o f Gillespie 1959s p*200*)
It was in this era that geology developed the principle of 
uniformity to interpret the past In the light of the present® The 
Tirineiple has several senses# (Of# Kudwick 1973% p.206#) (a) There
was a, general sense of uniformity without which science became 
Impossible # (b) There was what Hooky^ms termed ’ActualJ,sm®
(1974/bg p«74f»)i? the view that the agencies responsible for past 
events can be evidenced today® (c) Strict ’UniforraitarianiBm* 
went beyond (b) to claim that those agencies possess the same 
intensity in the present as in the past#
This debate never engendered the bitter .'Invective of the 
Me%)tmiiB'Wilcanist debate, mainly because it was conta:lned within the 
confines of the Geological Society of London# (Of© Gillespie 1959% P® 
122o) There was» however, a certain affinity between the leptimist 
and CatastropMst positions# The Oa.tastrophic viewpoint, as opposed 
to the Hniformitarimi, held that preseal; causes were not sufficient 
to explain the past® But confusing this picture was the featu3?e 
that by appli.ca.tion of the ’acbuaJistic’ method one could arrive at 
the Catastrophic system; whereas by holding to ïïnifor/aitarianism os a.n 
implied method one could arrive, via an ac'tuslistie principle, at an 
ïïnif ormi t arian system ©
Non«%nlformitarlan views held that great irreversible chenge-s
CjEïjjaaarj7iar«ssrariiLap2Eii2j!îiï»M:.'AT=aw2wy.-tsÆaEï-«riîÆ.'.a
had oceured in the earth’s crtmst and in the organic world, and this
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basic catastrophic position centred on the imiversltiGs where men like 
Biiekland (Oxford) and Sedgwick (Cambridge) held ehsArs# It must be 
noted that, though the unlformitarlan views would ultimately trimaph In 
the 19th century, catastropXiists did more to extend the frontiers of 
knowledge* They held their views because of the evidence of 
mechanicsO. violence on a large scale, and because of tXæ complete 
changes in living things - both of which appeaa'/ed amply testified to 
by the evidence* Indeed tiiere was strong support in pal ae ont ol ogy 
for the sudden appearance of higher animal forms in the younger strata*
The basic creed of ITniformiitardajaiaiii was the 03cplanation of the
ff,i&&?r.^zü:rC*a.K4=ü reas?! 3-3Jg2a.'g?.T&t ar^ 'f.'n v
past in terms of present causes and processes which obviated the need 
of any sudden transformations ; the explanation of the past without 
the need to refer to any divine activity - such as an a,ppeal to the 
Flood; and an explanation of the past as uniform like tXie present, 
thus involving no progrèssively upward cXisnges* Lyell, for instance, 
originally claimed that the fosil record gave no evidence for 
directional change* (Of Hooîcyaas 1974/o, p*13«) The IMlformitarion 
view was cmiried to esntremes by Lyell who posited tXiat as well as the 
same causes being operative, they alno possessed the same energy today 
as in the past* So he applied the achualistic view as true of 
primafjy pXiysical causes as well as true of secondary geological ones* 
Ïïniformitarisnisïïi of this type was derivative from the extreme 
application of the ActuaZliatic' principle, involving the same physical 
causes plus tXie sa?no intensity of force© As time passed numereoue 
compromises hojd to be made ;m tXiie extreme view which undercut 
'fJniformit£i3i*ianiem as a system, and actualism, as a method, became 
limited* . Therefore ITnifosrmitarianism tended to pass to a view 
involving a * coming^-to-be ’ rather tXian a ® steady-state ’, or the 
reversal from uniformitarianism as a system to a methodology* (ibid
p * »}
■- viaEî a n  iio p o jE ta n t figure in th e
formulation of the catastcophist position emd provided tXie scientific 
’bible’ for tîiose that followed — eucXi as â/>;aosis ami Owen*
2 t W j,%._Milllm « was, frmi 1820 onwards, the
foremost 3&iglisXi geologist# A le;ptuniet, he exploited and extended 
Ouvler’s method (of the correlation of parts) and put natm^al history 
once more at the service of religious tîmth* In 1021 miners 
discovered a large cavwi at kirkdale in Yorkshire in which were
deposited a large number of bones (hyena)© This led Buclclond to 
produce hie magnum opus in 1823 - ’Beliguiae Diluvianae; or. 
Observations on the Orgsmle Remains contained in Caves, Fissures, and. 
Mluvial Gravel0 and on other geological phenomena, attesting the 
action of an Hniversal h©lug;e* (1823, p*371*) Here was the opening 
blast of the csitastrophio controversy which firmly reinstated the Mosaic 
inte3?pretation* Geological structures were the result of violent 
convulsions and their cause was not blind chance but the intervention 
of the Divinity# In hie Inaugural lecture at Oxford, published as 
’Vmdi^^iae Geologicae; or, the Connexion of Geology with Religion 
Explained’» he clearly states M s  objectives
shew that the study of .geology has a tendency to 
confirm the evidences of natural religion; and that the 
facts developed by it are consistent with the accounts of 
the creation and deluge recorded in the Mosaic writings*"
(1020, p.352.)
Following BucklEjnd, SGdgiclck
and his collaborator Roderick Kurchison did much to advance the 
oafoastiDphio position* Between them they identified the Cambrian and 
Silurian systems of the Paleozoic period, and correctly fixed them in 
the geological succession* Sedgwick, a leptunist as woll as a
Gatastrophisl:, became professor of geology at Ci-mtoidge in 1818#
His basic vieif was that geology clearly jmdicated that God had not 
created the universe and left it to xun itself#
In 1829 Sedgirfiok was forced to abandon the views of homer and 
accept the Yiilcanist position of Hutton — though in 1831 he could still 
point out that the basic problem of Lyell’s theozy was that it implied 
an evolution of species* He might recent the Flood as the 
e^rplsmation of all, but not the cstasbnophio position© The under^ 
pining of the Flood only deprived the catastnsphists of their moot 
spectacular catastrophe ©
p
.7jtrU,4.^ 4j5 As see ement « ^ It is worth noting that this debate is still 
an open question® "It is impossible to say, even with the advantage 
of h:mdsight, that either catastrophism or uniform!tarianism was ’right ’ 
(.Hudwick 1973% Po206e) This applies to the question of a mil versai 
Flood; there imy be insufficient evidence to point to such a flood as 
outlljied :m Genesis, but equally there is no evidence to rule it out*
2* space precludes details of others such as WilHliavfl Smith, Joseph 
Townsend and John MacGullooh (Of* Hockyoas 1974/b for background 
details of several, leading individuals »)
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Uniformity may have hecoiae the Boientifio orthodoxy of the present,
‘but it has had to he qualified 'under the coercion of facts* Indeed 
some modem g;Gologlsts posit a ’pulse of the earth’ cyclical concept 
which rules out the application of strict unlfomiltarian principles 
with respect to the early geological e%)ochs # One of the basic 
problems here is the philosophical reality that one© the principle of 
progressive uniforaiity is admitted it becomes determinative as to how 
the evidence will be interpreted© In other words, it is a paradigm 
lying behind the theories themselves# (Of* 7*5#)
"In other words the principle was transferred to other £U?eas 
of investigation on the unsupported assumption that it 
applied, the evidence as it was found was arranged in the 
pattern dictated by the principle and so was shown to support 
the principled The enccmiple of the tools of prehiE;torio man 
is the most telling one © © » ,'bheii? arrangement in ascending 
order was made on the assumption that mmi amet have progressed, 
on the basis of an aotuaJ.istlc reconatract!on of how these 
tools would have been developed by modem man in priiTiitive 
conditions*" (Lawlesss ref© Hooîcyaae & Lawless 1974/c, po33#)
In the 1830®b, even for IMifomiitarianists, the Creator was still 
an important explanatory conoejyt, covering areas that would later be 
explained by evolutionary theories* As Gillespie comments, "geology 
had nothing to do with the Bible, this does not seem to have meant 
that science had no religious implications. All it meant was thab
8criptuî?e had no scientific implications(1959% P®139 of* PP*105, 
218.)
7.1.5. The Development hypothesis. It is wrong to envisage Darwin’s 
theory of evolution as something new for there was a general move by 
maîiy scientists to postulate a long, slow development of the earth and 
its species* In lookMg back, however, at those who went before 
Darwin, care has to be talsen not to read them in the light of Darwin 
as this would be unfair to their views. They were predecessors, 
not precursors.
- hacl ao elear oirt thoosgr of
evolution as some olai-B. The choice before him was not simply one 
of evolution or creation* Tho3?e was a third choice residing in the 
firm, and new, belief in spontaneous generation. Hence even if he
could envisage one species exte3miina,ting another it would be false to 
picture tills in his thought as a competition of species, an element 
in some causal process underlying evolution. The simple case is » 
that while Buffon is looked on ae one of the early modem foreramiers
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of evolution, he was not intoreeted :ln that question ao suoh, but 
rather in the problem of olassifieation (at least in his @a:ely work*)
% n . a ,2,_Jew  - is poi’tops the moat
influential figure amongst the French thlrikere. Indeed when 
evolution beoome establi.slied, LomarklEmism would provide a rival 
viewpoint within the evolutionary camp* He was by no means 
atheistie In outlook, being imder the influence of Deism* He clearly 
articulated a development hypothesis of the species as opposed to a 
degenerative sequence (Buffon), and as a skilled tsaconoraist can be 
regarded as one of the prrlneipal founders of modem biology»
Lamark was committed to the idea of the ’Chain of Being’ which led 
him to posit a linear evolution which he tended to cling to even af'ler 
such a BChemata became imtenable* Hers he drew on the work of 
Robinet» and xAiile he could envisage 'khe ’Chain’ as not fully 
continuous, he, like Hobinet, suggested it possessed an inner force of 
SGl3T-^ 'd.mprovGHient. He saw creation as that which was rational, 
ordered and intelligible, and thence as a corollary to this that species 
could not become extinct* At the same tilme his national optii'aism 
precluded the concept of a, stsraggle in nature such as 3)arx-mi would 
suggest®
In his work he dl,d not clearly distinguish between what he could 
prove and wh&i'k was speeulaticai, and this meant that he could present a 
ranging and consistent theory of evolution "unhamjîered by any too nice 
an attention to evidence»" (Wilkie 1965% p»264«) Thus, though he 
accepted evo3ntian as a general, progressive principle, he did so 
without tying himself irrevocably to any one mechanism to produce 
such development ®
The method of Lamark was in effect the obverse of Buffon’s, for he 
required in principle a linear classification of animals upwards*
This led him to postulate three versions of his development theory*
(a) His em?liest view - 1801 - suggested the agency of inhcorlted 
acquired charaoterlstlos (the so-called Lamarkian mechanism); a 
sohein'ata. Jn which the ’Chain of Being’ was limited to providing a 
scaler classification on mi artificial level mid possessed little 
relation to the mode of origin® (b) The second view — 1809 is 
contained in his ’Philosophie fioologlque’, fmd here he posited a 
natural tendency to increasing complexity in organisms* The 1801 
primaa?y theory of acquired ohoraoteristics had been reduced to a
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subordinate role aw.d ho could present his thesis as a law of nature 
resulting lu a single linear develcjjRient. The idea of a ’chain’ 
was exerting its attraction, but unlike the earlier concepts of one 
unified chain, Lanark suggested two chains — on© .for the animal 
kingdom and one for the plant kingdom* (c) Itmiiark’s third view 
appeared posthumously In 1835 in ’Animmuc san Vertebrea ’ where he 
rejected any single chain of being and saw no gradation from living 
to non-living* Here tho two earlier accounts achieved a synthesis 
which runs through his thou:#it in s sort of complementary tension®
The only conclusion is that there was not one mechanism for Lamark, 
but two — the inheritance of acquired charactGrla tles » and innate 
tendency to increasing comple^city, with man the Iilghest complexity* 
(Of. Wilkie 1965s pp.267o268.)
Larrtark was attacked for his views by scientists and theologians 
and the two are not always easy to distinguish. On the scientific 
front there was obviously problems w:lth a theory postulating 
:hicrea*3lng complexity just when physics was coming to the conclusion 
that the reverse was the ease* In Aiglemd hie theories were 
associated with the theories of nebular hypothesis which led to cosmic 
evolution and thence, for the social critics» to revolutionary desires 
(cfo 1?B9)« But despite the apparently atheistic tone of nmoh of 
Lamarkg he could» as a Deist, slip .into tsleologloal argiments as wall 
as ;Ln sincerity appealing to the divine plan for the world®
1^3^3^*3.o^M^l<:m^MM}fAAX!31r33J3l  gave the basic English response 
to Lamiaxk in his ’Principles of Geology** Lyell, a, pupil of 
Buolcland, depaazted from the views of his teacher and pushed 
unifomiitarianlsm through to an mctreme position® He rejected 
Laiïïark’si theory of the ooiitlnuous progress and transformation of the 
species; and also refuted Linnaeus because for him life had a number 
of foci of creation and not just one divine Incubation area© (Of. 
Gillespie 1959% p«150#) So Lyell, .faced by the apparently 
increasing difficulty to refer the Gomnenoement of all the so-called 
a>lluv;lal deposits to only one event or period, turned to a strict 
miifoianitariaviism which posited that the gaps In the ’Chain of Being* 
were filled tlirough the intervention of intermediate causes — not by 
some first cause ® Change was going on in. the present as it had
silways done in the past, and it was only these Bome forces which had 
been at work :ln previous periods. A pathway was being prepared for
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Lyell claimed to derive his theory from the appoararacee, Imt irhat 
he really did wac to abstract the general idea of miiforürlty from 
Hutton and Playfair end universalise it as a basic principle.
Having got his %}rlnGlp3.e all the data was armnged to fit® (Ofa 
Gillespie 1959% p*128«) For Lyell the fossil record was far too 
imperfect to indicate a progression in the history of life as 
expoimded by Laiaark and he rejected evolution in the 1820’s; later he 
revised his views for if the succession of fossils iji the strata 
iraplieci a geological, evolution, then there also had to be an evolution 
of the organic species©
Interestingly he maintained the dignity of man in relation to the 
rest of the. created order and appears to have had Unitarian 
sympathies. (Of® Brooke 1974/®% Po37«) His work on geological 
forces, however, Gven*bually led him to G2£amine the distribution, 
dispersal and eactinction of species, and from thence 'to a sympathetic 
approach to evolution© But to begin with he could see pairs created 
at different times and places as a requisite of natwal unifomity and 
distinotivenesfs of species® In a peculiar préfiguration of Wallace, 
Lyell added intellectual and moral faculties to his basic ’system of 
nature’» for any movement from animal to man. involved an "interruption 
to the ordinary course of nature," (Uoolcyasis 1974/bo p«70,) However, 
he recognised that natural selection could be combined with a belief 
that events follow from forces ooimmmicatod by some Ijaterrnittent 
divine interurention.
In 'i;ho final analysis the origin of the universe was not a 
scientific but a metaphysical question, Science and religion had 
their appropriate spheres end they should be restricted to them in the 
light of tills o lyell did not question the Pentakeuch in terms of
history and religion, but it had nothing to do with science* Despite 
his tempered views on evolution he recognised 'bhat his ’Principles * 
were contrary to accepted opinion and hod a bad case of l.lterm?y nerves 
while his book was going tlirough the press. He was eventually 
elected to a ohalr a,t King’s College, London, and as these £ippo:Lntmen.ts 
were in 1;he hands of the bishops the only conclusion is that» if the 
bishops were uneasy about his theories, they did not thinle it serious 
enough to prevent his election ©
7«1 „Hobert Ohoiabers .(1802—7l), Two other important figures who
featured prominently at this time were Chambers and Hugh Miller — both
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Beottishg both to a largo ©x'fcent self—'ksmght naturalists ; and both 
more interested in the moaning of science than science itself, and in 
popularly Gomm.nloat:mg that meaning® Chambers, and his brother, 
founded the famous publishing flsm and had a quite remarkable output 
of books themselves a But ao an amateur in the field of geology he 
X’Tould be criticised oæî euch© However when his ’Vestiges of the 
Natural History of Oreatlon* appeared in 1844 it was anonymous# But 
the outcry it brought forth effectively prepared the %my for Darwin 
and helped drew-/ the sting from the later controversy.
Ohajabers, more imlformltarian then catastrophic, criticised 
Lamark^s mechanism# But his own view was little better or clearer, 
and relied heavily upon the biological theory of recapitulation© He 
seemed to suggest that every individual literally went tlm>ugh 
embryonic stage £3 of being an invertebrate g fish, reptile and so on. 
Despite this blatant espousal of a radical evolutionary view, his 
chief aim was really in the field of na,tura!l theology where he was 
trying to set out the beneficent rule of God» Hi© central thesi© 
was that the dominion of natural law testified to its divine source. 
Hence he suggested that Genesis chapter one resulted from the oonmands 
and expressions of the will of God and not from his direct acts® lie 
could therefore quote the biblical material in eueh a way that it all 
sounded like a -process of development.
U!he response to thi.s was an outburst of horrified rejection. The 
theory' of development was by no means in the ascendancy, and Gillespie 
can write» if somewhat Bweepingly, thats
"....around 1850 fexf scientists of any note in Britain hsud a 
good word to say for development or a kind one for the author 
of the ’Vestiges’ # CatastropMst and unlfo:miitarian, 
astronomer and biologist, joined in repudiation. Even to 
quote a sentence or bo from each of the leading figures would 
require pages — they @11 spoke out a Herschel, t&Gwell, I'orbes , 
Gwen, Pritchard, Iteley, Lyell, Bedgwickg ï’tochison, Buckland, 
Agassiz, Miller and others." (1959% p«l62.)
It was claimed that the ’Vestiges’ was contrary to Scripture with
respect to the uniqueness of men in the image of God; that it
destroyed the physical and moral distinction between man and animale;
and that it was a work of ra^ ik mater-ielisra. To conceive that
biblical fundamentalism was the chief problem would be quite wrong,
for the social, moral and mate3?ialiE3tic problems were shared by
Christian and non=Ghri©tian alike, (ibid p©l67f.)
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- ^ ’8.8 a lœy figure in the arena of
skilledQ yet popular, reaction to the new 'theories of imiformitarianism
and development. He was an unequlvocable evangelical, enad a respected
scientist# His attitude to God’s world was that of a romantic lover
of na'hree and though his original oontribution.8 to tîie field of
geology were sound end important, they are not of first importance,
%
Bssentia3.1y he was a populariser and interpreter* ' Ho firmly 
believed that science revealed the wonder of God’s creation; that it 
was therefore of the greatest edaoatlonal value; and. that a profound 
Isiowledge of geology should enohle the Christian m:bid# Thus his 
task of populerrislng science was a religious duty» At the; same time 
he was no litemlist, holding tha,t the six days of creation were six 
epochs/encertionE} of creati've Emotivity# He was, in effect, a 
progressive evolutionist who saw the creative power of God unleashed 
at the start of each new epoch. Hut development as e^cpoimded by 
Lasiark and Ghamhers was a figment of the imagination with no basis ;ln 
reality for Miller, and he invoked the fossil Goelacanth to confound 
the development thesis.
Unlike others. Miller aeh3.evec!. a real harmony of his faith and his 
science o It has been said of him that "he performed the miiqiie feat 
of blending science and religion together instead of bending them 
together." (Gillespie 1959% poT/5») His reasoning was quite £iim|)le§ 
if man came from the lower animale then either animals had immortal 
souls or men. did not# Indeed he reverted to tho doctrine of 
degradation and pictured each epoch as a regression from higher to 
lower forms — although the existence of man could be a problem here.
He was a dojiiaglng; critic of the ’Vestiges’ and his critique was 
particularly penetrating for, unlike many» Miller Imew exactly where 
he stood. He was an evangelical not a deist, and as a result placed 
no final stress on design® 0?iie basic problssas were ethice)!, not 
abstract, and he required "a divinity rather than a landscape garde^ier." 
(ibid p«177«) His God waa a God of love and redemption who held out
3» The first ten editions of the ’Vestiges’ ran to some 25»000 
copies; Lyell, in tim editions, memaged toiBach a circulation of 
only 4D080g but Miller’s ’Testhaony of the Bocks* qMekly reached a 
circulation of wMle his ’Footprints of the Creator’ swiftly
ran to 17 editions, and the ’Old Bed Sandstone* to 20 editions» In 
the last of thebe works he spent an entire chapter refuting Lsmark.
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the hope of everlasting life and salvation to the individual soul^  
7.2. smB
1?he years preceding Darviin had laid the stage for the piiblioation 
in 1859 of ®Ûn the Origin of Species hy means of Batairal B election ^ or 
the Preservation of Pavom"G(i Eacee in the Struggle for Life.® The 
stage was sotp for eraoiploy in the concept of the struggle for 
existence which was gaining favour in Britain (Maithus9 Bpenoer) and 
:lrx the developing work in the fields of palaeontology from Prance ahcl 
the new hiogenetie laws emanating from Germany. (Of* Pledge 1966g po15&o)
3a the early 19th century the
word ^evolution® had a narrow^ specialised meaning that referred to 
the development that went on In the fodtus* Pre«-»Barwin the word 
simply meant the development from egg to offspring. In the li^t of 
this it was perhaps not surprising that 3)avw:ln rarely used the term.
In the general concept of evolution there vmn an utilising of the 
theory in the rising study of anthropology. This new area.j remote 
from the rigour%s of e^cperimental science g did not bother over much with 
data g but relied on imaginative speculation* ®®Their conclusions 
sometimes outran the evidence*” (Chadwick 1966g p.291.) The basic 
problem with evolutionary philosophy as applied to a field such as 
anthrox)ology was that the basic aiciorns used to posit evolution were g 
and are g miverifiable/unfalsifiable* ântbropologistsg for instance p 
held firmly to the view that all societies developed through parallel 
stages and that all development t-zaa for the bettor# Theszofore the 
îiiore primitive a, society the earlier it was deemed to be* But many 
of today's so-called 'primitives® are in fact the degenerate remains 
of what were once high civilisa/bionB such as the descendants of the 
Inoas in Peru9 or the survivors of the î’-'feyan empire in Central 
Aïierica* But despite such apparent falsifications of the basic 
general theory of evolution it has not led to ©ny significant revision 
in the views of those still working within an evolutionary grid of 
reference# This Indioatee that the general thpoxy is not a 
scientific, theory but a metaphysical _coHiBiitment which provides a 
paradigm within which 'theories and related data are placed*
It is important g as îïookya£is points out in an incisive essay 
(l 974/e g pp#10™29*)g tha/b evolution be seen to apply only to 
bio3.og'ieal phenomena; it is i-îrong to read off from biological theory 
into other modes of being* Thus it ie linguistiool nonsense to talk
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of thô evolution of history g motor oar or BOience® Yet for the past 
hundred yearo this has been done* Su.eh was the general, application 
of the concept of evolution :m the latter half of the 19th eentmy 
that JftYeSrlmpson could talk of the ”evolution of the theory c»f 
evolution®” (19^3g pel64») Here the first 'evolution® refers to an 
undefined general philosopîiyg while the second 'evolution® pertains to 
the 'biological theory I
In various concepts evolution itself p histoityp man g speclesg and 
the possi'i)i'i.ity of transformation and reproduction (epigenesis and 
preformation) there was no consensus of scientific opinion® It is 
not surprising that Dampin's thesis found no -universal scientific 
acoeptanoe even if po|)uJ,£i3? mythology sugges-te that it did. Indeed 
DaiTifln did not even expect to convince the scientific 'world and 
indicates this at the end of the 'Origins*®
Dan-dji in effect
inverted the aotualis'tio method and used the evidence of the past to 
interpret the present* In doing this he managed to claim to he a 
true Baconian and collect facts on a wholesale maxmer* But this 
claim is open to question if it was moaiit as a claim to scientific 
rigour* The gods of Darwin as a student were Mmmeus and Cuvier 
as he passed from medicine through divinity to the fields of geolog^y 
and biology* His voyage in the Beagle (1831^56) is well îmovm 
and it was during this period that he was influenced by Lyell's book®
He also acknowledges the crucial influence of Maî.thus* 'Essay on the 
Drinclple of ^Population® which he read in October 1838, On the
'Voyage he noted the extinction of many species g especially sro'und the 
coast of Argentina,a Here toog he noted the mcistence of primitive
people and compared them with the advanced civilisa,tions of Europe g 
but fell Into the 'brap of seeing them as prlmi'bive with a latent 
potential to r3.se ^ not even en‘berta;lning the idea that they m:lght be 
degenerat3,ves o This .is important for it indiea‘bes that the concept 
of a philosophy of development was firmly adhered to before he in fact 
set out on the voyage* This :i.s a- point often missed by commentators 
who suggest 'bhatg while l/fallace had his theory and set cmt to prove it g 
Bar‘wij.'i arr:lved at his theory only ai^ 'ber 'bhe collection of data» To 
bel.leveg however'bhat Banfin devised hio theory to explain "bhe 'facts* 
wou],d 'be mive» Pacts are not gi'ven ae suchg but mmst always be 
gathered ifithJn a conceptual framework* (Of# Parts II and Uo)
Indeed rOaxrviin weis worried if he was gathering the 'right* facts the
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right facts being those that would fit M e  eoneeptiial pm-formed 
metarjhysica3. gj.dd «
In 1055 WallaOG brought out a paper entitled 'On the Law Vllrlch
I'iaB Regulated the Introduction of lew Species#' This had a twofold
effect® It induced Lyell and Danfln to look again at the species 
problem with a new vigour; mid it stlDmlated Darwin to wrrlte
fear of having his _'aciontific priority^_ stoleno"^ '
In the oonstruotion of his evolutionary
mechanism Darwin hecsme involved in a number of assumptions that were 
distinct from any facts deprived from observation or experiment# At 
root there waa the presupposition of a struggle for existence 9 and 
withrln this the occurence of favourable variations which advanced over 
the normal, or inferior members of a species®. This was on ae sumption 
based in tmn on a metaphysical promise that (a) wholes were 
explicable by analysing partSg and (b) tliat events were explicable by 
preceding' events which were their causes « This principle of
eont:li'iuity leading to development was a basic falth^ -sti-mce that must 
be seen as stemming from outwith science » Darwin himself wrote §
”The noble science of Geology loses glory from the extreme 
imperfection of -bhe record, The crust of the earth with
its embedded remains must not be looked at s® a well filled 
museimîjj but as a poor collection made at hasard and at rare 
intervals»” (16599 P»453«)
We therefore find in his work an ^sumption of the principle of 
continuity and uniformity overriding any evidence to the contrary; the 
assuiaption of gradations and variations wi'bh:în organs and the struggle 
for existence; the aibrdssioB of a lack of evidence and no scientific 
esqjQCtaney of ].:WcB :ln this chain.g and therefore a concession to the 
philosophical nature of the theory#
7»2*4o Basic Concept# The essential ar'giment of the “Origin of 
Species* looks simple g that no two apeoxmens of any species are alike; 
no two survive their environment in exactly the seme way; hence 
(assuming variations are inherited) simulative changes In the race 
will always be going on.# The general theory of b3.ologioal evolution 
is therefore that theory which states that all l:?„v3jag species have 
arisen by gradual modification of pre-existing' species@ and which
4* Barwln woxites (in E.Dandri 1867g Vol#11, p«49o)“ rather bate
the idea of writing for priority g yet I certainly should be vexed if 
any one were to publish my doctrines before me*”
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generalises this oonoept of the origin of apeelee to ineorjjorato 
fossils* Thus it postulates that epeoies have arisen from only one.g 
©r perhaps a few g primitive 'feypeso It will he notiocd that iiiis 
concept saya nothing concerning the acfcual asechaniems of evolutlouo 
The question of a mechaniem was a sep&ira’fce conceptual area g though 
Darwin hound it together with the general theory in "one long 
argimente” (lanwin 1839y #*499*)
Basically Darwin relied on two lines of argument the 
distribution of aiît-inot species through time, and the geographical 
clietrihutioxi of living species tkrouz^ h space# Fore these he drew 
eactenslvely on M s  experience garhhereci on tho voyage of the Beagle 
and to some degneo on the embryology of von Baer (of# Mason 1962g p« 
41?®) whom he Intfurpreted as positing ‘fchat mi individual organism In 
its growth from a single cell to &:a adult animal -passed tîirou^ the 
total history of its species# So Darwin was led to suggest tliat the 
evolutionary series of organisms was a genoalogleal tree of descent g 
with 'branching lines from coMiicm parents g some to end In extinction 
and others sun/lving#
In presenting his theories D&mwin was not making a peroonal attack 
on religious belief # There migli‘1; be  ^athoistio elements in what he
was saylngg but he hisiself did not in the first Mstsjuce understand M s  
work in, 'l‘ha,t light# Bather the acceptance by him of the nu'tuiral laws
and the continuity of eeooïidary causes was seen as consistent with a 
belief in a Oreator who had Impressed natural on the univorsso
theory of evolution to the ooUBol meohanlmi of natural selection out 
of the struggle for sixrui-valo Actually 'bhie theory con;bsanB several 
CHonoepts* There -was the necessity for reinclom variations "fco occur 
whlohg -when reeogaiscclg would fit in with his mechanism g though this 
does not explain the ac-tual occurence of these variations g and there 
%-ms the concept of the struggle for survival which flowed out of tho 
fact tlmt more offspring -were b o m  than survived g as well as tho 
competition 'between species# TM.s led to the idea of the srnivivaJ. 
of the fittest where those liavlng advantage would live longer#
0?lae evident -ifsatage .i.n nature was the motor that a prooeos of 
evolution required to provide a. causal maohanismg and Dancln sieaed on 
this and developed, it in oonjunetltm with t;he concept of small
variations»« He'recogrnieedg howevery that to argue o,s he did from
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isolation (relying on his experience of the Galapagos Islands) for
these variations was a difficult concept^ only acceptable to those who 
already aooepted his oonoeptuel framework, This led him to 
experiment and argue his case from the arena of domestic breeding*
This was BM original approach in this field of science and he went the 
length of joining several pigeon-<p0ncy3ng clubs* Thus he argued, 
from the inbred variations hy human selection to the variation in the 
wild from natural selection#
This was quite separate from any discussion o.f man which ])arwin 
did not enter into In the 'Origin*# However g in the 'Descent of Man*
1871 •*" he saw man in no way 3ntrinsioally different from the rest of 
the animal kingdom# He argued that the moral and mental faculties of
man were only different in degree and not in kind from other animais# 
Wallace failed to agree on this point#
The theory of na'luiral selection was a controversial analogy an,cl 
raised much criticism# This was confused 1>y Darwin's use of the 
analogy which appeared to vary from place to place. It has 'been
suggested (Brooke 1974/dg p#74») that his presentation of natural
selection takes the form of a rheg^ricM where it is seen as
”incessantly ready for action”; as assuming an ^bere
it refers to cattle to show that the severest competition occurs 
‘between variants anci their closest roots ; it has the form of an
0:^ 7 when it refers to breeders tond3mg to ”li%œ enctreaes” ; 
and it has a £ogs^kutiye^jmle when it is seen as making ”unconscious” 
selection come througji the breeder's selection# There were serious 
difflGultles as to whether it was valid to argue froBi the domestic to 
the w;lM with all the attendant problems of reversion and regression 
from crossing with inferior anJ.mals« In domestic breeding man's 
‘benefit rules g while in ne/kusre -bhe benefit must be for the animal#
Darwin was aware of these problems ‘but did not a3.1ow theia to count 
against his theory# 3hit it is clear that his own j>:eesentation 
presented a. goal-klireeted nature which i-mM unconscious! To posit 
'selection' ;hi any shape or foimi was to present the need for someone 
or some tiring that selected#
In 'fchsï end g Darwin was forced by criticism into g "Documented 
qualification and na,gg;in.g doubt#” (ibid p#79«) Thus nàtirre became 
seen ae much more a complex of Interacting forces in organic 
interdépendance end in interaction with their envlromient# The whole
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concept of 'xiature rad in tooth and. claw* has been, greatly modified 
under the weight of evidence to the contrary* "Today greater 
attention is given to bhe sources of coordination and organisation 
within the body and the structures of internal stability end harmony g 
which were neglected 3ji Darwin*o doy," (Barbour 1-968/1)9 p.8 ?*)
Today the concept of natural selection is in decline and even for 
Dan,-,Tin the basic argument became attenuated In later editions of his 
work* "The primacy of natural selee/bioiig which was later 
jncoiTporated wlthiïi neo^ -*l)an-miian osrfchodoxyg was effectively 
sacrificed by Darxdn (Brooke 1974/i-a p*79*) Brooke goes
on to note that 8 "This is of oourse an aspect of 1;he evolutionary 
debate which is quietly i.gnorecl or lamented by those who like to record 
the linear triumph of truth." (ibid p«79«) There is today more 
©mphaoie oai the balance and cooperation evidenced in nature and Pledge 
elaisis that "natural selection tmrned out to be not a law but a litanyc.” 
(1966, p.158.)
3 believe it is important to distinW^h betï^ men
three ideas of evolutions (a) the general theory across disciplines;
(b) the general biological theory; and (c) the spécial theory lAich 
posits a Bieehanism# Confusion arises if these are not dist.1ngmBhed* 
¥ith pa5?tiouIar reference to it .i.s to be noted that he claimed
to present 'one long argument* where all. stood and fell together*
This is eapeeially pertinent under the reality that he attenuated his 
argument under pressure of criticism and his own additional researches® 
¥here then the long argument?
,7#3. Tmi: GHàLLmGB OP
7*3*1 «, To 8 criniure# ïïnder pressure were the 'days* of Genesiss 
questions wore being asked about the biblical sequences of création; 
questions were being: raised eoncemiiig man as a special creation; and 
the question of 2jntG:j>-speoies relationships * But the Woriptural 
problem^ , though real g was neither crucial nor new® Time scales were 
thoroughly argued out in the pre-A)arwlniæi eontsr-oversies and this 
ground was well trodden® The question of man and species could only 
be attacked by arguing from what Boripturo did not say5, and was not a 
serious d3..fficulty« Even granting that man. liacl evolved froia lower 
species g it would still be perfectly valid to refer to him as 
ultimately from the *dust of the earth* g and men as spécial creations 
could be 9 and were g seen in the light of the guiding hand of God in
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évolution# Mother avenue of reply to this challenge was the 
principle of accommodation which removed the dlffloul ties of absolute 
literalissao
7*3*2# To Design# l^ atural selection seemed to replace the need for 
a conscious des:i.|pfier in nature# But Darwin retreated in later life 
from his extreme aî)t:Wbeleological views (of# Eus sell g G#A, 1974/hg p# 
46#) even though he evinced cm inc%%as:mg loss of awareness of the 
design which others assm?ed him was there# Ta 1862 he published a 
ifork on the fertilisation of orchids that wae seen as an interesting 
piece of na'Wral theolo©r in that It talked about “purpose* and 
'beautiful contrivanceDamfin admitted that here was aa example 
of purposive design which thrust Itself upon liisiig though at other t:Lmes 
it receded from his consciousness * This euiibivalence to design comes
out in the very title of the 'Origins® where .Darwin speaks of the 
'^réservation of I'avourod Races ® but how do we Imow that races ore 
favoured? by their preservation! Thus his very title Involved a
toleologioal metaphor# (Of* Singer 1962g p.510.)
It has been said that teleology was given a death blow by Darwin@ 
but this is an e3£aggora,ted elaiiru Many undoubtedly c3.aimed this g 
but equally many could point to an overall design that encompassed a 
broader field 'bha%i that of natural selection^ wMle yet others claimed 
that design was built Into évolution»
'■lOervfln did not destroy the argument from desi^i# He 
destroyed only the watchmaker and the watch* #0 .Dart-rin h.ad 
delivered a death blow to a simple g a siaively simple 9 form 
of the design argument@ but eto Huxley himself cam© to 
realiseg it is still possible to argue for direetivi'by in 
the process of life»" (Eisley 1958» P*19B#}
3r'or Darwinians man was not unique g
but essentially just an animal, g even if slightly more aâvanoed than 
other animsils» D% opposition to this there was tho theological 
objection that man was Intrineioully distinct and unique# This was 
a real problem in the 19th century and even lyell was worried over the 
loss of dignity to man# There arose a dioagreement be'tween Wallace 
and bartfin® For Wallace the body had developed tiirough the process 
of na'tm:al seleo'biong but the intellectiial and moral faculties had not 
thus developed# He writes thats "Haturol Selection could only have 
endowed savage man with a brain a little superior to that of an ape g 
whereas he actually possessesone very little inferior to that of a 
philosopher*" (1871 g p#329o) TM.s is a god«^ of«»th8«gaps explanation g
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bringing in teleology in an area which could not otheriflse he 
G2q>la,lnetl« B© there was a deep and fundament^], cleavage between two 
views of man# The one bbm man purely in reductionistic terms and 
led to a concept of progressing mank:lnd; the other saw a wider canvas 
and pointed to the predlomaent of mmi as well as hie unigiieneBSo
EtMcg,® Huxley suggested that ethical norms 
could not be d@r3.ved from evolution in o ontrad3. ction to the views of 
.Y)a:«:win and Bpencer* Bpenoer saw evolution as the unifying key 
underlying all knowledge « Concomitant to the challenge to mauls 
identity there was seen a possible sociological implication that 
negated ethics ». Tiie consequent danger of the disintegration of 
society was eoimtered by Seclgwick and others®
General Response* Prior to 3)aa?win there were various 
theories of evolution the environmental adaption and acquired 
characteristic theories of Lamark; the gemMplasm theory of Meismann; 
and the chance combination of chemicals view of Haeckel» To this 
Darwin added his theory of natural selection <=« but evolution itself 
was not new,
Xntermationally the .reacît.ion depended on the st^^ength of the 
current theories in different countries® On the Continent there was 
little enthusiasm for Danmi at first as they were influenced more 
directly by Lamark (France was hostile to Darwlnlanlsm) and Haeckel* 
But 3;n kime Darwin .found that the ground had been prepared for him and 
the world was ready to accept his theory# In Britain the credit for
popularising him has gone to T.H.Hmcleyg but It should not be 
.forgotten that Bpencer played an imiportant role in advocating the 
philosophy of evolution before Baixwiiig and so paved the way for its 
SGientlflo formulation,
The controversy was polarised in the infamous debate between 
Hmcley and \iilberforoe» Huxley g throu^i better manners and more
intelligently marshalled arguments, won the day though this has 
unfortunately been taken as the establishment of the voracity of 
evolutionary theory and the victory of science over religion# But 
In the years that followed it was often the scientist who opposed the
5o There :1s an excellent analysis of this response in the Open 
'Dhiversity course on 'Science and Belief® (Russell; 0,A# 1974/b}^
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new tîî0O3?ies wM.le theologians were prepared to accept them® In 
faet Darwin e^gected soientific opposition»
hmcleyg then; swiftly supported the new theory of Dartfln and m ’ote 
a favourable review in the “Times* of 26 December 18599 and 
throughout the controversy played a leading role in defending 
evolutionary thought» In tor e s tingly enough the 'Daily lews® thought
it had all been said before (of# Brown; C« 1969© p*148®)* lot all 
reaction was however as favourable® The reaction of the father of 
Canon J,M«Wilson is tyj^ical when the former was given a present of 
hanfin's book at Christmas « SisipEJon records the words of the father, 
a country oler^iymans
”*I oannot ooncaive'g said the older gentlemajn to his song 
“how a book can be warltten on the subject# 'We know all 
there is to be Imown about it» God created plants and 
ammals out of the ground#*” (1925© PP»1?6g1Y7o)
Despite a surge of public opinion against evolution in particular 
and Bcienc© in gener&il ±n the late 19 th century^ the new theory was 
relatively swiftly absorbed into the thought of the age» Sarvriln was 
welcomed9 with minor modifications; by mon such as the Hevo Gharles 
Kingsley; and Asa Grc^g a keen evangelical Amerlcm'io .lïhrolution was 
seen by them; if not by Ban'/ln; to point to design in nature* In 
other fields D.F»Strauss used evolution to justify an optimistic 
theology of man in deviation from the traditional concept of the Fall; 
SuBffiier used it to justify the Protestant Ethic and a capitalistic 
society; while Josiah Strong used it to justify racism. (Cf* Brooke 
1974/a, ppo9S,97.)
The attitude of Hujcley owed a great deal; not to scientific 
objectivity; but to deep-rooted snti--eXericalism® He was ever eager
to attack the reU-glous establishment and Dæ?win provided an e]coellent 
opportunity which he seized with both hands ; pointing to the 
deification of chance in DEirwin's theory g the harm that it did to 
teleology; mid the general anti-^theistic tendency of evolution - though 
he dJ.d note that the abolition of teleolog^ gy was not a necessary 
consequence of evolution (of* Huxley, T«H. 1887© P«479f«)* This 
attack on religion via evolution looks rather peculiar when set 
alongside the remark he made that Darwin *s work in fact transcended 
theism and had in reality nothing to do with it! (Of. Brooke 1974/&© 
p*06») Essentially Huxley merely used the si'buation to his 
advantage while realising that there was nothing new being said of
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phllosophlea]. importance « For Huxley, Darv'/in epitomised the 
scientific enterprise in its struggle against the ohseurantisïrt of 
religion (ef« Iteloy, T«3io 1887; ppo457p459*)« XronicMly neither he, 
nor Dam'fin, were following ecientifioally verified data, but as Hmcley 
himself notes, a. "pious conviction that evolution is true»” (ibid po466e)
%#4»2j!L,T'W_jk*4Gntific Hesnonse@ This is a sector of the debate which 
has been lost eight of in popular mytholO;gy which sees a relatively 
clear division between science and religion# But only when the 
scientific reaction and climate is put in perspective can the 
theological reaction be truly assessed» (0f»2*2.3») If there was no 
consensus of acceptance within scientific circles it hardly seems just 
criticism to attack theologians for a failure to go overboard for 
Dari'jfini em theori© s #
There was a basic barrier between the life and physical sciences 
that has not yet been satisfactorily resolved* Physicists tend(ed) 
on the whole to refrain from speculation beyond a core of tested data, 
and Daniin's approximate 800 'we may suppose ®s* did not compare very 
well with, the rigour of the pliysical sciences♦ Therefore, while
physical sciences opereited on the level of sufficient data in terms of 
•"che acceptability of a given theory, evolutionists were faced with a 
methodological difference that they could not produce sufficient 
conclusive evidence for transmutations of any sort*
7.4*2*1# Various Views» 8ome scientists, of course, accepted the
theos^g thougli generally with reservations® Albrecht Kolliker (lOlY^ * 
1905)9 for example, accepted Darwin In part and pointed to several 
wealoiesses in his work nsmiely that there was no experience of species 
foiTmation; that there was evidence that a union between different 
varieties was re-lativelji' more sterile than between the sane; that there 
was a rarity, if not a total lack, of intermediate forms, whether 
living or fossil; and that Danfin had fo:mmlated a non^testable theory*
"In iColliker's view, Darwin was dealing w3*th the “might* and 
“may be* and not with any theory that could be tested by 
experience o Evolution was perhaps unique among major 
soientific theories in that the appeal for its acceptance wa.s 
not the evidence for it, but that any other proposed 
in'berpretation of the data seemed wholly Meredible*”
(Singer 1962, p.514*)
Many of the scientists of the era were strongly Christian in their 
vieim such as Brewster, Joule, Mascwell, Kelvin, Faraday and Hayleigh — 
but opposition to Darwin must not be attributed to them on the basis
160
of :œ3-.igious belief # They îiad powerful scientific reasons for their 
oppoaitioïi» The issue is complete for CMistian Influences were not 
tho only ones on such scientists -end other opponents of Darwin, such 
as Owen and Agassis, seemed to have been influenced by the German 
'.lliturphilosophie * o Hiehard Owen (1804'^ 92) was perhaps the foremost 
student of comparative anatomy and fossil bones in Britain and ijaa 
resolutely set eigainst the new theory; Agcisisis, on the other side of 
the Atlantic p was likewise a foreizm'mer in science suid unliappy with 
evolutionary theory» ^
7.4#2o2aLord Kelvin (1824^1907)» Of considerable scientific stature, 
more open to natural theology and even more specific in his rejection 
of evolution, was Sir ¥ill;lam Thomson, later Lord Kelvin* He ie 
important because he did not oppose evolution joer.Qe^ , seeing it as 
compa.tible with the divine benevolence # M s  objections were strictly
of a scientific nature and',not from theological conviction® He saw 
a chMlenge lying in theimioclyngmiics which raised problems on two 
levels -■> the time scale@ and the basic process of nature Involved# 
Accepting the evidence of physical science he dismissed Darwin's 
theories as “futile'» (Of, Hussell, 0#A# 1974/b, p.62») The first
problem was the time scale Dand.n required for evolu'bion» Kelvin 
worked out, on the ba.sis of the loss of heat from the earth and sun, 
that the time required by uniformitarian geology and evolutionary 
biology was simply a scientific non-starter# The time was not 
available® Mow it is of little importance that the figures of Kelvin 
were wrong «*• that was not realised imtil much later for this was a 
serious scientific objection and had to be acknowledged ae such® (Of# 
ibid p*64®) The second problem (still unsolved) resided in the 
second law of thermodynanlos. (Cf* Appendix B®) This implied a 
running down of any closed system, while the degree of entropy or
So Mother lacking enthusiasm for evo3.ution was Michael Faraday 
(1791 **1867}* Faraday was perhaps the greatest figure in physios
betvjeen lewton and Einstein, and his significance for science goes far 
beyond that of Danfin® Ironically in the 20th centmy most peo%jle 
are fajmlliar with Darwin; few Imow much about Farsiday# His 
QChiGvements were numerous liquefying chlorine g isolating ben sine, 
formulating the two laws of electrolysis and the phenomenon of 
electromai^ netie Induction (this being the basis of the dynamo)# A 
devout Cteistian of evangelical theology, Faraday had a deep sense of 
the unity, as well as of the diversity, of nature and 'khe natural 
forces, which led him to posit his Field Theory - and thus 
revolu'bionise the whole physical sciences* Here was irhat led up to 
the prediction and discovesy of radio waves*
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disorder increased* Mow thie law is perhaps the most universally?' 
validated of all na'lural scientific laws emd therefore to transgress 
it a serious matter® Thus it was used to attack evolution == for 
ezaaple “The ïïaBeen Dhivero©' in 1875 by Stewart and Tait» More
recently JoH.Rush claims that "a living species embodies a unique 
accumulation of genetic individuality and adaptive wisdom» It is
one more ins'orrcoetion against the Second Law of Thermodyriamics» (1957© 
p.240*) But a standard textbook tells us that8 "The law itself is
applicable to every type of process««»" (Montgomery, S*R» 1966, p*7*) 
ÏÎIUB evolution and entropy are in tension, the one building up and the 
other breaking down and disintegrating# Many attempts have been 
msjde 1;o evade this though even Julian Eiurley could admit to it as the 
greatest single scientific objection to evolution# (Oft Wilson I966, 
p#128f«; Koestler 1971© oh.14*) ^
The problem for evolution was that the whole tide of the physical 
sciences was flowing in the opposite direction to evolutionary thought® 
Atomic theory seemed to be pointing to the fixity of species - for 
instance the fiicity of el.ementa as enumerated in Dalton's atomic theory 
was in marked contrast to the gradations of evolutionary thought®
Thus is revealed the importoace of the philosophy which under- 
girded the. theory, for if this had not been strong then evolution may 
well have collapsed as a scientific theory® (Of* More 1925© PP»117»304*^  
X’ihatever the scientific ar-giments for or against, it irould seem that 
the whole question ultimately resolves itself bade into the 
j)Mlosophieal# It is in the light of these scientific objections 
that the debate of the 19th century should be seen, and M  awaraness 
of this that the theological reaction asaassedv
TM ol.ogâçal,#8pp^e As might be expected from tlie above,
Darwin's supporters in I86O were "numerically extremely insignificant#” 
(Eœcley, 1887© p*464») Only in tkls li^it can the hesitancy of
the church be measured in accepting the theory of evolution, for there
was little reason to go overboard for a theory which hcxi not yet gained 
scientific respectability and which had failed to answer serious
scientific objections# This does not mean that many within the
church were not willilng to accept evolution and indeed 3)am>/in could 
claim by February I86O that many clergy went far with him.
7* Mother .importemt critic was Lord Rayleigh, who, as late as 1906, 
when asked if natural selection was adequate to explain evolution 
replied in the negative# (Cf* Russell, G»Ao 1974/b, p«62.)
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The debate in  theological c irc les  was an open one and in  fact is  
s t i l l  w ith us in  ETutecl form. She re la tiv e  importance attributed  to  
evolution varied g rea tly , and while Gharloe Gore could accept evolution 
in  1883 he considered i t  as a matter o f no great controversy» In  
1885, however. Bishop Magee accepted evolution and thought the matter 
newsworthy» So in  general i t  is  d if f ic u lt  to sustain the idea of 
consistent persecution of Darwin by the churches »
Theologians were divided on the issue, and pred ilection fo r or 
against appears to  orig inate in  more basic metaphysical, and 
philosophical stances*. A general d ivision of theologians can be 
made «"° Liberal or Modem-istio divines were more ready to accept 
evolution ao i t  obviously correlated to th e ir  ideas of pro^?essg 
funda^îentalists tended to oppose; while moderates merely held 
judgement in  suspense* This la t te r  position would seem, in  the 
lig h t of the s c ie n tific  position, to have been the correct one fo r men 
who had no ephere'^ ’-authority in  biology#
3)a:rwin posed the problem fo r re lig io n  of a  view which saw mstn as 
no loïiger fa lle n , no longer unique; while fo r scien tists i t  seemed 
that he apparently abandoned the inductive method of science and was 
un scien tific  in  setting  out his theory (fo r Instance in  the basic 
ignorance of a cause of va ria tio n ) # Mot sui^ris3.ngly conservative 
scientists had deep reservations# Yet by the end of the century the 
general theory was widely accepted and had in  fa c t been transferred as 
a paradigm to m m y  other disciplines# I t  was tending to the na'ta’o 
of a world'-vlew as w ell as a world-'picture, c%id men lik e  T y ler,
BurMieim and Fraser read ily  applied i t  as a paradigm w ithin th e ir own 
spheres of research#
Theistio evolution beoame acceptable in  both Protestant and 
Roman Ga/kholic c irc les  the famous Archbishop Tempi© cou3.d assume 
evolution ets a basic axiom in  his I 884 Hampton lectures; while 
Catholics lik e  %ahm and Mivort both wrote of the com patib ility between 
evolution and Ohristismity® But perhaps the most surprising feature  
was the ready acceptance of evolution, or a t least suspended judgement, 
on the part of many of the leading eonaervats-ves of the la s t century® 
MeCosh of Pr:meeton, Dana, James O rr, J»C»Jones and J.Strong* a l l  f i t  
th is  category» (Cf, Ramm 1971 ©PP^^OOff#) Even BaB «\tefield was 
guarded ~Jm  his statements but seems to have a3.1owed the p o s s ib ility  
of evolution# These notable conservati've thinkers found no basic
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me'haphyeiûal incompatibility "between evolution and GJiristianity as 
long as evolution remained a biological theory* Hence it cannot 
"be argued that there was a violent reaction against évolution© even
aiongst conservatives »
nenrv 3)%uimond ** one of the most famons theologloal 
exponents of Danfln and welcomed the concept of natural selection as 
a foTuitful addition to natural theology* Els haslo approach was to 
endeavour an absorption or syntheslB of evolution Into theological 
struotures* Keenly interested In science © he saw it In general© and 
evolution in partlGular© as the key which restored the Bible to 
ordinary man* But despite his great evangelical piety which made 
him friends with D*I,*Moodyg Dszumaond ifas hardly the epitome of 
conservative theolo^* He defined the Christian faith in progressive 
terms which saw sanctification as the end of creation* Evolution 
and Christianity wore one; evolution confirmed the faith instead of 
posing a threat, (Of* Drummond 1953»P«220*)# espoused a positive
approach to evolution that sought to reinterpret it in terms of 
purpose and desi^* He saw evolution working tlirou^ love rather 
than throu0a a stru^le for existence© thus solidly transferring the 
Tfïhole schemata into a Christian framework*
2*4*3A2*jGeorge mtheson* Another Scottish theologian and minister© 
he Trms opposed to Deummond's approach© but initially open to the 
possibility of evolutionaa^ r processes* (Of# Macmillan 1910© pp,205f© 
309f@) Matheson was deeply Interested in scientific studies and 
gave frequent talks on archaeology© anthropology and pre^historic 
humanity; he evinced great enthusiasm for the work of men lllce Pasteur 
and Lister and was himself elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh* Ee was blind! Matlieson did not accept or reject 
evolution as a valid scientific theory — but welcomed it as an aid to 
thought* He was postulating, not its validity, but the question,
“If this is true© what does it mean for theology?' He© like many 
others© reconciled science and religion together in a unity of truth « 
truth must ultimately be one compatible whole and not contradictory 
ports* In later years he came to the conclusion that evolution was 
not true© but it remains a testimony to his intellectual honesty that 
for long he kept an open mind on the subject *
7*4*3*3. Charles Hodg^* Naturally many clerics were dograatically 
opposed to evolution end indeed to science generally. Of all the 
theologlanB who resolutely opposed evolution (but had hi#i regard for
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science) one of the most a rtic u la te  and penetrating was Hodge* He 
rejected evolirbion, 'but i t  was a temperate and CÊÛ,enlated rejeotion  
based on a sound Imowledge of past and contemporary science* He 
made careful d istin ctio n  between Danfin and, Dacewiniaiism (of# Hodg  ^
1960, Vol*II p»12a); charges of atheism may "bo ‘brought against 
evolution but that did .not mean to esy that they could hs teoiight 
against Darwin® MeTortiieless Darwin ima g u ilty  of reducing man (in  
the 'Descent' .not the 'O rig in ') to an e.iælusively zoological question 
and thus .ignoring the "teetimony of history© of langmagie, and of 
scripture»" (ib id  p®27o) .% ainst the theory of Dan&n could "be 
'brought objections oonoeming missing' connecting Irinka© the peculiar 
fcippeal to  the imperfection of the geological record, and the problem 
of the s te r ility  of hyhrids©
Hodge went on to appeal to the immitablllty of the species as 
argued by Cuvier, Agassis, lyell, Ikrchison end Sedgwick all of 
whom were world authorities in this area» He also refers to the 
discussion, at the Académie des Sciences in 10;50 where Cuvier won an 
almost unanhiioiis victory over St» Mlaire* Hodge oon'bimied his 
argument agains'k evolution "by an appeal to the actual data available «=» 
lake dwellings, foss.il. human remains, races of man, and ancient 
monuments and comes to the conclusion 'kbat evolution was not 
acoeptdble* Ihirther, it was to be rejected because it vas a more 
liypotheslG Incapable of proof© all the facte being open to other 
:hite.rpretations as ilndicated in many scientists rejecting it; and 
finally it was an atheistic system which w m  being used to attack 
teleology* In all of this Hodge was perfectly in line with a large 
number of leading scientists, never eonseïnfative theologians »
He is clear in one thing the first two chapters of Genesis teach 
clea3?ly that man's body VKm formed by exi immediate act of God and was 
In no w'giy subject to a process of developmen'l» 33vol.ution, then, was 
seen as a retusm to primitive doctrines from Greek end Homan sources »
The basic problem was that the question of origins was no-'fc open to 
sciences Therefore tho religious prosupposltlonal stance was of 
decisive importance© though Hodge's own presiippositional critique 
relatively poor» Hodge tried to distinguish be'Ween facts and 
theories g  and correctly pointed to the differing epistemologloal base 
of Darwin from normal scientific theories * In the end Hodge tied it 
all 'back to the denial of the design that was in the 'universe, though 
he was well aware of the weaknesses of this argument#
7*4*4# Heviexf. To simmarioe the response in general tersïs Is
KAi7tjiAAta5»=iB-jSiJtei3îja:a6-ïr)iïc'ïS» '
obviously Impossible» The eniBadiïig Huxley founded the ®.X-GIub®
■which was aimed at showing* the trlimph of science over religion»
It consisted of nine scientists - Busk© I'ranklend, Hirst, Hooker,
Huscley, Lu'fohoek, Spencer, Bpottiswood and Tyndall. Hoxfever a
counter grouping of scientists was founded M  1865 for the opposite 
reason - the Victoria Institute or Philosophical Society of Great 
Bz'italn — which continues to function today# Its function being to 
promote "khe investigation of the relationship ‘be'bween science and 
religion* , Interestingly In the same year there was produced by the 
British Association a “.Declaration® bearing the sigho-tiuues of some 
617 scientists condemning evolution# (Of® Eussell, €»iU 1974/b© po66o}
I#3.#_ THE. M jIQEYs its .STATUS Jffll PRÜBÏklîf3
It is perhaps appropriate to preface this section with the comment 
by ¥»ReO?ho.mpson in his ikntroduction to the oen'kenary edition of “The 
Orig:ln of Species®, where he confesses that he is8
"aao.not satisfied that 3)arx-/in proved his point or that his 
influence in scientific £md- public thinking has been 
beneficial. » » # * Darwin did not show in the “Origin* that 
species liad originated by natural selection; he merely 
showed, on the basis of certain facts mid eissumptions, how 
this Ejight have îiappened, and as ho had convinced himself he 
was able to convince others.#.*®' (I959e pp#vii©xli#)
The problem is different paradigms# Poincare wro*be that § "Any fact
can be generalised in an infinite number of ways© and it is a question
of choice.®' (1905g p.146«) Facts are selected by the theories, and
the theories are selected from the paradigm held» lilveii within
evolutionary though#; three main conceptual frameworks competed for
primacy - Darwinianlsm, Baltatlonismi, and Lamarkianiemo But wlthM
any evolutionm^ y' paradigm it becomes Mpossible to refute *bhe paradigm
once it is aesiraied evolution has ocoured; once it is adopted, as a
scientific methodology applicable to the question of origins. This
mslces the question phiXosophioaY. rather than simjDly scientific, for
there is nothing open to teBtlng.
As a philosophy of progress it seems to me 'bhat it mist be 
challenged» If this is postulated as a basic axiom then the question 
can be asked as to how we have progressed aesthetically or qualitatively, 
and how degenerate civilisations are to be explained» This last 
point is an apparent refutation of the view which sees, primitive tribes 
as 'living fossils®, when we now are aware that the reverse is often
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bnie» In general I would agree with the principle enunciated l)y 
Hookyaac that a "The term 'évolution® .should ho avoided outside the 
realm of b i o l o g y (1974/0 , p«23«) bhfortimately it is not, and
àeoauss of„ the_aooej)toce of_exotetioa_a^ a 
soiGatino. i s  
being accepted#CiJVt iSi.'T» tMSj QiXi tta titil
It is required, then© to clistingiiisîi between the 'vague* theory 
gmd the “precise® theory of evolution as well as the above# The 
vague theory is the general belief that evo'fation has occured, whereas 
the precise theory involves some mechanistic h;ypofheeis - and there is 3 
"No Imowa satisfactory and clearly demonstrated precise theory- of 
evolution®” (Eamm 19710 P*169«) This is home out’in the 
conclusion of a (relatively) recent article where a strongly pro-- 
evolutionist writes 3 "Pending additional discoveries it may be wiser 
not to Msist that the transition from ape to man is now being 
documented from the fossil record." (Simons 1964o p*62.)
Perhaps the basic technical difficulty with evolution as a 
scientific theory was how to deal with a theory that explained wliy 
there was so little evidence to support it® This remaiiifs an 
outstanding feature of the 19th century debate, for whatever the 
present evidence there was certainly little or none xvhen the theory 
was foriTiUlated • Since the theory was formulated data is
inte3:?preted to fiti Thus the choicîe betxmen creationist and 
evolutionary views is not primarily a scientific choice *
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ŒIAFHSR
G.I. THE mfTONim BmmDOi#
Tkrough the 19th ceîitiiry two ma:hi themes dominated physical 
science «* Newtonian niechanies and I4a.xwoll'o equations which governed 
electricity and magnetism. The first provided the deterministic 
'base for scientific activitys the belief that if all the initial 
conditions of some event were laiox-m eicaetly, then the outcome could 
be predicted indefinitely* Maxxmll hacl for*m].ated a set of 
equations that quantified Faraday's lines of force; and, _int^ _ aliao 
related the partial variation of an electrical field ân space to the 
tisEe variation of the magnetic field# According to Einstein this 
was the first blow at the heart of the Mewtonisn system, for it 
entailed, not instantaneous action at a distance, but action by a 
process propogated through space at finite speed# (Cf# Einstein 1975i 
p.259ô) One of the conclueions was that wave propagation oceimed in
empty space an.d many rejected this because it ran counter to Newtonian 
theory'» It was only eoiifiirmod by Herts in 1008© nine years after
F/arX’felYJs death© v^ hen it was shown timt radio waves passed Ftewell'o 
prediction of the identity of light and electromagnetism @
This raised problems for classical pliysics as it could not 
acGommodato waves oscillating :oi empty apace# Thus the ether was
^ *î» X/ ?t5**s5ïux*i:,:»aÆ3i
pos'kulateti» TMs did not solve the problem for if someone was to
move at the speed of light in the ether the wave pattern of lif^t 
would disappeeir, and Maxwell's equations did not provide for this 
eventuality# Therefore either 'kho theory of the ether was wrong, or 
nobody could move at the speed of light* This second alternative 
was i'neompatible with Newtonian mechanics.
Gonceming the ether there were two possibilities either it was 
dragged along by the earth or it was at rest and the eaa?th moved 
through ito The first alternative was quickly ruled out because of
the phenomenon of stellar aberration which was widely recognised and
would have been cancelled out if there was an ether moving with the 
earth» The second possibility gave the suggestion of some absolute 
rest«-frame® The e:iq)eriments to detect the ether are eoBWionly
regarded as the jumping off point for modern rœlativi'by theory* The 
crucial experiment was the Michels onW%rley one (1881 and 1887), and
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Goneemed the ©attempt to measure the différence M  the ve loc ity  of 
lig h t in© and a t rig h t angles to , tho earth 's motion® The idea was 
that i f  the earth was in  motion re la tiv e  to the ether i t  should have 
some e ffec t cm the speed of lig h t in  these two directions » But no 
e ffec t was observed which suggested that the ethe^r moved with the 
earth -  thou^di Lodge disproved th is  conclusively ;lri 1893»
In 1892‘“3 Fitzgerald endeavoured to explain the l'îlchelsoii-Morley 
failure by postulating a contraction of their apparatus M  the IMe of 
the earth's motion* If there was an alteration in the velocity of 
light; and a corresponding alteration in the measuring apparatus, then 
no effect would be detected. But there was no reason to support 
this except as an ad—hoc hypothesis i;o explain the unsatisfactory 
outcome of the Michelson-Horley eigjeriment. Who;k was needed was a 
new approach in which the hypothesis of the ether would be abondonedo
8^2. 33IN8TMM A #  REIJmVITY
EMstein is often regarded as negating Newton*$; views, or reducing 
them to a limiting incidence of M o  own theory of relativity»
However libistein himself noted that Newton x-ms aware of the weaknesses 
of hie system even if his folloxmre were not. heverthelass 
classical physics was imdermined# (Of» Einstein 1975g P*513a) But 
though Bluet ©in saw his theory replacing Newton's© such that the 
classical position could no longer be regarded as the foundation of 
theoretical physics, ha retained the highest regard for Newton and his 
theorieso (Of. ibid pp*232o500.)
Ermstein waa a remarkable mmi and his contribution to science 
esctensiveo (Of® 10.5p5* and 18.3*5*) In 1905 he produced four 
papers in the “Annalen dor Physlk® which changed© in different wa,5?B© 
our view of the universe. There were the two famous papers on 
special relativity which outlMed the principle of the equivalence of 
mass end energy® There was a paper on Brownian motion conceming
^  «' <rasj.oit^a?j=iiiKif-fctÆis=ari3ï*3«=Jra ^
the k:lnetic theory of matter; the incessant motion of suspended 
microscopic particles in liquids which had the result of establishing 
once end for all the existence of atoms. Maeh had not accepted the 
reality of atoms until this point! The fourth contribution, the 
first published, concerned the concept of and
provided the basis for Bohr's model of the atom. It wfLs in this
field that he received the Nobel prize in 1922. Hie other major
contribution was the General Theory of Relativity :ln 1916 xdiieh set
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forth tho ecjuivaLence of Inertial and gravitational masB. Taken 
singly eaeh of these papes?o \-jas a cracial and isiportant step In sciences 
regarded collectively they represent a staggering output*
Einstein drew initially on the physics of Lorentz and the 
phi.losophy of Mach (cf* 10*2*1*}, though he later moved away from a 
positivistic position and such views do not reveal his overall 
philosophical stance* The renaissance of positivism was crucial, 
however, in this early phase of the new physios© hut Einstein 
penetrated far beyond Haoh's reductionistie api)roadh (that tried to 
abandon metaphysical questions) Mto the ontological Btimote^e of being 
where the real merged with the ideal ;ln a non-JSiielidean universe *
He had a deep perception of the essential religious character of 
scientific activity - not in any Christian or Jewish sense© hut a 
mystical percc%)tion of the order and hmmiony of the universe that drove 
man to searreh for the underlying unity in the midst of diversity#
Despite M s  frequent references in amicable style to tho “secrets® and 
•plans® of the “Old Oo.e® he was a self-confessed mystical pantheist*
H© oncpressed this religious awe in the basic premise of sciences ““One 
may say 'the eternal mystery of tho world is its comprehensibility# 
(Einstein 19739 p.292»)
The genius of the man is without question® Despite the obvious 
connection of his theory to the Miolielson-Morley experiment he 
apparently arrived independently at his position» (Of* Bernstein 19739 
p*49») Even the great Iiorentz, from whom he drew so much, could not, 
as late as 1909» believe the theory of relativity — and yet Einstein 
claimed to have had the basic idea at 16# Here was cliBXjlayed for 
all to see a mind of Inexorable logic that had no recourse to gmademio 
research facilities and was igporan'i; of rmich of the contemporary 
scientific frontiers* Indeed Einstein in a way recar)tured the 
ancient Greek methodology of the ®thought experiment'* If thoughts 
seemed to run counter to commion-^ sense© then the recomr'so xfas to 
abandon coMaon»«sense - and even experimental results if they did not 
fits 80 he was driven to the conclusions that loiigfch, time and mass 
were not constant, but varied with the speed of the observer# In 
this he marched triumphantly along well in advance of any e-xperlmenteil 
corroboration# He was "contiguously ahead, of the experhaental 
confirmation that eventually established his predictions#.” (ibid p*151o)
hlmt was the basic problem and the basic premise? 0?he basic 
uroblem was how to reconcile Newtonian mechanics (which would allow an
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observer to be accelerated tln?oiigh the Bpeed of light) &md the 
relativity pr:lncij)le of eleetromagmetlam (which would not a^ Llow this ) # 
This was where the ether had ‘been invented to effect reconcilration, 
but Einstein'G breaktireough was to abandon the ether and see that the 
two cannot be reconciled bec^u^iJjexritpjJL Jfrongc »
adopted was that any state of rest, or motion at constant velocity, 
cannot be distinguished by any esqjeriment from axiother, either 
electrieally or mechanioally© when analysed by an observer in one or 
other of the systems thou^i relative motion can be deteriiiined»
RelatiYity. (Of. Einstein 1951; ]Mdinf#on 1923;
Eddington 1930; Marks 1972) At the hemzt of this was the question 
of similtaneity, masss-eiiergy equivalence and geometryo
Her© we find the ingenius thought experiments 
of Einstein coming into play. He posed to himself the question as 
to lAfhat would happen if he were to ride a beam of ligîit away from a 
clock — the answer was obvious o If he was receding from a clock at 
the speed of light, then the time on that clock would freeze.
Therefore if time could stop there could be no such thing as universal 
time# Thus even the objective sense of time as measured by clocks 
was not as simple as it was thought to be» (Of. Eddington 1930, p*36f*) 
Simultaxieity is an undefined factor.
Now the speed of li^ #it is the same to any observer no matter the 
speed of its source as long as this source is movl'sig at miifozm 
velocity; thou^ #i as the source moves to the observer the:ce ie a shift 
to blue© and xAen away a shift to red - the Doppler shift# In other 
irordsg as the light eouj?ee moves towards an observer there is an 
increase in the frequency and a decrease in the wave-length that 
cancels out and leaves the speed the same. It should be noted© 
however, that this constancy is only concerning uniform motion and if 
the observer is accelerated relative to the source then the 
measimsment of the speed of light will shovf a decrease from that of a 
reat“-fraïiie« This was a challenge to the Newtonian system which 
would be confirmed experimentally by de Bitter In 1913»
From this it followed that the rate of moving clocks was slower 
than that of rest clocks. A watch at the north pole will run faster 
than one on the equator - çîonfirmed experJ-mentally by Hay# This
1. Others were close to relativity (of# Bernstein 1973g PP»190,195»)*>
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woxiltl 'be developed to show that a clock In a gravitational field is 
slow relative to one that ie not, and that the B'b/onger the field the 
slower the clock. This had grave effects for the assumption of 
simultaneity® Later Einstein and Infold postulated the following 
thought experiment» Imagine a laboratory with transpa7?Gnt walls and
fitted on a truck* Observerb aiee prepared inside and outside x-rith
a3.1 the necessary instruments » A device at khe exact centre of the 
laboratory emits a flash of light as the track moves uniformly forward. 
The physicists inside the laboratory measure the velocity of li^it© 
fiïid that it is 186,000 miles per second.© and note tha,t the front and 
rear walls of the laboratory ere illuminated simulteneouBly® However, 
their GOunter%)artg outside have different results. They agree that 
the velocity of 3.ight is 186,000 miles per second, but see the emission 
of light reach the rear wall cm incitant before it reaches the front.
In  other words s what is  siraultfmeous inside is  not s,o outside, This 
would be quite impossiblG in  a Newtonian universe.
For Illmstein the velocity of light is constant and independent of 
the velocity of the source and observer; whereas Mewton saw these 
factors additive# (Cf# Mason 1962, p»543e) Now for Newton the 
application of a force would cause an indefinite inoreaso in the 
velocity and kinetic energy of a body while the mass component of the 
kinetic energy remained constant; Eineteln on the other hand saw the 
epjplieation of a force causing an increase in the mass of a body as it 
approached, the speed of light# The force conferred energy in the 
form of mass upon the body because no longer could It be seen aa 
en!i&mcing the velocity component of the kilnetic energy when the limit 
of the speed of light was approached ® The net outcome was for
Kinste:in to challenge the epistemological basis of the assumption of 
absolute time. Mo longer would space 'be regarded as independent of 
time#
Bernstein comnenting on this principle points outs
"This has been interpreted to mean by some science-fiction 
writers, poets© novelists, and plrlloEmphers.#,.that somehow 
because of the fourWimensionM aspect of relativity one can 
move oneself back and forth in time into the fivti?re and past 
and God îmows what, Unfortunately, nothing like this is 
true, ¥e are each attached to our oxm proper Lorentz frames© 
and for us© so far as the theory of relativity is concerned© 
the fhtircG remains the future and the past tlie past®”
(1975, p.95.)
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8«2a1.2» Maes-Biamy Equivalence# Spécial relativity indicated that 
mass was not constant Imt a fiuxction of the energy content # Einstein 
related raass and energy ■ such that an addition of energy “E® to a body 
lncx’ea,sed its mass "by and a mass ®m“ ie to he regarded as the
same as a store of energy ®mo^' # (Of* Pledge 1966© p.287.) It
follows tlîcit as the speed of an electron approaches the speed of ligjit 
(o)o it tends to become more massive until at the speed of light its 
mass heoom.es Infinite - clearly necessitating an inability to reach 
that speed# At th.e same time it hints at a new soureo of energy in 
matter itself#
8,2» 1,3» Geometxy© Einstein x^ rotea
"From tho latest res'iilto of the theory of relativity it is 
probable that our three--’dimensional apace is also 
Bppro3cij)iately spherical© that is© that the laws of disposition 
of rigid bodies in it are not given by Euclidean geometry© but 
approximately by spherical geometry© if only we consider parts 
of space which are sufficiently extended,” (19739 P*243o)
So we are introduced to curved space, Han;y thinlc that this ie
unpicturable© but if anyone has looked at the reflection of a room in a
rounded doorluiob they have ezcperiencod a type of curved space. It is
popularly thought that the sum of the angles of a triangle Mways
equals 180 degrees. But a triangle on a curved surface will be more
or less thmi 180 degrees depending whether the surface is concave or
convex, There is a choice of geometrioal systems between IDuclldean©
Hieramuiian and Gaussian* It so happens that the one that fits best
with relativity is the Hierasmnian - though this was not settled till
1915. ®
(a) The b:lrth of relativity lies in aesthetic qualities - a search for 
unity© beauty mid order - and we have Ednstein's own testimony to this, 
Thils indicates something of the metaphysical nature of the theory,
(b) Despite the attribution of relativity and the undetectability of 
absolute velocity; this is a system© or theory© xfhich still haa 
absolûtes, Einstein xceitoFJs
2# Mdington concluded a discussion on “Vlîiat is Geoinetry?* s "it almost 
appears that the physics ,has been absorbed into geometry," (1959? po1S3o 
Involved i.q geometry is measuremcmt end any loiowledge of metrology 
reveals the inability to accurately measure anything for there can be 
no measurement x-rithout some 'rule® and how can that be tested 
against variatiogis?
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"Aecording to tho speolsl theo3?y of re la tiv ity©  spatia l 
coordinates and time s t i l l  have an absolute character i n  so 
fa r  as they are d ire c tly  measurable by stationery clocks and 
bodies* But they aro re la tiv e  in  so fa r  as they depend on 
the state of motion of the selected in e rtia l system.” (I973u 
p.247.)
(c)The theoizy has severe lim ita tio n s  fo r i t  accounts only fo r systems 
xi?h;loh are uniform and re la tiv e  in  motion; and thus thou#i i t  has wide 
application i t  excludes acceleration and gravitation  »
(d) I t  should not be thought that once fosBulated th is  theory was
oat scientists  
of Einstein 's
.accepted with open arms by the scientific community* 
at the frontiers of Imowledge quickly realised the value 
X'jork© but the immediate reaction to the 1905 papers was one of 
indifference® (Of* Eliittelcer I96O© Vol.II p»40«)
Hes?e wo aæo faced by, though <mly a little
quantitative difference from the Newtonian schemata© a profound 
qualitative difference. The essential incompatibility of the tx'jo 
systems - which seems to me to suggest that the idea of Hex-jtonian 
mechanics as a limiting case© though practically so© is not maintained 
theoretioa3.1y — is seen in that the tx/o systems have radically 
different sets of definitions concerning basic components.
Several basic postu3.extes lie at the heart of the general theory of 
relativity. It is assumed that the laws of nature are the same for 
all observers moving in any manner relative to one another© that is a 
uniformity of the laws of nature in all coordinate oysteras; that the 
geometry of space=«time is non-kkiclidean; that the gravitational motion 
talcee plaoo along- the shortest paths isi space-'klme (not straight lines© 
because non-Buelideasi) p and that the ourva'kure of a given region of 
space^time is dependent on the amount of matter in 'fchat region*
Involved in 'bhe formulation of this theory is the Princi-ple of 
EquivaXence* On the one hand there was “inertial mass'© that 
property of an object which measured its response to the application 
of a given force (according to Newton's law F = ma) and which could 
be measm?ed apart from gravity# On the other hand there xfas 
'gravitational mass® which meaaurod specifically the gravitsitional 
attraction between two particles# As Beznotein notes § "A priori it 
is not evident that these two numbers are the some*” (1973g P«99«)
In an eerly attenipt to derive the general theory in 1911 g Einstein 
arrived at the principle of equivalence between these two factors© 
pointing out that there was no difference in effect be-We en a condition
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of uniform eonatant aeeeleratlom on an observer and the ohee^ rver being 
at rest hut subjected to a uniform gravitational field#
This led to the prediction that since light possessed inase© gravity 
should affect it# Einstein worked this out© erroneously in 1911? 
hut by 1916 had arrived at the general theory of relativi'ky as 
formulated in oil its precision, The orux of any theory is© of 
course© its suhadssion to e2q3erimental predictions and tests© and this© 
as linsteiîi noted© presented problems* (Cf Einstein 1973g ppe231g232*) 
The two most epeotaoulax? oonfirma/bions were the predio’bion of the 
perihelion advance of Mercury and the bending of light in the 
gravitational, field of the aim®
(a) Einstein had indicated that the shortest path in space-time round 
weight particles should he an ellipse which rotated round the particle - 
whereas the Newtonian, system held to a stationary ellipse# The 
French astronomer Leverrier (1811-77) had already indicated the 
elliptical orbit of Mercury as showing a rotation round the sun© and 
the amount of this rotation agreed closely with 3ilin.steino
(h) The second prediction (which had an influence on the philosophy 
of Popper) centred on the fact that if light has energy© which it 
obviously has© then it should possess mass also and therefore be open 
to gravitational deflections* The only xfay to test this seemed t o  be 
the observation of starlight passJmg close to the sim© and this in 'burn 
would only be capable of detection during an eclipse, Oonseguently 
Mdington set out for the Isle o.f Principe :ln the Gulf of Guinea to 
record the 1919 eclipse» Binfateiln's prediction was a diepY-aceraent
of 1*74 seconds of arc© and the PrMei%)e results were 1,61 seconds 
with a margin of error of 0*30 seconds ; other results from Sorhal data 
gave 1,98 seconds with an error margin of 0*12 seconds. Both were 
therefore in reeisonable agreement® 8ince -fehen several repeats have 
been made© and in 1929o 1936% 1947 Bnd 1952 there were considerable 
diver^ vences from the predicted results* However oxie of the 1958 
results (from the Sudan) agreed well, This wide scatter of results 
is probably more indicative of the di.fficulties of astronomical 
oboeievation than in anything inherently wrong with the theozy,
(o) A third prediction was that in a strong gravitational field the 
li^t emitted by atoms should lose energy while moving away from the
5* For a graphic account of this classical experiment se©
Eddington (1959) pp«114“-’1l6®
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field g the li^t hecom-ing' redder^ This would not ’be confirmed until 
a series of observations froi» 1923^28 showed a shift to the red. in the 
spectral lines given out by iron g titaniujn a:ad cyanogen on the surface 
of the siuio
this it can be gathered that the general theory of relativity 
has Its llmiitatlons of applicability» There are grave difficulties 
in tryjjig to apply the theory to rotary motions g and to most gross 
situations (it was lewtonian mechanics that put man on the moon)» 
Nevertheless the general theory has been claimed to be the most perfect 
end aesthetic theory of all scientific theories and 1ms in theoretical 
principle replaced the Newtonian theory of gravitation » At heart 
the question for Einstein was not one of practicability but of the 
reality of the universe - as it was for Newton® In this quest he was 
guided by ontological and epistemological principles aîacl not 
scientific experiments alone p as any cursory reading of him swiftly 
indicatesa ïn this he stood opposed to the philosophical stance of 
Mach who had tried to abandon metaphysics and rely solely on sensory 
experience»
Towards the end of the Igth oentmcy there began to appear in 
several fields a break from the older traditional concept of th.e 
eontiiiuoua nature of matter and ohemge» In Britain the work of 
Faraday 0 Kelvin g Maxwell mid Fitsgerald envisaged electrical phenomena 
as resulting from a strain in a continuous ether» Faraday realised 
the implications of his theories pointed to an atomicity of electricity 
and matter but rejected this idea* The Germans were open to it end 
men like Hiemanng Kirehoff and Claiisius were prep&tred to see 
electricity as oharged particles an idea Maxwell had failed to 
develop although it was implicit in his theory of the ether® Through 
this period there were several discoveries which indicated ‘bhat the 
future lay in the cs-topjic concept of matterp for between 1890 and 1900 
electronsg X-raya and radioactivity were all discovered*
The starting point was the problem posed by the study of light and
Sheat emitted 'by black bodies ‘ - this indicated a coniMrmous spectrum 
of radiation as opposed to the line spectra given by chemical elements* 
îlkperiïiîonts showed that when black bodies were heated to some given
4» ,A black body is one which completely absorbs any heat or ligjat 
radiation .feilllng upon it*
r/6
temperature they emitted a mæclmim amount of radiation energy at a 
particular wavelesigthg the wavelength of the mæcimum decreasing as the 
temperature increased » This could not he aoooimted for by the wave 
theory of light which had dominated the scene for massy years g indeed 
ever since the Mewtonisn corpuscular Idea wao abandoned<, There was 
therefore mi electron theory which gave an electrical a,pproaoh. to 
radiation and a thermal, theory# Bat the only correlation found 
between these ti-m approaches was that both were erroneous qiuuituja 
theory* was needed to correct theme (Of® Pledge 1966g po271o)
The maYi who achieved the coneeptual broalc'blirough was Max Ptoiglg.
(ofo 10o3o1o) who posited a solution in I9OO at Berlm» If black body 
radiation was considered as emissions of discontinuous quantag so that 
the energy of a quantum was proportional to the frequency of the 
radiation g then the emission of longer waveleng'bhs would shif t ‘uo the 
red end of the spectrim which would be favoured at lower temperatiares »
So P3.a\icîk showed that the spectrum of radiation fizorn a hot object was 
accounted for if it was assumed that the atoms vibrated g not miyhowg 
but only in quantised energy values® This broke the wave dominance 
of light and suggested that it was discretG® But so-called crucial 
experiments had proved that light was not corpuscular but wave->like In 
character» Ifeve:i?th©lese Planck had. shown it to be discrete wl'i;h a 
qumita whose value was constant for a given spectral frequency » For
e*very wavelength of electromagnetic radiation the value of the 
corresponding quanta of energy can be calculated by multiplying *bhe 
frequency by Planck’s constant ®h®o This value has assumed a
comparable role in physics to that of *pii in mathematics@
The advent of quantum theory was a radical break» Even the
special mid general theories of relativity fittedp in a senseg ;mto 
the classical tradition in that they were contained in a philosophical 
context of causal description in spa.ee and time® ^laxrbmn theory g
however9 denied the reality of causality as traditionally conceived 
and undercut the epiistemologleal basis of science® The idea of a 
discontinuous nature introduced an entirely new framework of reference ® 
Needless to say the picture was confused to begin with and there were 
early doubts as to whether the quanta referred to energy in matter g in 
the ethe:;:'g or ;ln some transformation between them»
It mig^t' have 'been thought tha*b in turning from relati*vity to this 
field that Einstein had been left behind y but in fact his contribution
177
was cruciale There was the important paper of 1905 on 'khe quanta of 
light which indicated M s  interest in the field an interest pursued 
positively up to ahoirt 19^5» Light had assumed a rather 
schiBsophrenic character g being both wave-like and corpuscM.mW.ike g 
and Einstein devoted his genius to try to understand this i5?rational 
situation® He indicated that light was partlcle^llke and that each 
particle had its omi qmmta of energy a postulation verified in 1923 
by Oompton* So paradoxicallyg while Einstein was ousting Newtonian 
mechanics he was reviving Newton’s theoa'^ y of lights It now appeared 
that Newton was right in regarding light as corpuscular with respect to 
the spectrum of a dark surface g photo-electric effects g and the Compton 
effect ‘ g but tîiat Freenel wais right with reference to light as a waive 
concerning interference fringes and defraction» (Cf* House*1964? p«28f»)
Yet Einstein eventually *kumed his back on quantum theory and 
pursued a lone path :tn opposition to the consensus of scientific 
opinion# At the root of his reservations was the loss of 
vlsualis!ability of causal events and in 1936 he wotes
"I believe that the theory is apt to beguile us :lnto error in 
our eeozech for a uniform basis for physics g because g in my 
belief g it is an incomplete representation of real things g 
although it is tb.e only one which can be built out of the 
fimdaraental concepts of force and ma,terial points (quan'kum 
corrections to classical mechanics)»" (1973c? P»315*)
His reticence was backed up with detailed scientific argmnent»
8.4* THE WORLD OF ATOmC STRHCTTmE ^
Atomism lies very imch at the heart of the new scientific view of 
the world § it had been the subsis'kence of the reality of ultimate 
particles that had provided classical physios with its ontology and it 
was i;o be the destruction of that view that would provide new vist&is # 
Atomism had escisted. as a philosophic posltlcm from the time of 
Democritus§ Newton had held to ultimateg hardg indivisible particles 
at the root of nature ; and Lavoisier had postulated atoms at the 
substratum of his ohemical ‘l;heory« But these views are not to be 
eoiiipared with 1;he modem atomic theoi?y and it is j^rong to attribute to 
them g as Is sometimes done g atomic ideas as that term is now conceived.
5« Gom|)ton effects the elastic scattering of photons by electronsg 
that is g collisions in which both energy and momentum are conserved.
6* This field changes very quickly today and can therefore go out of 
date® A reasonable modem introduction is Oalder@ H. 1977
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PoBsibly the first to reaJ-ly utilise the atomic coîieopt in modem ways 
was in 1T3B when Bernoulli presented hie statlstloal mech&mlcal 
approach to the j>hysics of gases in which 'khe atomic îry;pothesis was 
used in a quantitative way as opposed to a qualitative sense» Like 
Lavoisier g however g this was still not compatible with the modem 
divisible atom#
Today we have the jQC£SlliZ piotnre of the atom g consisting of
electrons g protons and neutrons g giv;lng a %)lctiu'/e that is visual5.aable
®id often compared to a microscopic solar system the nucleus of
protons and neutrons being the stm and the electrons circling round in
their orbits like planets # But this is a simplified conception and
the modem thrust is to an atomic world that oannnt be easily
represented by models* Today there is a confusion' of particles at
the sub-atomic level with well over one hundred elementsny par'tlcleB®
Xn 1947 the list of elementary particles consisted of electrons g
positrons p photons p protons p neutrons g positive and negative muons g tmd
positive and negative pions — to this was added those for which there
was theoretical support § the neutrino p entineutrlnop neutral pioup
7antiproton and antineutron* Sines i;hen however xfhole new lists of
resonant particles^ kaons and hyporonsg strangenessg charm and colourg 
plus the fact that every particle has eix associated an'bijiarticle g has 
tended to obscure the original smplicity of the atomic world» (Of. H. 
CsXûes 19775 VWc 1972» PPo9“14»)
The story of the unfold:hig of the mystery of the atom starts with 
Becquerel in I896 and joirnieya through the researches of J »J ^ Thompsong 
Millikang Rutherford and many others* The atom became conceived of 
as a little machine g but under classical mechanics It had a fataX flaw# 
Machines run down in the classical concept and if Rutherforci’s picture 
was correct it memik that orbiting electrons should decay into the core< 
They did not appear to do so and therefore there must be something
stopping the electron losing energy»
At this point Miels Bohr introduced the quantum theory into the 
atomic stîTucture* This saved the electron decay and set them iïî 
stable ox/bits round the nucleus g with, energy emissions only occuring
7* Consider the proton. Isi the 1920*8 it was conceived as a very 
small object in th.e heart of a hydrogen atom; by the 1950’s it was a 
small object with mesons in its vicinity; by the 1960*f3 it had become 
a fairly large object (eft electron) and denser at the centre; by the 
1970*0 it was a large object contaljilng sEiaXler objects* Today it has 
been conceived as having tixz*ee quarks exehang'irig gluons #
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when sïi electron jumped from one orbit to another « Thus the Bolir
model of the atomg incorporating discrete energy levels g rem counter 
to classicM physios and all conceited atomic structo?e prior to it® 
Tl'iree fea.tures are to be noted s (a) that electrons move only In 
specific orbits fomixig a discontinuous series whose distances from 
the nucleus are to one another as integers — the fhrther out it is the 
easier to be detached; (b) so long as an electron remains in the same 
orbit it does not radiate energy; (c) whenever it jumps from one orbit 
to another it absorbs or emits energy.
Thus the arena, became increasingly complex and confusing^md several 
principles began to emerge to cla3?ify the picture » There Bohr's
Principle, of GorrestxondencQ which stated that in the limit of quantum 
numbers g the predictions of quantum and classical physics always 
correispondedo In effect this meant that all other properties but the 
frequency (e»go intensity) of the spectral lines were given by the 
classical theory in the macroscopic situation» But the absence of 
any explanatory physical mechanism for this principle kept it under 
eonstsKit criticism* Then In 1925 Pauli formilated his famous 
Ijhcc].usion Ibimnclple wM.ch stated that no two electrons in any given 
atom could have the same set of qimntum numbers (four to a set) ond 
therefore the same energy value» The four numbers being attributed 
to each electron with no two possessing identical sets.
Yet another model of the at ora appeared in 1924 under the guiding 
hand of Louis do Broglie* This was drawn from the field of wave 
mechanics and the basic idea was that as light was both wave and 
particle g  so the elementery particles possessed both undulatory ©iid 
Gorpuseiflar characteristics — or In other words y with every particle 
there was mi associated wave g which meant that electrons did not 
travel in orbits as such but were contained in wave-bsnds® To 
fioxther confuse this for the layman » the wave associated with a system 
of particles did not move in ordinmy space of three dimensions g but 
rJn an abstract space of a large iimaber of dimensions»
At this point Heisenberg (cf* 10e3o4«) suggested that the attempt 
to derive models should cease and that the Hutherfoa^ cL-Bohr model 9 along 
with all other mechanicM represen'kations 9 should be abcSidoned» 
Certainly all the models had severe limitations* So he abandoned 
the concept of orbits and tried to confine himself to observable 
quantities such as frequency and intensity of spectra in a new phase
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of the atomic adventaîre which was characterised by the increas:big 
preference for syabolicM over physical modèle» This move was :m 
keeping with the increasingly statistical natiree of research and the 
idea that nature itself was fimtkmentally statistical.® Statistics 
existed in the classical tradition^ o.f course g but in that realm every 
particle was recognisably different » In the new theory ^ the Bose-
Einstein statistics - 1924 " gave every particle as indistinguishable; 
wM3.e the S'ermr^Dirac ™ 1926 form suggested there could be no 
multiple filling# As .Bom remarked g theoretical physios wa&x 
becoming inoreaBingly a question of philosophy® (Of« Bronowski 1973t> 
P.3&4.)
Following de Broglie prediction that matter g ao well as 
radiationp had particle and wave properties^ Sohrodlnger - 1925 mid 
Heisenberg made the theoretical breakthroughs that led to modern 
quantum meehmiios* In the beglmiing it had looked as though they 
h.M invented differing theories g but Sohrodlngar soon proved that they 
were mathematically ecpiivalent g and Einsteiln greeted Sehrodiiiger’s 
first paper with enthusiasm# Schrodinger covered tlie same facts as 
Heisenberg on the assmiption that an electron had. a wave form but not 
a fixed or definite orbit® Perhaps it should be noted that his 
quantum), raeehanicsg though most fruitfiîl i/as non^^relativistic in that 
it contailned no time parmnetor. It was left to Dirac ^^4 926- to 
derive a relativistic quantum meohaxiics* Dirac's formulation was g 
howeverp very complicated and therefore found fewer applications than 
Sohrodiiigor’s theory# In 1927e following Sclnrodingerg Heisenberg 
indicated that the momentum and energy of any given particle tms 
indeterminate and tliis led to the formulation of the Principle of 
tfecertaiaty (of* 27*4*)
This principle centred on the reality that no matter how 
objective or onou:rate measurements are they w:l.ll in some way affect 
the system being measured# If we thinic of a therraometer being used 
to find the temperature of water we see immediately that uMgss by 
8om@ remarkable coincidence it is at exactly the oGBio temperature as 
the water to begin with g it muot affect the water by either minutely 
heating or cooling it» Heisenberg postulated that this 
Inde t ermlnanoy resided g not merely in the knowledge that can be 
gamed about a system g but in nature itself®
The Uncertainty Principle states g inter oÀMko that we can never
181
Imoiï both the position and momentum of an electron exactly# Thus 
Ileisenherg set forth a precise fomiilation of the fact that all 
scientific knowledge is tentative by rhidioating that the very physical 
means we take to get within *p* of the momentum ensures that we shall 
not get within of the position* where p q — h /2it. * Perhaps 
for the moment it is best considered * as Pledge notes* "not as a 
profoundly new philosophy releasing man from determinlsm* hut as 
another case of the old tendency of abstract science to negative modes 
of statement»" (1966@ p*S80@) It is also obvious that philosophical 
connotations can g and have* been attached to tMs principle®
Einstein firmly sets forth M.s rejection of it «« especially where it 
was e3r.tended in a philosoxxhical sense to cover the whole of life and 
ixîalityo This great scientific genius rejected in principle both 
qUEUitmn theory and imdctermlnmioy* (Of* Bernstein 1973d PP«176g177o)
Important aspects concerning prediction^ probability and the laws 
of nature are involved* Does it mean that the laws of nature are 
merely steitistioal probabilities? Does it mean that there musk be 
a total, breakdown of the old concept of rigid causal laifs in all 
spheres of ejcistonce? Scientists tliemoe3-ves were g and are* deeply 
divided® Einstein and Bchj?odinger insisted 'bhat uncertainty wan a 
by-product of man’s ignorance; Bohr pointed to experiment^ ], and 
oonneptual limitations; while Heisenberg noted the Inherent randomness 
of reality# But as de Broglie indicated* whatever the meicroscopio 
picture* the microscopic one was at jjresent Ivideterrainate even if one 
day wo may rotmrn to a deterministic fraweworko (Of@ de Broglie 1953g 
pp.216*217*) No longer can firm predictions be made (in theory or 
practice) when an individual radioactive atom will disintegrate after 
removal from an atomic pile®
TMs development of atoraie theory quickly led to troubled 
philosophical waters. Dirac pointed out the necessity for 
ëintipcürtieles g which on contact with their corresponding particles 
annihilate one another* leaving gamma radiation or mesons * To get 
round some of the inherent difficulties 3n this lie posited m%
":Infinite eea of negative electrons" which created all sorts of 
problems® "Many ipby^ iicists are not pleased with a un:lverse filled 
with an unseen* unfelt negative^^energy electron sea*" (¥iok 1972* p*26, 
It wl3.1 be noted that new mid more complicated elementary particles 
are entering the discussion# Pauli posited the existence of the 
jaeutrinog a chargelesB and massless particle* .in 1931 “• only observed
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in 1956® In 1935 Yidcawa suggested that protons and neutrons were 
held together :m the nucleus by the binding force of a meson 
(subeeqiiently ;pi-mesons and mu-mesons) *- discovered in 1947 by Powell® 
Neutrons themselves were not diocoifered until 1931 «
ïn 1931 'âolw discovered a constant ratio e^ sisted between the 
energy end the frequency of the emission from electrons emilog this 
ratio was a constmit Inimm from 1901* Planck’s constant *h’»
Therefore the electromagsietic radiation of atoms obeyed the same laws 
as ari emission by quanta* by fractions of energy# (cf« de Latil 1965* 
P«43*) Bohr was led to suggest a way out of the apparent d.ichotomy 
between i-jave-corxmscular confusion* and the uncertainty principle in 
relation to the macro—iwrldo This was the Principle _of
OompXementaritv which he borrowed from philosophy* and for which he 
has been criticised* Bohr wrote g
"However far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical 
physical explanation* the accoimt of all evidence mist be 
expressed :ln classical terms® The eîrgvjiiont is simply that 
by the word ’experiment’ we refer to a situation where we 
can tell others what we have done*#««This implies the 
iîTipjosoibility of &my sharp separation between the behaviour 
of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring 
instroments which serve to define the conditions under which 
the phenomena appear® Any eittempt of subclividitng the 
phenomena, will demand a ehan^ e^ in the experimental 
^arrangement* introducing new possibilities of interaction 
between objects and measuring instruments which in principle 
cannot be controlled* Conaequently* evidence obtained 
within a single picture must be regarded. as oomnlementory in 
the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts 
the possible Information about the o b j e c t s (1958* P*39«3
He is saying that we cannot avoid conventional concepts ; that no ohorp 
line can be draum between whs;b is observed and the process of 
observation; that different models have to be used differently* but 
that; they complement rather than contradict one another; and that 
conventional concepts cannot give a. unified pioturo of atomic 
struc'kuro* This is an attempt to renounce the possibility of 
interpreting atomic theory as a descrlp'tion of any’thrmg#
Against this background the neutron was discovered in 1931 g thus 
eompletimg the Bohr—Rutherford model of the atom and opening up a ^ lew 
era# The neutron* as a particle wl'kh no charge* was faced with no 
barrier of potential* no force of repulsion* and therefore became the 
ideal projectile for bombarding the nucleus. At this point the 
Jolio'h"Guries had a crucial, role to play and pioneered much of the
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earely work* They showed that positrons (positive electrons) 
oontimied to b© emitted after the source of alnha particles was 
removed in 1934s and in an isïiportant experiment showed that aimiiiniujn 
had been transmuted into phosphorus» Joliot played a crucial role 
in the breakthrough to the first atomic explosion end was possibly 
the first to record such an event in January 1939* He mid Frisch 
worked out that the energy liberated was of the order of 200 million 
electron volts for every nucleus split — and in splitting a chain 
reaction was envisaged from the balmice of neutrons left over, The 
magnitude of this energy is seen when compmrod with the combustion of 
one atom of oasibon ifhieh yields 30 Mllion times less energy® (Of, 
IBlcjuard 19^3» ch*3*)
The man who above all others led to the first atomic chain 
reaction was %rlcp , He was the first to apply the new
theories; the first to bombard the nucleus with neutrons* thus giving 
to It an artificial power of emitting; radiation; the first* in 1942* 
to build an atomic pile and achieve a contiziuous chain reactions he 
was the iuuie progenitor of qusntwn mechanios; named the plan and muon g 
Slid had the final accolade of Mv:ln.g an element named after him — 
fermium* His genius is seen In that having become Interested in the 
field for which he is best Imoi-m* he turned to it from other pastures 
(in 1934) and within three months had overtalcen those who had long 
been in the field* and was producing crucial research papers along 
with hie Italian toam, (Of, de Latil 1965s pp»60ff*)
By the end of the year he* and îiis team, iiad discovered that 
screening effects of neutron boiabardment were not constant and that 
neutrons in fact had their effect increased if slowed through 
collisions. In pursuing this particular line theaze Is Oïie 
delightful Incident where he and his team finished up experimenting 
In a professor’s goldfish pond — water being a good slower of neutrons< 
Plethodically going through M l  the elements Fermi came a/b last to 
Uranium where he thought he had produced the elements 93 (and 94$
IMe was a false trail and others were to find the true answer - that 
ur&mium had fissioned into two lifter elements. However before 
Fermi could pursue this his teem was broken up, The man Icnown 
affectionately as 'the pope’* 'the prophet’ and 'the admiral' was 
forced to f3.ee with hi.s wife (a Jew) from Italy to Auer lea. But
Fermi realised the consequences of fission and lent the briXlismee of 
his raind to the construction of the first atomio pile. On 2
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Decesibor 1942* George If ell * under the eommands of Fexwul* withdrew the 
control 'bar from the atomic pile and at 5*30 that afternoon a chafm 
reaction was achieved# The world was Irrevocahly ohongod <- 
pliysically and psyohologioally,
8.3» ,_A NOTE ON BGimOE#
The above is a very brief and s'liperficial aeco’imt of two basic 
reorientations In the physical sciences — relativity and queminm* and 
their application to atomic struotare# There has oeouredg however* 
another and deeper reorientation in methodology, The classical 
physics of Newton * framed in a Euclidean world* was seen as finM anil 
absolute; the basic discoveries had all been made mid though there 
were gaps m  the reco3zd these would be filled in in due time ® M l
was seen in a localised concept of time and space* and the scientific 
enterprise was oheraeter;ïsed by the fact that it could create easily 
picturable accounts of rea3.ity, Today this is gone for there is no 
single pattern or method that is applicable at the frontiers of 
aeiencQg nor any visualisable models® Yet fin the midst of this it 
mst be cleej?ly seen that for most people in ordinary life the world 
is still Newtonian - quantum g relativity^ curved space and 170 degrees 
to a triangle are Irrelevant,
The great advances into the modem scientific world had been made* 
not by carGful deductions from experimental researches in the first 
instance* but by gigantic leaps of the imagination® Einstein noted 
this time mid again s it was a mental leap for him when he announced 
that matter could not travel at the speed of light ; it was a creative 
leap for Bohr when he proposed that electrons* to acoount for their 
stability* could spin in their orbits without emitting energy; so also 
it was an iiaaginatlve leap for Planck when he altered the entire 
picîtnree of the physical world by quantifying energy* meaning that 
energy* like matter g could not be indefinitely subdivided#
Part of the aim of science never changes - namely the attempt to 
unify al.l science in one oomprehensive structure ® Though wo "need 
to recognise that 'science' as such does not exist® Only flesh-and- 
blood scientists existg and they hold certain scientific theories," 
(Sc'huimnen 1977e P*1B») Howeverp Einstein wrestled with the 
diohotomy betireen gravitational theory and electromagnetism* trying to 
reconcile them in a unified ifhole® Noting his .failure he wrote 8
csjinot be claimed that these parts of the general 
relativity theory which can today be rogarded as final 
have fitrnished physios with a comp!lete and saitisfactoxy 
foimdation#" (1973g PP»330*331®)
There are many mo'bires 'bo scientific endeavoim* but the sapiratiœi
for unity that ezplai%i8 all the diversi-fcy of phenomena, is deep*
profound and eseentia31.y religious,
Resulting from this scientific work in our century we have the 
reality of the nuclear age - i&ioh man has had to learn to live with® 
But the prbW.ems .Introduced are not dissociated from man# Science 
is a human enterprise and this is sometiios lost sight of. As 
Bronowski movingly related in a television programme 3
"It is said tlmt .seienee will dehummiise people end turn them 
into nuTiibers. That Is false* tragically false, Look for 
yourself. This is the concentszation camp anti crematorium at 
Auschwitîa, This is where people were turned into numbers# 
ïsîto this pond were flushed the ashes of some four million 
people# And tlmt wtis not done by gas® It was clone by 
arrogance. It was done by dogma® It vjbâi done by ignorance# 
I'dien ])eople believe that they have absolute Imowledge * with no 
test in reality* this is how they behave « This is what men 
do when they aspire to the loioi-ledge of the gods.
Science is a very hujnan form of .knowledge* he are alx^ ays 
at the brisk of the knoi-m* we always feel forwmx'l for what is 
to be hoped. î'ivery judgement in science stands on the edge 
of terrors oxiô. is personal. Science is a tribute to what we 
can Imow eilthouggh we are fallible® Zm the end the words
were said by Oliver Cromwell f, *X beseech you* in the bowels of 
Christ* think you may be mlstelsen. '
I owe it as a scientist to ïïiy friend Leo Ballard* I owe it 
as a human being to the many members of my family who died at 
Auschwits* to stand here by the pond as e, survivor and a, 
witness, ¥e have to cure ourselves of the itch for absolute 
knowledge and power# We have to close the distance between 
the push-button order and the human act* We have to touch 
people* (1973* p.373# of, }3ronowski 1961* oh.1.)
186
POBTBOBIfT TO PART I
Amy viei’q)o;lnt cam be ’proved® by careful selection of historlcai. 
datag nevertheless I believe several points cam now be made ® The 
thrust of the material reviewed is that there ^  a positive impetus 
to Qoiemoe from religious interests# There was the involvement of 
the Babylonian priests o not only because they were the scliolsirs of 
the day* but out of the religious necessity of calexidar cornsirizuction
® 1.2#)» More 
he Reformation and Puritan 
cieno©; seen cloarly :m
and the correct prediction of feast days (o 
specifically there was i;he contribution of 
Blent all ty in forming am ethos conducive to 
the individual testimony to their motivation in science from Kepler* 
Bacon* Boyle and many others (of, ch»3o)« As hookyaas points out 
(1973d p.162#) the onus is on those who wish to disprove this 
correlation between the Reformation and. the rise of modern science#
The religious roots of oeienoe have had to struggle against a mythology 
(dearly loved even by academics - ex® 2#2e3»3$) that the church was 
agalnot Copernicus ; that the Reformation was amti^soiemce; that the 
Pireitsns stood merely for a. szigorous morality; and that Baszi'/ixi was the 
champion of free thought agafinst the oppression of religious thought »
I hope 'bhe foregoing helps to dispel such mythology* though 1 do not 
deny that particular episodes have seen the church az'raigned against 
the .individual scientist or tlieory»
Part I sets the stag© for Part II* It luie shown* in the rise of 
the Newtonian worldview * how a rigorous objectivity’ was sought and 
claimed in. the natirieal sciences. But in chapter 8 we have seen this 
objectivity undermined by the theories of relativity and quantuia 
mechanics® Yet the paradox is that* while we live in an Einsteinisn 
world as far ao pliysics is conoemed* there is still a pop’Mar 
worldview firmly attached to objective Nmrtonlanism* Chapter B* 
then* provides a bridge into Part II as I seek to set forth something 
of the nature and philosophy of science »
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I now wish to turn to the intr:msie nature and aJjac of 
scientific endeavour; the character of its theories; how they are 
arrived at; and what 'bhey eire conceived to 1)0® I mi not oeek.isig 
to develop mi overall phllosoxihy of science * hut to indicate how 
modern philosophies of science give substance to the proposition that 
there is a metapîiysical, stance* a basic hear"h-^ commitment* and a set of 
presuppositions that underglrdo scientific thought and practice*
I will ma!ce particular note of the work of Karl Popper ami some 
1of his followers» Often individual thinkers axe categorised into
&n?tlficial moulds - such as verifioationist or feilsifieationist or 
revolutionist — ‘but as far as possible I hewe sought to focus on the 
individual rather than a position» It is more fruitful to examine 
the fluids views of creative thinkers like Bridpiaii* Eddiiigton* 
Erasteikip Kulm and foppex’* without labelling them as o;perationalist* 
idealist* realist@ revolutionist * sceptic and so on» Again* 
because of shortage of space this discussion is highly fixbitrary and 
I have had to omit several people Ï would have liked to include — 
notably EoDhaskar* I#Lakatos* G»Claxle and ?®b»Polythress*
It is not my aim at this juncture to present a coherent 'i'heistie 
stance to 1;he pMlosophy of science although I have sought to plant 
signposts® â more systematic staleiient of a Theistio perspective 
will be developed In Part IV,
1D Though ■ I will look at Popper and Euiiu 1 will make no direct 
reference to the debate between them» Nevertheless this debate 
(ofo Lakatos & Husgx*ave 1976) is central in the study of the 
philosophy of science end will obviously exist in the background 
of what I discussing»
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OHAPTm 9 
G E m w ,  immoDUGT'im
tKacsL5s3aTi:ti£:;x;2i6TÆ'.a-«o;;tî(CSîtrr;’c«rns?5a^ i:m:2Sjoti^ .^teXte
The pmzpose of this ehoptex Is to IndioGite something of the 
problems facing soientlflo endemromzg to note the nature and aim of 
solemtiflo ootivityg omtline eome of the views regarding the 
relationsMp of solenoe and belief.
9#1# BOimOE g ITS PRaB™<f8
tij^arcrSEac-gîH^ v.’?a4::i!0:^ sî:?gvi«=aatege33fflsa?asÆc;33:ï ^ ^
,9$„1 $10, The,, po;(lap^ _o^MeKtmlm% moh^ios® (Of, 8,1.) Thle strnide 
at the centre of the philoaophioM problems of eclenoe today®
Mewton’o flret low of motion g the foimdation of hie mechanics g is the 
law of inertia with its att^idant aeoumpticm of rect:llinear motion.
B%t with the realisation that notliing is at root this Imd to be 
abtmdoned and this autoimtloally alters all tliat follow in Newton’s 
aye tern® The concept of abeolute rest g motion* space and time are 
not in good repute today; and although Newton entered qualiflGatlons 
against these eanoepts* the fact is that hie system was built on the 
asaimption of their validity. Today the Newtonian system gone® 
It premapposed the poseibility of determining the posltlmi and 
valooity of any particle absolutely* that ie apart from any relation 
to other particleeo However at the same time the law of gravitoticn 
assezrbed the contlniMma interaction of all particles 2 For a long 
time this basic incompatibility did not 8@@)n to be of great 
ocnsequenoe* but as eeen in the last chapter it eventually broke doim 
under relativity theory®
The advent of the Mnstelnian worldview radically altered the old 
claseioal ccnoepts* and although some argue for the Newtonian system 
08 a limiting case this seems to me untenable. Without* for the 
moment* briïtging in emioepts of worldvimfs which I believe are 
crucial 0 tliis can be seen in the basic concepts of moss and velocity® 
In the Binsteinian system the relativistic mass (m) is not constant 
but a variable connected to the mass of t M  Newtonian system (m^ ) by 
the equation: m « /^1 ® Tills means that logically a
new principle of cmiservation of momentum is called for® It is also 
evident that logically (while when 'v® is  small ®m® tends to so 
giving a practical equivalence) there is no tlieoretleal identity®
(Cf® Nagel 1974* pp#111ff*g Feather 1970* eh®#*)
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The 8mue applies with the oonoept of Telocity® In the 
Bfâ'wtonian system two velocities axe additive - a mmi walking fortRird 
at 4 miles j?ex’ hour ;m a txaiJi txarellilng at 50 miles pei? hour is 
moving forward at 54 miles pei? hour® But in the relativity theory 
the equation is more complex. It iss ¥ sj (¥1 -î* ¥2)/(l ¥1oT2/c^)#
For values of ¥1 and ¥2 which axe small relative to (the speed of 
light) the two systems become prfzactlcelXv the same® But the
fcmajaaj3Kl^ .ni
.Newtonian formula ¥ ea ¥'1 <- ¥2 cannot be theoretically or
ma,thGEiatiealIy deduced from* or be a special case of* the relativity
formila. Bo the two axe often similar in value* but that is quite
a differmit matter from saying that the one is logically derivable
from the other* or tha;b the Mewtoniem system is merely a limiting 
1oasGo
Thus W0 have the situation today where perhaps the majority of 
physical science is carried out on the basis of HeMon’s theories 
which BX-e Mmm§MMlÛlZJm M S ,.loA9..£sÀSSj *o this confasion can 
be added, the ambivMence of the two theories of light* or the two 
theories of gases, (0.f« Eddington 1930p p.IBSf.) Experiments on the 
thermal properties of gases, use a theory which pictures a gas o8 an 
aggregate of discrete particles; but in acoustics the scientist sees 
gas as a continuous mediim® Logically* as with light and the 
lewtonian-IlMsteiniai;! theories* both cannot be 'true® - or can they?
It would seem* on the surface €it least* that scientists are not 
concesmed with the literal, truth of their theories 5 But is this 
really so? And if so today* then has it always been thus or is this 
a new departure in the. status of theories?
It was in this setting that Karl Popper oame to the conclusion 
that @11 previous ideas of the working of science an.d the nature of 
scientific knowledge wore incorrect. He asserts that the modem 
reorientation of science "showed that m) theory oan be claimed to be 
inductively established»" (Poppers In P/agee 19?3/a* p»94o) A fter 
all* the Newtonian system has had probably more experimental 
verification than any other scientific theory* and yet it finally had 
to go in theory if not in practices (Of® Magee 1973/b* p*50o) As 
Mowton is now seen to have fallen short of final truth* so it would be 
folly to tirhik that Einstein had given us such toowledge (of 8®5@ *=* 
quote on po17B.)
1«- It would seem that an instrumental view lends Itself to the idea 
of a limiting case (Nag:el); but that realism seeks a dis junction ®
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The ProbleBi of Nmiber® liimbors enze of the esseneo of 
physical science ("the Imigiiago of science" (Demtslg 1947© p#lii,)) 
for what science does not measure mid how do measure without 
numbers to count by? Yet there is no consensus of opinion as 
leegæzds the nature of nurnbers; whether they are part of a formal*
2lo^ ;jleal or Jjrituitive system; whether they were discovered or invented® 
This is £L problem at the very root of science mid it is an 
miGomfortable eseperienoe for the various disciplines to be mskle aware 
of the fact that their particular branch of science rests on 
foundations which are undecided end impossible to demonstrate,
Allied to this is the problem of geometry# Why do we use on© 
form rather than another when "there is certainly no intrinsic 
property of space which leads a„j)riori to a partioiileir geometry," 
(Theobald 1$6% p*?*)
pi-obiaa of
reduotionism is where a science abstracts* as it must* but then the 
scientist forgets that he has made an abstraction and seeks 
G2!hausta.ve explanation of reality of tiiat perspective® This leads 
to the scientific assertion that music is merely audible mathematies I 
Related to this is the problem of specialism of which the famous 
biochemist Œimzgaff wrote g
"A unified and consistent vision of Na,ture has become 
lïïipoBsible in our days * at any rate for working scientists#
.00,Each science protects itself from its neighbours by a 
cordon of slogans and catcto'oMs; and fashion dictates 
whether this year we are featuring enayriies or proteins or 
nucleic acids and whethor we wear molecules long or short*
New journals are bom every day by Goestuzean section 
pojzformed by skilled publishers; and ao new disciplines ore 
formed* so are new mid ïnutually unintelligible languages % a.
Tower of Babel of paper," (1963* p,109*)
But safe in the retreat of Bpecislity the scientist has moved hlRiself 
beyond reproaoh* beyond the need of public accountability®
5?o1®4© The Lack of Self-Oritioism, This creeps Insidiously into all 
areas of thought - especially Im the social sciences* ¥hen the 
physical sciences become unsure of their basic reference to reality ik
8# IWLsmmm quotes Frege s "science does not Imow the thought content 
attached to its propositions ; it does not know what it deals with; it 
is completely in the dark regarding their proper nature*" (1951 )
Gf* Frege 1893» pp#1^32g B.Ruoeoli 1956*pp»111‘«1l6§ Dmitslg 1947» PP® 
71ff* In that num'ber is a mode of reality and possesses an 
irreducible kernel Eioment - no definition ie possible (cf* 19*7#)
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seems etrgmge that the Goolal sciGîiees* dealing with a emoh more 
diffuse area* ore as positive as they ase® All seiene© needs 
perpetual self—eriticiem of the subject being exasrliied mià the 
selfhood engaged in that task# Here lies a xadloal weakness in 
modem science* for even when the eiibject is examined radically * all 
too often the selfhood and the szationality of the ego goes 
unohallenged ®
s^tJ s m s s L ± m ^ m ^
There is no consensus as to the mature of science# There axe 
still those who conceive of science as relatively a body of certainty* 
resting on some self-electing presuppoBitions of scientific inquiry 
(of* Torrsmoe ?)@ - a scientist and a Christian - ffialntains
that science is the best means of acquiring certain knowledge and 
accurate descriptions of the worlds and in doing so is philosophically 
neutral. He cXainiSg
"«.*# «since science describes observable phenomena it can 
equally well support any jjhilosophzlcal outlook that is 
rationally consistent with these obserrvable phenomena*
To borrow a meithcmmtical phrase* science is pMlosopliically 
indeterminate," (1966* p®12*)
In his view science marches autonomously forward as the basic cohesive
force in modem society* Technology has given us our modem world*
arid is the ground for buildi^ig a secure wa^‘ ' of life for man and
society* . As I see it this neutrality is contrary to the intrinsic
nature of science and how technology is worked out in society,
There is* in fact* no defini'bive Bta,temont of the nature of - 
science g but following acce several statements that tackle this question 
and Indicate several aspects* First of alls the ba8i(2_aspi^ticn of
science is to achieve
"The supreme goal of Science has been the unification of M/1 
Icnoi&edgG within a single all-embracing system* and the 
imifom intorpro1;ation of all reality tlmough a single all«^
■ sufficient principle of explanation(Tan lusen 1963» po62,)
ÎCoestler i-jrites In similar* but more tempered veins
"In the discoveries of science* the bisociated matrices merge 
in a new synthesis* which in tmm merges with others on a 
higher level of the heirarohy; it is a process of successive 
confluences towards unitary* universal iawso««" (1970* p*554o)
Following from this* the scientific enterprise is involved in a 
seqgçch for oveja^J.„ order; it seeks to unfold an harmony which
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presupposes an existing order® Bronowski wizitess
"Beience is not the blonîs record of facts* but t W  seaazch for 
order within the facto, And the truth of science is not 
truth to fact* which can never be more then appro^clmato* but 
the truth of the laws which we se© within the facts » And 
this kind of truth is as difficult and as humen as the sense 
of truth M  a pa:lnting which is not a photograph* os? a 
feeling of emotional truth ijx a movement of music» Mhen we 
speaJi of truth we malce a judgement bcWeen wha.t matters and 
lAEit does not* and we feel the unity of its different parts»" 
(1951, ».87.)
Einstein clearly aclmowledges the szellglous charaoter of the 
scientific quest and notes that science Is in effect a reocmgj^^ption 
M-6Kiatege.
"Bcience is the eentiozy-old endeavour to bring together by 
means of systematic thought the perceptible phenomena of
this world into as thorough-going asi association as possible»
To put it boldly* it is the attempt a.t the posterior 
reoonatniction of existence 'by the process of 
conceptualisation." (l973o Po44$)
In similar vein Ritchie Galder m'iteeg
"Beience is the everlastliM^  interrogation of Natmze by Maiio 
It certainly did not begin with Aristotle* and wi3.I not end 
when someone produces a 'imified theory" « Even léien a theory 
assumes the stature of a 'law** because the consistencies oeeai 
to leave no room for doubt* it is not defzbiltive; It is waiting 
for the next amendment." (1968* Po3o)
But :ui this search for unity and reconstruction of reality the ease 
can so easily be overstated* such as by Vasi Bus en above or by Pearson 
when he writes thats "The goal of science is clear - it is nothing 
short of the (Complete interpretation of the universe." (emplmsls mine) 
(1911Q p«14o) Such assumption of the sovereignty of science and 
attribution of (potential) oimiscience must be called jmto question*
03 must the implicit
A more limited view* from a typically modem InstrumentMiGt 
viewi'ïoiiit* is given by Hoi ten and Roller who argue tlmt 8
you ask ’IJhat is science’* you are in effect asking 
mainly ’What do scientists now do at their desks and in their 
lÊiboratories* and what part of their past work is still 
useful to men in a given field." (1958» p.213«)
5j»-g.«1.._M.ltesaJlmfe;gtWa..fosJAeS„S&A^ ®h3.a is en
essential part of the nature of scientific activity@ As a human
search* and therefore finite* it can never exhaust truth or Imowledge* 
but nevertheless it can attain 'true taxiths' concerning reality.
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Be-.ience is that body of îcaowledge dealing with the structure @n.d 
oaueal/fimotional relationships of certain fæts of the created order* 
In the coirMonly accepted Sfeaglish connotation of the word ® science % 
those disciplines have little to say concerning theology* ethics* 
justice or aesthetics»
■ Soieaeo is a
social entemrisG end subject to the problems of social structures and 
instituticms (of, the role of the loyal Society and the Fronch 
Academy) ® Deriving from the essential hmnan oharoster of science * it 
becomes iiaperative that science be seen as possessing a tentative end 
not an absolute status» It ie men who carry out scientific research 
and as men bring to this judgements* prejudices and personal 
aspirations - though the corporate character helps to minimise 
individual traits. But as a coBmmnity* the scientific enterprise is 
like all lima&a oommnities susceptible to a set of values* a bias of 
mentality* a pattern of attitudes®
IteX Poppe^ ? .-w one of the Xeafling
philosophers of science today and his philosophy is8
<j .fundamentally at variance with all views of science or 
rationality which see these as excluding passion or 
imagination or creative intuition; and it condemns as 
'scientism' the notion that science gives us certain 
teiow-ledg© and might even be able W e  day to give ue settled „ 
answers to all o'or legitimate questions»" (Magee 1973/b* p«68.)^
Baient If Ic theories have .increasingly been seen to be of a 
tentative nature — the fate of all being potential replac einent. The 
Baconian view received a severe seW)ack in the 'breakdown of the 
Newtonian universe * for if laws had been really discovered then they 
would not be open to disomzding. Diagram Ï helps to illustrate the 
formulation and subsequent development of a scientific theoryo (Oft 
Davies 1975& p*5*) Starting from general esqporionce a vague idea 
may be formed which can be tested a^ a^ins'h oxperienoe. From there 
fiuether conjectures* analogies or creative intuitions may lead to the 
formulation of some scientific theory of more precis© mature® This 
in turn is tested agsiiïist predictions and may bo modified into yet more 
precise format* As examples the following two eases are cited.
5» Popper himself notes* :u:i language remiascent of Einstein* that g 
"Science is most significant as on© of the grea.test ' spiritual 
adventures that man has yet ïmoim»" (1961» p,56«)
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«K4T1 wî« ciî u^ w:URrr:?::4Kzaamüxn;j%a.
# 1 0  Doalo Gao Law P@V@ ^ R*9?* Is ST Ig but as tills noticeably hueaXm 
doim under certain conditions it Ima to be modified by the van der 
WaalLs correction such that it becomes (p sî EoTog where
G< relates to Intermoleoular attractive forces anti. ^  relates to 
molecule 8l%e@ T M s  is now ST He, theory is no longer as
simples but it is more general and preciseo A second example is
where the Eewtonian theory is ST I and 'bhe Eilusteinian ie ST II®
To e'j'ctend this briefly the following may be noted. (a) Theories 
which have been disproved by so-called crucial experiments are 
nevertheless useful such as the warv© and particle theories of light® 
(b) Theories are commonly formulated before there is any data or 
experiments to verify them <=■ such as relativity^ Harveypostu3,ation 
of capillaries g mid Eekule " s ben sine ring® (o) Theories can be 
to‘i;a.lly rejected such as the theory that the earth Is flat g while (d) 
the converse theory that the earth is a rough sphere may move from the 
arena of a 'theory* into that of an accepted^ observed 'fact*®
9o2*4« CorjMamicable Knowledge. This does not mean that the progress 
of Imowled^ is eont;mnous or cumulative* Scientific Imowledge ssxid 
technologies omi be lostg men forget or become ignoraiii; of past 
researches and while the danger of this has been cur'kailed wi'bh the 
printed word it is not altogether obviated. An obvious modern 
problem is the lack of intes^-diseiplinary comrcmilcability®
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But underlying the eo len tiflo  queet there reeidee in  the minds of 
indlvidoals a shared pattern o f eacpeotation^ as w ell as owimon oonoepts 
of regularity and intelligibility* I t  is  not enon^ to  glibly 
assert that sooh phenomena are w ritten  In to  solenoe in  a 
philosophically neutral mannero Many phllosophloal systems provide 
no rationale fo r the assumption o f snoh thought -  existentialism ^ 
lo g ica l positivism  and lin g u le tlo  analysis to name hut three* I t  
seems to me that here Is  a facto r o il too often Ignored hy the 
modem ommunioator w ith a naive assumption o f these qualities without 
any attrib u tio n  to their derivation *
9 *2 .5 . %he Mm of the za&tem rise* This is  to understand nature; to  
derive laws which give a predictive power, and theories whloh w ill 
have some explanatory foroe* As M nstein claimed8
aim of science is , on the one hand, a comprehension, as 
complete as uossihle, of the conneotlon between the sense 
experiences in  their to ta lity , and, on the other hand, the 
aoeompllshment o f th is  aim by the use of a minimim of
There Is  the question what? and the question how/why? But the two 
do not go together* The Babylonians were good a t predictions of 
certE&in heavenly phenomena, but in  the l i ^ t  of modom Gstrcnomloal 
knowledge we must consider th e ir theories as of low explanatory force* 
m  turn modem explanatlooB must not be considered to lead to fin a l 
tru th , or as giving necessary insl^ d&ts of the ccmplete canvas of 
re a lity * Bevertheless, i t  seems safe to claim that science deals 
w ith data concerning the world we liv e  in  and desires to  arrange th is  
data in  seme in te llig ib le  order «= though there Ic  no such thing as an 
isolated *fao t** Prediction is  not enou^, there is  also this 
craving to underetend*
This quest is  fraught w ith immense philosophical and in ternal 
s c ie n tific  problems* A@ Bronoifski records « **One aim of the physical 
sciences has been to give an exact picture of the m aterial world*
One achievement of physics in  the twentieth century has been to prove 
that that aim is  unattainable*" (1973» P*3530) Here is  a 
discrepancy between aim and achievement that needs escamination and 
which highlights a question that must be raised against the aim of 
to ta l, exact descriptions * As I  hope shall beoome c lear8 the 
problem is  one o f abstraction from the to ta lity  of re a lity , and then, 
in  the drive fo r exhaustive knowledge in  that abstraction, a fa ilu re
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APPROAGBilS IK 80II#CE
9«3o1« To the î'iatnre of 0?îi©D2?:Igs« Two approaches stand ont -» the
emâ ^ 'kmaiallstlOo The former emphasises the internal
eliangxss a\id processes of .development mthin a scientific discipline y 
holding to a certain autonomous inevitability in the path that science 
follows» It seems to me that this is inadequate in providing a 
satisfaotory model for the nature of science althou^ it is widespread 
in its adoptions The latter view seems more consistent to life# 
üiagrajB IX is posited as a nossible stractœæ concerning the :oiter^
*** Éikrtav=îU-*iysas.?r2c::œ\>» '
actions of science and other spheres of life« (Cf« Eusselly G*A* 1974/a, 
Po22fa) Different ideologiesy of coursey stress different
features and affect even directly the scientific sxfnereo With
reference to the model the following e%azapleg are cited s
10 The interaction of Darwinian belief and ClTristiaziity»
2» The impact of quantum on the philosophy of causality*
3« Oppenheimer^s aesthetic appreciation of the K-Aîomh»
4o The Dyeenko affair g research directives; government funding*
5* Interaction of psychological theories end education*
6* Development of teaohing-alds»
7» Public health»
8o Weaponry»
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Tîius it eeems to me there is an interaction of Intellectual and social 
factors wMch influences the soiŒitifio enterprise and gives direction 
to it* This was y of course 3 impliclt in Part I»
Certain inherent criteria are evident in the atniotira© of any 
scientific theory* (a) The scientist will use words and sytibols in 
a manner that is relatively escplicit and formal in contrast to the 
pre^theoretica-l usage of words in everyday thought o (h) Ho will
exercise a "strong aesthetic appreciation of the elegance of basically 
simple general theories®" (Davies p%6@) This is aspect 5 in
Diagram II» (c) He will endeavour to make sharp predictions and 
carry cut rig;orous tests to see if these theories work, (d) In the 
event of refutation or criticism^ he will be ready to modify the 
theory 3n  favour of a better one.
However there is no consensus concerning the status of theories, 
Some a/Pvooate that a theory gives something of the essence of roaJ.ity 
(eseentialism) ; others see a theory ao a true representation of the 
world but elaivi that the essential world is not observable (v© 
eeBentialism)j) yet theories sre true as well a,s useful (v, 
instrmnental.ism); instrumentalism in turn asserts that the tr?Ath or 
falsity of a theosy is irrelevant and that what matters Is the utility 
value of a given theoryg operationalists point to the crux lying In 
the teelmiquee involved g while others $ such as Mnig stress the 
importance of worldviews»
If there is oonAislon ao to 
the nature of scientific theoriesg, ‘there is also controversy so to 
their derivation® Among others^ three are here mentioned®
rasa) <, lEstorioally the Baconlcm 
tradition is seen as Gxerolslng a strong influence» Oomionly called 
•the biieko'b approach* it is the idea that man observes the xrorld and 
gathers into hie Eiindy as Into a bucket p all the facts of Ixls world 
ttoou/^ i his sensory chanïieXs, Then9 having assimilated all this 
infoma-tionp with the mind passively receptive 9 ‘theories are formed to 
relate the collected data® This view comes under radicsil attack 
today but is popular the mincis of non-«sciontists g popiüarlsera and 
theologiansQ (Cf® Popper 1975© ppoùOfg 541ff»)
4# This view fits naturally' in with British esipirioai traditions.
But it should not be tied too closely with Bacon9 much ae lewfeonisnism 
should not be equated with Mewton®
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* B Fishnet * Bddrmgton suggested that theories 
ifere like fishing nets * A net of two inch mesh would mover oatoh 
fish smaller thgm this m'lless by aooMemt a few small ornes got 
caught together® In similar vq5m  the scientist has a 
X>resuppositio:üéil grid of si certain sise which preâetezmimes by its 
eonstsuîction what is going to be caught» If something is mot 
caught ill the grid (or net) it is considered not to e3ci8t,
*^3#8*>3.0-JjQTpggr*s^i3eai'.^ch3.ig^ Tbo In this Ema?.ogy theorios are formed
In the mind and then focused on the observable range of phenomena for 
GonfirmiatioB or refutation «=« in a similar way to a eearaMlght tracking 
en aeroplane* This is the reverse of the Baconian bucket® The 
mind is crucial in forming a pattern^ or focusing a beamg on the 
obsesmrable ivorM thus selecting data® It is not a process of 
collecting facts blindly out of which theories will automatically 
follow, To xmrsue that path buries the observer imder a veritable 
avalanche of  ^facts ^ » The commend to * Observed * Isg, by itself* 
meaningless# (Gf® Popper 1975» pp»541ff«)
The very postulaÆion of ^science belief* imx/lieitly assumes 
that the tim are somehow separate^ autonomous realms# But is this 
80? Gertatnly there Is no apparent reason for the assumption that 
it Is; and if it is* iilimi cogent arguments for it as?e required. As
I hope to show* any such argument fails in the face of a radical
prssuppositional critique* the examination of the selfhood* and the 
nature of science» As already argued* the modem scientific 
traditions omte into being in a particu].m? imiltsnscaitungglehreg and in 
no other® As Professor l^aehner once noteds "it was within a '
Western 01xL?istleii setting that our technological oivilieation earns to 
birth* and this was no accident* for OhrlBtiamity is both thiS':., 
worldly and other-worldly," (l9^ 3t) pel84#) In s:lmilar vein CoBoLewia 
pointed to the concept of the Lawgiver aa a necessary prerequisite of
the concept of imiforsnity and law?
"Men became scientific because they expected Law in Mature* and 
they expected Law in Mature because they believed In a 
Legislator, In most modern scientists this belief has died;
5, Bdclington. wrote 3 "We picture the mind like an editor :m his 
sanctum receiving through the nerves scrappy messages from all over the 
outside world and malcing a story wi'bh them with* I fear* a good deal 
of editorial invention," ( 1*950* polOO,)
It wlll be intereetlng to see h(X'T l<mg' their ooafidenOG 
in imifomnity Burvives it®" (I96O* p@110«)
ParadoKioally it can be claimed that 'bhe ohaisoheB* as represented 
by the Roman Gatho].ie anil Protestant traditions9 provided at <me and 
the same time the bitterest opposition and the ultimate inspiration 
to the develoxmitait of soiŒioeo In "Wils li^it It ie wron^ to molce 
ïiaety gmierallBations one way or the other g although the thesie here 
defended is iÊiat the Reformed vleif did enhance and enoonrase 
scientlflo endeavonr by providing ecienee with a positive "kheologloal 
framework which saw it @e a creational pursuit before the face of God®
Thie debate 5ms taken new twists In our day lEth the realisation 
of the tentativeness of theories* Ro longer can science be 
presented as a body of irrefutable p Infallible do^^a derived by 
absolute objective researGh on the part of tmblased observers» The 
aayth of InfaHiblll'*;;^ ' is nevertlmless retained at certain levels p but 
in practice physical science has become mathematical and abstract and 
in this isolation tends to support some form of philosophical idealism* 
On ancbher plane the Uncertainty Principle has been seen to breaZc the 
cords of Intransigent determinism mid reinstate the ancient gods of 
chance^ as Tmll as the responsibility of human fceedom* Perhaps^ In 
'(ïhe light of what has been said so farp the greatest need of our 
modem society is that educated opinion leam the limitations of 
science Instead of appealing to It os the final cour'k of arbitration» 
(Cf* Borgun 19&4& po78@)
Science has a roo'k==r@lationship to faith In that all ami hove 
faith " whether It be directed to God or mfay from God» (Cfo 
20e2»46) Faith is an essential part of the struoimie of being 
human.; it is the content and direction of faith that differs» Hence 
the confession that believe In God* hsa its counterpart in the 
confession that *^1 do not believe In God^g the claim that *A11 ends in 
death^ is no less a confession of faith than believe In the 
resurrection of the deod»^ This aspect of faith must be distinguished 
from the relation of science to Ghrlstlan faith which is the 
relationship of a particular faith to a particular branch of study» 
Several models are posited conom^ filng science and Chrlctlon belief*
9«4«la The Warfare Model. This is idLdeapread and sees the two 
aspects In direct confrontation — the idea 'lhat science has disproved 
the Bible; 'bhat such and such a belief is impossible because science
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ÎÎEU3 proved this mid thatu, In this tradition stands J»Wo Braper 
who wrote ®History of the Confliot between Eeligloa and Solenoo® 
(1875)* In a sli^tly more baiimiced approach A«De White is still 
exposed :hi the title he gave his work - ’il History of the Warfare of 
Boierice with theology 'hi GlirietendoBU ® (1905) Another revealing 
title ie JaYt Simpson’s ’Landmarks in the Btmgg3.e Between 8olei%oe and 
Eeligiont,’ (1925)« While there is a popnlar belief in the clash of 
science and belief p it seems to me unsustainable hi the light of Pert 
I« The leading: "bhinZcers and experimenters of the first modern 
scientific reorientation were not only miconacions of any dissonance 
between their scientific work and religions convictions^  but saw their 
science as a oonsclons esspression of these convictions « The notion
of a clash is a myth Btemriclng largely from the 19th ceatnry tliongh 
ïfîinetoin could boldly assert that the church ’always® fought against 
science and persecuted its devoteeso (1975» p*59*)
The concept of a clash hae been perpetuated by scientists and 
chm7Cl:Bien« There have been scientists g especially atheists and 
humanists^  who have argued as part of the;lr ’faith® that science end 
belief are irreconcilable a On the o'kher hand there have been those 
within the religious traditions ^ who g advocating monistic or pietistie 
withdrawal from the ’things of this worldhave seen in science that 
which is alien to their Christian belief* This latter group tend to 
represent smaller sects rather than any major view of the historic 
mainline stream of the church; they are not orthodox^  but naively 
hyper-ortllodox in their beliefs and represen't;ations of SorlpturOo 
Paradoxically they are inconsistent in that they see little problem 
associated with the daily use of the benefits of scienceg or in their 
;|jLiplieit erection of an antithesis between the Word and Work of God*
9*4*2# The Divorce .Model.o This can be divided into tiiree distinct
tr,aîû-cîi5a«^ ii’Tia:ïi3:Æï32rm2ajîrrF?^ -=irr3SKïTîAiÆ»aïaaiarflr«aÆffciisSics^ fftaLits
views® (a) There ere those who advocate a separation of science mid 
belief al.though they recognise the Christian origins of the scientific 
tradition; (b) there are those who hold that the two spheres have 
tilways been distinctly separate; and (o) the viewg represented by 
Glerk Maxwellg that the two are connected but for public purposes 
should be kept separate®
Alan Hichardson provides an excellent exmiple of the first of 
these positions 'when he tolls us that theology is ’.indifferent* to the 
choice of cosmologies* (19689 p*29*) This seems the current 
theological consensus g a clear discontinuity being arg^ ued for except
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wliere seienco and belief jointly impinge on morality*^  The Eeo- 
Orthodox theologians point to the uniqueness of the revelation of God 
o:ncl the centrality of man^B eneoimter witli that revelation In 
confrontation with Oteis’i;» L;m^ îuiFjtie analysis suggests that the 
languageB of religion and science fulfil different fonctions, follow 
different sets of miles* Existentialism drives a wedge between the 
personal and impersonal, between the moment and the being> 
eonoentrsating on epistemologlcal questions to the negation of ontologica3.<
It io further argiiod that sm faith is enduring and science now 
seen to bo ephomesml miy close association must be played down*
PMsoall writes 8 can think of no greater disservice that coiüil be 
done to the Christian religion than to tie it up with* « « * scientific 
views that are merely temporary#" (1956* p.166; of* 16*5*1*3»)
This view can be criticised i:a drivlng experience into discrete 
autonomous realms@ allowing religion to control a religious aspect and 
science a scientific part of life* This assumas that a fence can. be 
built 'ho delineate these territories and sniacks of a god-of«»the--*,;>;apa 
mentalitijo It presupposes and sustains a dichotomy in man’s 
existence*
5.^ .^ 0_§y:#iotio.Model* Having quoted Einstein’s poor
historical reconstmction of science mid belief (9*4#1*); he is again 
referred to in pointing out the close connection between the nature 
of Goienee and belief* While hie concept of religion is not 
Ghrintim^ ip it provides a starting point for this model*
"The interpretation of religion g as here advanced g implies 
a dependence of science on the reli-gious attitude =, a relation 
which g lïi our predominantly materialistic age g is only too 
easily overlookedo" (itmsteln 1975» P»52o)
Hot only are the two connected@ but science is itself a religious 
quest and has a religions mature* From the Ohristi.an viewpoint this 
dependence is extended to cover the essential harmony that must exist 
between the Word of God. as revealed In CIruiot and Bcriptiireg and the 
Wozek of God as revealed In Oreation« In this view the concept of 
creation is of paramount importance and it is maintained 1}liat science 
is dependent on the revelation of a divine law«*giver for its very 
e3d.Btence« This is the root of the concepts of law and orderp the
?>* I had hoped to deal at some length with Eiohardson. in Part îlîg but 
space precluded this* However he is an important figure for ïiïy 
topicg providing a classic apologetic for the divorce model* As I
shall be clear from my oi-m approach g this is a suspect apologetic*
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source of the motivation to demonstrate mid master the order God has
ihiparted to Jiio oreatlozi*
At the seme time i t  must he c le a rly  stated that both theology and 
Boieaoe are human pursuits ami therefore falJ-ihle» They are humsai 
puraiii'fes dealing with d iffe re n t modes of rea3.1%* But in  the final, 
snal^f'sis the p3?oponent of th is  view BialntaiuB that oJ.1 of maji’ s 
exist once forms a cohesive un ity before Godg ouch that Ohristian  
b e lie f is  in  accord with the siateripj.g eupromaterlal and experiential 
facets of his being* ûue of the main d iffic u ltie s  facing tiiis  view 
is  the in terpretation  of the B ible in  re la tio n  to scianee*
9*4*4*, Attendmit^ BroW^gg.* The warfare and divorce models have been
enhanced by the general eulivjo?el revolt against authority (and so the 
church); by "khe rise of much modern philosophy; ‘by the rapidity of 
scientific growth into an ove:ndielrrfing monolithic structure which no 
one person omi ever hope to master; and by the intomec:lne warfare 
within:], the church* To these can be added the loss of a historical 
perspective on science j|ua science g though this Is now in part being 
recovered* But gencrrations of students have been turned out in the 
sciences i;lth no reference to the historical, i)hiloE3ophical or 
religious roots and problems of the theories they are taught* It 
will take time for any new aw£o?eness to have Impact* Implicit in 
this io the spiral of spécialisation whicli loses general appreciation 
of the ïéioleness of life® Other features assisting the f;lrst 'Wo
models have been the imcreaslng ignorance of scientific matters by 
theologians 3 due in part 1;o scientific growth; the failure to develop 
a Ghrlstimi philosophy of science; the rise of many non»-01i%istie&i 
scientists (in contrast to previous centuries); and the general 19th 
centitry retreat9 via Bchliermaïoherg Into the ’sacred’*
Many mietslces have been perpetuated on both sides of the divide® 
Tiieologians have often been imsy^imathetic to science by ignoring i t  
and Its  problems. Again some have tended to t ie  a given worldview 
and its  science tj.ith specific  texts which do not necessarily teach 
th is  9 fa ilin g  to rea].ise that the B ible is  not a s c ie n tific  texWbook 
which is  not to say that i t  has nothing to contribute to s c ie n tific  
work® Od. the other hand g scientists have been g u ilty  of anti-- 
relig ious scaitiments that have nothing to do with science per..,j|eg of 
im irra tio n a l bias against teleology; and an rejection  of
the suprsjnaierial* iigaiai the sc ien tis t has often been
reducticmistic» Bertrand Eussellg for exampleg claimed that8
"^j?he evidencog though not conclusive g 'tonds to show that 
overytMng distinctive of living matters? omi he reduced to 
chemistry g and therefore ultimately to pÎTsysies® The 
fimdamental laws governing living matter are® in all IDellhoodg 
the very same tlmt govern the 'behaylaiif? of the hyctrogen atom^  
namely g the of quantum mechanics*®^  (1948@ p*55@)
This simply will not cl.os the evidence Is ’not conclusive’*
Other errors from both theologian and scientist follow when 
scientific theories are seen as final, and ini^ allible ; from general 
misinterpretation of the Bible; and from a failure to see that all 
himian ïmowledge is mperfectg that sin Zms a noeti.e ciiaension* This 
does not measi that we can never have t'Eue ïmowledgeg but our knowledge 
cannot be exhaustive* Popper (l972/a@ pp»29&30*) Is mistaken when 
he equates truth mid exZiaustive truth*
a.§a.j« g g L x „ . i!3 a « ™ ^
One o.f the most important things for Greek philosophers was the 
jaeitura of ’univeroals ’ * Por Plato these took on a certainty absent
from the world of e:2cpez'lenoe and this was? one of the reasons for the 
stagnation of science witliln this tradition^  and conversely for the 
great advmicas in science (of* Tmznbu.!! 1962*)* Aristotle saw two 
types of substance xxrinuary and secondary* The former dealt with 
partioulars 9 inciividua'ls ; while the latter dealt with universale c,
It should be noted that nouna as?e such univers al.B man g horsey fruit o
’Accidents® were questions that rai^ it be asked of any substmiee 
what is colouug shapeg etc*? ib^ lstotle believed that science should 
coneern itself with the exemiination o.f the relation betimen the 
secondary substances® He further held that the logic of ericplsmation 
was deduotlve (as opposed to the intuitive inductive creation of 
hypothesis)3 and that the premises of scientific anation were 
ma,;lnly generalisations from observations *
Obviously it would be helpful to know if any part of scientific 
Imowledgo was certain and not liable to revision under my 
cirouraetancsesa Is there eucli Imowledge that is not also tautologous; 
how do new discoveries affect the status of what we at present think 
we Imow; is the :!nformation derived from a theory different from that 
derived from an observation; can obsesrvations be made without Bome 
theoretical frame; is all knowledge theoretical? At heart what do 
we ImoWg and how do \i& know? Gan w© know what is too smell to be
obaereved; is a chemical equation merely a simmaz-y desciription of 
certain oliangesi in colour^ taste@ etc*? Bmûi are the Questions to 
be faced* VJImt is esrplanatioii? ¥imt is probability? 1#at is 
These and oiiailar questions are "beyond the rosolTition of 
scientific observations and toolmiqnes for they are philosophical*
They determine the paths science will follow* As Garforbh
notes 3
"eemeit Is fair to porliit out that science itself lacks the 
concluelvenesB popularly attributed to it. The history of 
science 9 it has aptl^ f been said g is ’strewn, with, the 
mzeekage of discarded concepts®’" (1971» p*18*)
The scientist does îio'b so amoh. read his conceptions cmt of the
observable world as read his pr@--conce.tYed Ideas into the world «
As a snan sows his axioms so shall ho reap his déductions*
Hetapîîysiofj is connected to the world of science and miy attempt to 
dissociate scieneo from i.t io doomed to faiJnree» ¥e have alread.y 
seen how belief was a omcial feature in the first modem scientific 
reorientation and there is no reason to suggest g despite changing 
theories of -sciences that this %iaturo has been ;c».egatsd* Science 
is still bound u.p with worldviews g with 2>hllosophiog?l ooiimil'bmmtSg
and with value judgements that preclude any simplistio view of the
objectivity of science*
The Bpec3.tal Theory of Belativityg for example g like all important 
theories in physics is a blend of metaphyaicafl and empirical elements* 
jhaplriGGlly there is the alleged faoi; of the constancy of ±im speed 
of ligiitg while metsj^ hys.ically there is a denial of the :kitelligibil 1 ty 
of e.mx>irical concepts of absolute position and time* 'ilhe theory 
assiHiïes that there is absolute similtanelt)'" between events while at 
the same thve asserting tli£;.t we can never determine which events are 
simultaneous vji.thout reference to some arbitrary frame or grid da'tmm* 
Again it is claimed that Bohr bad a relativistic philosophy which 
enabled him to aooept quantum® These escamples could be îmltlpliedp 
but the point is that in the bsgiitinimg we have to choose some concepts 
with wliich to thank about the world $ and mix. Jiffk, .cÊ^ goncepts thus
Tiio problem is that truth often is atomised along with scientific 
thoug'h'bg thus losing the essential wholeness of the concept of truth® 
The rolation of truths to Truth must "be consistent and not enviseged
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as a bit here said -another d,iseomieeted bit there* Isolated ’facta’ 
do not exist a foot only exista as long aa it is in relation to
other facta Q ICaat’a ^£EEMa% hie ® cling ^  ..§iqh.^ & is not simply
beyond the reach of knowledge it does not exist* This is not to 
Bay that there is no distraction between apisearanoea tmd essential 
attributes* (Of* Knyper 1898g p*22«)
The exact role of aenaory perception is not simple to analyse» 
Some propose contemporary versions of Kantian idealismg while others 
cliBi)arag0 the senses® . But it seems to me that we should realise 
that our senses do not as mueh report^  as help us to construct a 
universe® Of ttoflsgl-ireo they discover notlrmgv but transmit to 
the ïïilîîd a selected chaos of phenomena which has order iraposed on it®
Again.9 this perhaps goes too far as there is conceived to be im. order
.latent :m the phenomena -* God’s order and care has to be taken not 
to reduce objective reality to the mental; but superiîaposed order is 
not necessari3.y the order inherent in creation®
"33tymologlcallyg it is -fairly certoJui that .to...kqQW as an 
Intellectual conception is derived from the sensual 
conception :bo^.seeg and more particularly from seeing:
BOMeth:mg one was looking for Jji a sense of findiSS® A$ 
a resultg there is both a naive and a deeper sense of
laiowlng: just as there is a naive and a deeper sense of
seeing*" (Kuyper 1898? p«l6 ®)
In science g then@ lliere is at legist a threefold organic relation
between the subject and the objects between the object and our n&itmzeg 
between the object and our censclouEmessg and between the object and 
the wo3?ld of thought* It therefore follows tlm'k tjrirfch is something 
towiardB which science .moves ^ and that this movement is governed by 
diverse factors* Prior to seeing o:e observing is a conoep-bual 
framework - oonsolouGly or imconsclously held *- that governs wligit is 
’oeen’o Mote the distinction 'between ’to see’ and ’to see as’g the 
former asserting something of factual import and the lattes.’ being the 
forraing of a. hypothesis® ®Ms suggests tîmt experience does not 
give mesmlng to concepts@ but "uhat concepts give experience meaning® 
(Of. 21.1.4.)
iftiat is scientific œq^ lan&tion :V la it a description of what 
is g of what appears) to be g or something else? Perhaps there ie no 
genei?al oliaracterlotic feature of all esqilguiatlons and tills compounds 
the situation. It is often held that Bcicritifie expla^ iatlons must 
yield predictions of some Bort^ and although some deny this g It seems
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difficult to dlamisB as this tfould entail a rejection of ueefulnesep 
testability and validity® Certainly there can be precLictione vd.th" 
out adequate farce on the explanatory aide g but this does not in my 
opinion hold in reveree* It ie of the nature of Eicientific 
explaaationG that they pzrediot in some form and it aeeme to me that 
this ie of pai’eaiount l^ iportance in all the objective modes of meaning 
(%8 opposed to the normative modes)# ia%plan@ticai must be reasonable 
to g but not neceosarily wholly Gonslstent with, what we know# If
it WG3X3 totally consistent then neif brealsthrou^ ig would be precluded, 
tbou{^ consietenoy is demanded in relation to previous theories and 
other modee of being to eome extent* (Of, 15.2,2.1. and 15#4#5*)
Poincare gave a famous proof that if cme mechanical explanation 
could be given for a phenomenon then an infinity of explanations could 
be oonetruotedo (Of. Hagel 1974» p*1l6f.) This supports the factor 
of t W  crucial role of philoeophy and religious interest aa 
deter^ nining influences behind theories and their explanations* Thus 
we are left with a position tliat ie far from popular thou#it* It io
%«3ll auDmed up by Sir Julian Rixley*
"The clear light of science, we are often told, has 
abolished jUTyotery, leaving only logic and roason* This is 
quite untrue* Science has removed the obscuring veil of 
mystery from many phenomenag much to the benefit of the 
human race g but it confronts us with a basic and universal 
mystery ™ the mystery of existence :ln general @ and of the 
existence of mi%]d in particular* XÆby does the world exist?
IVhy is the world^stuff what it is? Vjhy does it have mental 
or subjective aspects as well as material or objective ones?
We do not know*" (1961, p#42*)
Within the logic of the humanistic position of a closed universe 
Huxley does not Imoif, But the Theistio position olairas to unfold 
something of this n%rstery*
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BIVIiSSE PiaiSi’KCÎ'XVISi
Tlie question of the status of aolentiflo theories is eese^ itlal to 
any underetaading of science. Is a solentifle theory a description 
of reelityp or an explenatitm? Is it merely a tool with wliloh to 
maZce predictions? Is it solely a constnmot of the mind?
Immediately problems arise ocmceming the being and nature of ’truth’ 
and ’reality’# Eatmzally tWre is no concensus here for these 
questions assime a philosophilcal and religious charaoter that oannot 
readily be resolved* Thus a long and inoonolusive debate has 
surrounded t!ie question of the correspondence of science to reality*
The issues are complesL and involve points of formal logic and 
sclentifio data ae* well as philosophical conslderatiŒis as to the 
nature of meaning and knowledge*
The historically oldest view, and possibly the most widely held 
at non^soientific levels, is that scientific theories are essentially 
true (or false)# Even if in the limit this connot be established, 
it is held in principle to be a valid frameifork within wMch to place 
theories# The other extreme =» the modem ’official’ view holds 
that a theory is primarily a logical instrument for organising our 
e^^erienoe and experimental laws# Theories are viewed as rules or 
principles for malcliig further actions possible, rather thaiï as premises 
from wMch deductions csui be made oonoeming the world# here a 
tWory is not even in principle probably true/false. (Cf#10#4o1.§11o4<^ )
BcWfeen these two positions are various mediating views that 
would reoog^ iise some correlation between idieories and observable 
events/properties as regards truth# Theoretical tenas are seen as 
shorthand notations for complexes of events, but not therein 
necessarily indicating some obaervatiwially inaccessible reality#
This middle ground covers a variety of positions witliin wide parameters 
but it ie often associated with the idea that theories describe 
(not explain) in simple and economioal ways any succession and 
concomitance of events# Singer (1962, p#296«) claims that 
"description Is #ie ahii of scieyice#" This view was widespread in 
the 19"tb century and smr the birth of the positivistlc position idiloh
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oolight to clissooiate science from Metaphysics # This trie d  to  
envisage s e ie n tifio  theories as both aoourate analysis and weapons 
ag'£d.nst philosophical positions that would bind science to  re lig io n / 
metajjhysice a However, In pursuing this the word ’description* was 
Made to possess a varie ty  of meanings # Perlmps Ptolemy and 
Goperniesns were both merely describing the heavens as they saw them, 
but there is  a greater eirplanatory power in  the la t te r  theory fo r i t  
is  closer to reality®  ( I t  is  a b e tte r description?} In  as much 
as theories are often proposed before there is  any evidence to support 
them, and  therefore ?}.o observatioBifl re a lity  to be described, one imist 
ask how th is  can be regarded within the normal meaning of ’description’ 
Simple description is  thus beset with many problems® Indeed to  
translate theoretical statements into a language of sease-^dsta auB w rnB  
m i autonomous languago of bare^sense^content, and such a language 
would not appear to exist® Mote the following ©xaaiples of theories8 
The theory of mechanical force in the formulation of the 
principles of hewtonian mochæilcs®
The concept of the light ray, used to give geomietrical form to
optical discoveries &md given two quite distinct interpretsitions 
dependljig upon wbleh gmieral theory of llgtit has dominated®
(o) The coKioept. of heat in the escplasistion of Ocdoriaietry®
(d) The concept of virus to explain the appearanoe of diseasee 
with no obvious bacterial cause®
Here ere four scientJ.fie theories whose status seems to take on quite 
different roles® (a) seems to suit some form of phenomenalism, for 
in effect it cmi axqjoar merely as a way of spsaïcing about mass 
aooeleration® (b) seems to fit the concept of theories as fictions
or instriMeiits to achieve certain results® It is useful even when 
strongly refuted ® (e) again suits a sceptical view which could be
treated as either (a) or (b)® (d) has passed from being a
candidate for reality to the status of a real entity throiigh the work 
of Pasteur and Koch, so suiting a realist vievqpoint®
i & â u i i a s a m L z æ s E ® ™
®o outline the
ocmfusion, not only in detemilning what a person believes but in the 
terminology of categorizing. It should be noted that Each is 
variously called an ’opereatiomlist®, ’positivist’, ’phenomenoîlist* 
and ’clescriptivist’o Each developed a critique of Newtonian science
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àlcln to Berkley’s, both sharing a ’type’ of instrumentalist vietjpointo 
He ifrote that "it is the object of aoienoe to replace, or aayep 
experienoes, by the roproduotion and antioipation of facts in thou^t*" 
(Mach 1960, p.577b) For Maoh, the basic imit of all experience waa 
sensation «" colour, sound, pressures etc# =- mid imderstmkiing was shut 
up iid.thln the %*ealm of 8ensory=^xpe3?ience# This meant that his 
starting point was close to Heo^ICantian positivism, and that ;i&iat are 
called ’bodies’ and ’minds’ were relatively stable complies of 
sensations*
From this it follovred that soienoe was to ooncem itself with 
’ho%f’, not ’why’ anything happened# To explain ’why’ vjas to 
endeavour metaphysically to get beïiind sensations (or elements) to 
’tlilngs^in^thernselves’o Science, however, merely described ’how’ 
events happen, described the regular conneotimi between elements#
80 Maoh was moved to mount a violent attack on metaphysics «, Among 
other concepts thus attacked were the ’atom’ and ’force’. Atoms 
were seen as merely orderâJig devices and Imd no foimdaticn in reality, 
and Mach rej^ kised to accept them as ’real’ till late in life* %&e 
tried to remove the concept of force by redefining it as the product 
of mass acceleration, and then define mass in terms of acceleration#
Opposed to any materialistic or mentalistic metapliysics, î'Zach saw 
reality as basically neutral# This probably meant that he did not 
oppose all metaphysics as the later lo^#oal positivists did, although 
this assertion of neutrality is ra#ier on ambiguous proposal ivhich 
tells us nothing at all, and indeed goes no further than Kant’s 
miknowable# Neutral meant neither mental or material 1 he 
postulated that it lyas a mistake to assuiae that the concepts and 
relations of science corresponded to reality as such « and refused to 
posit a realm of reality behind appearance# (Of# Berkley)(Maoh 1911, 
p#49.) Bou^t to reformulate Newtonian mechanics from a
phenomenalogioal standpoint and dispose of laetaphysicel accretions, 
seeing empiriosl generalisations as contingent truths confirmed by 
experjjmental evidences# To ^^de and direct this aim he suggested 
a principle of economy which reintroduced meta^pliysical factors#
(cy^ %k#h 1960, po586o)
The position Mach is most generally associated with is that of 
positivism « thou#i not with the rigour of the later logical 
positivists# This view sees scientific theories as summaries of
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data,, shorthand of experiments, and omwenieat ways of
classification® Its emphasis falls cm the eacperimental side ami 
tends to miss the role and influence of theoretical concepts aa 1:hey 
stand over against seBSor;v experience® llhssiswes^ ed is the basic 
e%)l Btemologlcal problem that within the logic of pooitivisra you have 
sio reason to know that data data; or that what is reaching you via 
the senaes ie data* There are no unlveroalo, no certainty, and 
Intimately no reel criteria to distlnpnish reality from ftmtasy®
The positivists of this early period divided into two distlncfc 
the phenoïïiGîiallsts and the paychlcalistso 9?he farmer saw 
the basic data as sensory where all verifiable propositions mist be 
tran.slated into statements about se3iae>=impreosionso The latter 
required the trenBlation of all conceptual statements into statements 
about the public woxdd or direct experimental résulté© In this 
sense, Bridgman (I0o3o2o) pointed to the need to define all opérations, 
claiïisisîg that g "The concept is synmiymoua with the corresponding set 
of operatione©" (1927» #o5o)
Three further probloms are noted© (a) Man never starts with 
bar^ e sense-'-data, but from patterns of experienced relatioïiships wiiich, 
interpret the present© All sensory o3[peri<anoem arc conditioned, 
educated experiencoo This Is readily seen in that x#at is oommon*' 
sense for one age (a flat world) ie not so of fmother© (b) The 
requisite of a neutral observation language has been shown as an 
illusive dream® (o) It is clear that all conscrptual tenus connot 
be elimina,ted as in the attempt to got 3?id of ’force’ ©
His famous "Grmmar end Bolenoe*
was ‘based on a tho:f?ough->going philosophical esipiricism as the basic 
epistemology of all scientific thou^ 'ht; and further, as he usurped all 
of reali'ky as the domain of science, this became a general, 
eplotemology© hi si position can. be seen In his own words sî
"There ie no better exercise for the mind than the endeavoiu? 
to reduce the perception we have of ® eternal things ’ to the 
simple eennC'-impresBions by which we know them© © © © Beyond the 
sense--Jmipreosions, beyond the b3?ain terviinals of the sensory 
nerves, we cannot get© Of illicit ie be^ ’^ond them, of ’things-- 
isN*tb.Gïi'»seîveB ’ o o » oWe can know but one oharanteristio © © © © (tlie ) 
capacity for producing Bense--3japr0BsioBS© There is no 
necessityp nay there is want of logic, in the statement that 
behind eeïiBfc>“impreseions there are ’ thingS'-in'-themselves * 
producing sense-impresslonso" (l957o ppa60-6So)
Like Mach tmd the other poBltlvlats, ho held, tïiat atoms, oloetrone 
gmd moleoulee imre merely ccmvenleat oategorlee for suiamariBimg mid 
simpllfyli;^  laboratory data, «» but ^  they do not themeelvee designate 
anything real, they must not be thou^t of ae themoolveo real#
:^t Pearson went further than Maoh In Insisting on the all™ 
pervasiveness of science* For him, scientific knowledge was the only 
possible knmfledgeg nothing lay outwlth the iforld of scientific 
descriptionp tmd so he claimed that g "The i^ole range of phenomena, 
mental as iiell as physical « the entire universe »» Is Its field*
The scientific method is the sole gateway to the whole region of 
knowledge." (ibid p*24»)
^ 8  view of theories was that 
they bound together e]cperimental laws, that they represented a gro*^ 
of laws oarefolly delineating between representation as a descriptive 
and an explanatory funetlQn, he rejected the latter# %lle theories 
are sometimes thou#it of as revealing something of the underlying 
reality of superficial appeeranoes, huhem criticised this. Insisting 
that It was the a e^presentatlve function of a theory that altme ims of 
scientific value© For him, theories embodied an axiom system and 
rules of oorrespandenoe which correlated the terms, t-ihlle In addition 
there may be a picture or model associated with this system* He 
realised that solentlflc procedures were impregnated throughout Tilth 
theoretical considerations and supported Whewell’s contentlcm tliat 
there were no such things as Irreducible ’facts’ devoid of theory*
In other words 2 2 a 4 le not an Isolated ’fact’ but only assîmes
meanlyig as It stands Tiithln a theory* this standpoint Duhem
went on to criticise the inductive generalisations advocated by 
Newton and wrote in criticism of inductive methodology* (Of* Duhem 
1962c p.32.)
.msi«>ïiï» «.jsftMîjfi
■1.Q.3.«l....MiiS..naB«ac (lesfetaaal. He envisagea aiffereat levels of 
reality* (a) 'fhe world of sense^peroeptiong the world as man
1* Vleim such as this ware challenged even in the 19th century and 
it must not be thou^t that Much and Pearson represent a consensus 
vleif flowiïig in the walse of the Newtonian breakdoim of essentiallsm* 
Hen like Meyerson and Boltzmann, for oxample, opposed suoh views, 
maintaining that the object of science waa to discover the actuei 
structure of the physical world «= atoms If substantiated 
experimentally Tiere to be considered part of physical reality*
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peroeiveB it eaid from which he draws his scientific stateriien'bo about
nature o This is where physical laws are found © (b) A world of
reality ‘beMnil (a) which is Independent of man though he cem ga'Ln
some Insight to it indirectly through his eenses and by s;ymholSo
But this 37001 woreld is independent cmd can never be directly
ap'jsrehendedo (e) The world of science, of physics © This is a
deliberate creation of the human mind and as such eoiitimially obonges
Pas science progresses® " The 5?eol. world, as op|30sed to the perceived 
mid physicalL worlds, has a greater depth and richness*
"Modern physios impî^osses us with the truth, that there are 
re£il,itl0s existing a.part from our s©ase-peree]3tions, and 
that there axe problems and conflicts whore these realities 
arc of greater value for las than the richoct treasures of the 
world of esgerlemceo" (Planck 1931» pcolO'ifo)
claimed to moke e^ cplieit the methodology of Mack, Poincare^ biahem and 
Einstein © Each endeavoured to eliminate concepts pertaining to 
Tfbloh no operation could assign a va!Lue; Poiijcar©^  claimed that .a 
concept was only useful if we could Imow how to measisxe its valuiee; 
Bpjiem indicated that the first stag© of any scientific inqiiisTy was to 
select, primary qualities which could be measured, and :m addition 
extended this operational requirement to theories, maintaining that 
only the empirically signi.fleant was of value iihen its conclusion made 
©Bse^ rtioBs about concepts that could be measured g while in
his diseiaasion of simultEmoity reve&fled how, prior to hie work, this 
was assuiüed to be mi objective property of two ore more events, 
whereas be ooi'.ie.luded that it was predicated correctly only of a 
rslationsMp involving two or more events and an observer® This 
last point, with its insistence on the observational aide, deeply 
impressed Bridgman* One Important conclusion that he drew was that 
the concept of ’absolute eimultaaeity’ had no empirical eignificance 
and sBg'gested that- unless all concepts were linked to measuring 
prooednrea then they should be excluded from physics* This took the
nature of a general principle * (Bridgjami 1956, p *10q ) Einstein IW.,
in fact, denied that absolute simultaneity was a légitimai;© concept in 
physics on the ground that no experimental operation could establish it,
2o Popper’s Gonetruction (19T5/&; 1975®) of three worlds is8 (a) the 
world of physios, or rocks and trees and fields of forces g (b) the 
psychological world of feelings mid fears and hopes ; and (c) the 
world of the products of the mind*
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©recïtecl cm opej?at:loï,ird theory of demaroatlon and moaning*
Boienoe was desareatecl by the dose^ zlption of its operations © It 
followed tliat selence did not describe natural objects ox- physical 
reality, hut only the concepts sjkI procédures of physics which fell 
within the qperational exsmmatioa of the phyoicisto But pieoblems 
arose* For escemiple, velocity ie defined as the limit of the ratio 
de/dt and acceleration as d/dt(ds/dt)o These coimot actually he 
meaEmred im any way because as limi'fcs they are ehstract matliemsitical 
concepts o Nevertheless Briclgsias.! held fixmly to his operationa-l 
theory of meanMg so tiiat the moaximg of a concept is noth;mg more than 
the operations performed to aesign value to it®
"’oQoothe concept of length is.o*.fixed when the operatlmis by 
which length is measured are fixed g that is, the concept of 
length involves as mmoh as and nothing more them the set of 
operations by which length is determined*" (Bridgman 192?» Po5o)
The origin of these views lies, ae he records, in the shock of 
real.isation that ac^ compemied the awareness of the Newtonian breakdovmo 
This led to his outloot: of pm’G empiricism® But it i-ias mi 
empirioism lacking f;h).allty or oortainty© "An esrplana.tion is not an 
absolute sort of thing, but what is satisfactory for one mem will not 
be for another*" (ibid po58o)
So far this constituted a negative attack on i;he current realist 
views and lie had more to say in a positive way concerning the problems 
siirroiuiding the philosophy of science® He took the simplest of 
oonoepte — length® In the past this had been regarded as a real, 
physical characteristic of real individual objects; it could be seen, 
3%easured and so on# But for Bridgman there i-ias no .real individual, 
object and therefore length must possess another meaning* It 
became syn.onymous with a sot of operations * So he showed that 
astronomical, naive and microscopic length are quite different concepts*
"What ie the possible meaning of^ the statement that the 
diameter of an electron is cm? Again, the only answer
is ÿgfund by examining the operations by wM.ch the number 
was ob'be-meti© This number came by solving cex-taln 
ecpia'bions flerived from tlie field equations o.f elootrodynamics, 
into which certain mimerieal data obtained by e^ cpericmce had 
been substituted# The concept of length has therefore now 
been eo modified as to include that theory of electricity 
embodied ;m the field equations, mid, most important, assomes 
the correctness of eaîitending these equations from the 
cluiionsions in which they may bo verified exporimontally into 
a region in which their corroo'tnoss is one of the moot 
Impoz-tsnt and problematical of presen'Wiay questions In physics
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ooea/m a ïïie..tter of fact, the concept of length ciisappeare 
as BÀ1 independent thing and fuses in a complicated way with 
other concepts, all of which are themselves altered thereby 
( ibid pp o 21 --'22 ® )
Bo the scientist descx’ibeB operations, mot matvxal objects® Indeed 
the most certain truth of physics becomes that physios Is mot true 
neither a-s an aocomit of what nature is, or how it works *
revised Ms early views but maintsimed the theory of the 
operational demareation® He rethought the queatiom of meaning, 
insisting that Bome of the concepts of a theory must be linked to 
measuring operations* He himself noted the limitations of his views 
that it was impossible to specify all the conditions when any given 
opQ3?atioB was carried out; and that to function, science needed to 
assiijïîo unanalysed operations o In effect the final, justification for
the view was that it worked E
ÊPÆEÉâllIâMiE thesis of demarcation derived In part from
Hewton’s assertion (via misinterpretation,?) tha/b experlüiental science 
deals only with properties whose values can be measuredo But while 
science is imdoubtedly grounded in escperience it would be iirong to 
conoludo that it Is coneexned solely with experienoese This is the 
reductive pîiilosoplïy at the root of operational 1 sm and instrumentalism# 
îidiG former holds that theoretical, concepts are to bo defIxzed in terms 
of measuring operations, and if this is impossible eliminated from 
the scientific vocabulary; while the latter holds that theories are no 
more than instruments for getting our expériences into order® In 
operationaliss only propositions about observed phenomena have the 
status of genuine knowledge g and phenomena are essentially viewed as 
the behavioural relationships of ordinary things, such that Imm end 
theories are nothing but the records of past experiences which can be 
used to antieipat© further experiences«
This has problems In the philosophy of mathematics (no observation) 
and the philosopl\y of perception* A further problem derives from 
mioro^systems wliieh are not open to ordinary forms of perception, as 
Bridgman hbnself noted* Here any operational definition of a, micx'o--'* 
quantity has to be given in teztns of a theory about the mloro-sywtern, 
together lyith various ordinary=8caled experimental procedures by which 
testing can bo made# But Miowing the meaning of the theory 
Goncemod presupposes knowing what is meant by the micrt>=>tfaaatit,l0s in 
question, and therefore, strictly speaking, no operational definition
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is axlegaatèe It ie even more difficuj.t to see how this would apx>ly 
in the social aiicl hiologicsi3. sciences. Itether, operationalism 
precludes any new statemmits or c'iaims and hence tends to ‘block emy 
creative intuitions.
Perhaps it it not smiprlsjng that this view has been attacked by
mmij scientists* For those who follow it, the path leads to an
:inoreaa;bag scepticism concerning the na'Wre of science and its
theories* Thus Dorgmann complains of the confusion and inconsistency
in the use of the word ’operation®. However it mist he rememhered
that no system is free from all confusion fand Inconsistency# (Of
Ber^imm 1957» po58.) Oonfusions con he clarified and
inconsistencies ironed out. In fact Bridgman asserts a general.
ex>lstemological relativism while inclining' to praajnatlsia and logical
positivism; 'but this could fee avoided fey joining the operational
aspects (in a clarified sense) to some other epistemologicsl frame--
%
work which avoided the extreme nominalism of M s  position»
JQ»l«g.'».Aî|LJi3^ fem^ .&.,.lâltegtoÆJl§g rf^ ^ EcWine-ton
finds himself placed in several categories conventionalist, 
phenomenalist, hut priviarily as an idealist where he is viewed wi'kh 
men such as Jeans, Milne and Margeneau. Today few sup-pori; the 
position of idealism, but nevertheless it still contains relovsmt 
insights. Eddington tried to derive fundamental laws of phj/'sics 
and constants of nature from a priori considerations * In his viewipsfsr^ iAïff;y.aaaa5:r.-g.;jLi
the ult5.ma.t8 fants are sequences of numbers derived from simple 
ofesorvatlcms and the reading: of pointer^maasurementa on a scale©
3%?om this the observer derives a mental picture of the world. The 
theory is based on am analogy between nerve 5.mpul08s and the 
transfoirmation of these into perceptions fey the brain; and the 
ohsmgimg of pointer^meaeurements into data fey scientists © 1 problem
surrounding this aaiadogy is that the brain does not malce inferences 
concern,Ing the world from the nerve xBipulsea, nor do we infer a world 
fj?om sensations alone»
Eddlngbon, in fact, makes Implicit use of experimental findings, 
though he regards physical science as a world of symbolism far 3?emovecl 
from sensory experience* The scientist begins fey afestj?ac1;5-ng from
5* GoH.Glark maintains (1964) that this philosophy of science if 
the best possible in a Ohristlan perspective© I#lie he presents 
cogent rc^ asons fox- this I will take issue with him in Part X¥©
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reaJ.ity these aspactB wlïioh he oam measure and ignores the .rest®
The work of the scientist io to correlate ’pointor-readings ’ p 
revealing a tie with the xjrevious vieirjpoixit» There are many symbols 
"" such as electrons ami quanta for which there ore no analogueo in 
the world of ordinary sensation and hence he comes to the conclus ion 
that the world of the scientist is a world of ’shadows®» The 
ultimate .reality is spiritual.® (Of* Kddlngton 1950, pp«552o558*)
The essence of 1;he scientific abstraction is that it is lîmited in 
its approach to reality wliich possesses a wholeness foreifpi to 
scientific endeavour* This led hijii to emphasise the opposite side 
of the coin from the positivism of Match g or the traditional realism, 
hy poixiting to the suhjeet5;veness of scientific formulations smd khe 
crucial forming role of the mixki* (Of. 9#3,2»2. and footnote) Tims §
"The subjective laws are a consequence of the conceptual 
frame of thonglrb into wliich our observational îcnowledge is 
forced by our method of formile/bing it»" (1949» Po105*)
Again Mdington witesâ
"We hfewo found a strange foolM^rint on i;he shores of the 
unknown© We have devised profound theories, cme after 
another, to account for its origin# At last, we have 
succeeded in rooonstmcting the oraature that made the 
foot-print# And loi it Is our own#" (1959% p«200o of.
Within this idealism the ’fact’ that 2x — 43c does not lead to
the conclus lorn that 2 2 «iï 4» for the prior statement is true only
of the empirical world while the latter is true of the matheniatical 
world that is of any world# In idealism theories go beyond the 
o37dering; of data they create ’facts’# The theory of the mind 
dictates the ontological commitment; it determiïies the meaïiing found, 
and the sigaiflc&mce given, in any obse^rvation®
The general problem of th is  view is that i t  neglects the 
expérimentai, side of science. However, mere mental economy of 
thought mid s im p lic ity , and a loss of the objective e^cternal world 
cavi.not be aktribu'ked indlsoarimlnately to ÏMdington# CC'wo more 
quotations from his “Space Time and G ravitation“ indicate that g lib  
catégorisation is  im helpful emd that though several philosophical 
viewpoints nay bo adhered to , scientists in  th e ir work assume some 
realism#
" I am not sa tis ifed  w ith the view so often expressed that the 
sole aim of s c ie n tific  theory is  ’economy of thought’ ® I  
cannot re jec t the hope that theory is  by slow stages leading 
us nearea: to the txuth of tilings." (1959% p*29*)
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Jhid finally3
"The physicist, so long ss he thinka as a physloistg has a 
dofin ito  b e lie f in  a re a l world outside him.» For Instm oe, 
he 'believes that atoms and moleoules re a lly  ex is t; they are 
not mere inventions*" (ib id  p«180 ; of© footnote p*175 my thesis)
Perhaps his basic
oontrllm tion to aoience and philosophy has been the problems 
associated with the P rin cip le  of I^ideterminancyi and the issues which 
surround i t  are of the essence of his general views ® Heisenberg: 
Maims that physics rests on speculation not on ’ fa c ts ’ alone» So 
In  the introduction to  his ’Pïiyaios and Philosophy® we find  
Mor-tMop wieitings
"oA#»the theory of physios is  neither a mere description of 
exp037imental facts nor something; deduoible from such, a 
description; m stead, as Jîî3.nst0â.n Im i e«iphasized, the 
physloEil sc ien tis t only arrives a t his theory by sp©culat5.ve 
means.eo#eny theory of physics malcea more physical mid 
philosophlcad. assumptions than the facts a3.one give or ivnply 
• oo.These- assuniptions # .may be ontological « ©may be 
epistemologlea,!." (Northrop 1971, p .15*)
Heisenberg points out the great change that has occujrcocl, over the 
ilmdamontaJ. concepts of re a lity  duo to re la t iv ity  and guantum theory.
He emphasises in detail this break from the past as something ra/Zical, 
end of the nature of a worlrL«view (o f. Heisenberg 1971» p*45o; of© my 
10o4o2a}o In faoing the difficulties arising f3?om the new wor3.d of 
physloBg Heisenberg espouses the Copenhagen interpretation wMeh 
firmly adheres to the olaasioal language of physics, wMlo holding; to 
qiumt'iM perspectives, (o f* ibid p.46.)
Hisamin:lng any experiment we must be aw i^re of the errors stemming 
from the experiment its e lf ,  and f:eoiü our observations of i t .  I t  is  
tepossibXe to describe what re a lly  happens; "we cannot describe what 
’happens® ■ between th is  obsejTVation and the next." (ib id  p.feio) 
Compounding th is  is  the feature that re a lity  its e lf  is  changed qua 
re a l.ity  by ouj? observation of it©  So re a lity  varies , depending on 
whether we observe i t  or not (o f. ib id  p.52o). Heisenberg argues 
that we are forced to f a l l  back in to  the f ie ld  o f probablll'by, and so 
he reinstates the ancient A ris to te lian  idea of ^M gntie, -•> the concept 
that we stîiike a t something wlilch lie s  between the idea and the 
actual.ity o f an event, be-fcween idealism and realism® Indeed, he 
claJ.ms that the theories o f A ris to tle  give a closer representation o f  
modem theories than do the concepts of classical physics. Matter
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is  its e lf  potent la® In  praotice however there la  a fee lin g  of
rea lityg
"livery scientist wlio does rosea3?ch work feels that he is 
looking for something that is objectively true. His 
etatemento are not meant to depend upon the conditions 
under which they oan fee verified® Especially In physios 
.the foxît that ne can explain nature by simple mathematical 
laws tells \m that here we have met some genuine .feature 
of real-ity, not something' that we have •=- in  ^any meaning of 
the wo:ed invented ourselves*" (ibid p*?6..}
Having' said th is  he proceeds to reduce facts to experimental, results 
(of# ib id  p»l60o)« This seems a strangely ambiguous position, fo r 
what then is  the re a lity  th at he is  tallcing about? Is  there an
externM  re a lity  th a t transcends the laboratory; or is  re a l.ity  
reduced to th is  ; or is  he misusing the words ’re a lity *  and ’ tru th* ?
He goes on to suggest four systems of scientific theory that have 
attained Independent, final form - the Newtonian system; the 19th 
century theory of heat; the theory of electricity and ma^ietism; and 
the quantum theory* These relate, for example, In that the first is 
con‘b£i;lned :hi the third when the speed of llghb tends to Infii-iityi and 
the first in the fourth when Planck’s constant tends to zero# Hut 
this does not malce the systems compatible as such# Newton is not
replaced by Einstein; at least in terms of an iinprovement»
"Newtonian meehanios caimot be Improved; it can only bo 
replaced by something essentially different® Wherever#@othe 
concepts of MowtonlaiA mechanics caji be used to describe events 
in nature g the laws formulated by .Newton are strictly correct 
and cannot be improved# But the electromagnetic phenomena 
cannot adequately be descï^ ibeü by 'bhe concepts of Newtonian 
meehenics#" ( ibid p#89#)
But th is  claim tha;b i t  is  ’rig h t* or ’ krue* where applicable ie  a 
devaluation of the concept of tru th  and reality and reveals a basic 
commitment to instrumentalism» But two contradictory theories can 
not both be "true to what is# He goes on to re je c t the postulation  
that science aoeimies a world which i t  has not made and which would be 
present g essentia lly  unchanged, even i f  the sc ien tis t was not there# 
This coupled w ith his re jectio n  of Idealism forces him to axi 
ins'bmmentallst view# Nevertheless he caneludes ’Physics and 
Philosophy® with what amounts to £i litu rg y  of unification as the aim, 
desire cmcl accomplishment of science* He ta lks o f movicag * toward*, 
a “process of®, and a ’ fin a l state of* u n ifica tio n  as) a human 
enterprise in  which pbyalos plays but a small part* (ib id  p#176e)
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UhliZcG KWm (of# he
rejected, the concept of revolntlcme In science and pointed to the 
continuons line, traceable through centuries, with reference to his 
own theory of relativity# There is no radical or sudden ’conversion*# 
Turning to the debate hetifoen zTsallma and Instrumentelism an 
intezTesting plctu3?e arises# Einstein conceded that theory decided 
we observe', Tmt nevertheless saw the phenomena as confining tMs 
process Tmiquely#(Cf# Einstein 1975p p#226#) Thus, Miile axioms ere 
free creations of the kuDAsn mind, with scope for the illogioal intuition 
and the occa s icmal suspension of logic, he clung ultimately to the 
objective reality of an extez^W. independent world*
IWle in his early days he drew upon liaohlan positivism and 
inclined to instrumentalism in M s  interpretation of relativity, 
providing a sort of operational mialysis of siDmltaneity, he later 
rejected this heuristic stance* Though» despite this z^ ejectlon, 
these early views have done rauch to further the widespread acceptance 
of the instrumental positioKi# But he exhibited in his thought a 
reallEKQ that sought to find true trutW of the universe while 
accepting the limitations of the human mind#
His scientific procedure was deductive thought at its best# Time 
and ag^in he derived tlieory from a thought experiment# He 
consistently pointed, hoifiever, to an objective reality that could be 
known, and tha,t science strived beyond the construction of a kit of 
tools# Following are quotations which stand in ma^ced contrast to 
the views of men like Mach, Pearson, Bridgman, Heisenberg, Tou3nln and 
Kuhn#^
"The belief in an external world independent of the perceiving 
subject is the basis of all natural science# Since, however, 
sense perception only gives information of this ezctemal 
world 03: of *pl%rsloal reality* indirectly, we can only grasp 
the latter by speculative means# It follo^m from this that 
cur notions of physical reality cen never be final#" (ibid p#266#)
^peWcing at Oxford in 1955 he remarked»
"If you want to find out anything from the theoretioal 
physicists W)Out the methods they use, 1 advise you to stick 
closely to one principle; don’t listen to their words, fix 
your attention on their deeds#" (ibid p#270#)
Then, having given this ivaming, he went on8
Like Planck, Einstein proposed a threefold structure of the 
world ™ the real and the perceived worlds, and the ideas of men which 
lie someiiAiere in between#
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" I s t i l l  believe in  tlie p o s s ib ility  of a model of re a lity  
that is to say, of a theory whloh represents things 
themselves and not merely the probabâ-llty of th e ir  
oecu'orenceo” (ib id  p©276.)
S im ilarly  in  rni a rtic le  m^itten in  1940 he says 3
"Some physicists g among them myself, cannot believe that we 
must abandon, actually  and forever, the idea of d irect 
representation of physical re a lity  :hi space end time; or 
that we must accept the view that events in  nature are 
analogmis to a gwne of chance#" (ib id  po534o)
10.4. VIEW
statement of the instrumental position# Concepts do notnecessarily
equate w ith observable or re a l entities. "La-ws of nature resemble
other kinds of laws, rules and regulations. These ar-e not themEselves 
true or false, though statements about th e ir range of application can 
be." (Toiilmin 1967» P«71.) He fu rther suggests d iffe rin g  
classifications of laws g as phenomenalogieal. (io e . containing no 
tlieo3?eticaJ. terms, such as Boyle’ s Law); and abstract laws ( i .e .  
providing a framework w ithin which to work g such as Newton’s Laws of 
Motion which are useful but not true). ’Between these extremes are 
intermediate laws which have theoretical and phemomenalogical 
components g such as S n ell’ s Law. Bone of these la iis , claims 
Toulmrjjig " te ll  us anythjmg about pht-moifienag i f  taken by themselves."
CiMcl p.77.)
Thus he contends that» "Lmm of na'bure..o.to them the woMs ’ tru e *, 
’probable’ and the lik e  seem to have no application(ib id  p«78.)
The essence of th is  position then is  not ’ Is  i t  true?’ , but ’Hhen does 
i t  hold?’ In  a sense th is  rea lisation  of the non—autonomy of a 
s c ie n tific  law is  a valuable in s ig h t, but i t  is  eon:Piis6d with a 
paz'ticular ©pisteraology and ontology rooted in  a humsinistic philosophy 
that makes a sharp d is tin ctio n  between science and boyond‘-‘ScienoG, 
between the nature=»idoal and the porsonalityM deal.
Before any scJ.ence talcos place there is  a pre^scientific  sta,ge, 
and before experiment takes place a fommlation of theory. He xfritess
Competent sc ien tis t does pointless or implaimed 
experiments*...Before the sc ien tis t enters his laboratory at 
a ll  g he D'fust therefore have guidance about the kind of state  
of affairs the type of apparatus xj^th
assGiribl:lngg and the sort of measurements
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your theoretioal problem hau been oarefully 
thought out, experiments wlli he premature#" (ihld pp#59^60.)
10#4#2o Tliomaa Kuhn makes several valuable pointe In hie
<LSM»4aC:ïïaRSaKAiB:S«UJ3£»KB1KM=ïïœfy$S..’eiV.ÎM3iX^ ^
important essay on ’The Structure of Soientiflo Bevolutloms’ (1975) 
where he emphaeieee the euhjeotive side of eoientifio activity and the 
role of faith in the oholoe of a pm?adigmo At the outset ha states 
his rejection of the idea of aoienee as a progressive Gocumulation of 
Imoxfledge, advmiee by aoGretion (of© ihid p#3*) But while aeoepting 
in part his idea, that in any ecientifio ’revolution’ there is a 
rejeotion of older views as well æ  the addition of new faotora, 1 feel 
he does not give juatioe to the vital element of oontinuity that existe 
from one period to another and firom one paradigm to another# He does 
however aolmowledge the cumulative nature of ’normal soienoe’*
In M e  thesio Kuhn divides ecienoe Into two realmB that which 
produces new theoriee, which oreatee or ohoosee a new set of paradigms g 
the process of normal, routine science# Noa%nal science assumes 
that the scientific community knows xfhat the xiiorld is lilœ and is 
therefore engaged in ’mopping up operations’ xfithin that assumed 
paradigm# Within this context, normal science seeks for predetermined 
results that xfill mean an attitude of rejection to any results outwith 
the predicted range «° a research failure* This means the suppression 
of novelties and a 3C^ tardation of the cs^ eating potential for new 
paradigms e A serious criticism at this point is that this division 
into nomal and revolutlotiary science seems artificial and in practice 
a new paradigm can arise out of the processes of normal science# (Gf# 
Tculmin 1976, pp#40f#)
Kuhn notes the ingplioit role of belief as a necessary piiereguisite 
before the scientist can even begin to collect ’facts’# Collection 
can only be by selection, and belief will govern this selection and also 
exeoeciss control over tlieozy articulation#
di^ct^J^lief activités (of# 
Kuhn 1975^ PP&17918*) su^ests that there are i&iree basic
5# ki&i acknowledges a debt to Popper (1976, pp#1ff#), noting that 
both of them are agreed in rejecting groxith by accretion; both 
emphasise an ’inevitable entanglement of scientific theory with,^  
scientifio observation’ ; both are sceptical with respect to some 
neutral observation language; both aim to ’invent theaooies that qxplain 
observed phenomena and that do so in terms of real objects’; both 
appeal to tradition; neither is an inductivist# The basic difference 
is that Kuhn divides science into the two realms; Popper does not#
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problems which face the sc.ientist that of determining the 
slgnifloemt facte; of matching these with a theory; and 5n artioMation 
of a theory and in all these aspects fai'bh will ploy a decisive role#
The scientist will see what he wants to see# Tims he cites the 
famous card experiment where subjects were exposed to, say, a blaok 
five of hearts and consistently caw it as either a five of spades or a 
five of hearts (of® ibid pp«50,59963®)
In the change from one scientific period to another - such as 
Newton to Einstein, or phlogiston to o^ cygen not only are new
quantities ;mvolved, but a new qualitative way of perceiving reality is 
entered into (of# ibid p#7«) A shift of paradi^ talœs place, a 
conversion (ibid ppa148,150a)g a gestalt switch. Unfortunately it is 
not precisely clear what is meant by ’paradigm’ (ïfestermsim 1976, p.6lf® 
lists twentyk-'One senses of its usage) and the word assuji'es tMoughout 
the original thesis several distinct meanings which ICuim acîîiiowledges 
in a 1969 postscript (ibid pp«174“210#) Essential to its meaning is 
the idea of a model or pattern which the %mradigm provides, with data 
and theory being fitted into tîxls preconceived xiattern. (Ofo Ibid poSfe.} 
Again he gives the analogy of a paradigm as a map for reading the 
territory we are in a M  also ae fmictionlng as directions for 
constructing the map in the first instanceI (Cf* ibid p#104«)
There asie at least two distinct areas in wîiicJi a paraZiitSm acts. ^
It functions as a constello,tion of beliefs, values, techniques; and it 
aJ.oo functions ae "one sort of element in that constellationo" (ibid p@ 
175») Thus a paradi#n is crucial 5n the beginning of research smd :ln 
the detailed continuation of that research; it provides an. overall 
discixilisiary matrix which determines the syjiibolic generalisations that 
can be made g as well as determining the erection of ® exemxilars ® ( 
concrete x>ro'blem-solutions which form a teaching basis). (Cf. ibid p#182l) 
Kuhn makes the telling po:lnt that no one in the first instance learns 
science from experience, but because a teacher, a textbook, or eomo 
accexrled authority pronoimeetl that this was the way things were. (Of, 
ibid p.80.) Indeed when experiments are recoursed to, in order to 
back up authoritative pronouncement, they can fall, but that is of little 
importtmee. In my own scientific training I have vivid memories of 
eacperiments proving the oppositie of what they should?
6* Masterman (1976» p.blf#) lists threes a metaphyfaieal paradigm, a 
weltaKiBOhammg prior to theory; a sociologies paradigm, a set of 
scientific habits; and mi artifact paradigm, less than a theory»
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Paradigms5 then, are standard, accepted examples which guide 
researoh because they define the legitimate questions to he asked, the 
techniques to he employed, and the solutions which will he admissible. '
In the select ion of a paradigm the factors concerned are not 
scientific a though the choice will not rest ult;mately xiith a single 
individual but wi’bh the scientific oommimity® Before this 
paradigmatic stage there Is a pro'*»peradigmatie stage in which various 
ideas compete for eicceptance without any one galnijng ascendancy® (Of, 
ibid. p®6lo) But once a paradigm becomes accepted it ie coercive 
over nature ™ nature is forced to fit* (Cf. ibid p*135«)
Within this settJjig he regards laws as tools - a paradigîîi shift 
involves ’rotooling’ (ibid pp«46o76»)o Yet against this he avoids 
the claim of Heisenberg concerning Einstein and Newton by imequivocably 
stating that Newton was -wrong; that only one of them could be right#
He thus argues cogently for the rejection of Newton as a “right* but 
limiting case of Einstein# So he presents no Biîiiple instramentalism, 
nor a simple subjectivism, for he talks analogously of science seeking 
to solve a ® jig-saw puzzle ’ for which there is obviously only one 
objective solution.» (Cf* Eddington 1930, p»352«) Science seeks not 
just to manipulate the world, but to understand it thus assuming 
some reality that can be unfolded# (Of. KuM 1975» P«36#) Thus he 
contends that a poaîadlgm is not only to be oompored with other 
paradigms to see which is the best suited from predictive purposes, but 
they are to be compared and measnrecl against nature® (Of# ibid p»?7*) 
The scientist is to seek to solve the problem of nature (cf® ibid pol68 )^ 
yet only a few par’agraphs later he tells us that he does not tM.nlc that 
science ever gets closer to the truth (cf® ibid pp.lYOglYI•) Tims 
despite iiis talk of probleiA^solving, tziith appears to bo an Illusive 
soMethiJDg outwith the domain of science « TM.s is eonsis-bent with his
attack on Popper where he contends that, though falsification appears 
analogous to his concept of the ’anomalous event® which leads to 
paradig^n sM.ft, it is not the saxiie and in fact faleifica'bion cfannot. 
exist® (Of® ibid p»146f«) ^
Reality seems lost and pragmatism the final justifics.tion® He 
writes that "notion of a match between the ontolo 0^ ’ of a theory and its 
’real.’ coimterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in pr:moiplo®"
7# Lakatos fi976/b, p*93) points out tha;b Popper sees scientific ohango 
as rational, the logic of discovery; while ICiihn sees it aa something 
HQ/’Stieal, a conversion*
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(ibid p*206*) Indeed he argues that facts mid theories are not 
themselves dist:hiot categories, (Of# ibid p»66«) Hence, despite his 
remarkably valuable contribution to the study of scientific models, his 
relativistic concept of truth emerges to mar the whole# He becomes 
entailed 1)1 directionless shifts, for reality is purposeless® 
Nevertheless g if as he po;lnts out, parWigmo are moulded not by the 
world then what does? Ehat can be lemmed about the genesis of 
paradigms? It seems to me that it is all too easy to move from 
tW.s final position of Man to scientific sejepticism« There is a 
knife-edge here between scepticism and knowledge, but a position of 
genereal scepticism seems to sit uncomfortably on the history of 
scientific activity, m;id in the scope of a Glaristlaai Theism®
H Popp_ero Popper is a crucial figure both for his 
own formulation, and for his devastating destruction of the positivist 
position® His basic work ’The Logie of Scientific Discovery’ (l972/b) 
preceded A©J®Ayer’s ’Language Truth and Logie* by two years# Popper 
argues that8 "The scientist aims at true descriptions of the world, or 
of some of its aspects, and at a true explanation of obsesivable facts," 
but tliat he "can never Imow for cortcdn whether his findings are true, 
although he may sometimes establish with reasonable 'certainty that a 
theory is false#" (1972/a, p«114«) Scientific lawÈ are therefore 
ten'bative inventions and not true discoveries fors
"Chie cannot escape t?ie fact that the standeirds and criteria of 
testing in any cormiamity of ilnquiry reflect eul'tural 
îjrestippositionso Methodological assumptions are thesiselves 
subject to historical variation*" (1972/a, p.igg.)
Popper thus strongly refutes the anti-metaphysioal bias of the 
positivists, pointing out that metaphysloal aspects have played an 
important role In the history of the development of scientific theories, 
and in trying to rid science of them altogether the positivists have 
finished up getting rid of science itself® (Of* 1972/b, pp*19o36o38@) 
Thus he is led to develop his theory? of demarcation of science from 
non—science* This is not to be confused, as the positivists do, with
a demarcation between Bieaning and non-sense, but merely between the 
spheres of na/taral science and other theoretical disciplines such as 
ethics or aesthetics# (Oft 19?2/b, p.51*) In seeking this 
demarcation Popper is still trying to establish a corpus of science 
free from metaphysloal factors* He accuses "bhe positivists of open­
ing the door to an invasion of metaphysics into the scientific realm*
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(êfa 1972/133 P«37a) ïfeYlïig’ x*Qal:l3eâ tîie falliu?e of positivionig 
Poppea?o otliore siich ae l'îagel aiiâ Hempel g still aosvmies ti-ro âistinot 
IovqXb :m Bcieraoe» ïïha,t :1b @ a filxed observatlonal^ 'data free from miy
theoretical interpretation end forming an maprohlematioal lower level 
of imohanglng objective datag deeorlbable in pure observation langasge 
(cfft15«3o3e2e)§ and æiother higher level of tîiGoretical eonstniots 
seen as the produets of man's creative imaginât Ion=
Popper formulates his in this settings ^
How falsifioa-tion has never been taJcen hlstorloally as a definite 
means of theory rejeotiono Bewfcon's theory prodloted a motion of the 
moon only half of that observed, and for sl%ty years 1;his anomaly stood, 
far outside the limits of e^ querimerital en?ore But it was not 
considered to falsify the theory* More recently the advance of the 
perihelion of Mercmzy was regarded as an anomaly for eigh.ty«^ flve years 
(wltMn Hewton's system), 'until w:lth the development of relativity it 
was tahen as a disproof of Hewton* But prior to ]?elat:lvl'ky it had 
not been regarded as a falsification^
%ile it is impossible to conclusively verify a thoox'y. Popper 
argues that it la not so difficult to falsify on©o But care la needed 
here a Ifeiiy, for example ÏCuim, take this pr.1ncipl£? as the reverse of 
vorificatioiio But Popper clearly delineates his prhiiciple ae 
different in character from verification « "My proposal” he writes
”1b based upon an agrvmmetagy between verifiability emd falsifiabll 1 ty; 
an asymmetry ‘which results from the logical form of ■universal, stats".^  
msntsa” (1972/bo p«41«) There can be no crucial disproof, just as 
there can be no final, jjroo:?, for it is a^ lways possible to claim that 
the experimental results not reliable* (Of* ibid p#50*) Thus he 
denies what is attributed to him»
As port of his critique, Popper (and Udm) attacks the concept of 
an IncWctive process as khe i-jay of scientific method and points 
instead to a prooeoe of deduction within a given, framework of 
prosupposl'bionss But again care is needed, for he is not ruling out 
.induction in terms of the dreams, intuitions, conjectures from whence 
theories arise».
8* A good critical discussilon of Popper's theory of falsification 
is found in ÏjaJcatos (19T6)o Here he criticises Popper for adopti^ig 
a naive methodological falsification end 'vmiitB towards a 
8 ophi 13 -fcicat eel me thodol ogieaX f al s if iea'bi on »
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Popper's notion of the truth is therefore gome thing like this 3 our 
aim in the pursuit of knowledge is to get oloeer and closer to the 
truth, end in any given eltuation we may claim timt we have made mi 
adveace, hut we can never kno%7 if have reached our goal* 
cgamot identify science with truth* <»o" (Poppers In B3a^e ISïV®'» po78*) 
Science is capable of making real discoveries and distinguishing 
between prediction of events of a known and an imknown kind* 
Instrumentalism cannot ïWce this latter dlstanction*
hhfortimately I believe that Popper's position haa been weakened 
by his remorseless allegience to the imlformity of natural omises in a 
closed system# In an essay cm the 'Sourcesof îùlowledge and Ignorance" 
he va].idly points out tliat to have any confident knoi&edge of ultimate 
sig^ifloence there mist be a knowledge^oource beyond man* he writes 
that: men's authority can establish truth bgr decree g that we
should submit to truth; that truth is above human authority**^  (1972/a, 
p*29*) To have ultimate knowledge demands a supraMoatural origin 
for truth* But Popper, as a humanist, is forced to reject this 
possibility, and he sadly and romantically concludes his essay t^rith 
these words8
""What we eh%m).d do, I suggest, le to give up the idea of
ultimate som^ces of knotfledge, and admit that all knowledge 
Is Immang that it Is mlaced with our errors, our prejudices, 
our dreams, and our hopes; that all we can do is to grope 
for truth even though It be beyond our reach»" (ibid p*30*)
he is forced to absmdon the possibility of verification you can say 
nothing ebout a thing, excopt ifhat it is not» hence with Popper we 
find that the concept of the external objective reality becomes dim, 
forced upon him by his failure to establish an epistemological base 
big enou^ to deal with the issues involved» But while his 
epistemologieBl base is inadequate this does not prevent his 
contribution being of vital significance to the development of a 
Qiiristlan approach to these problems* There is an inner tensicai 
evident here g Popper desires after truth, knowledge, as a God=igiv#i 
creational instinct; but having rejected God he is bound to an ell 
pervading uncertainty»
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c m m w  11
The GGlentiflc world Has moved gradually from the objectivity of 
easoïitialifôja in the 1 Y'bh century, tlirough positivism, to more 
subjective views» 3Mo doubt few advocate the e:3ctreme ideal.Ism of 
Kddingcon, but seepticieai and aiistimmeiitalism are widespread, often 
abandoning the very concept of truth» Those Wio strive after 
reality g such as Popper and Einstein, often fail to establish an 
opistesiiologieal base which aceomits for the mystery of their existence » 
They are tl^ erefore loft stranded from sny hope of oertainty* The 
cnwc of such sGopticlsm lies j.n a fa.ilur3 to actnowledg© the Creator 
liho made the world and men, and who alone establishes the identity of 
man* Man, knowvmg his identity iln the image of God and having the 
revelation of God, can attain to truth that is t3?<20 oven while liîâited»
The divergence of views oureveyed indicates that there is that which 
lies beyond the structure and imdersttmdjng of scientific concepts*
There is a religious root which determines how a man views his 
scientific activity» By spotlighting different theories, or spheres 
of science, support can be mustered for various viewpoiB’ls* Realism 
seems suited to anatomy, while inst^ Tumentalism may seem suited to 
modern physics » It seems to me that theories have a. potential, of 
being refuted — and thence discarded (flat earth); or retained because 
useful (theories of light)» On the other hand a theory can be 
verified provisionally (that light bends), or more conclusively pass 
into the realm of otmBmn^sense "foot" (the earth is a .x’ough sphere)» 
lâetwee]^ K these extremes of verification and refuta/bion, theories remain 
in a middle-greound of uncertainty* While there can be no absqlid^ 
verification/refutation there can be ^ eogonabljs v©ri.fication/rei‘uta.tiono 
I now wish to confine the discussion to the basic viewpoints of ,x\eifjpam
be utilised to hl8h].lght the
other two vlmis «,
The following diagram (from Popper 1972/a, p®108») provides a 
useful model for understanding the basic positions» Xfes(mti.g3,laja 
is represented by tlie total di.agrajfis ilistingiiislilng the imiverse of 
essential reality (i)g the universe of observable phenomena - (li); 
and the imiverse of descriptive 3.migue@e or symbolical representation
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( i l ) ( i l l )
ygjffîMM m .
-  ( i i l ) o  la  Diagram I l ls  "a" and 'b^ represent individual
phenoBiena; oiiô. ®3' the reality bsMnil llieso plieïioaeaa, with H'x®
being their QoseBtial properties; 'et® mid '^ ' are the descriptions 
03? symbolic representations of the realltloa, ami ' £' the theory 
describing W #  Thus froai * e ® a M  can he deduood and we
can arrive at an e.irqlmmtiora of why 'a®' eaiieeB or leads to "b"» 
JïElâlE^SlteâiS the other hsmd wants to drop the ean.cept of 
deseription and €iilmina1;©s imlverse (i) from the diagrmi* Thus ®a® 
relates direotly with 9 and "b® with ' ^  ; " E ' refers to thing, 
being merely the i&istrument that allows uo to go from “ * to * Ç “ »
(of. 13.2.1.)
Against instrwmontalisM Popper puts forward the Galilean view, 
whiohg while agreeing that theories are inst^TimentSg asserts that • 
are mgjjily "descriptions of the world, or of certain aspects of the 
world*" (Popper 19T2/a, p»101 ») At the heart of this view is the 
idea that aolentlsts Imve made conjectures, myths or theories which 
though in s‘l;rik;ing contrast to the everyday world of naive tncpereienoe, 
are capable of explaining aspects of the world of ordinary experience» 
Hoppes?, however, does not wish to uphold that p£irt of the (Jalilemi 
view which alms at, and obtains, some ultimate explanation of the 
essences o Here the attack of instrumentalism is leeganded as valid o 
Popper sets out the docijrines of the Galilean view as followss
”(1) The scientist aims at finding a true theory or description 
of the world (and especially of its regularities or "laws"), 
shall also be an explanation of the observable facts*
«  o  o  13 a
The soiontist can suooood in finally establishing the truth
of such theo:cies beyond oil reasonable doixbtoooo
The beet, the truly sciontifie theories, describe the
'essences' or the "essential natures' of things the
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realltiûB which lie behind the anne&irmiOGB »" (ibid ppdO^fo)
Both. Popper smd the Instimmentalist reject dootrliies (g) emd (3)9 
1;hough for different reasons» Popper aooepts (I), but the 
2218trmnmitallst dose not» Po%)per wiahOH to amnend (S) to a negative 
form — that theories cozi be beyond reasoïiable doubt 5?efuteclo I
would wieh to retain doctrines (I) &ml (2) an fozmulated»
This was historically dominant up imtil the last century, alth.ough 
the publication of Ooiaxider^ 's Xl’eface to Copemicue " ®X1e Eevolutionlbua ' 
indicate8 that the:»?e were those prepared to advocate theoriee on the 
groimds of iaetromontal usefulln.ess» (Ofo2o2o3o3o) But it was not 
until, recently that instrumentalism cmm to the fore (cmd many of the 
leading physicists accepted it with the notable excejjtions of 
Bins'fcein and üohrodinaer) »
In esoentia,'iism theories are envisaged as representations of the 
real wor.ld of essenceso Against positivism it timt the reel
is not solely the observable § against Instmmentslisia it assercrbo that 
valid concepts are true ae well as useful; while against idealism it 
asserts that concepts represent st^mctmzes of events that exist in 
the real world» EssaitialiQm, as cîpposed to realism, oims at a total 
mid ultiïPvate explanation of tlio essence of things ; "that is to say, mi 
explanation whloh (essentially, or by its very nature) casiiiot be 
further eiiqjlaMod, and which io in no need of any further explmmtiono" 
(ibid polO^o) Here is a s1;ress on the objective relationship found 
in nature* it is the eharaoter of olasaical phyelos that it d.escxdbe 
without reference to the selfhood* The keynote is absolute 
objectivity» bcienee is mi edventu,re of discovery tuid exploration as 
well ae of investigation and construction of theories * Atoms end
trees are both ultimately real, though they behave differently *
In criticisiip;^  this poeâtion, it is obvious today that tjcieneo 
does if.xot, or at least has not yet, attained to anything of finml 
Glgkilfiomioe* Today most acientiats reoognlse tluit ttie
requisite of achieving an esseatielist explmiatlon la impossible for 
there is neither pur© appearmiee nor puræ observation * .i^ew theo3?lef3 
arise and cause a reinterpret at ion of the old appoaraxiees axid thus 
change the very character of what is perceived» Nevertheless I 
xfould contend that a theory is still a theoxy whether of low or higji
g^eimTL\l±tjg a M  it eeems to m& that we can hold to the aooomixiishment 
of reasonable final sigYiifieanoe ixt theories of low generality (of* 19* 
4o3o) ]3ssentia3,ism tenda to block the foxmilatioii of new ox" better 
theories by agawuialng that it liae reaobed. f jxiallty* If the eesenee 
is found there can be no scope for fundamental theory révision*
ïlistoriea-lly, though finding edvocatos 'hi men like Oaiander and 
Berkley, this follows on from operationalism* In contract to more 
positivistic views, inatx'uiaentalisBi does not require . that theoretical. 
GGxictTpte oorrexaposid to observables; while in compsx?isoa to realism it 
makes no Instances of real entities I'jithin these concepts » 
Instrumentalism considers tîiat a theory is not some smsriary 
description, nor a generalised statement of the relations between 
observed data - merely a rule fox? mieilysing and symbolically 
rep3?esenting' gross experiences» Thus it provides an instnuaent or 
tecîmigiie for inferring observation statements from other observation 
statements (of» diagrojH III)»
Thus, while models msy be provided, they in no way correspond to 
reality for they are simply convenient shorthand for getting 
©xiperienees into order* Theories are useful tools; laws a'ce maxims
or directions to enable us to find our way about the scientific world «
Theories as maxlDia or principles of procedure provide us with 
ealeulatlng devices with which to make accurate predictions; 
organising guides for controlling and directing' research work; end 
practical, tools for giohieving control over a given field » lawB or 
theories bear no coJ^ reapondenee with reality (taTuth/falsity) for they 
are not discoveries with respect to essential reality* (Of » Toulmin 
1967, pp=121ffo) Rather they are inventions of the theoretician, 
patterns wbieh he uses to order Iiis e:icperieneeo So the kino tie theory
Sipplied to gases allows us to go from P1o¥1 to P2»¥2 without actually
assertixig anything in fact about the world*
This liae meant that axay confidence in science as a clue to the 
myGtes?y of reality has to bodio extent disappeared* The sciontiot 
has become merely a technical expert over an increasingly abstracted 
smd speolELlisGd realm in which any relatimishlp viith reality in its 
compos:!.'te moanrmg becomes v:b?'l:UELlly impossible» he is content to
manipulate his mathsBiaticoI. abstractions, striving for fpjoator unity 
mid elegance, but forgetful of ultimate meaning and significance »
Woienoe in this view is The mot'bo is 3 "Boyi't ask for
Its meayiing = ask for Its use»' This is strongly defensible for 
oontradiotory theories are held in msny fields & and their use 
determined by the situation* Whether one or the other, or neither, 
is true is deemed iDerelevsnt by tlie instnuaentallst» But the realist 
will always try to resolve a olasli of theories*
It does not follow that because a theoTy is instrwRental that it is 
reduced to the status of a fiction* Indeed such a oharge would be
denied by mi instrumentalist in that the oonoept of a fiotlon implies 
that a theory can be true "= and for him questions of truth are 
irrelevant* However, theories can be assessed for superiority in 
terms of usefulness, muoh as one tool osai be stqierior to another 
without any question of veracity*
This standpoint, then, allows more room for the observer' than the 
OBsentlalist positimi in teams of the imaginative creation of theories; 
and 1 find myself In substantial a^ greement tfith its positive attack cm 
essentialism* The emphaals on the knower who records and organises 
selected data, who Ed)stracts, idealises, construots and invents, is to 
W  welcomed as a positive contribution to the understanding of the role 
of scientific theories vis a vis reality* But I also contend that in 
what they negate several weaknesses bec(me apparent*
Reduotionistie* The likstrumentallst viewpoint is Mghly 
reductionisticp Its nfles lead nowhere in tenus of exploitation or 
real understanding of the world *= Indeed such a desire is excluded by 
its philosophical parameters# The idea of theories as merely scRae 
form of convenient shorthand is a].so misleading as theories display 
oharacterlstics that go beycaid this* What alxmt theories where ideal 
concepts are enq^ loyed and which are therefore not directly 
oorrelatible with experience g that have no pragmatic usefulness?
11*4*^» Ho Verisimilitude, (Cf,19,3o5o) Reduotionism carries over 
into the abandoning of gnentionB of truth/falaity« This ignores
that body of theories which move into the world of cmmon-stmse 
acceptance, as well ae the point that the development of any
satisfactory new theory entails the integration of new data into the 
body of scientific knowledge,
Usefulness8 Z^ eani^ ftgo The criteria of usefulness is a
reductionistic assessment of tZieory superiority, Copernicus' theory 
was ultimately better than Rtolemy's, not on the Imsls of greater
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ueefiilîiesB alcme, but on a better descriptive, explæmtory and
ooiFiprehensive power* It ïaade' more sense; it \m.B bagjiioally oloser to 
til© t:!?atli thoiigli not Itself ® true " » Thus while Instzimentaliem
can offer no objection to the existence of two ccntra/iictory theories 
if both are equally useful, this doss not in effect equate with 
scientific p3?aotic5©o For aXthoiigli both will be utilised in the ease 
of no new theory being available, or synthesis possible, the point 
remains that as long as this is the ease scientists seatreh for a theory 
which will resolve the eontz'éidietion »
Moaning cannot be reduced to use, which if not stated is implicit 
in "khis approach because "use ' refers to different situations which 
means that any essential meaning changes with the situation» Meaning 
mid use do not exhaust each other because sometimes when we use 
concep'ks we have to specify the sense in which we aaie using them --- and 
this JjEplles a meaning prior to use; or we may Imow how to use a 
concept 'correctly*, but yet not loiow its meaning, We can know how 
to apply the concept of entropy wlthi'w thermodynamics but fail 
miserably to understand the implications and meanings of this concept 
its overall physical &md pMloaophic&il signific^mce,
Testability* Scientific research, much of which is in
caBj)». jix!iIaiu.s5'v-î5i;-"=;s9R#55£5=s« ”
practice aiiaed at fielding evidence for or against a theory, undercuts 
the instrumental view* This imdertatclng would bo pointless if a
theory was not a genuine statement about reality, but simply a 
procedural policy* ï'bren more serious than this is the psieelusion of 
its adherents from admitting; the "physical reality" or existence of 
any "scientific objects postulated by a theory* - though.as to what 
physical reality actually is will be a debated po;mt« (Of* Toulmin 
W Y o  P0I21#)
The idea of testing assimees that there is something which can be 
affirmed or denied® It is therefore difficult to see just how in 
practice the instrumentalist can neglect falsification and stress 
a,pplicatioii alone» Popper writes :
"Instnmentalism can be formulated as the thesis that 
scientific theories *«• the theories of the so=«callecl "pure * 
sciences — are nothing but computation rales (or inference 
rules); of the same character, .fundamentally, as the 
computation rules of the so-called "applied* sciences,®*»»
How my re%)ly to instrumentalisni consists in showing that 
there are profound, differences "botween "pure® theories and 
toclmologioa]. computation rules, and that instrumental ism can 
give a perfect description of these rules but is quite imable
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to aecoimt for the difference between theia and the 
theories® Tims iBstr/.ujnantalie.m oollapoes®" (pooper 1972/a, 
PoirU)
The logical rolatlonB-bip between theories mid rules of compu'kation io 
not ayïmjîetriüÊkU Indeed the mrnmer in which the latter are tried
V  (LsavygmyiaTtT'■
oirk is quite differenl; froî« the way in which the former are tvx^ tedo 
The oTiQ is -bried out, the other tested I The terbrriraentol position 
cmmot accomit for real tests which strive to prove or diFjpi'ove, and 
subsequently eamiot. account for the phenoniena of scientific progress® 
Thus "by neglecting falsification, find stressing application, 
instrojuentiolism proves to be as obscurantist a philosophy as 
essentlalism#" (ibid p*113»)
11.3. REALISM
This holds that there is a reality external to man which he can 
approach in his scientific theories® It is the offspring.; of
essentlalism mid basically an attenuated form of that position in the 
light of the development of science* In a sense there is often little
practical difference between the realist and the instrument allot in 
the laboratory® (Of® Theobald 1969o p»123o) Historically the word 
"realism" has carried several connotations, but it can be taken to 
stand for that view which posits a Imowledge of a. real world which 
exists quite independently of our cognition of it® Therefore it is 
opposed to idealism i/hich suggests that the world is im some way 
dependent on mind; and opposed to instrumen'fcalism in suggesting that 
our scientific theories are in the arena of truth and not simply 
pragmatic tools® For realism, despite the fact that our 
descriptions of the world are stamped by our minds, being is prior to 
Imowing® This does not mean to say that the realist maintains that 
all Jiyipothetical entities exist eoiiio are real, some false, and often 
those accepted as false may bo utilised for practical purposes®
The realist view can be set out as consisting of the following 
principles ® (a) There are thooretloal terms which can bo utilised to
make reference to hypothetical entities® (b) Some of these 
hypothetical entities are possible existing entities, that is, real 
things with qualities azid operations in the real world® (o) Some 
candidates for existence are open to demonstration mid are accepted ms
1* Realism has been viewed in several ways a naive realism tends to 
essentlaliam; critical or sophisticated realism is popular today, but 
still :œma.ins cau#it in a closed universe; I prefer transcendental 
realism® (Of® Bhaskar 1973°)
real* Tbie does not neeeissitate all theories being regarded as 
perrTfc aining to the real, ‘but it does memi that this is tho of all 
seieiitifio iiiouiry® That which is accepted as instiuïïieiitsdly useful 
will 1)8 abandoned when a theory of comparable elogmice offers closer 
•anderstmiding to reality# For some real.iste, intelligibility rather 
than obsGzvability becomes the stamp of the real. It is the v'oi^ y 
power to order that shows the correspondence of a theory with the 
real world®
It is in this context, and in opposition to ese©ntiaJ,ism and 
inestx'iuiientaZiem, that Popper offers a third way of conjectureB, 
truth, an>d reality#
"third view* is not very startling or oven surprising,
I thinics It preserves the Galilean doctrine thsit the 
seiexitist alms at a true description of the world, or of some 
of its aspects, and at a true ©xplenatJ.on of observable facts; 
and it combines tliis doctrine with the non^Clalilem view 
that though tMs remains the aim of the scientist, he can 
never Imow for certain whether his findings are true, although 
he may sometimes establish with reasonable certainty that a 
theory is false." (Popper 19‘?2/a, p®114«)
I believe Popxjer has gone 'too far here and that we can entertain a 
roasonable certainty that a theory is true such as that the earth is 
a rough sphere® The aim, then, of science i&i no'fc to describe only 
the so-called primary qualities (geometrical shape etc.) as the
OBSoratialist once did, but to view all quEl.i’bies as equally part of 
G onstltuent reality.
There are problems facing tills position, especially if it falls 
into an micri'bioal approach which assumes some ultimaoy :m general 
acien'tifia theories, which grants them autonomous existence* A 
critioEû trsnscenciental realism is needed which allows room for the 
revelation of God, for the creativity of the mind, arid yet also 
realises thsvb there exists patterns of events that ave not mental. 
There is also a need to provide a broad base for the concept of what 
io real# An atoin is "real" at a certain scientific level, but bears
little correspondonce to everyday life® A table is "real* for most 
people as something they work at, eat off, etc#, but this will have 
little oigilficmice for the reality that 'khe atomic physicist pursues, 
while 'khe joiner will view it from yet another perspective# (Of 
S?cldington 1930, pp.xviff®) I would. ds?aw attention to the concept of 
modality (of# glossary) and note the interlacement and coherence of 
reality# In the final aialyeis things and events are to be
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analysed smd understood ;m their meaning, not their reaXnesrj#
r,m%!
It seems c'iûar that with i%ioreosi%ig speoialiscitioa, oiid deeper 
mid deeper shstraotioas, the essetiee of reality is 'beiiig lost® As 
mmi has driven over olosor to ’klie fmidammital structure of reality, 
he lias been forced to give up the oheriehed hop© of bXJll-JliiiM. 
imdorstmid:mg th.e wo'rld In which he lives; "whatever foatiaraentel units 
the world is put together from, they are moro delicate, more fugitive, 
more startling than we catch ;m the butterfly net of our Qensee." 
(Brom-roski 1973» Po30»)
Scientific objecti'vl'ky as total disinterestedness ie impossible®
As Horttoop recognizee s "physios is neither epistemologicolly nor 
ontologically neiitraX#" (1971 g p»3û«) Ifeisenberg a5?gues that, 
stemming from the Greek dualism of mjzid'^ matter (or fox®-matter), there 
enbored into Western thouglrb a dichotomy that was never reocnoiled® 
(1971B P«73«) Plowing from this, God was separated both from the 
*1* and the world in ouch a way that He a-pi^ esired in the philosophy of 
Beecartes onl.jr as a point of x^ eferenee to help establish the 
relationship beWeen the self and the world* The mechonios of 
Hewton meant a model which for science effectively oxcluded God and 
eiolf from the universe® I'b was tliought possible to describe the 
world with no reference to its creator, and this swif'kly was asmmied 
as a n.eo8S0f:n?y condition for naimral Boience (of* La:plaoe)« But the 
advent of the new physics has motmi; a. closer identification of the 'I® 
and. ‘the world once more; the objectivity onco deemed noocssEiry has 
gone® Perhaps it is time thad; God was put back into the yiioture, 
not as contained within the structure of croatlom, not as an appendix 
or oponing fillvp to rooearoh, but as its groimd and enclstenblal 
upholder (of® Oolossians 1§15-20® Eomans 11;36®)®
The 1-taan.isrb starts from some self-awareeness, some autonoirq?- of 
self or of the external world; he takes for grmitcd certain 'temporal, 
facts ' not only as temporary but as ult.l»iato starting poiii'os for all 
thought® But the distinction should be noted between mid
ultjjmte stmrkihg points # 'Inmodiately' we start %d.th awjselvesp 
from the ïimusm heart and from the reality of the world around us®
But this is quite temporal * There is also a point of ultimacy from 
which we oen also relate namely God and His revelation®
'Ultimately' the Tbelet roa3.1ee8 that he Is mot olame in am allem 
tmlverse, W t  kmows the Imf Imite, pesrsorml God who made the world and 
him# Btartlmg f??am the Slrimlty, he ha^ a hagile for meamimg emd the 
oomnmloation of meamimg (love) revealecl through the %mrk. and word of 
God# God reveals Himself though mot exhaustively; we are in His 
image ond Be is not some philosophie other# So there need he no loss 
of categoriese but @n attempt to integrate the whole of man's being in 
obedience to M s  origin#
God is the true personal universal above all other universels g but 
He also speaks about particulars, and therefore -we have no 
fuMamental problem as to universals and particulars# The Ohristien 
is called to start neither from mi abstract universal and make 
deductionsg or from isolated particulars « but from God# If it is 
true that 'in M m  live and move and have our being', then we cannot 
erect theories or arguments as though they had some being eqpart from 
God# I'fithin creation, man emd the external reali'by are made to go 
together, and because this is so, then men will eadilbit this idiatover 
their philosophical predilections# Ho mem can escape the fact of his 
creatediiess or the general providence akid common grace of God* Men 
cannot finally deny iidio he is, his essential mennislmess before God# 
Nevertheless Theism's basic claim is tliat nothing can be knovm unless 
God can be$ and is, knoim#
The Thelst Mil seek to avoid the trap of looking outirrards from 
Mmself as ultimate# He will seek to distinguish betifeen reality 
and illusion; he will accept M s  finiteness and dependence, and 
therefore avoid the feustration of trying to bi%13.d autonomous concepts# 
Go (a) the external world, (b) my own internal world, and (o) the logic 
of that position I hold, ifill, under God, begin to approach one 
another*
This Cëtrries specific implications for any Christian approach to 
sciontia* It will* jn the recognition that soientia has a religious 
root, enable soDie of the modern dead—ond problems to be avoided# The
s
laifs of science ere after all God's laws not nature s laws, as thouÆ 
nature were some autonomous province# (Of# ch#23«) The la^m of 
reality are not merely something that man inventas
"#$.#but rather laws that he discovers r.ore or less aptly, as 
God discloses his 1mm to the scientist# God's laws for 
phyeical things «« which we term scientific laws are 
imdeaTstandeble to us because God lias înade us in M s  Image#
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Yet they .not rationalistic In the sense that In 
prlnoijjie we ean Goraprohensively imderstsmd them, heoanse 
Goa'Hi ways are also above our waye* (Romans 11 ;33"36s 
Job 38g41*)” (Taxkie:J¥emien 1975» p»110«)
We eeekg thorofore, the XTdo of Ood§ not kho imle of ii-iTjeroonal laws 
of nature*
The Ohrlstlmi approach eeems to mo to entail a %'eoognition of the 
fntilit^r of any search for a rationalistic base for Imowledge. There 
is a vast difference between the imlfor&iity of cause and effect within 
a closed system an.tl the imlformity of oanse and effect in an open
Thus essen'bialisni mid positivisïîi aro :lnherently fallacious; 
in stsmctiire while i;he subjective approaches of insirmaentidism and 
idealism are inadequate. When iimm tried to Interpret reality within 
one modality of being he inevitably runs Into a regressive 
rednc'lionisnà (of® Appendlsc E)« The GZiristian in oes/vice before God 
will point out the essential unity, ae well as the manifest diversity, 
of creation §a a^ereated ordor^ tmd not just aa somethâjïg which 
happens to be there rmd which we can look at® Thus sclentifie 
theories will be exmiined, not only as they .relate interr^ al.ly to other 
theories and escternally to the phi/csioal world, but also in their %)laoe 
and relatiosliip within the Gteistian belief in creation, and the 
structure for that crea’TloUo
ÜO I believe we can move towards a t.on'hativo défini■t.ion of 
scientific 1mm as man«®iade representations, of varying degrees of 
validity, ei'blio:?? in iford or mathematical, symbol, of 'ii’i.e constant 
pattern^) Ip/ which the personal., infinite God opere:.tes in ruling His 
creatioUff Thus, while maintaining a realist poslticca as opposed to 
an instrumen'kalist, ‘this helps distinguish bei:ween reality and our 
representation of It* But any formulation of scientific laws ever 
remains iirperfeet, at best symbolic repreoen'bations, yet we can hold 
that they a??e intended to Imply and ref].oot a degree of trutli*
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12.1. IHmODUGTim
Bcientifio théorieB enable uo to satisfy three (iistinot needs 8
(a) to condense Imowledga into workable forme g (b) to imderstmid the
world; mid (c) to predict probable future courses of natural phenomena,
and therefore control events» As noted, there has been a tendency
to exclude the validity and explanatory power of theories and reduce
this to manipulative control® The basic moral and philosophical
problem is that of relativisai/soopticism® Thus the clioJ.oe be two en
competing thsorrles is reduced to an a,rbitrary utilitarian selection
because it ie hold that there is no objective standard of truth»
This view is hold despite the point that often the utility or
fruitfolnesB of a theory oannot be detormined imtil the theory has
been chosen and developed# It is my contention that theories are
governed by a degree of truthfulness - they are either good
BX>pro3d.mations (reflections) of the truth of God's universe or a
denial of that truth® Xn this chapter 1 wish to outlilne some views
of the basic Gomi)(ment8 of theories before moving on to a brief note
1oonceming 0.ln?istlmi perspectives on bzuth and theories*
12*2® DIVERGE VIW0IHT8 OF Tm:ORY GOIWOmm'S ^
12.2.1, P® JMiam (cfa10»2®3#) hhewell liad drawn the Image of« î‘«ca.a 6yvta4/-'m;nii.i'a»;iïsAa5.'ïin:isr*'=iîA*»îMaa»iii':r» M tf» ■‘•v
scientific progress as the confluence of tribufcariefa into larger rivers, 
ami Miem acquiesced that successful theories bound together 
oxperimontel laws into larger wholes# Duhem regarded theories as 
'^ representing' groups of laws rather than a'fc'bributiag; to them an 
explanatory function# This view was based on an idea of 'bhe sts/uoture
of theories as axiom- systems with rules of oorreepondenoe correlatlxig 
the axicmatie. terms with experimentally detemined magnitudes® (Of»
Lose© 1972p p#89.)
This is seen in the kinetic theozy of gases where the arxiome give 
rolations of terns such as molecule, velocity and mass# The axiom 
BjBtem is linked to experience by means of the concept of the root-
iv«j»l:v ~
1. These viewpoints are noted to givo a "feel" of the territory„ I 
ma not concerned to provide a ca?itlgue of them as tMs would talce up 
too much room, and would not pertain directly to the thesis®
2. A particularly interesting work here Is W.Young (1967)
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mean.-scpare velocity of all molécules® Eiiles of correspondeneo 
relate this root'^ Bieao/^ Bqiiare velocity with pressure mid temperature o 
Duhem ïield that this theory was valuable because it boimd together 
previously imrelated laws comicoting; the maoroseoplo behaviour of gases 
(the laws attributed to Boyle, Charles and G m h m  are deductive 
coiisecriienceB of theoretioaJ. assumptions); but saw this ae 
representative mid denied that the model had any eirplaaatory function# 
The model associated with a theory may have heuristic value but is not 
itself a premiss in the explanations given by a theory» Acceptable 
theories must give experimentally testable laws, but the basic 
proBUppositions of the theory may include magnitudes v;hieh cannot be 
correlated with processes of measurement® Thus Duhem, like Vihewell, 
contended that there were no irreducible facts devoid of theory*
He made the Gruolal distinction between axiom 
Bysterns aw.d their application to reality as the bfusis of hia analysis 
of th@ atruoture of théories * He saw a ]^BlGàl theory oomprising
two different sets of statements s (a) 'khe tomykhQois of the theory, 
which is a collection of statements which cannot be experimentally 
verified; and (b) the dictionary for the hynothasia wliieh relates the
* ^ ** • tT?tg:rg^ 3faTCigsaXM.'ffJ--itfj« if „ v  «w
former to magnitudes that can be empirically determined# Therefore 
it is meaninglcsB to talk of the truth of a theory in itself because 
no empirical meaning is Involved* (Cf# Loses 1972, p#136«) He 
further subdivides theories into matheme,tioal and meolianieaj. sections 
on the basis of differing formal struotures* In the ma.thema,ticaJ. 
theory each decisive tmm :hi a hypothesis is correlated directly and 
separately witli magnitudes th&it gbxi bo empirically determined 
physicM geomo'kry). In the mechanical theory some terms in the 
hypothesis are correlated as above, but through functions of 'khese 
terms (e*g* the individual molecular velocities in kinetic theory®)
/
12#2«3» Ro Itore# In opposition to Mieia, Harre shifts the centre 
of Investigation from the formal deductive etimoturos of theories to 
the associated models, appealing for a Copomioen revolution that8
"«•ct.GOBGists in bringing models Into the central position as 
instruments of thought, and relegating deductively orgmilaed 
structures of propoei’bions to a heuriatlo role only, and 
resiirrseting* the notion of the generation of one event or 
state of affairs by another* On this view theory 
construction becomes essentially the building up of ideas 
of hypothetical mechanisms(l970o P*116@)
He distinguishes throe aspects of a theoryg (a) statements about a.
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model ; (b) eiujiirieal laws; and (c) t:msisfoz?raatioB rules* This leo/Is 
to a stress on the eseioteatial hypothesis iudioatod by a model, rathe:e 
than a deductive atruoture whioli can be developed from deecrip’kive 
hypotheses* Lose© depicts his analysis of the structure of the 
kinetic theory of gases as fallowss (1972, p»144o)
MODBI. mmBPomATim Bmim mPIRIOAL LAhU
lîxietontlal hypo'kheees 
"There eicist molecules "
Bes criptlve hypo'bheses 
"Collisions are elastic* 
® E3 constant*
Causal
'Pressure is caused by 
molecular Ijmpaets "
(»ïf I than P»)
Modal
"Tempera-ture is the mean 
kinetic energy of the 
molecules *
(*T if, and oMy if, IŒ*)
P¥ oonatant
j..2#2e.4f@ LofjeOo Lose G himaelf suggests that we always need to
distinguish 'kh.G axiom system and ‘the application of 'khio to experience» 
II© illustrates this from the 19th century, where Lobachevsky, Bolyai 
and liemsmii invented axiom eys'kemo which were different from the 
Eiiolidean one» In the Euclidean system it ie assumed that only one
parallel line can be draim through a point not on a given straight
%
line ; but the new developments ïiialie different assumptions «
Lobachevsky and Bolyai replaced it with the assujjiption that tlirough a 
given point there are tifo lines parallel to a given etralght line; and 
from this and the other axioms of their system, Lobachevsky deduced 
that the sum of the angles of a "brlmigle would be lose than 100 degrees, 
decreasing as the area, of the triante increased. For Riemann there 
were no parallel lines to a given straight line, and the sum of the 
angles of a triangle was always greater than 180 degrees, increasing 
as the area Increased# TMs a formal deductive system ®â® had po 
grounds for claiming to be 8upo3?ior to a formal doduckive system "B". 
(ibid p»132.)
Loseo go08 on, draining froia the work of Bempel, Nagel and 3^ anlc, . 
to suggest that today there are three typos of criteria of
acceptability for scientific, laws and theories# (a,) Tha correspond™ 
enoe between a law/theory and empirical, data; (b) the logical 
TUGlakionshlps that one law/theory may have with other laws/theories ;
3* The Greeks were of course the masters of the abstractions of 
geometry and while Euclid came to the foro, others msd.e many 
different asowpitions and axiom systems# (Gf# Timibull 1962, ehs®1->4o)
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and (o) the hemrlGtio power, of "khe la%/theory# Thera
are also extra-solentiflo considerations ®
12h2o5u E» Na/#1 » Nagel clistiiiguiohes betweon e^ rperimentol laws and
«:ciaii:ci;%ar^ SLKiJrssa'.T:nxK:x3x.\r=s*r:a^ r:s>'?i^ a^ iii *•
theoretieal lawe, seeing the former as relating obse:rva,‘bles and being 
Inductive In cili^ j^ raoter, wîd.le the latter deals with what is not 
directly ohssrvod and is therofors 'basically deductive 'hi oMtraotor#
(Ofs Nagel 1974» p«79f*) The question of the observable is a thormy 
one# Before space craft the othere side of the moon was always :m 
|)r1jxelple directly observable; on the other Wmd, alpha particles 
are not thus observed, we merely note the tracks left hj them in a 
Wilson Oloud Ohomber# To compoimd the issue, Magel notes that all 
reports of observgïblee as?e ultimately couched in some theory»
He makes another difference between esgierimental laws and theories 
in tha;k the former are "without æccoptlon. formulated by a single 
statement" while the latter are norioally systems of related statements 
(ibid p«88#}# He goes on to suggest that there are three major 
components of a theory# (a) A scientific theory’ ie often pointed to 
by the materials familiar to experience or by certain features recorded 
in other theories. This means that there is an "abstract calculus 
that is the logical skeleton of the ©icplanatory system, and that 
'irûpllcitly defines" the basic notions of the syotenio” (ibid p#90«)
(b) If a theory is to explain experimental lat?e it must be more than 
Implicitly defined emd a set of rules assi/y.i:b.ig empirical content to 
the abstra,ct ealciClns Is required# Theory must be related in some 
way to empirical reality or it osimot be tested® (c) There is sm 
interpretation or model for (a) which fills out the abstract oBloiilus 
xa more or less familiar terms end viBualisabl© concepts ©
12.3. TmOEY FOmATim AKD SCimiTIFIC mPLANATim
How m?e theories formed? Different philosophioeil 'traditions 
have emphasised different ways and it seems foolish to confine the 
dieeovGry or oonstructlon of theories to any pa/eticulaa? path# There 
is rooTii for the InduetiveMdeaJ. of Baeom, Hill and Ikmie mMMi seeks to 
generalise iiiom particulars to univeraa].s ; and also for the deductive- 
spirit which postulates the derivation of VGrifiabl.e observation 
statements from generalisations. The former is better seen, it seems 
to me, as the psychology of science; while the latter concarns the logic 
of science® But as well as those approaches there is ample scope for 
oraativo imagination, the leap of creative thought which neither
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induction or deduction can encompass » While tliere may be a 
definitive logic for testing theories once created, there would seem 
to be little room for logic in their creation# Popper of course 
argues tha'k there is a logic of discovery# It is often the novel 
combination of ideas that leads to now theories, and Koestler 
indicates that creative imagination, in both science and literature, 
is frequently tied to the Interplay of two concep'kuel framewordcs #
(of# Koestler 1970, p.322.)
Bcientifio theories seek to tolce oome
system, which can be anything from the universe to an atom, from a 
bird to an eoo-reglon, and give an adequate description of it within 
the parameters of a p£irticular discipliiie. They do not therefore 
mavfiine concrete reality, but abstractions from that reality (md are 
therefore never exhaustive explanations or descriptions » The
scientific description of such systems aims at specifying the struerkure 
of the system by desoribin^^ the sub«=»aystems and their arrmigemente and 
connections o Tills in *kmi leafis to the amination of the sub«= 
systems and the reoogKiition of a buil'b-in limitation@ No such 
investigation eon ever b© exhaustive but will seek to specify the 
properties of the system being examined using the fewest possible 
predicates»
matorieaXly there has been differing views as to this process of 
BystematiKation* Aristotelian systématisation envisaged Imowledge 
as ordered by arranging the objecta of knowledge and simply using' 
generalisations to facilitate this ordering process. The Galilean 
oysteimtiMatlon sought to sys’tematize the knowledge expresBed in a set 
of generalisations by ordering the generalisations * (Gf« Havre 196?» p® 
72.) Harre contends that a particular happening is explained when 
the conditions under which it happens are isolated (of* ibid p.82.).
A logical condition of this Isolation being the enr-isteiice of a 
gesieralisation(a) linking tlie happening to be explained with other 
events which could be settled on as whole/part oausstive of the 
bappenlmgo The formulation of â3?ia'fcûtle end Galileo@ as well ae the 
typically modern posi'idon of Haa?re, are inadequate from a Theistie 
point of view*
12*1#2# Consistenoy. Theobald contends that all "explanations must 
be reasonable, and they must be consistent with wliat we loiow. **" (1969» 
p. 104.) This may seem a ftd/ely strMghtfonward assertion, but cere
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is needed for if all theoretical poetulations are bomki by oonfonolty 
to ciixxent Icnouledgo there would be & sti fling of seientifie advance# 
OouM Einstein have developed relativity if he had mado it consistent 
with known Newtonian meehani<se?
It sraema safe to osaest that
there are no general charactezeietics of all explanations, though a 
considerable number of people siigges't; that 'khore mist be a predictive? 
element o hut no'b all explanations are intended to predict *- for 
example, historical explana'bions® Again, predictions are posaible 
apart from explanation. I can sai%ly predict -fchat a piece of dry 
paper will bum if I put a lighted match to it - without in any way 
oirplaining the theory of combustion® (Bimilolrly with the assertion 
*1 will go to the theatre tomorrow" or Boyle's Law.) Qonversely 
e3cp3.8aiation does not impX;v prediction g "wo c&m oseplain the 
phenomenanologloal laws of thermodynamics by reference to atstistieal 
mechanics, but we are not at the eavae ttoio predicting them, because we 
know of them to start with#" (Theobald I969» p<s105.)
Ibcplaâia'iîions seem to be deductive in nature cuid. so are dependent 
on the preBilsses being better known (and tme) than that which io to be 
eicplained*. But then arises the problem "khat prémisses themselves 
will be couched in some tlieory, which drives us back to the validity 
or otherMse of a given woltanschamuigsleteeo The problem that 
iùiïïiediately obtxuâes io that if the premisses wa3?e 'knio and the 
deduction valid there is no room left for doubt or the overthrow of a 
theory. Yet obviously we do doubt; we clo overthrow theories» 
Deduction, then, is best seen, not so much in the construction of a 
theory, but in the elaboration of the implications of sophisticated 
theories to bring them to a point where a comparison with observables 
is possible. Thus the basic relationship between theories aj'icl theory 
implication is deductive; while the relation between theory laiplioation 
and observation is non«deduotive » There is a logical gap be'fcween 
theory and data, for it must always be remembered khat In a real sense 
theories do more than simply order the available data, they also create 
and select data, thus determining the meaxiing and significance of 
observations»
1^ o3o3*»2s„ArQ Limited® There ie the basic impossibility of 
comprehensive explanation of wholes in terms of ports® In biology.
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for InstcmoGg It is Impossible to reduce ex.pl£na'bioBs to the physical 
aspects of the biological system® Life has no meaning In terms of 
rslcsg biology is meaningless in se^ ta.ra‘bion from life®
12®3o3»3o3^vels of IkManatioRo in the biological discipline we 
can note the postulation by Simpson of distinct levels, or modes, of 
explanation (of* Jeeves I969, p«6l») (a) Explanations that answer
the qtiebtion JiowTg and conceive themselves with the meehanlsn^ G involved; 
(b) explanations that aiiewer the question wha.t for?, mid which seek 
answers oonoeming the function of an object; and (o) answers to the 
question how, did th£yb. come .aboiit?, which io concerned with the 
history of organiemo* Of theses (a) is often seen as reductionietic;
(b) as coMiiositionist; and (e) as basically irrelevant as far as 
phyoicB is concerned» Bimpson claims that explsmations may be 
Gidiaustive at & partiou3.ar level, but this never means they ore 
eidisus tive overal 1 »
1:1 the forimtion of theories, mialogiee
and models play an important role, providing a fruitful source of 
theories although becoming dangerous and misleading if over-eztemded 
to asBumo all ‘klie cha5?anters present in new simiations® An analogy 
is constiucted on the basis of some observed or postulated similarl by 
between two situolions; while a model is simply a systematic analogy 
linking some phenomenon alreacby' knoi-m with one under investigation» 
There is a formal similarity ;m the equations of a mathematical model 
between the two sets of phenomena, though there may be no likeness of 
the phenoimna themselves - the seme differential equation describee the 
vibrations of an elliptical membrmie and the motion of an acrobat.
(Cf® Barbour 1968/%), p»158o) Xfell Imoim examples of the use of 
analogies are the development by Huygens of the wave theory of light 
on the pattern of sound theory, end the development by Fourier of the 
theory of heat flow on the pat'kern of fluid flow :ln hydraulics®
Mel ogles and models have diverse forms and relationships to 
theories® Harre notes two g calling them mioromornhs and paromorBhs.
Cï?ae5Kai^ tt:iiïi?«ci7Tas«cEiz5Srsï»a.7ri3
(Harr^ 19^7» p.86») The former is after the rneimer of a pilot plant, 
where a small scale model is constructed as an exact representation of 
the actual or intended scheme. The paramorph on the other hand is 
based on parallel laws in different fields such that the proGose in 
one field (say mechanical) is represented in an analogous s^ stera (say 
electrical)# Bimilétrly, Magel, drawing on Majuroll, divides analogies 
into two broad categories - substantive and formal* Substantive
C^’gAa?rf-.'cv-a ■-s.v.-gtccja »c4p^it«to
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.analogies re la te  a, aystem of elements with ©peelfic fa m ilia r  
properties coimeoted in  known ways (laws fo r the system) to a model 
fo r the theor^r oonstriiotlon of a second system. The formal type 
Involves a laioiRi, 'but abstract, set of relations rablier than the more 
or leas visualisable oonneotlone of the substantive analogy » (Of®
Bagel 1974» p»110»)
Analogies have a jiowerful. heurlstlo  ro le , mi1; th is  can be 
variously interpreted w ithin d iffe rin g  philoaophioal frameworks ©
Duhem and Qampbell were both awEire of th is  ïie iiris tio  power; but while 
Duhem sa,w the assertion of a theory as merely that of a positive  
analogy, Gaapboll saw i t  aa 'khe assertion of a pooltive^^plus'^nGutral 
analogy» TMe Duhem saw the development of the basic k in e tic  theory 
of gases to the van der ¥aal,s m odification as a replacemen'l; of one 
theory by another, while Campbell saw the development as an extension 
of the theory® (Of® Lose© 1972, PqI^B»)
The idea of extension seems more popular than that of replacement 
end lu c id ly  expoivids th is  viewpoint, seeing extension as e ith er
formal (where the lo g ica l censeqtiences ere dxmm out by deduction) or 
infomssl ( where the tlieory is  extended by extending the model on which 
the theory Is  based)» (Of* Harro 1967, p<>98fo) Two kinds of model,-» 
extension are noted — cleployiæirb and development. 3)aploy»aent involves 
the addition of the description of a model o f new predicates by analogy 
with a cora?es%)onding re a l situation® In  development there is  -bhe 
supe:f?impositioB of on® model on another#
Hetivming to Campbell it will be remembered that he saw a theory 
consisting of a hy/iothesis and a dlctionm?y, but he also mannttilned 
that a theory must be associated with an analogy. Any acceptable 
theory reveals an analogy to a system governed by previously Imown 
laws# Tims a theory "always escplaine laws by showing tlia'b if we 
imagine that the system to which those laws apply consistEi in some way 
of other systems to which some other laiown laws apply, then the laws 
can be deduced from the theory." (Campbell 1952, p-96»} The 
analogy is therefore drawn in  the kinetic theory of gases between the 
molecules of the gas and a swerm of psn?tioles which are assumed to 
follow Mewton's laws and experience oolllslonB with no loss of energy, 
Thus Campbell saw an analogy ai3 more than a heuristic device; it was 
an essential j?art of a theos?y* HempeX, while conceding the value of 
analogies, criticised this claim, maintaining tlmt as analogies do not 
occur ae preraissee in any doductionss of experimental laws they cannot
be part of the stimc'ture of theories©
EovieWe An analogy oon never he totally identified with, nor 
seen as, a complete description of some phenomenonfos? it is merely a 
simplified and limited setting forth of the relationships of 
phenomena irnth other phenomena. An analogy is only similaa? in some 
eharaeteristicB; models suggest only possible hypotheses. Malogies 
end models have indeed a heuristic value but care must be taken to 
keep inessential elements from coming to the fore* A model is not 
the theoay itself. In the filial analysis all scientific concepts 
must in some sense describe or explain physica.l systems to which they 
refer, end while analogies and models m?e useful to this end they are 
only means®
Several points can now be made. ' (a) There are clusters of 
possible explanations of any given phenomenon and a particular? 
explanation will depend on how 'the event is abs'iiracted from the 
concrete reality and e^ cemiined* It is possible to give physical 
explanations of man as well as biological, psychological, social and 
so on g 'but no accoimt ever ez’cplains man man. (b) It follows that 
different modes of ©sqlanation are not logical, alternatives or 
conipetitors of one another* (o) We can extend this into the 
religious domain and point out that biological, social and 
psychological œcplanations of man's behaviour mie not ei^haustive, nor 
necessarily to be regarded as oompetitors of biblical affirmations 
concernirig man» There can be no logical basis for claiming 'ühat a 
valid scientific explanation denies the aetivi'hy of God, and this meeds 
stressed against both the non-christien who would absolutise science in 
an endeavour to detMone God, and the Clniistian who eoes science as a 
tlireat 'bo his faith.
The revela'bion of God includes both disclosi'»res and dioco'vers?y* 
Science is concerned Mth 'bhe diacoyogp^  of the truths of God's 
creation as revealed in the natural order* More generally we think 
of revelation as the dipelqsiire of God to man of Himself in His word 
and works. Whatever order and 'unification wo discern in phenomena is 
a part of God's created order, deterMnc-id a,nd sustained in an ultimate 
sense by Him» The proper (ippreciatlon of this will prevent falling' 
Into the tra;o of ex'breme objectivism or subjectivisme Belief in ‘the
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Creator God and Itle revelation will provide a basis for oonfidenoe in 
the reality of the external world, end :ln the sensory and intoilectuaX 
abili'bies of man to subdue and rule over ereation® Man in his 
soienti-fio activity is aetualising the oultural mandate given to hJja 
whether he recognises it or not (of® 24»2a2»)#
12,«3*i1 « The .Deficiencies of lloin^Theistio. Gonceptjs® The scholastic
error was bo put truth simply in God's mind and deny miy objective 
manifestation In the externad. world. But today truth as an absolute 
has been abandoned altogether# The Truth that alone makes all 
temporal truth possible Involves a sharing in the fulness of meaning 
of the cosmos in Christ#
"This mean© that we have once and for all given xvp the illusion 
of possessing the norm of t3?uth In our owïi fallen selfhood.
We have arrived at the self^laiowledge that outside of the 
light of Divine Revelation we stand in falsehood»
Any one who gr^ asps this Divine Revelation with all his 
heart abides in the Truth# Abiding In the Truth frees our 
insight into the horizon of human mmerlence from the 
prajudices of imamience»philosophy, and it also en£Û>les 
theoretical knowledge to be directed to the Truth# At the 
same time it cuts off at the root the overestljnatlon of 
synthetic scientific îoiowledge, which remains bound x/ithin 
the temporal horison.®" (Dooyeweercl 1969, Vol. 11, po564®)
Becular concepts, at most, see truth as a relation of correspondence 
sustained by a mental affirmation with noetic form, or shut wp in the 
arena of verification/refutatlmi. 5iie basic fallacy is the
absolutisation of some aspect of the created order and se@k.in/; 
subsequent explanation of all things from that perspective. This can 
only lead to frustration esid relativism# There is a general foiling 
to appreciate that theories are man's attempt to roflect the ordering 
laws of God# In thle failure the above views (of#12#2#) seem cauglit 
in a Kantian dilemma of having some d:mgym , sloh which can never be 
finally explicated® This fails to roalisG that nothing exists by 
itself, but stands in interwoven (enkaptleal -■> see glossary) 
relationship with the rest of creation and before the face of God#
This is 88 true of scientific theories as devotions#
The idea, of a gocB^ t>f*^ >th0-gapi9 is absurd# But It should be noted 
1;ha;h this idea, is not only from distant eenturieso hliiteliouse writes ü
"X am myself inclined to think that the mystery of God's 
Providence lies deeper than, the eruption into nature of such 
interference (eo® mind over matter) and I am attracted by the 
fact that scientific explanations and predictions rest now on 
' the law of groat numbers * ; ihat fuiidtanental physical laws are
statiBtioal and not ©xaolj la the popular eenae® Mhy tlds 
should he so in an ixiterosting matter for specMa,ticm® It 
may provide a ouffielent room to manoeuvre beneath the 
observable, regular processes, for the personal car© of God 
to he actively exercised»" (1952, p»121o)
The last sentence here is crucial for the idea of *rooDi io manoeuvre® 
suggests that things as?e more or less tied u%) aeiemtifloally hut that 
God still has a little scope for action. This leaves God as Lord 
over a steadily dwindling territory, the explanation of the left-overs 
from scientific endeavour* But thio is not the God who is there*
Ifkien Jesus asserted that His I%ther 'Hakes the sun rise cm the evil 
cpid on the good, mid sends rain on the just and the unjust' ; or asked 
us to look at 'the birds of the £iir§ they neither sow nor reap nor 
gather into bams, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them' (Ht® 5»45s 
6;26o)|H© was not putting foriferd some olahii which could be taken over 
and explained scientifically at a later, date, nor was He presenting 
some-bhing incompatible with the physical mmmor in which the planets 
move or birds feed# Eather He was pointing to the ultimate truth 
that God is in oxietential control of His creation# ^
1..2j&mlA.. aa_a Hatrlsc# The Box’ipljuml vieifpolnt seems to me to
present truth &m a matrix within which (loti's creation lives and moves 
and hae its bolng* There can be nothing outside of Eis (meation; 
while within it God reveals reality ;m ways bounded by His ordering 
law. No îcnowlodge ever can be (or Is becoming) in separation from 
God's la%#-structm?o (nomos -cosmos) of the universe. The word 'truth' 
in Scripture means etedfastneas, certainty, reliability, and this
4* HacKay vjrdtes somewhere that s "But if cnee we recognise that
at least most theological categories are not 'in the same pimie' (in 
the same logical subspace) ae most scientific categories, there is no 
longer any theological merit In hunting for gaps in the scientific 
pa,ttem« Gaps there are in plenty. But®©.#it would seem to be the
Ohristian's duty to allow - indeed to help these gaps to fill or
widen as they will, in humble and oheerfui o%)edience to the tmth as
God reveals it through our scientific disciplines# # # »" This is an
excellent statement although it does carry a latent confusion be'Ween 
'religious' and 'theological® statements which will be returned to at 
a later date# Then Maolay goes oas "©ooabelievlng that to hajve 
theological stakes In scientific answers to scientific questions is to 
err in company with those unbelievers who do the lilce#" ( From 
'The Christian Graduate' Vol.VI, 4o p#l63#) There is a potential 
danger here of losing sight of the Inherent religious foundation of 
science itself# Nevertheless the point that Oteistians are to seek 
to fill the gaps in scientific lmowlec!g;e is valid#
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unfoldf3 the meaning of the injimotlon to "stand in the truth®" iiie 
prerequisite to true theoretical reflection is a standing in the Tsmth® 
I'hie ean never be reduced to an atomistic concept of truth, or to a 
Kantian ding an sioh®
(of* 21*1*1.) VJe need to distingulah 
different horizona or i;ays of Imowing®
"lllien it comes to human iaïowing, that integral act of the full 
bodied man apprehending objects with raiderstanding, the first 
thing to be said ia that the most fundamental, the largest, 
fined. Siorizon within which limnen knowing necessarily takes 
place is the Truth. Mo Imowledge ever just is« The fact 
that an Individual human subject gets to know an object 
structured aeeorclLng to creational, order is all pointing 
directly to the Truth within which the whole operation is 
framed and which it is to embody." (Beerveld undated, p«*3o)
hliile there are different horizons or levels of Imowledge, these do 
not exist in watertight compartments. The Christian will never in 
a Scriptural way be able to coHipartmentalise his scientific activity 
from Scriptural truth® Each individual is a whole, hlo experience 
and thought being part of his whole life as a man before the face of 
the Lord, and any compear tmental is at ion will mean being untrue to 
himself@ i:o creation, a/ki to God® It will me&m a schisophrenic 
existence* Our loiowledgeg in all its facets, is inevitably one web. 
Undoubtedly our knowledge has different dimensions in that God heM 
varying' holds on Hie creation — inter alla,® in terms of special and
^  cg^ a,-jrjrsrjrajxTJ.'XKPJpr:ijr.-3 V  A-
general revelation - but Re alone gives all individual things thei]? 
identity® Jjidividua3. identity which is ever interwoven with diverse 
and universM'-wide orderings before Mini; "For of him, ond through him, 
and to him, are all things s to whom be glory for ever®" (Rom* 11;56.)
ZfecKay (in Jeeves 1969, p*68f*) Illustrates the complànientary 
aspect of differing horizons of îniowledge as follows s two people are 
sitting on a cliff top overlooking the sea; a light is seen flashing 
on and off out to sea® One of the men, a keen physicist who (sazcrie.© 
all sorts of scientific equipment in the back of his cm?, says that 
given a litti,© time he will give a full account of the wave-'length, 
emission rate, frequency, etc* of the flashing li^ i^to His friend,
however, is worried because in his youth he learned morse*
.Eventually he works out that the light is telling them that the cliff 
they are sitting on is about to orumblo into the sea® The plijrsioist's
account of the light, however accurate at i'ks level, was quite leioking
an integral knowledge of the significance of the light*
Is a attractive analysis (of* l6*5.2»2*)p but I must 
contend that the two essplanations aræ not eo®pleroGntaey<, The light 
in this context 1b qualified in laeaning by the eonmmnicablon content 
and not by physical analyBiB® The meaning of the event is not given 
in the rnideratonding of ita frequency^ emlsBlom ratOp etc 09 hut in the 
social import it hears* The danger that always confronts the 
scientist is of forgetting that; hi.s disclpliiie abstracts from reality* 
Yet liaving said l;his X muât also acid that there is a kernel imcleus of 
modal irrednoihility Ixi each law-sphere (modality) which cannot be 
explained by reference to other sjiheres of beings But centrally we 
must determine of an event what is its primary qualifying modality and 
refrain from indulging :m moaningleBB objootivity.
o,.. Tlpistic  ^°A Priorio ^ a To talk :hi a limiting way about truth 
it is best to start any discussion from biblical ajxriorls<r. Seerveld* 
a leading aestheticianp has witten thats
"AceorcUng to the Boriptureap Truth is the way God does things®
ÂB God of i’îTuthp Yalweh ie the utterly stedfaety firmly 
established covenanting God who has ateyJng power for ever and 
ever* His deeds show ’Tru.th in that they holdo have an 
05?cler:liig reality that is able to stand idiatever traffic bofir^ s 
dowïi on them® The Word of the Lord9 at its vezy funding 
bottom^ is epitomised by Truth because that Word God speaks9 
whether the Lai/ at 8inai or the Commands in the beginning9 is • 
completely triietworthyjj certain of fru.itg effecting what will 
last* Wherever the Truth appears ^ 1;hore is a God-revcalingg 
a faithful healing dynamic that enriches those who are 
responding to its development* This is why the biblical 
expression *to stand and walk In the Truth^ is pregnant with 
îfieani'nge” (deerveld undated9 p*1®)
Given this conte]ct and the idea of the differing horizons of 
triithfuMGSOp it is important to distinguish the varying a jiriprij> 
which bound our îraowledge and require our obedience® Seerveld 
preoents three theses which may usefully be adapted here (ibid ppo3™4o)*
(a) TÎ10, f’oqt'^aw of truth which establishes the knowledge man attains 
as true If g and only if 9 it develops Christ " s Lordship of the cosmos 
asia plcf.!s«i0 Him, (ij) hMoIi asssss -fchG
ImowledgG men gains as correct if $ and only if 9 the relative states of 
affairs Imown are kept relative 9 related to the rest of the cosmos in 
proper context and relationship * (Of criticism of MacKay above*)
(c) The criteria of aeciiracgg which holds that; Imowledge obtained by 
man is accurate Ifg and on3y If, the subject's îmowing conforms with 
the law«strueture related to a specific feature or function of a 
knowable object»
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lînder (a) iie discozsi that laïowlcxlge ach.ie'ved is true if it 
de'velûpes Lordship of the earth &mi Bets forth Hie redeeming
prosence (of, - all things are redeemedg %h* 1;22* Col*
True iciiowledge leaclo into the Timthg hut eJ.eo will have a critical 
awareness of the sin that permeates all human ImowleclgGe Yet it 
will lead to true truth and give an edifying ttoist« l&ider (h) we 
note that îaïowledge is considered correct wider specified limiting 
conditions * Fian^ s ambition to integrate reality about himself teacls 
to make him mistaken about reality so that he absolutizes or minimizes 
nheit he Iqiows beyond its rightful place® But as. Galvin pointed out g 
knowledge must serve God or it becomes an idol® Correct knowledge is 
constrained by the cosmic order* Under (o) we see that the 
conseqnencse of true^ -God-^ directed- discemvjjent is accurate loiowledgo*
One of the most widespreaxi ideas today is that true and false are 
characteristics only of propositional statementsg or that to say 
something is ^true^ is merely 1:o give some "concessive signal liiæ 
V®^p yGs'g the cat is ox?, the mat®" (ibid p*g@) This reduces truth 
to the iiimilpulations of logical properties and linguistic analysis/ 
co:<iimdroj/?Sg stiff ling any penetrating discussion of the wider 
ImplicatioîiB of truth* Truth is not an attribute of things or 
events g sometimes present g sometimes laek:hig* Hence 2 ^ 2 ^ 4 is 
not a truth ix?. itself y becanee in itself it is meaxiingleas * M l  
things e^ clst avid m?e memiing only as they stand in relation to 
creation g end to their Greater a
CM Psm 13 
Tm im HODOLOGY OF 80I#0B  I
Oliiapt/ers 10 to 12 concerned, various porspeotivee of scientific 
theories vis a vis reality* I now wish to look more closely at the 
relation of theories to scientists g or how theories are de^ iived*
I%ch light Goi'i be shed on an widerstending of science by studying the 
processes whereby hyrpotheses are first disoovered/invented; and how 
they az-'o established and, confirmed into the corpus of scientific 
îaïowledge (cf« eh® 15}® There are no simple answers as to how 
theories originate, although it is wid.ely believed that “the’ 
scientific method is an entity which governs all scientific processes»
At the outset the concept of “the* scientific method must be 
regarded as fallacious, if only for the reason that oompoting views 
of it are presented by differing philosophise» Chapters 10 to 12 
indicated no consensue of what science itself leg so it is even less 
likely that there will be a consensus of methodology® Priestly 
suggested ch&mc© was the key to discovery^ Planok that the process 
was s:U£iply an extension of commmi-sense ; some highlight the interaction 
of observation and esqjeriraontg othosrs the collection of “facts “ ; others 
inspired creativity§ while yet others eon1;end that there is no such 
’thing’ as ’the® scientific method® Bridgman asserts thats
"The scientific method, as far as it is a method, is nothing 
more then doing one’s damnedest with one’s mind, no holds 
barred® hlmt primarily distinguishes science from other 
;Wtellectu%l enterprises in which the right answer has to bo 
obtained is not method but the matter." (1950, p»3‘?0«)
13.1. *M3® aCXEwTXPXC mwiim)
32»®c’3CS:
In popular thought scientific method is seen as the empirical 
collection of facts with as little bias as possible, which yields 
under inspection some ordep? from which a hypothesis can be formed, 
tested cmde if sufficiently verified, pass to the status of a 
scientific law* This idea. ie widespread oven among practising 
scientists who often have little philosophical or historical awareness 
oonceming their o m  discipline* It is believed that this 
scientific method, of sitting: down with an empty mind before the faoto, 
is the only road to truth® Thus many defexid this viewpoint *- that 
there is a pmL'tioular and definite scientific method peouliar to 
science «> and olaim it as the sole route to loiowledgo of va3.ua/mesning.
253
Orne of the reasono for this view is that only the eiiceesees of
science are looked at, only the publications that have endm/ed®
This tends to indicate lixnear progk/essiono Bvvb the history of 
science la filled with a multitude of dead^ ’onds, glorious failm/ea
whicïh make the reality of science a imaae and not a line*
3?«Bo Mels Be I talcs two examples of this popular view. ' Thecrtÿ&aj*%Uwsr-;uMii*i-*«T3aaÆivywvasiïa24ai;4w:*i’Ks«rnrcsT:i ^  •*
first is from a text on bio3-ogy which Î quote at length*
"everything that is science ultimately has its basis in the 
scientific method® Both the po%;ers and "bhe limitations of 
science sire defined by this method » M d  wherever the 
scientific method cannot be applied, there cannot be science*«
M l  soienOG beginB with the first step of the
scientific method® At once this delimits the scientific 
domain g someth:lïxg that caimot bq observed cannot be 
investigated by scienoeeo*olt is necessary, furthermore, thext 
an observation be repeatable, actually or potentially*®*
* Boothe second step of the scientific,method is to define a 
problemo In other words, one asks a, question about the
obseiTvation* * * *To be valuable scientifically, a question must 
be relevant and it must be testable*®*»
»»o»the third step of the scientific method® Tîiis involves
i;he seemingly quite unscientific procedure of guessing» One 
guesses what the answer to the question might conceivably be* 
Scientists call this postulating a liTOyfehea'f^ ft ® « ®The scientist 
will not Î010W whether his guess was or was not correct until 
he has completed the fourth step of the scientific method,
it is the funotlw of every e^ qperiment to 
test the validity of a scientific guess**®«The result of any 
experiment represents, evidence| that Is, the original guess in 
answer to a problem' is confi:rto.ed as correct or is ;lnvalidated®
If invalidated, a new hypothesis, with new experiments, must 
be thought up*®®*
Esgerlmental evidence is the basis for the fifth and final 
step in the scientific method, th.e formulation of a theoryo ® ® « 
JSvery good theory has predictive value*.*" (Weisz 1961, ppA-^ S»)
This 1b very neat and rigorous* • It is the ’Baconian Bucket* (ef« 
9«3*2»11o)o is displayed a total allegiance .to a specific
scientific method which follows the pa.ttern observe, define a 
problem, form a hypotheslE?, escperimentg formulate a, theory*
Writing specifically from a Christlmi angle this 
scientist also holds firmly to ’the’ scientific method which he 
describes as consisting of observation., geiioraliBation, and 
verification by farther observation (1966, p.19°)# Here observation].,
which assumes a reality to be observed in the interaction of the 
Imower and object, is oharactorsied. as quantitative description -=
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though he allowe the necessity of some context^ the guidance of some 
prior hypothesis© Generalisation assumes that logic applies to the 
description of physical reality# while verification assumes the
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veracity of operating csus^ Cl laws© 'fo review this position thus g 
immedi;%toly Indicates the miderlying ocopMcal issues which
cI'Mxllenge any concept of neutrality <» Dye g however g maintaJ-ne that 
the basic attitude is ^Let®s see what happens if**©* (ibid p«32«) sxid 
that this contains no article of faith or oommitmont. He writes g
"With our intellects we organise our perceptions ijato 
consistent patterns «“ the scientific method is a means to 
th;l8 end* Integration requires a world view that supplies 
some meaning to the consistent ^ but philo8ophioa,lly neutral ^ 
descriptions of the physical reality in which, we ere 
immersedo" (ibid p *103q}
For Dye g meeningg purpose and Interpretation are mQt&=*8cientiflo and
there is a substrattUB of scientific fact ;^ivailable to exposure by the 
scientific method which is a-pMlosophieal (of* ibid p«119*) (Of* 
Popper*8 *ba8io statements * - 15»3®5*2*) Dye sets out two models 
(of* ibid ppmTlgY^®) the materialist and the Christian (Magrams X¥ 
and 7)* X contend that they reveal a serious flaw in that they 
assmae that observations are not conditioned by presuppositions^ 
education g or ejspec tations * Bo I pieopose that for a sjjiiilar model
to be acceptable it should be arnîtieaded as shoim ii.i Diagram VI* ïhe 
objeôtivity demanded in Dye*8 models seems to me an illusory dreemi* 
Total objectivityg even at some basic level of observation, is 
untenable in the light of the history end philosophy of science *
.13.®J-®3j^ .ffcnclusic?ne I present the conclusion of chapters 13 end 14 
at the outset* I"L.%
v^ldl% e s t ^ ^ h  ^  tq^of
^
MPlPh^lPMF^J^È 1 @m therefore sympathetic to Polmiyi
when he writess
"Theories of the scientific ifietliod which try to explain the 
establishment of scientific truth by any purely 
procedure are doomed to failure* Any process of enquiry 
ungulded by intellectual passions would inevitably spread 
out into tx desert of trivialities * Our vision of reality, 
to which our sonse of scientific beauty responds, jraiet 
suggest to UB the kind of (questions that it should be 
reasonable to explore*" (1573» P9135«)
This is no negation of the general progression of science, or of the 
mecesBlty for the ordered collection of selected data, and the 
sygtematlc expression of this :Ui descriptive ternîs by theoretical 
laws®
13.2o AM (of* 4®5.)CTïtft-.XiA-3iP.&wPUüii^T^fiîîiCïicS£=cta?îîswca:vr»--crcsi.%îiï5r3;:ri5.'4i"iviïiacv-atTsss*ca ^  »
Core is needed so that; the [past is not tmnspoood into the 
present system of ujicierstanding, for different eras have had different 
basic c^ meep'lBï which con,stra:lned thought* The etirly period up to 
Kepler believed in systems of mmhers and the configuration of 
geometric structures g subsequently there was the donilneaice of the 
concept of mechamlcally constrained masses in the hewtonlEm imrldvlew# 
end today the dominant belief in mathematical invarrisnee © But it 
Hiust Eklways be remembered, that ir. different frameworks of thought the 
same range of experience? takes the shape of different  ^facts ^ and 
evidence® Therefore Bacon, Mewton, Besoartea etc© can not be 
charged with inadequacies from the perspective of the 20th century, 
but only from wlthlsi their oim context*
13*2,1* The Galilean Method (of, 11*2») Aristotle followed a
qualitative method In his blolog-ioal work, but with Bacon, and further 
with Galileo g the experimental method became qiumtltatlve © These 
two approaches are quite disparate, end the 17th century evinces a
totally new process of investigation, a "paradigm^ change in 
methodology which would facilitate the reintez'jjretettion of datti into 
a new frameworks Galileo was concerned with the role of imtîiematies 
:hi science p mid tMs was new (not to be confused with the Pybbagoremi 
approach of harmonies)© This new view, eacoBipassing an 
escperimental'-matheBiatieal method, led to the subsequent developments 
of modern science and tecl-mology® Heedham (l95^y p*30f*) suggests 
that thie new method, which he calls the Galilean, had the followiing 
steps8
(a) Selection, from the studied phenomena, of specific aspects which 
can be expressed, in quantitative terms,
(b) The formulation of a ïiypothesis ;lnvolving mathematical 
relationsMps between the observed quantities @
(c) The deduction of certain oonseguenoes from (a) which are within 
the range of feasible verification®
(d) Observation, followed bÿ' change of conditions, followed by fresh 
observations that is, experimentation which embodies as far as 
possible measurement in munerioa,! ma^ giltudes,
(e) Acceptance, or rejection, of the b^potheeis® An acceptable 
b;ypothesis serves as the starting point for fresh theories*
This basic proeedu^ ?© was not confined to Galileo, but was tyi>ical of 
the new worldview arising from the Eenaissanoe aski Reformation ©
13®2o1.ol0 ®i0,kfeaf:k.Cû:i]rppnent« Th© above is in Mmrked contrast to
that of the eraftsnian whose approach is outlined times
(a) ScâleotioB, from the jAenomena studied, of specific aspects©
(h) Observationg followed by change of conditions, followed by further 
observation ioe« (d) of the Galilean method®
(c) Idxmmlation of a hy%)otheslB of a primitive type,
(d) Otmtinuod observation asid experimentation which io not tœ strongly 
imfluenoed by the cmmomiTent hypothetioeJ. considérations ©
Meedhmm gees this as the ° empirical componentof the Galilean method «
13_o_2o.1o2. Spegmatlve. OomDWoat# This elemmt was found .in
Western 3;teope from the middle of the 12th cc?ntury onwards ©
(a) Selection from the detailed phenomena under discussion of features 
which seem to be common to all, complete enumeration being; seen
as ■unneaesBciry because of faith in the uniformity of naturo and 
the reproseKitativenese of saiaples©
(b) The induction of epeciflc princlplos by reasoning from the 
essential content of these features ©
(c) Deduction of detailed conséquences of this hypothetical principle 
(synthesis)®
(cl) The observation of the saie and similar phenomenei, leading to 
vérification/falsification by experience ®
(e) The aooeptanoo/rojebtion of the hypothetical principle for/ailsi-fcecl 
;m (b)
This is, very briefly, Meedham^B reconstruction® From about Galileo 
onwards the empirical ami speealstive components came together in a 
creative synthesis of the craft and the theoretical (eft 1©6g 3*5; 
6a1o2o) Mded to this was tlie intrusion of tho m&^ thematloal 
component® The scientific spirit here stood for reason over emotion# 
it wtas a "memis of discovering new phenomena, tmâ of formulating new 
theories®" (Ha,son 1962, po602o)
4.5.2; g.s.a.i.) Moaem soitaufio
methodology of tern points to origins in Bacon who advocstod an empirical 
approach which ami.Gavoiired to unite craft and soholEtrship© His
method has been held up ever since as tho r^oyal ,ro£ki to science's the 
marriage of the empirical and rational .in a eræative synthesis ©
However, Bacon was ever suspicious of deductive procedures and io "khe 
proponent paKk-exoellance of the inductive method which ho bbm aimed orh 
power over natune as well as imderstending© Undoubtedly this
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on the ie  one of the reeeome fo r the
domlnsmoe of the industrial revolution In Britain ae oppoaedl to ttie 
more ratlonallotlo outlook of the Gimtlaent* Aoplrlolsm led directly 
to industrial techniques (of* Mason 1962, po281») Bie method, then, 
le briefly ^  the collection of ae large a body of facts as possible l3i 
a given area, the H atin g  of negative inetanoee and the degrees of 
comparison of features, thus leading to ^latent conl'lguratlons* and 
^latent proceseea of Mature^ being unoovored*
This method has by no meano died out and Is  still prevalent today 
(cfo 13«1*) Popper, perhaps not entirely fairly, oharaoteriees tMs 
ae the ^bucket method** Nevertheless it still exercises tremendous
power in t W eolentlflc world and eomeone like Ritchie Gelder can hold 
it up ae the scientific ideal (of*1968, pp«12,13*)
13p2A3® Gajgteol^W"^ (cf*4a5o1e) Deecartee stood for ratlcmalism 
agal&iot the Bacanlmi s^haoie <m the empirical tmd inductive* lie
crltioioed Bacon fee? starting fypom partlculero, contending that we
1must s ta rt from general principles end deduce ooneequenoes*
Rgperlment was merely something to decide be Ween rival vietm/theoriee* 
The Enli^temmnt saw the Oartsslan method being extended from science 
and metaphysics in to  the social sciences and philosophy* here i t  
wan believed that doubt and caritloism would purge obscurity and rebuild 
the world s c ie n tific a lly * This was, however, a Oartosianism
tempered by emplrlclem* laplace atsmds as the great enthrmier of
thie objective scientific method whose legacy lingers on* With the 
rieo of the other sciences = biology, chemietryg geology etc* « there 
aroee emphases of method in identifying, ranglzig end claeelfylng 
analytically, as seen in men lllce Gondlllao, Hnnaeus end I^ svoieier*
In ohemlstiy, bavoieler set forth tho virtue of orderliness and 
systematic analysis with such success tlmt thou^ he discovered nothing 
of importance, he stands as possibly the founder of modem cliemistry*
With the demise of the hard mechenism and objectivity of laplaoe 
a pool of uncertainty has arisen and with it a new emphasis on the
1* Qritical of Bacon and Descartes was Biygens, tAo realised that the 
former did not sufficiently appreciate the role of first principles end 
mathematics, while the latter failed to appreciate the true nature of 
expérimenta But empiricism prevailed, especially in the Royal 
Society which in the beginning liad unbounded enthusiasm for the most 
trivial experiments*
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subjective* This ie ûomplicà'kQd by the contimecl existence of 
various strancie of h&ird objective methodology (of* 13*1*) hhlle wo 
coil talk of tho modern method being mathematioel, to soy this io more 
to describe the content of science than any particiilar set of rules 
for engendering theories* Merton comments a
"Science is a deceptively inclusive word which refers to a 
vm?iety of distinct though intesiSGlated items * It is 
oomionly used to denote a set of cliaracter:lstio methods by 
meims of which Imowledge is certified; a stock of aociiBulated 
knowledge stermfiing from the application of these methods# a 
set of cultural values end mores governing the activities 
termed scientific or any combination of the foregoing^"
C'i972a p.66.)
Though this chapter maintains that absolute objectivity is 
impossible, end that there is no such thing as 'the' scientific 
method, nevertheless there is a universal ethos connected with 
science that sets it, when followed consistently, in a sphere of 
objeetivity as opposed to, say, the subjectivity of 
aesthetics» TMs is a difference between norsaative and objective 
spheres of being (of* Appendix O)© There are pre-established 
criteria which science mist remain faitMlil to; there is a consezisus 
involvement that precludes, in part, individual particularism* This 
communal aspect whereby science is a matter of common property and 
belief does not necessarily decree that what is accepted is the best 
possible theory from the alternatives available - though in general 
this may be so. There is in science a degree of disinterestedness 
and organised scepticism that is foreign to other spheres of life 
such as politics and ethics # But this dislntereste&iess is not 
absolute* It would sesm safe to state that any real examination of 
scientific activity, or understanding* of the phllosopliical issues 
involved, leads to the conclusion that there is a spectrum of ways for 
theory construction® There is no one method, despite the contention 
of Welsa (13.1,1.) and Dye (13.1.2.)*
WlHgi (1952, pp.21-35») sets out a modified Baconian 
procedure which is of particular interest as his book I0 intended to 
guide students of the sciences In the methodology of their chosen 
discipline® He contends that we begin with selected observations, 
rejecting at all times any prior authority as an ultimate basis for 
truth* Me notes that observation will involve selection and states 
that it should lead to description* There az.'e undoubtedly human 
predilections Involved but the public nature of scionoe will sift these
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out® Pollowlmg observation, there is a possibility for the 
oojistmieticm of hypotheses, the floating of trial ideas by induction 
from the facts» Prom the liypothesie, certain cleductionEi e&m be 
made which will be tested by agreement, difference, concomitmit 
variation etc» - for aoopptagioe or rejection»
Zl3_*Jl(L§»__iCAtL.2PD]^  (of. 10a4»3p 11*2; 15«3«) strongly refates the 
above methodology and sees Bacon as presenting the mind as passively 
receptive of external s'fcimulii from which it formulates and orders 
hypotheses». Popper ma’intsins, an the other hsmd, tliat theories are 
first formed in tlie mind® Only then do we seek data to verify/ 
falsify them» So he has more sympatliy for the deductive Cartesian 
approach and comments syrapathetically of Abelard who said that it was 
only by doubting that i-?e came to the real questions of life (eft .Bfwies 
1975e p©25o)® Popper's theory is amilagoas to the operation of a 
searchlight seeking to track sm aeroplane (cf»9«3*2.3*)*
13®3«ï3* Polanyig like Popper, stands out against the concept of 
objectivity, positivism and 'the' scientific method» His thesis is 
that there can be loiowledge apart fro3ti loiowers and ' that this 
perswal aspect is pervasive and inoscapable, even when not explicit 
(ofo 21»1o1*)o He notes a degree of objectivity :hi the public
nature of science but points out that
large, but merely a certsiin section with a specific training and 
committed to specific modela» The public may be reduced in effect 
to a consensus of only two or thi?ee specialists in a given area»
BehiLnd theories lies the skill of the researches?, the escpertese he
has acquired over the years, the teolmiquGS he has mastered@ the order
and beauty he seeks® The question that must be asked io therefore 
.'How are we to distinguish between subjective belief and truth?'
Polcmyl answers that i-re need not fall :into a subjective trap, for the 
scientist should be committed to miderstending reality exte^ nfà! to 
himself g while always EUfare that he may be wrong even In the most 
rigorous caq^ eriment or observation» The future will endorse this 
commitment.* Buts
".»»#ae human beings, we must inevitably see the imiverse from 
a Centro lying; witMn ourselves and speak about it in terms of 
a human language shaped by the exigonces of human intercoin^ se »
Any attempt rigourouely to eliminate our humcm perspective 
from our picture of the world must lead to £ibsurdity«" (1973<? p»3<
2« This reco(-ï4iisss the Arohimedian point of the human hem?t, without 
acknowledging the Arche cf* 20»1»3e2o)
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Xü. f^eners?a3, te:«ns, miggeate a tteeefold prooedura - a
atage of praparatlcng of IXXumlnatlohg and of vorlflcation© In the
first im recognise the situation mid EWi^ reclate the problem; ;bri the 
©0OOBÛ there is discovery by experiment, :bituition, chanoeg i-Alle the 
third establishes tho status of this illuxminationo (Hoinearef mddW. 
another stage betwoen the first and seoo'M Incubation® )
There is alwezya tho danger in utilising historical material to 
select only that siibstaniiive to a oaao and ignore that which is not 
00:1 table© Hevortheless X hope the rûEvîseriaX utilised here will 
indicate the diversity of features operating In the formation of
theories* Buch diversity negatee any 'em© best tmj' to discovery©
ocmDzeenoe of this 
undermlnee the Idea that science starts froia observation/experiment 
mid then forms hypotheses (of* 13*1*)* Mewton predicted the motion
of the moon's perlgree which for 60 years stayed at only half the 
observed value* This situation prevailed mnt.il 1750 when Olairaut 
showed that M s  value was fjatiofactoiqy, his theory correct, and that 
it was til© nmthematlcml Eipplica.t:lon of his theory which had been 
erroneous*' fcmnmlated M b  theory of citoll-fo2?mation
in a purely deductive spirit long before he over visited a coral reef » 
TSie suggestion by |^ :thajy>ras (532 BoC®) that the earth was round jmd 
Bign% prediction of the midnight sim :?n the Arctic, both preceded 
ex.periment« iu fomiulEitlmg his theory of the clrcmlatloia
of the blood, postmlfited capillaries wîrleh were not discovered until 
much later* In I916 EJnetein postulated that lii^ ht should bo bent 
and retarded In t W  gravl'National field of the mm© The bending 
effect was first confirmed by 3M.d:aigtoïi in 1919» mid the retardation 
was not observed until 1967 when Shapiro achieved this effect by 
reflecting radar sl#ials off Mercury when it was nearly beliind the 
eiiiio Again we earn thinlc of Rutherford's. Dispersion Fommla (1911) 
wherë, from the distribution of a3.pha particles, he was led to propose 
the existence of the nucleus but not imtll the aiivent of the Geiger 
ccmnter and other developments was evidence produoed and the nucleus 
establishcïdo .Plaiick intuitively arrived at his Radiation Pcmnula, 
but not until two months later was he able to present a thoorotioal 
proof where he introduced the M o a  of quanta*
262
In the 1870*8 lAan waa arramging the ehemlcal elements
according to tWlr atomic and finding that they grouped
together In dietlnot familles, h@ eame across a gap In "khe sequenoe*
At the third colmm of bl8 arrangement he had no known element to fit 
in» He solved the problem by Interpreting It æ  a gap, making thle 
oholce beoanae the next element « titanium -« simply did not have the 
properties tWt would fit the same horizontal family as boamn end 
aluminium. %r opening a gap he could place the later elements in 
the rl^t columns and roim « but he had no obBervational. or 
esgerimental corroboration for this step of aeeumlng missing elements; 
It ifaa elg^ly a conjecture, a scientific Inspiration*
13*4*2# %ieoKy_%!# .Dreamy* 3h 1865 Kelcule, on the basis of a 
dream, suggested timt in aromatic chemistry @1% carbon atom© imre 
linked into a ring tlmt persisted intact through many chemical 
reactions which changed certsiln atoms attached to the ring* He had 
been imrklng on the problem and getting niwAere* Falling asleep, he 
dreamt of a snake which curled into a ring end eleaed Its tail and on 
waking applied, this to his problem* It i-forîtedl
Nor is this an Isolated incident* Otto loewl, professor of 
pharmacology at the jMlveralty of Grae, awdm one ni^t Mth a 
Ixrllllent Idea smd resched out for pencil and paper to jot doim a few 
notes* Next morning he was aware on tiaking that he had Iiad an 
inspiration throaggb the night, bat to his frustration could not 
decipher his notes* By bedtime he had been unable to recall any­
thing» But during the night he again awblce with the same flash of
Insight =» and this time carefully recorded It© "The next day he 
went to M s  laboratory and in one of the neatest, simplest and most 
definite ei^ qperiments In the history of biology brought proof to the 
chemical mediation of nerve Impulaeso" (Beveridge 1$6l, p»T1*)^
ll»W.!L3«eæ_%m_A6el#aâ« «Chaaoe» C&Etaltoas olimmstanoee) 
plays a conBlderable role in the hietory of scientific diaomrery* 
Perhaps the best knoim e%a%>le being the dlBomrery of penicillin by 
Fleming# Polanyl commente thats "Accident usually ]^ays some part 
in discovery and Its part be predominant*" (1973s pe120«) 
Obvloimly diaace favours the prepared mind, and Hoverldgo oontenda 
that probably the imjorlty of discoveries in biology and medicine H e  
In thlB category. Associated features being the Infrequency cf
■es^ ïJi22ïeÈ3"»i«=;t:ls^ teî3^  ^ ^ %
5o Beveridge (1961) is a olewBsio book on the diverse types of
theory formatloh/dlseovery»
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op}:JortoD.itie8g the ability to grasp em opportimity when it maizes itself 
available, and to note the clue and Interpret it oorreotly*
Xn'kerestlngly it ima not a phyGloist W t  a phyEiiologiet Imigi
Qalyasii who discovered eua?rent electricity* Having cliosected a
fïîog and left: It <m a table near an electrical machine, someone else 
touched the nerves of the leg with a scalpel and noted that this 
Gsiiiaed the leg miecles to contracta A third perBon noticed that the
action wsb avoitod X'/lien there was a spark from the electrical macMiie. 
When Gîil'vanl'e attention was drawn to this he Mvcsstigaiied and 
followed it up to diricover eurrent electricity®
In 1822 the phyoicîist tegsteâ at the end of a lecture happened to 
bring a wire, joined at its extremities to a vo3.ta,ic cell, to o. 
position sibove mid parallel, to a magnetic needle.» At first he 
purpoalvely held the wire perpendicular to the needle Imt nothing 
happened g therx). by 'chancG' he held it horizontal end parallel. He 
xme astonished to see the needle react. Reversing the currant he 
found that the needle deviated In the opposite direction® So the
path was opened for Faraday to invent the oleotric dynamo®
Another eiscample .is voji.Rjgrfej^i's. discovery of When he
made thJ.s discovery he was escperiinentang with olectrlcE!l discharges :hi 
high vaoim and using barium platlnooyanide with the object of 
detecting invisible rays ««* ‘but had no tlicuglit of these rays being 
able to pewG'urate o%)aque materials» By 'oh&moe' he noticed that
barium platlnooyanide left on the bench near his vacmmi tube became 
iluoreacerit althoo^ separated from the tube by black paper. At 
least two other scientists wore close to this discovery but failed to 
ïüake the vital eonneotions for if Hontgen's apparatus had produced 
]&-rayBi, then a mmber of other reecarchera must also have g for some 
time, been producing themi® Guriously, Lord Kelvin greeted this 
discovery by claiming it to be an elaborate hoax©
Cosifesioa imiy exicit . t o  eomc-j teaioh
of science and only be resolved In Gonjnnotian with a el£Lrd.fication of 
termse The atomic theory of chemistry, established by Dalton in
1008 was generally accepted very quickly* Ye1; for nearly fifty 
years while it m s  widely applied it remained obBOuroo Thus it was 
something of a revelation to scientists when Gaimixarc in 1858 
distinguished precisely the three related conceptions of atomic weight, 
molecular weight, and equivalent weigiit wliich prior to this had been
PM
used m  an indatesfminat8'J.y intereliEmgeable? mamier© Tims from 
confusion this aapeot of chGiiiistrj passed into ollarity and eolieronce
4 Elogmiùe Gild 'beauty may ir& i;fee 
surface seem far removed from the siosniO. concept of scientific theory 
foaation© Yet they are virtiwil3„y universally aoeepted by 
philosophera of DOien.ce as a valM eukI important criteria, of theory 
formation mid assessment (cfo15*4a3*)* Polanyi wri.t@8 thats 
"Nowhere la intellectual beauty so deeply felt and faoticlioiiely 
eppreeiated in its various gradee and Qualities as in mathowmtlosoo 
(19739 PalOîo) îii matliomaties, the most objective of all faciGiicee, 
the style of proof, .its elegance, is o.ften regarded as importmit to 
its merit as the truth of the theorem proved®
It was pa:ntly for aesthetie reasons that Louie âe Broglie, in his 
doctoral thesis, Mtrorluoed the concept of asorlbing wave 
oharaoteristlcB to ponderable partieles® Iî3,e exaüilniiig; professors 
were doubtful whether to accept this deviceg which lacked evidence and 
ima purely for reasons of liitelleotual beauty, mid X'«?ote Mnsteln for 
edvlooo Binsteisi recognised the validity of the approach and de 
Broglie duly received hie degree.
# i:"
I t  is  hoped that these illu s tra tio n s , M  their d iv e rs ity , w ill 
Indicate tîm'l; MstorioaHy, seienee reveals no single objective 
Rfâtîiod of diseovery®
J3.®5..©.lo Prenæ%tipno Ho matter what f ie ld  o f theoretical work a
person is  engoged :Ui they are dependent 011 preparation prior to 
aetualising research © At one le v e l, before any experiment or
hypothesis cen be pursued, there must be some form of immediate 
preparation; but even deeper and more signifloontly there is  the 
preparation Involved in long years of study and residing which maJces 
them qualified in th e ir f ie ld  training which w ill have conditiosMMi 
th e ir  thlnïcing to certain  patterns. Preparation Involves a 
selection of ia te res t w ithin a chosen discipline^ and in  the 
particular perlodicalo etc® which are read and studied regularly®  
Beveridge points out that a t the frontiers of research th is  baclcgroimd
4® In a private survey I carried out only 3 out of 79 did not 
reject beauty as a clmracterlstj.c of theory formation; tmxl 4 out of the 
79 alone retained elegance* Most were prof ess ionel ly qualified©
of training, xiihlle o'bvloaaly nGoeBaaszy, oan W  a hindrance* Too 
much raading shuts the mliid to a particular pattern of commltmont mid 
leaves the researdher closed to "the poselMlitles before I%im* 
Eelnfo3?olng this soggeetlon Is the fact that many great scientific 
breakthroughs have come from men new to a particular field© Oroseing 
from (me field of ):?e8earch seems to yield fruit, and here we can cite 
Galvanlg Fez%al, Paeteur and Dalttm* Beeeemer claimed that he made 
Ills c37uoial breald}hrough to the cheap production of steel because he 
@pp3?oaohed the pazoblem irjlth mo fixed ideas which hiased M s  mindo 
(Cfo Beveridge 1961, p*2.)
13<t5»2. Observation* Scientific theoriea do not necessarily follow
gsJ*Ja^ :g.ar.;£3Ai.'Sa::^ .wassac:£a.'tiSig::^  ^
from dlreot imveetlgatlon (cf* 13i)4«1»)@ Often it lo the unexpected 
factor or t3%e prolo&iged incubation of disconnected Ideas in the mind, 
quite apart feom experimentation, tliat beara fruit© The ineuhation 
of clear thought, rather than haphazard experimeni/oheereatlon Is the 
pathtfsy of science© But having said that It must ho noted that 
science often proceeds hy trial mid error© The experimemtsl facet 
la very much of tlie osoenco of science as It has developed® This 
maa±c It off from the (hceek period and is one of the benefits of the 
Reformation mentality® Binstoin olalmsd that "all knowledge of 
reality starts f2?om experimice and ends in It®" (l973e pcSyo.) But 
this can only he agreed to hy a Thelet as long ae the reservation 
concerning special, revelation he held over against it aa also dealing 
with true knotflodge and reality* The claim holds in the ophere of 
gsneral rovelation ifflth little difficulty as long aa we include the 
experienoe of the oelfhoodm Nevertheless, and Binstein would 
among the first to agpee, an mclomati.o basis of general principles fr(m 
wMch specific deductions can be made also lies at the heart of science» 
Those aspects =» the free invention of the mind, the thought experiment, 
and personal ccmmitment; and the empirical examinatien of theory « 
exist in creative teneion (of* 14#1*)
1 challenge any reduoti<m cf methods in science to starting with 
observations alone, the collection of 'facto'» Observations are 
undoubtedly crucial, but at all times they are subject to tlie 
llmitatloiis of men* This not only means that they can be orrcneouc, 
mi.8understood or wmTped because dressed=43p for com%mioati<m; but that 
i&i the beginning a selection of what to observe Is involved* As 
Oohen and Nagel note, science Is never satisfied if 1th psychological
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certitude» "No single proposition dealing with matters of fact le 
beyond every eignlfloant doubt®" (19^1, Pa394o)
Soienoe le not objeotlvely Interested In all ' f a c t s W h e n  
Tyoho Brahe noted the appearanoe of the neif star In 1572 It ima an 
observation of Immense In^ortanoe for tlie eolenoe of his day® It 
"was 03%el@l In undermining the Aristotelian framework of the 
(Kgyetalllne spheres * On the otiier hand, #ie:i the noted physiolst 
3h?ledrloh Kohlraueoh declared that he ifould be pleased to accurately 
determine the speed of water arunnlng an the gutter, ho totally 
misjudged the natu3?e of eolentlflc value* Accuracy o f observation ba?8 
little to do with the value of that observation* Eddington's 
ccnfirmatlon of Einstein's theory of the bending of light was not 
particularly precise « bat I t  was oignlfleant © (Of* Folanyl 1973o p»137«j
Even behind the objectivity of the most rigorous obsezrvatioais, it 
must be realised that selective laboratory manipulations are at wosTk 
which exclude certain variables in favour of others g and that the 
scientist will, in general, select for testing a hypothesis of high 
probability® Both selection and observatimi which govern any 
experiment mie perscmal acts® Tliey therefore have subjective 
involvement. At each step the Bcieaitist decides to Isolate this 
feature, to exclude another, and therefore all data is a priori theory 
laden® Neither must we for^t that as well as the scientist being 
subject to human fallibility he is also subject to s.ln®
13o5«3o 33xperi!ment» There is the need to confirm 'facts' and theories 
for, al'bhou^ I reject absolute empirical objectivity, correspondence 
with external reality is necessary* In the final onolyBis no theory 
t!iat is a flagrant breach of what can be observed or experimentally 
confirmed (in limits) can stand as an acceptable theory©
At the best of times experiments are never oonolusive proof of 
miything but merely tentative verifications* Beveridge, as a 
practising scientist, notes that "all sciontists know from experience 
how difficult it is to make an experiment come out correctly even when 
It 1$ known how I t  ought to go»" (19&1» p*25») In the realisation 
of this, the door is opened to the possibility of theories that go 
beyond the evidence, that do not equate iflth omirent data* Thus one 
commentator writing tm 3&&nstein noted that he "refused to let the 
'facts' decide the matter»" (Bernstein 1973» p«82») Einstein could 
hold to a view despite anomalies in it and in the face o f op%)Osing
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theories that seemed to liave better evidence* Sisieraee is aliat 
through with otmfldeyioe timt is dospllie of, not.boomiGO of, the
evidence*
It should also be noted that epporently rigorous ezvporimerats can 
be quite mistalcoB miii deceptive — such ae MeedhamLs famous flask 
experiment which appeaizod to prove spomtmieous generation© indeed 
It is features sueli as this that tend to lend support to the Popperlen 
approach to science as a progression of falsification rather than by 
verification© Intereatingly science is now of siieli a nature that no 
pnMic verification of theories is really possible * At the froïrbiere 
of theory formation the likelihood is that only a very few arc 
qualified to undoratand a theory mid only they can test its veracity © 
They are trflined people, with particular predilections that have been 
schooled into them, and this mmmt razlse se::eious philosophical and 
psyoIîologicEîl quQst.i.ons against the concept of any conseBBvn approval 
being final o
. 1 Failure * Approaching any given tlieory eeveral areas of
possible dissE?.tif3faction are readily diseesn-ible» There is the 
imiediate possibility of a failure to aceoimt for all the phenomenon
which should be covered « There is  a fa ilu re  area eoneernrmg the
power of predietiong aesthetic satisfaction , and generality® T'a-iliir© 
is  not g o f course 9 imeommon to science though th is seesns often  
forgotten.* The history of science reveals that fa ilu re  predorrjinates 
and that scientists spend long yeasTS pursuing lllu a iv e  ekimerEi-s ulileh 
never bear fru it©
Nevertheless theoretical failure, or experimental anomaly^ Is not 
valueless and the reaction to a specific experimental or 
observational anomaly need not be the rejection of the attendant theory® 
A contrary oase might merely follow in tlie law being upheld and the 
smoBialy noted (oog* lewtcw:i with respect to tide and moon); or in the 
general retention of the law but recognisrag new IMita (eog» Doyle'o 
law snd its modlfioatlon by van der Waal) g or the postulation of 8ome 
new ideal situation# or in the formation of eomo new generalisation to 
cover the old law and the anamaly© This latter result mit may 
involve 8ome olienge of paradlgm* But there ie no Biimple prooeee of 
methodological falsification®
It zmst not be thought from the above that scientific discovery
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pm\si:u9s .a liiiipliazarci oourse of guose, aooident, failure ami Intuitive 
leap® Science is  5?. ra tio n a l a c tiv ity  where reason and experiment 
are bound together .io. er@atJ.vo liamony® One without the other 
creates a stu3.tifled science ® But there mus'b be no ebsolirb,islng of 
either for tM s  leads to the classicEd. fa ilu re  o f ra'tJ.omal.l8m/ 
emplrlolEm#
ploys am important part in scientific thou#it and 
is valuable in suggesting clues or Iiypotheses and in help;l:ag to 
iBïderstand phonomana and oacu::o?e:aees w@ ossmot bqg® .Despite its 
wide use it is often .mi,slead:Mg and never proves anything. Often g 
however, a problem In one field (say meohamioal) can be solved by 
setting %p the tmtilogaa of the probltm ;ln another (say eleetrloGl) *
Two main themoe of reasoning ere induction and 
deduction «• the former going from 'facts' to theories, particulars to 
generalisations; and the latter the reverse. It seems to me that 
both play on importait part in creative and routine science* In the 
creative fozmmtlon of theories .induction takes its place alongside the 
creatii/o and .mtnitive ÿ^iesBQB of scientists that transcend the bounds 
of tho purely deductive approach from first prruciplesa Tho problem 
of induction is that there are no imlnterpreted facta and that often 
facts are confused with their Interpretation©
The Inductive M eal has beam pursued by Bacon, Hivfio and M ill and 
XJOSBGSses an In to lle e tim l sltreictiveness :m the eaaj mmmier :ki wMeh 
im iv0.rsal pattem a @%i9 conceived out of generel Isations from past 
experimental sequenoeso Despite th is  I feel t'imt Induction ohemM 
be lim ited  mainly to the psychology of science and that its  value has 
been overrated by w riters expounding" 'th o ' s c iez itific  method©
However I would not wish to  bo as extreme as Popper when he says, 
equatJag 'n a tu ra lis tic ' w ith 'in du ctive ' theories o f Eîcienoes
"(sG@ X) dispense with the principle of induction g not because 
such a principle is as a matter of fact never used in science, 
but because I think that it is not needed ; that it doss mot 
help us# and tîmt it even gives rise to inconsistencies©
Tims I reject the naturs?aliBtic view© It ie uncritical©
Its upholders fail to notice that lAenevcr they believe 
themselves to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed 
a convention© Hence tlje convention is liable to tum :uito a 
dogma© This criticism of the natureHstie view applles not 
only to Its cr'ltorion of meaning^ W t  also to itc idea of 
science g and GonRoqucntly to .its Idea of empirical method©" 
ims/h, po55o)
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I#,lie there io an element of truth in tbi.s it seems to zno that 
induction can play a useful, If limited, role mid that a 
pliiiiosoplrleaJ, baals for its validity o$m he derived frazii a Tlieio'tio 
opistemoiogyo li^o- I dlsagasGG with Popper @nd Einstein when they 
c-oBtemi that logic is nooeBsarily deductive, feeling that ■this would 
require @a iï/ipos£uU>l@ degree of ohjeotivitj and tîiat it is 
inoosisistcmt with the historie„al e^ rdstence of this method of 
roEisoBlngo As scieno© cmmot he tied to logio, neither ocm logic 
ho confined to déduction»
2rls£sx5&=jlEk^MS4u The deductive procedure, possibly more than the 
Induotive, cmi loail to miexpeeted conclue ions » By means of the
preiRlasee aesmied mid ndes of logic folloiied, conclizslono at 
vavianco with what might he expected can he encountered© This isp 
as it were, the diocovery procedure of deduction there is also a
confirmation procedure, or truth aspect, where deduction comes into its 
owEio It is 'fche deductive spirit that lea/lB to the relating of systems 
of generalliaatltms though tlieao generalleatlons may h&we been 
:æaohed by other methods ©
Consider the eleznentary Im-m of kinemabics® ï*ïe;i?e wg have a
deduotlv© system of symbols that is Intezqareted as the kinematic lawe®
Thus starting wi/th (v S3 n 'S» at) mid (o ^sj %t we ejin by the
ordinary rulee of al^bra deduce another Ieiw which eliminates 't'»
Hence (v^  <- 2as)® Ho new hypothesis is forthcoming^ but
various predictions can Toe made amd various potential new models cem 
bo deployed ï^ -^zieh may le@A eventually to new generalisations *
In the final analysis induction and dodiiction have? an intenvwon 
role in the models of scientific ingulogy, and both are only utilised 
to their full potential when coupled to creative imagination© Often 
breaktbro'ughs have eome from men who wexv* not tied to pursuing Bomo 
rigorous logic, but who capable of allowing their mindo to 
interplay two conceptual f3?amoworks® Logic has ite place, ©md it 
is an important place, but it does not mean that total objectivity is 
ever possible * "The dispassionate intellect, the open mindg the 
tmprejudieed observer, exist in cm exact sense only in sort of 
intellectualietio folT&^ loro; » * » (Beveridge 196I, P«9Û«)
whether Induction or doduc'tion is advocated g first principles 
must be established from which 'bo work, from which conclusions can be
derived* Einstein a deductiviet writes s
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"The tlî,eoriet'G ïiiethoâ Involves his usMg at M s  xoimciation 
general postulatea or 'principles' from which he qbm cloduce
oonMusionso ItlP work tMo falls Into two parts @ he mist
first discover his prineixileG and then draw the conolusloBS 
wMe'h foil Gif from them© © © @The first of these taske, namely, 
that of estahllshlng the principles which are to serve as the 
start.iK.g point of his deduction, is of aa entirely different 
nature® Here there is sio method oapable of being learned 
said systematically applied so that It leads to the goal©
!Bi0 scientist has to worm these general, prdnclples out of 
nature by perceiving in oomprehensivo comple-ises of empirical 
facts certain general featuroEa which permit of precise 
formulation(1973 po221©)
Einstein, of course, exemplifies the thoiqiht experiaient In much of his 
theory- formation® He typlfloa the extrof-’ent.pirical aspect of modem 
science and the deductive spirit once these principles are established»
But first principles ncod to be formulated in the beginning®
J.Sq6e4o - It is of the natm?e of hypotheses that they
should lead to new ozperiences or experiments as wall as new 
observations for bo'bh m ?0 oonditlcned by what is being sought» In 
pursuing hypotheses it follows that a persevering faith 'be found in 
the propoimder of a theory © History reveals many oxzmples of this 
epir.it Oopexsiicits, Kepler, Newton, Faraday, etc® - wlrloîi labours for 
years before producing the result it aee'irs. But such persovorenae 
and coRmltmeïit must never degenerate into blind dogmatism cwo^ r^lding 
all evidence which might count against anhypothesis © The caution of 
Popper that all good Bciontista should discard oy»e good hypothesis 
each lisy before bi^ oakfast io a saliitory reminder timi; ocienoe .is 
littered by the I'Gzeckage of discarded ideao©
Gohen and Bagel ouggest seven points .in the relatlonohip between 
liypotheoaD and scientific method (cfo196'lp ppo392.ffa)o (a) There 
are no set railes for getting hypotheses g (b) hypotheses^  are required 
at every stage of any inquiry; (c) pa3?ttoilaa? truths are not 
necessarily germane to the topic 'being examined# (ci) the choice of 
hyxzothesis is imllmltod; (e) it is convenient, especially in eMbryonic 
stages, to have di.fferont hypotheses to <ûiùobq from; (f) the deductive 
Glaboratioxi of bypoth.oses is not the sole purpose of scientific method; 
oicd (g;) 1-10 'iiypothoss.a which states s. general prcqiosition can be 
demonstrated as absolutely true by any method of scientific logic® 
Though having said all this they iiTrite in their conclusions "Bcientific 
method®©aois the most assured tee'.bniciue man has yet dovlsod for 
controlling the flux of th.Mgo anci establishing stable beliefs (ibid 
pe391a) Such is the power of the mythology that there is a specific
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scientific method*
One problem can he noted# csimot be exsmiined ;ln the
same way as directly accessible features of life# How are these rays 
to be distiïigiiislied from fast moving particlesÎ Ton Lane made the
suggestion that crystals, if they were in fact lattices of regiilorly 
spciced molecules, would serve as diffraction gratings of tho requisite 
finenesjs to defract the rays «=• a standard test of e. wave© So he 
demonstrated defraction of But this cannot be seen as a
direct demonstration for it depended upon the acceptance of another 
model the lattice model of cryatale® "Indeed," œltes Harre, "in 
]6-ray cryatallogzaplTy the situation is slbnost reversed for the wave- 
model of X««raye is now tmcon for granted and the Btnioture of crystals 
investigated by moans of the diffraction psittems they form*" (I96?s 
p. 153.)
13.7. w m m m t s .  WHTOB
Before [passing to the ©.ttitndinal, side of sclentifio methodology 
I note tho riermg influenee of statistical methods, especially in the 
fields of mechanlGS as ilnaug-^ rated by Clerk Mam;ell in the last 
centm?y* Thus a subject like thermodynmnlcs is today tau{^t from 
both the classical mid statistical vieirpoiiits, though the weigirb of 
practical application may still sees to favour the olasBical approach 
which is not to say It is preferred* Itceept under very rare 
conditions of impact, collisions would be bound to alter the velocity 
of pEirtiouIar raoloGu3.es* But .fei a stea/ly^ state, distribution of 
velocities from zero to isifinity must follow some definite law* Wo 
oem therefore describe a system by computing wimt por'bion of the 
molecules would be at each velocity* What seems a real weakness of 
this is that there is a theoretical possibility (probability), though 
very sma3.1g that when you put a kettle of water on to boil the water 
wl3.1 freeze 2
mmPTER 14
laimoLOGY Œ  scimcE ii s ATTiTimifis
I BOW turn to a more perBonal angle — the subjective features of 
a scientist's character which are involved in bis scientific activity 
such as honesty. Integrity, enthusiasBi, humility, siBgle^mindedness, 
patience g judgement, curiosity, hope mid joy® lot all of these 
immediately appear as relevant to scientific research®
14n u »  î»  staaylng
scientific methods it is well to hear In mind the reasons men liave for 
entering' scientific [pursuits© Itlnstein contended that the motive 
was often nothing other than the desire to escEi|>e from the hopeless 
dreariness of life mid the snores of our own desires (of® 1975» po225o). 
As well as these negative reasons he also cited the (creational) 
mcmdate (of God) for man to overcome the world, to rule and have 
dominion, to fashion simple and intelligible pictures of the universe« 
To this moat be added simple curiosity, the desire for îaïowledge#
These reasons, and no doubt others, have led scientists to exhibit 
a cprpiyitraent to their work, an obsessive driving force thtat makes them 
persevere no matter the hindrances (cf« Madame Curie)* It has been 
maJaitaiined that obsession with a problem is the ma-inspring of all 
inventive power and the advice given to rise J.n the momiMg, eat, live 
and dream about a problem# This obsessive feature means tWit 
although the scientist is often portrayed as the totally honest end 
opeiv-ffiinded researcher willing to alter his views ao the evidence 
dictates, thi-o io not quite sos
"Though the scientific enterprise may be open-ended, whatever 
this application of that phrase may mean, the individual 
scientist is very often not# Whether his work is 
predominsntly theoretical or e^ p^erimental, he usually seems to 
luiow, before hia research project is even well under way, al.3. 
but the most intimate details of the result which that project 
wil3. achieve® If the result is quickly forthcoming, well and 
good© If not, lie will etruygle with his apparatus and with 
his equations until, if at all possible, they yield results 
which conform to the sort of pattern which he has forseen from 
the starto" (KMm 1972, pp#80,81o)
Yet coupled with comif;i'%mexit is d m M ,  the acceptance of i^ 'iorance# 
hmiillty lies in the heart of all great scientists # Newton openly 
confessed that he did not pretend to Imow the cajuse of gravity;
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])©scaTtes raaâe methodological doubt the key to hie whole philoBOpMoaJ. 
approaeha Merton (1972, p»77*) au^ests orgEmised scepticism ao 
both a méthodologie and an Institutional mandate; the idea, of 
suspended judgezaent, the 'wait and see what the facts will reveal o®
J4.fJ„.t28,J«aij0fea§me.-,X^ ^^ Simnisig Srom me paradox vjo
eorae to another eomon-Bense and speoulatioa* Einstein was guided 
by tm Eisrpiration to liberate oeienee from the traditional Gomnon-sense 
asaiimi>tions concerning space and time* He was led to replace them 
with an openly artifieie*! framework where the assumption of absolute 
rest was replaced by that of the absolute constant velocity of light*
"Brushing aside the protest of common sense as the complaint 
of mere habit, he gidcmted a vision in which the electro­
dynamics of moving bodies were set beantifalXy free from ell 
the anomalies imposed on them by the traditicmol frameworlc of 
absolute space and time*" (Polanyi 1975, p.144*)
Yet while speculation is obviously a neoossary Ingredient of 
scientific research, or it will never get anyiAero, it alifays needs to 
be hold in creative tension with oomicm.'-senoe * Speculation about 
time loops into tho past obviously infringe basic oommon'-sense and the 
problesis of me m'urd.erlng my zaotlier when she wara only two B3oe obvious#
A third creative tension exists
between an openness to new solutions which are often guessed without 
evidence, and the necessity of corroboration * The scientist is 
engaged .in a search for corroboration of his speculations one way or 
another, either of their truth or falsity* But even if a, solution is
not met, or before it is reached, there is a firm conception of wtet it
should be* It is widely reported that Gauss claiziied; "I have had my 
solutions for a long time but I do not yet know how to a,irrive at them®" 
(e*g* In Polenyi 1973» p*131«) Or as Polanyi puts its "Scientists «>
that is, creative scientists - spend their lives in trying to guess
right»" (ibiti pa143«)
If rigorous purouit of a specific objective scientific method was 
the key to scientific brealcthroughs, then it should logically follow 
that the experienced scientist should make all the new diacoveries*
But it often is the young researcher whose mind io untrsjTmieled with 
long years of work, or the mim coming from some other field, who makes 
vital breakthroughso Balton was not a chemist, nor even especially 
interested in that topic® He was a meteorologist interested in the 
physical problems of the aboo‘j?ption of gases by water, and of water by
274
the atmosphère® Thiie he approached ehenîistïy with a different set 
of parameters end made liis cruoiol contribution to that field©
14» 1^4» Detaobinent v® Pension© Passion and detachment do not
seem to mix very well in the popular concept of science, but the 
historical reality Is different© After all it is people who must
carry on the work of science» So A*M@Taylor can. writes
"The history of science shows us, again and again, great 
disGoveries mad,e by passionate adherence to ideas forged in 
the white heat of imagination* It shows us, slow construction@ 
brick 'by patient brick, of a scientific edifice, often In 
complete disregard of apparently conflicting evidence© It 
shows im hold imaginative leaps made in the dark, in 
lînjiiatified anticipation of s'acoess, only later to receive 
astonishing oxperiraental conftoiation® The three attributes 
of commitment, ;koagins,tion and tenacity seem to he the 
distinguislrMg Bm?ks of greatness in a scientist©" (1966,
PP»4»5o my emplmsie®)
It is iiitereatrlng thEit scientistB themselves clearly recognise this
passionate involvement in their subject© Kepler could talk of the
'sacred fury' that drove him on through the long years of his quest
for precision In his astronomical theories# (Of© Polanyi 1973» P»?«)
Nor is this some ocientificMly detached z^asslon® Hot only do
dreams, conjectures and leaps of inspiration play importent roles, but
scien'bistB become passionately involved© A good example is an
incident between Pasteur and. Guerin over the topic of 8mallpo3C
vaccination* One day Pasteur had been criticising Jemior (who had
made inqsortsnt contributions in this field) at the French Academy of
Medicine, and provoked Qimvin to certain sarcastic remfarks* This in
tu3fn violently’ provoked Pasteur and the spectacle that followed can
hardly be described as edifying or an example of die interested
scientific objectivity© Tho ra,thor staid members of the Academy
found themselves forced to physioally separate two heated I^enclmen
one of whom was past eighty (Guerin) and. the other (Pasteur) sixty and
partially parolyeed by a stroke© Guerin went as far as to later
issue a challenge to duel, but Pasteur declined the invitation# On©
commentator m?ltes of Pasteur, conoeming; another incident, that he
was; "Peisslonately involved, as always, in the results of M.s work
(he had little use for cold scientific detachment#)" (do Ropp 1972,
p#74»}
Joy, ecstasy, passionate Involvement all part of being human, 
and all brought to science by those engaged in unravelling the secrets 
of God's creation* This emotional involvenzent is perfectly natural©
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Am eactreme preoccupation with a. prdbleii iBipoaea an. emotional strain 
an,ci the discovery of a solution whicli releases from that strain cornea 
as a great emotional joy^ Some have claimed that such emotion g 
while present g In no way affects the outoomo of scientific research, 
hut this appears to be a denial of history cmd what man is aa mazio 
(Of. Beveridge igGl* p*144.)
Boyertheless the natural aclenoesg dealing as they do with the 
objective modes of being (aritbemtlool g spatial» kinematic » physical» 
biological and psychological) as opposed to the nomiative» possess a 
controlling degree of detachments %ere is no idealism » no 
surrender to subjectivity (of# 14*1.G*)*
Wî3t ia the oïÆgla of
a scientific theoryf. Debate has raged end it seems ’there is no 
simple aiswës?o Theories come from isituitiw leaps of the imagination» 
inspiration» induction and oonjeotuzesg as well as from more 
obsorva-tionaL and experimental approaches o But theories which are 
unifying generalisations can never logically follow from our 
experiences of a, few particular events o ' loxfna,! reoeeireh is bound by 
its pi?radi@ms to partioular i-mys of looking at tilings and it often 
takes a flash of intuition to give birth to some new paradigm or theory.
Dewoy suggested that productive tîmiîcing first becomes awas?e of a 
X>roblemg tïiat there then springs to mind a possible solution and on:ly 
then close logic take over. This * springing to mind* occurs all the 
t.We and is not a deliberate voluntary act. (Of* Beveridge 1961» p.55») 
It Is eoraethlng that happens to us rather thGai something we do» and it 
seems a strength of certain individuals to be more receptive to these 
flashes of insight* 8omo seem more capable of thWsing in new 
categories and possessing an. ability to discriminate between valid 
and nonsensical ideas # Lord Keynes attribu'ked the pre-=’eriiiiience of
lewton to his well«developed 'muscles of intuition* (of* Bernstein 1975*
p.15?o).
'Bisîïe Tfould appetœ to tie ao siiapls connection tiotvioea ejqieriment/ 
e3qperienoe and theory* Intuition ami free creativity in the mind of 
the scientist is sean to frequently play a decisive role» and this 
spirit» this feeling of how the universe shoifld be» plays a more 
important role in formulatii'ig the axiomatic structure them the results 
of any particular esipesdment» As Einstein remarked of the 
universal elementary 3.aws from which we deduce our vast complexes of
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scientific theory - "There is no logical path to these laws 5 only 
intuitionp restirag on sympathetic 'onderstandiiig of experience(1973* 
p#226o) I believe it is- oraicial that intuition he accepted» but 
would add that it mist be seen» as Einstein notas» to relate 
responsibly to oxperienoe» even if not bound by Ito
Poincare (1914) te lls  how a fte r  a period o f prolcmged and intense 
rae.theinatical, work he went fo r a journey in to  the country and 
dismissed th is  work from his mind* Yet i t  was there the insight 
came that the transformations he h,ad used to cl.ef:me PuacMan functions 
were Id en tica l to  those o f non-’^ Euclldemi geometry* On another 
occasion he re lates how* baffled  by a  problem he gave i t  up and went 
to the seaside. One day out walking the crucial flash  of insight 
came to his m:mdo
Beveridge recounts of Helmholts to llin g  how» a fte r  Investigating a 
problem in  a l l  concelvablo directions and getting’ nowhere* "happy ideas 
came unexpectedly without e ffo rt lik e  m  insp iration ." (1961* p*69o) 
Indeed he found as a general ru le  that ideas did not come to him when 
he was tire d  or when working a t hi© table - but often 3m  the morning 
a fte r a mint's rest* or during the slow ascent o f a h ills id e  on a 
smmy day* ideas would flow in  his mind. Intuition» Inspiration 
and hunch are thea^efor© seen ao ihitegral In  the orig ination of theories* 
and th is  is  not confined to a few eccentrics but is  revealed in the 
iliveo of the groat men of science» such as Bewton* Dalton and I ’araday.
Imagination le» o f course» dangerous i f  le f t  unfettered and I am
not advocating blind obedience to every wMoi that enters the head*
But thOBG men were trained in  science* wer© rigorous in  thought*
observation and eacper'iment* and could therefor© take the illu s iv e
hunch and translate i t  in to  the world of science and pursue i t  u n til
i t  yielded up its  secrets* Many ideas were wrong; bii'b many led to
crucial steps forward “■ and even failures could lead' to discoveries 
1£it a la te r  date®
i:;WK3rs«OTaa
1* 1 survey of scientists by Platt and Baker (the reference is* I 
thisilc* ®The Relationship of the Scientific *Hunch* Research' in the 
'Journal of Chemical Education' 8 (1969)0 1931) found that of 
aneworing scientists 33% reported frequent* occasional* and "Ifjù 
no assiB.tanc© :ln their work froni the phenomenon of :lntuition*
1-Kmt as for as to olaim that their intuitions were always cor%'©ct^  
Though I would suggest care here @ the correct tends to be re:;.©mbered» 
the erroneous forgotten®
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ït seems safe to conolude that intuition does play a pari; in 
ecienee and that it is especially fruitful when a person turns from 
intensive work to other activities c For in/kultions a certain degree 
of emotional sensitivity would seem a requisite* as well g&a the need 
of contemplation and freedom from interruption « Hone of this 
obviates a foundation m  the experiences and observations of life*
The precise observation and the earafully planned and executed 
experiment still remain at the heart of scientifio aetivl'hy®
14*1*6. Objectivity v, Subjectivity* So far this oMintor may 
seem to bo lending itself to some oubjectivistie imderstanding of 
seientifio methodology and indaed the weig#it of illustrative material 
has been in that direction* This is a deliberate selection of 
material to high3.ight the subjective involvement in scientific 
activity* However science exhibits a greater degree of objectivity 
thmi the nomiative disciplines such as theology» ethics* economics» 
aesthetics etc** The scientist is dealing with a real world emd 
must eventually relate to external reality if he Is to euoceed (this 
is not to say that the normative disciplines don't do this also); he 
W s  mi objective foimdatlon in reality as opposed to a normative 
foundation in reality* Scientific? laws .and theories do not 
decisively coerce reality* but it seems to me that the patterns which 
the scientist uncovers may be a, va3.id reflection of the order of 
creation* and the ratiomal.lty that God lias imparted to llie creation. 
But any such objectivity is qualified In the metliodolo^ of science 
precisely in that that methodology Incorporates a strong aesthetic 
function# And aesthetics is normative and not objective*,
There is an undoubted aesthetic appeal in science for hero Xb 
unfolded a comprehension of the world wliich is not obviously peraonel* 
But aesthetic appeal goes beyond mere formal attractiveness and 
comprehension * and is something that man imposes on hie theories as a 
criteria for their formation* He cannot escape the power that 
.intellectual, beauty and refinememt have to reveal the truths of his 
imiverse* , The question must be faced as to why the laws of soione© 
shoul.d exhibit such harmony and beauty*
Badly tMa aspect is neglected (as is much of the material in this 
and the preoeecling chapter) in practical university science courses * 
The articulate content of solence is successfully conveyed to students
throughout the world* but all too often they are given no zmslght 
Into the "rtnspeeifxable art of scientific reeoarch*" (Polanyi 19739 
p.55e) This has been ignored and they m?o left with vague
notions of some objective soieiitific method qb the key to research*
But science does not stand in Isolation from the sphere of aesthetics. 
There is a scientific taste lAich eon he beet described sb a sense 
for beauty* or aesthetic sensibilitja (Of* Bernstein 1973s p#133*)
In any given situation this may be reliable* or not* depending on the 
individiuil; one simply feels ‘hi his m:lnd that a particular line io 
worth following* perhaps oven without being able to articulate wliy«. 
Tiiere is im apocryphal story about îllnsteiai that well Illustrates this* 
He I'fas once ahmm a very powerful pîuyeieal theory which aooounted fore 
all the icnowEi facts hi a certain field, To the annoyance of the 
authos;*9 oo the story goes* Einstein after glancing at a few pages 
handed it back with the remark that the theory could not be any good 
as it waa not bemitiful onou^ gli* (Oft Harre I967 p*131*) Beauty* 
then* is of considerable importance as a. criteria for theory formation 
&md acceptance » and few mathematicians would contest that one of the 
features at the heart of liiathematics is its cold and austere 
Intellectual beauty, A mathematician» like the painter and poet» 
creates pattesrns wMoh conforrji to mi aesthetic ideal* which fit 
together in harmonious relationship,
Borne conMcntatorEi are imli^ appy with this claiî^ iing that only 
scientific criticism should be a3.1owed to deteriimie the Vfilidity of a 
theory. But as X hope is becoming clear* this wou3Xl necessitate an 
absolute objectivity that is neither possible nor dosireabloo We 
ommot avoid the fact that the aesthetic element ie integral to theory 
fonnation and acceptance» and tîiat a porticul£îr laîiguage is utilised 
by scientists Gonoeaailng their theories and experiments, A language 
which sees the patterns that emerge» and the esgeriments themselves » ‘ 
as elegant* pretty* neat* beautiful* or as clumsy* ugly and dull*
likperiments and theories may be termied elegant
because they consist of few steps; steps which are uncom%)lioated; or 
utilise some ingenious device to render a conclusion, This term 
oannot be equated with eimplicity for it goes beyond th.B:h description, 
To unclerotsncl the appellation of 'elegance' we must turn to its root
2, Î can fully testify to this. On completion of my honours 
science course I had. virtually no awar.=©nees of the history or 
philosophy of my subject* 8%id probably adhered to 'the' scientific 
method*
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raeaninga It is derived from the Latin "elegans ' * meaning chosen 
skillfully or om^efully. Thus we call a proof elegant as well as 
simple when skill 1-ms been ehoi-m in choosing the simple proof. It 
is therefore the exercise of a skill a,s well as the simplicity of 
construction that leads to this fom of aesthetic satisfaction,
I'Aiem we are faced with two equally explanatory 
scientific theories how are we to choose between them'? Is thesre a
way to choosoT Einstein replied a
"I saiGwer without hesitation that there is» in my opinion* a 
right way* and that we are capable of finding it. Our 
experience hitherto justifies us in believing that nature le 
the realisation of the simplest conceivable Diathematl.csl 
idGess,'* (1973s p.274.)
Of course simplicity is a relative term and it must ïiot be thoug;ht 
that science should or could be reduced to the s;lmpl:ls'fciCo Bather 
it is the difference between the complete and complications * Theories 
may be complex» but there Is no need for them to be overburdened by 
mmecessary complications * Ae Polykarp Kuseh was acoristomed to
telling his studentss 'If it isn't simple» it isn't physics*' (in 
larauii 1964i) pe1l6*) Even from a mmdmiely practical aspect it is 
clear that everyday decisions are taken in the laboratories of the 
wo3:'ld on the basis of slitiplieity«, (Oelenoe theses are shorter tlian 
most othersI)
lL4,o2,Sj^ 1j* Aspects jpf __81«mlleityo The use of slmpliolty seoms to me
to have several related concepts anesthetics of eouroe* but also the 
économie and social« A theory may be considered simple because it
contains few parts in its Btsmoture or because its structure is put 
together in the easiest manner this without primary aesthetic 
referenceo both instances the word 'simple' is used in making
judgements of description such that it is really the ebcmomy of parts 
and labour that is implied# Another aspect is the ease of
understanding by others which simplicity induces •- the social side#
, of ^8&,mHnity# From a functional point of view 
several criteria of simplicity operate in selecting gmieralisations* 
which lead to arithnîetioal economy as well as aesthetic simplicity# 
There is the criterion of jjrWg;ral numbers, If for experiment on
C_I_= .-3=™ =
Ohm's Law we got the experimental result <“> 1 * so IR * then we would 
bo quite happy to escpress tills as - T IE, Another criterion is 
that of beet fit# A series of expes?iinaital results could be
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related by different lines on a graph* For Inetsmce a Bine wave end 
a straight line can be drmm t3aron#i a given set of pointe. But 
other thlnge being equal the investigator will agsime a straight line 
extrapolation (of* 15*4#2^ 15*4*3#)» There are the orlterlona of 
the Immet.-Rower end the re^&Otlon of The first
impinges on the arlthmetloal sphere and the latter on the eoonoBQr of 
varlahlee* Thwe experiment may yield* ^ hV"^ /l^ *o*.**h « 0*
This would again be converted to the eio^ler V % IR form*
It le often oold by eolentlete that in any alternative * other 
th&nga being equal * the almplor has a higher probability* that it 
stande a better ohance of being confirmed* Einstein epitwAlsed this 
concept lAen, he virote that 8
"**#*tlie@e fundamental conoepte and posimlates ifhioh cannot be 
further reduced logically fTmi the eeeential part of a theory 
which reason oennot touch* It io the grand object of all 
theory to make these irreduolble elements as eimple and as 
few as possible g without having to renoimoe the adequato 
representation of any empirical content idmtever*" (I955e p*154«)
SiB®lloity eeerœ eoxxobonxbsA by tte 
siDïple patterns of nature and not merely a@ an aesthetic imposition by 
men* There is a strong correlation between 8i%licity and symmetry* 
and narbure itself seems to tend to symmetry (which is aesthetic and 
economic), This is a result of tlie 'band' distribution of
attractive forces* %ese forces occur in four basic bends ranging
from the strongg short==range forces to the we^» long«<raKige foroes*
"This natural mm«4Pand(m distribution of forces into bands 
mmt result in our finding a relatively simple behaviour of 
matter^ and certainly no simple behaviour could be expected 
if there tfere a rather smooth» continuous distribution of 
forces*" (Davies 1975» p*86,)
Byrmoetry is revealed» for exaaxple, in the construction of the snoif- 
flake and other crystal structures* There is a general tendency to 
contraction within each band; therefore gravltstlon Iseeps the stars 
roughly spherical» liquids are pulled by intes^^molecular forces into 
spherical drops» and matter is concentrated into apparently symmetrical 
atomic nuclei* Forces within the atomic nucleus are so powerful» 
and of such sharWrange that this explains the usual finding that the 
rate of radioactive decay is independent of all other features* 
and then there may be evidence of slight overlaps with the next band of 
forces» thus leading to slight deviations from the slnqple Isuf this 
occurs with beryllium 7 lAioBe rarbe of radioactive decay changes by
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roughly lAea Its atoms are Incosrporated into certain ohemieal 
compomidB. "The olegmi&t aimx>licity of na;tiœe mid of many 
BcleBtifio theories» noted by Poincare* * * * tluus stems from the 'band' 
distrilmtzlon of forces in nature," (ibid p*91«)
*
It must be concluded that aesthetic factors are both Inherent in
nature ©«id sought for by msn, This muist no1; be seen as p^Toompting 
the empirical and analytical side of science but as standing in 
creative eynthosis «
M a & Æ m m L j g m ' m m
Anyone engaged in scientific piarauits will obviously need sm 
educated mind gained through long mid rigorous training» and a degree 
of practical skill to use that knowledge, The one without the other 
is useless» But tills necessary background can stiff le creativity 
by binding to a particular paradigm» and often the decisive break" 
thzeoughB are dependent on additional, attribute© of peraonality and 
eongcxuenee of events» But whatever the case» soKie form of scientific 
approntloeship lias to be se.wed before a person will be capable of the 
Intuitive insig^ its that ohaa?acterise the great men of science » The 
Paocall's of this world who osn manage with little or no training are 
exceedingly rare Î
Davies (ibid p»19f*) relates three basic criteria for scientific 
creaitivity which have been arrived at after recent reoearoh. (a) It 
would £ix>pear that an I»Q,. of 120 or more is necesssn?y» implying good 
poxfere of reasoning and memory; (b) an ability to æeooiate ideas» a 
creative imaginatzlcai; and (e) certGiin personality eliaraoteristlcs m?e 
recfuired such as the observation tl'iat many scientists who are acclaimed 
aé successful are fairly dominant» and have the capacity to chsmnel 
large mmmrhB of energy into the effort in hend» But the problem of 
these features is that they do not appear to differentiate between the 
reguiremente for success in science and other aspects of life.
There is therefore little peciillar].y scientific about them.
Mother feature which can be noted is the ethical recjuirements 
placed OB all researchers® Science never stands ;ln Isolation from 
ïnorality® This is true concerning specific areas of research - such 
as weaponry and genetics «» but It also holds true that honesty in 
reading measurements and in reporting them is required# Integrity of 
memory end judgement are called upon Cm each person. At all times
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"a loiowlng» ethical » dependable» Integrated» rational self ;l.s a 
BGeeBBar;y pert of the soientifio method," (kamn 19?1s> p*40#)
It is in this oomecstion that the Ideal of solentiflo
disintereatodjiQBS has received several reoent setbaeks, The 'Mew
Soientist'» in the wake of the esiposiire of Sir Cyril Bisrt's careleBsly
interpreted figures» sent out a queetioMiaire to examine the question
of _.%Tfcent:u?ne3> M a s in researoh*'^  A considerable number (about 200)
of iastarioes of intentional bias were thus ool3.ated which Indicated
that QGientifie research was not as disinterestod bb pesiiaps has been
A
generally ooxitended* '’ One oignif leant result relates to the outcome g
"l#at happened to the intentional hiaasers? In the vast 
majority of oases (oo per cent of total)» the. answer to 
queotzlon 9 was notMng* A quallflcatimi fregnontly ii'icXuded 
was the response 'promoted', Bismissal oecurxzed isi 10 per 
cent of cases and reprimand in 3 per cent, Two per cent gave 
'don't know'» while 'investigation still in progress®» 'funding 
withdratm®» 'doniod a reference®» 'demoted'» and 'suicide® each 
ooGurred in less then 1 per eent of cases," (Roberts 1976» p@469*)
The idea of the soientlfio method is x-jidGsproad. and can he 
Gummarloed in the following general statement * T M  ltele«hearJM
jnmths» Several featecos In such a statement need to he noted. It 
asserts tlmt scientific method is the 'only way® to truths; that in 
fact resx'ilts have heoome seoondas^ y to a commitment to the method; -bhat 
\’IQ should accept thl.s assertion of the ® only way® 'by faith» for we are 
not encouraged to question it; gmd lastly that truth has "been reduced 
to ®tmi.ths*» to bits of Iniowledge# TMs vlexf consistently sees 
■foniths with no overall integration (of* 12o5*)a But as Goiilson noteras 
"The relationsMp of truth to a pattern xneens that truth» Including 
scientific truth» must iLltimately be thought of as êï. whole» and not as 
®a bit here and ii 'bit thezro,®" (1971 » p*6la)
This naive sta.teBiant of scientific method epitomises a blind fsdth 
wliioh I hope will be imtenable In 'hho li#it of the preceding tiiseixosion 
«’z although we must 'be aware tlmt it is nevertheless widely adhered to® 
#iis prevalence is seen in the spread of the so-called scientific
5. Of. Mew Scientist 2 Sept. 1976» p.481fg 11 l^ ov. 1976» p.350f;
25 Mov. 1976» p«466f«
4« A recent book by M«J.Mahoney (1976) examines the j>syehologlcal 
imperatzlves on scientists and amasses evidence that everyone from 
Eewton to Galiloo doctored theia? data to fit their .ends (theories).
method to other disoiplines such as theology, Alan Hrl.cîii:u:deoïi» for 
exemple» applied 'the® ©oieratific method in the field of apologetics» 
cleJ.mrUig that induction was of the eosience of ‘bhis method « (Of a 196$» 
p*40# ) This opreaci seem© to be due to an unoritloal aocoptaaoQ of 
the dogma of 19th ceniuazy science ; asid while science has gone on beyond 
that etagG other disciplines often have not noticed thio,
3)iff0rent concepts of science will Inovit-ebly lead to different
15
views on the method involved » and one wr iter comiiemta s ‘
"There is *.*@the cmicial problem of what is mecmt by the word 
Golonoe# For some tMs means that nothing can ultimately lay 
olsim to the qualification scientific unless it is some tiling 
statable In terns of quantitative formula* But for ïübùij this 
goes nuieh too far* Beel?ig that in their scione© this is an 
unattainable ideal and wanting to qualify their work ae 
scientific neTorth.e3.esSo they state that the primary mark of 
all science is that it must be omplrloal* But this only 
Intensif les the problem» for now the term empirical appears to 
Bhm:e a mumber of conflictin'^ meanings, Some say that this 
clearly excludes ethics» aesthetics and history from the 
sciences# Those engaged in such fields raise an angry protest, 
They say that anything will do» so long as it is testing 
hypotheses by ;lmpertij-ul observation# :But what is impartial 
otïsermtioïiî Is that observation by 1jho senses? Oon it only 
be direct or is indirect observation via instruments also 
possible? And how about osqierMeiitf Is that essential to 
teatiîng îiypotheseaf If so» can anybihing scientific ever be 
said about specifically human behaviour*" (%;rt I96B» p*51©)
The only way out of this problem seems to be to assert that sclontific 
method Involves many face^ ts with at root a theoretical QxmirmB;ùix&. of 
the subject matter of a discipline wMch is as unbiased as possible.
I would accept this, But what exactly ie it saying? I fall to see 
mythiiig especitflly scientific about it for this has reduced scientific 
method 'bo the level of any careful thought process* The only 
resolution would be to see science aa seieiitia» which it is» but this 
thesis adopts th,e normal cormotative meaning of science/ scientific as 
referring to 'fche natural sciences» Therefore I would aacert that
&cien'!^iG^%od
s^ cîicm-bifiG jfcheo^  ^ Methods are used of aiialysifj and
synthesis» of deduction and indudsiosi» of foimdlng and démonstration» of 
systematizing and casuistry» of description » explanation» ovaluation» 
definition ^  involving on the personal side hope end Joy» patience and 
frustration» aa well as aesthetic appreciation and endeavour.
5# Of* Basît Cl9?7) fo:e a brilliant analysis of the impasse of 
rationality today#
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Further it le, clear that no process of ?œ?lfleatlon omi actually 
establish truth for this is a question epeentially related to tlmt of 
knowledge end meæilng (of* 12»5b oh*21») It would appearr? that truth 
as such is beyond verlfioatlon» for truths
". * A #l8 a matter of the stmid I telce end of the direction in 
which 1 go in that fu3Ity integrated intimacy of experience 
oallod Icn-owledgOa îhiowledge and truth» as the Gteiatian 
imverlflably knows» are matters of the fern? of Jehovah and of 
being rooted in Jesus Christ® Thi.e is where xfo must begin 
if we want to solve these problems» Begin! This âneasis that 
do not f|r||t have some concept or idea, of what knowledge 
and truth are and xfonder what on earth these oon have to
do with the fear of Jehovah and the love of Jesus Olwist*
For if these ideas or conceptions were conceived from that 
origin» they probably have little to do with it#"(ïtet 1968» p.55#
This aasartion by a Cteistiaii professor of philosophy is amply borne 
out OR the general philosophical front by scientists such as ..Einstein» 
Heisenberg and Godel* Mention has already been made of relativity and 
Ijideterimaney (of* ch*8g 10e3«4§ ch«.27*).® Godel's Xncornpleteness 
Theorem show's that while the rules of the predicate calculus are 
complete» the iRcomxd,eteness theorem proves that within each theory» 
which :mo3ud.GF3 is based on the predicate calculus» the decision
problem (for the predicate calculus and the fmaimlated formal theory :hi 
it) is insolvableo Tims he prosented two theoremss (a) if 'ft* is 
consistent» then there exists within *0® a statement such tlmt neither 
the statement nor its negation is provable wi’îiiin (b) the
consistency of cannot be proven within Einstein's theory of
relativity» Heisenberg’® s principle of uncertainty » end Godel's theorem 
of truth saaply Illustrate that in matters of theory there is always the 
theoretical possibility of error even when it seems practically 
excluded@ for all three seem to indicate a general principle that the 
ideal of science to isolate imterzlal so that all determinative factors 
are under control is not only a theoretically unattainable ideal» but 
impossible in principle®
It must always be remembered it is ®1* who emi asking Questions»
no matter what the theoretical discipline an '1* which cannot be
e^ camined by *1*^  It follows that all data, is from the beginning 
theory laden; that there are no uninterpreted facts g end that there is
no clear line between observation and theory# So» not only does the
practice of science differ from the formal, logical cmalysis of 'the® 
ecieîjtifie method » but also despite protests of objectivity we flad 
scientists coming to their work with many different presuppositions *
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Mîmt» then» can bs e-saltl of s<?ientific laethoci? In answer to 'bhis 
question Cohen emd Magol sugges'b that ao a method :1b must he guided by 
the dlooovored * f a c t s that these .'facto* ommot themselves he 
d.isoove3.’ed without reflection; 'bliat IcaowXe-dge oanaot he eqiuited w;l.th 
the brute iirmiedxaoy of our sensations but that aensory expezdenoes set 
the problem for knowledge* Tliey go on to note that every inquiry 
needs selection which 3xi turn reguiras some "hjfpotheaia » prœconcîeption» 
prejudice» which guides research," (196I» #.592*) They concludea
"There is therefore no aliaxrp line dividing facts from guosseB 
or hypotheses* During any inquiry tîxe statue of a proxvosition 
may change from that of iiyxiothesis to tliat of fact» or from 
that of fact to that of liypothesie® Every scMoalled fact» 
therefore» i^ iy be challenged for the evidence upon wM.ch it ie 
asserted to be a, fact» even thougji no ouch cïuLllenge ie 
actually made#" (ibid p»392*)
This m.ak;ee their allegisnce to 'the scientific method® in their
oonclugioii even more remarkable (cf. 15*6«4o)o In short there is no
specific scientific method, This does not moan that speczlfio methods
will not appear at certain stages In science as elMiraoteristic for
instance .it would seem that ohemlstry has often found Itself closely
tied to methods of nomenclature (of. Gillespie 196?» pa233o)o
Hagolg e%poimd:W.g how there is no set of rules for discovery or 
lnvent:imxg goes on to tell tl'xat scieYrbific method "is ‘bhe 
persistent critique of arguments#"'’ (1974& P«13») But this is to 
assert noticing’ distinctly scientific# It merely reiterates the 
basic approach of all abstractive th.ou.ght» It gceias to me that if 
we wtait to tglk of 'the sclent if ic method® then w© must find something 
peculiarly eolentific in that method, And this :i.s exactly what 
seems to be laoleing® There is h.owever a methodological difference 
between theoretioal thought and ordinary concrete awareness» This is 
the difference between abstractive and pre^ g^Astraotlve thought® (Of®
19.7.3s 21,1.4.)
It 1b oonsistent with the history of science that scientific method 
be seen as a- slmdoi-jy entity# Scientists use any method 1;h.at comes to 
hand fx-om the whole range of theoretical thought» and are even aided by 
that which comes ■ from without the processes of theoretical thoug’ht 
aecideatg guess# Science is not tied down by objective faotsg 
ilsidoed Its conclusiotis inevitabl.y go beyo.\id the established facts #
It follows from this that attempts to change paradigma take 011 
much more of an appeal, to reorientate .faith than a setting forth of
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some objective domomstration of the evidence which must be accepted, 
This is liubn's paradi^ fl 'conversion®* hlxi’le 'normal science®
generally knows the finished outline from the start aiicl will find 
ready aoceptenoe for its déductions; frontier science will fixxd 
hostility imcl rosintsnoe to the ideaf3 it puts forward in as ranch as 
they do not belong to 'liie current paradigm® So without entering into 
the veracity of Tolikovsky's idecwi %m h.ave lixertza the reality of the 
scientific coxiTRumity carrying on a personal hostility towartW him*
But such was the x>rob3.em that Galileo.g Gopemicos and a host of others 
faced* ICvesi were ridiculed when firci; eimonnoeâ#
Science is noi; a linear progression under the aus}>ioes of some 
relentlessly applied method which ensures inevitable progress g but 
rather a crossword pussle# In that puBMle» when a problem is solved 
it no longer presents a barrier» it closes a gap» ehonges the 
appearance of the rest of the puagle (of# Iddiiigton 1930» p#552#)*
Hot only is science not a linear progszcssion» but history zmdicates a 
loss of certain Imowledge imà skills. So wg ham the pathetic
attempt» with the ai.d of modern feiowieclge and technique» to reproduce 
one single violin of the quality that Stradivarius turned out as a 
matter of couxbq*
The thraot I wish to msdm Is to point out that once again we are 
driven back to the area of religioo^philosopliioal commitmentg to an
area, of faith, So we saisi; be on p^arcl ag-alnst the olaim that much 
of modem science Btands beyond metaphysical questions# Scieaice as 
well as theology rests at its centre on a religions view of life (of© 
Gh*20*)# Science never détermines valu©» meaning or purpose but 
rests on a, belief in order» Isiw and unity 'hi. the midst of diversity® 
Q)he only alternative to this is chance and oaprlee# But whatever 
the modem vl.ewpoint» the historical reality is that modérai scienee - 
resioon a heritage going back to the I6th century* This heritage 
which forais the base for science was set up by men I'jlio firmly believed 
:m the Greater» and saw themselves as endeavouring to reveal the 
•divine ordeirllness ' (of* ch*5«)# It is necessary not to confuse 
a model for imderstasiding the world with the wordd .itselfS
It Beeme to me quite wrong to see scientific methods as something 
thai; con open up the world» and then bring God in at the end as a kind 
of Gln?ist:lan. benediction® 3i’or the Christian» and therefore I Bmst 
argue to be true to reality» it is neeessoaiy for God to be worshipped 
at the outset* He must be there at the very start of all our
thought» all our iiivestiga.tion» mid. Ife must izemaim central throughout 
even if not at the forefront of oonscioiisnesss, There can he no 
antithesis 'between 'science* and 'religion' (msm's life is religion)» 
nor C£m they he separate realms »«• though the spheres of science and 
theology are different* It is God's world that the scientist seeks 
to explore; it is Bis truth that he seeks to imfolei, This must mean 
that imless s true religion stands at the base of science» imless the 
Individual scientist Inaows the rasd-ity of God» then. Bomefhlng is going; 
to he lacking :m his vision, True .insight and loaowledgje are eziccliided
from those who would deny God* Ab OouIbor piits its
"Science itself mmst he a. rell-gious activity, « ®wrant to ’be 
able to look at scïience» its methods» its presuppositions » its 
basis » Its splendid suooess and its auB'tar© discipline; and 
then I want to be able to say g Here is God revealing Himself 
for those with eyes to see®" (19715 Pe44f<>)
OertaiXily we naist not mi:aiB:d£5© that oommon grace (of# 24,2*1#) allows 
the unbelieving’ sclezitlst to make a valid contribution to science» but 
only the believer can understand the final slgnlflcsnoe of any theory 
■{'j-ltlmi the framework of God's creation*
Science doee not uniquely determine value » meaning or purpose; It 
does not explaJxi o:!?;lg;.tes« Tims we must accept the basic limitation 
of science tmd of any theory® Ab (lodel Ims Indicated no theory is 
itself cepeblo of proving all that it contains, I*h follows that any 
absolutizing of that which la relative is to enter into philoBopkicafl 
meaiilnglessBesB as we3.1 as theological nonsense <» (Of Stoker 1973 y PP« 
144-452,) It is the parad.0% of science tliat so often the great end 
profound is glwQ)le and economic; and it is a faith of science and the 
BiethodolOfgies of science that simple and économie pabtems of 
description and eocplmiatlan should be mieovored to reveal the 
coïïïpleÿcity of our universe, Scientific activity is governed by man's 
rationality as that reason bows domi before its Origin®
14.5, EEFIEW
Scientific processes therefore contain the following elements 
whi.eh do not in any way define it an a methodology# There is 
testeclness with experience and the exeluDion of dogmatic authority; 
opeimess to fresh evidence by minds which are not closed .nor prone to 
wild speculation; a x^ rineiple of conserVcitiem whereby we do not jusrp 
from the established corpus of theories unless required to do so; a 
mathematloal base; a reeogzaition that scientific method is merely to 
be defined m  abe'kmcstive thought» tentative and never final; and an
opemaeee to intuitions, The proeese hero advocated is that of (a) 
conjectures» speonl.s,tlons» indiietians which will lead to hypotheses» 
guesGQSg from \rhieh (h) oonsequeaces are detlueoâ» (e.) observations 
me/le and (d) atizempts to disprove the unity of otmseqnenoeB and 
obsesrva-tione» Scientific hypotheses gain credence» not oLsrely by 
finding wrification» hut hy repeatedly avoiding disproof©
In step (a) scientific creativity is required which Is sùbjecb to 
no zoutlzie method hut open to the Imagination and intuition of the 
trained, and fertile snlnd, There is therefore oWlously a tension 
between detachment and involvement and any abso3.utizin.g of either 
leads to sterility» ils fa.13.en creatures hefor© the Creator no men 
can have a pure lntu.li;lve yet ig.sjc. 1b to he over creation » to
discover and iTulo© Therefore God has imp3,anted In man the right to 
Mdu.ce» to dreara» to conjecture and from this to build a science tlmt 
brings creation into subjection and glory and honour and power to the 
Oreator# But always there are limits on man, There is the limit 
of his finiteness wklch means that he can never establish by himself 
within creation a true Tmiversal; there is the limit that in science 
no one men can operate alone; tîiat he can never be cerbaln that he has 
a3.1 the pertinent data* But in essence all observations are 
prec eded by hypothèses which are rooted In a non-inductive worldview* 
All things M  a man's thought are governed ult.lmately by how he stands 
religiously before God*
ÂB for the scientific method» I leave the oloslng words (even if 
Bomowimt extreme) to the physicist John Zimmi*
"I'Je used to believe In an elixir' celled 'scientific method® 
whichg i.f sipped 3ii the right frame of mind» wc/uld permit us 
Boim glimpse :mto that ideal world named 'truth'® Alas» this 
comforting positivis'h doctrine is no longer tenable©
Having lost the anchors of 'soientific method® and tlie 
'prinoip3.e of Induction' are adrift on tlmt raft of 
iu'kerlooklugg trussed up bundles of eontradictiono and 
miscoïiceptione the group of human minds constituting the 
contesporary soiesitifio community«" (1972,)
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I ROW to the axiology» or evaluation» of seientlfic theories ©
When we think of experiences/tliooriOG it ia obvious tlmt they fall 
into different categories@ A law like hoylo's» which describes
certain relationehips beMeen pressure and vo3.wDe» can he ohseszved 
end meaeuazed directly; lAereas the Second W f  of Thermodynmilco cannot 
be observed directly© Ordinmzy e^ q^ erience is of concrete things and 
events (eft Mdisgton 1930» p*xvifo)o Our concrete experiences of a 
man» or a table» is not cut up Into separate experiences of some overall 
matheraatieel unity» aspects of physical mass» biological groivth^ 
aesthetic form and so <m® te? osgerlence of the man» or table» is
integral and enkaptic (ef,21o4o4o)° However in scientific thought
we investigate first-order abstractions physioalg biological 
Qualitlea and functions and find tlmt these enabXo ub to derive 
seeond‘=zorMer ahstraotlons of the world which allow us to distinguish 
83uy type of quality from all other types© These second^  order 
abstracttiono are 'hows' not 'wîmts®; they exist in some conceptual 
framework and their adoption is a décision in the arena of philosophy 
and faith* M y  scientific discovery fgives new loiowled^ ge otmoeming 
our universe and opoKXs up a new vision concernMg it© Tills vision» 
as Polanyi poMts out (of* 19?3sj PP^^fp 142f«)» is both more than and 
less than knoifledge itself© It is 'less than îmowledge for it is a 
guess; yet it is more for it Is a forelmowTedgo of things yet 
unlmotm and perhaps sa yet inconceivable© But this vision is the 
guide for the Interixætation of all future experience until it ;ls 
coîifixîo.ed or ovortlxrowio
MsSÆÆÂ. (1975) cites as criteria, for the acceptability of theories 
the facets of certainty (accuracy); systematic relevance (profundity); 
and intrineio intoreat* To these he addc his general dieoussion on
the QUbjeotive elemerat© Dag^ oji (1975) suggests as cri1;eria -
generality; simplicityg precision; toGtednessg and refutedïxess©
Popper (l9?2/a; 1972/bg 19T3/b) suggests priiaaxdly the testaiiility in 
a potential sltuatiŒX of refutedness» but also utilises concepts such
1o AoTaeskl suggests expleaia'cory ;povfer; simplieity; and Icnown tzmth 
content whicli seems to cover Davies® criteria in a similar way©
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æ  empirical ooateyitg explanatory poivrer with reapect to previous 
datas alîaplloltys end verlBimllltudea Einotein (1975) poMto toV jJs. &/ ff <5>f?gw4X’a’gs^ £i:«v.Æiva:Ærig ^ ^
t W  general fit with facts@ and to a gpality of iimer perfection* 
Perlmpe one more criteria should he mentioned ae many see It aa of 
mrozTldlng importence "= fruitfulness* The enag ie that it can only
he assessed M  retrospect* As Mogben notes» advocating tMe as the 
sole criteria (the ohvioue one from the instrumental viewpoint) $
''Contemporary judgements upon the importance of new theorise 
ore ephemeral o The pre-eminent criterion of ahiding 
achievements in the realm of theoretical aoience is %eir 
social frultfulnesa» and thie we can only recognise in 
retrospect*" (195&9 p*1079»)
But one wonders lAat the social fkuitftüaess of Copernicus or Kepler 
or even Einetein mlg^t hmre to do xfith the validity of their theories, 
and even with their acceptance by the soientifio oomnnmlty?
Evidently, then, there is no consensiis oonoeming the main 
ottrihuteB of a theory, or tjhat criteria ore relevant and should he 
used in determining the validity and acceptability of any given theory. 
To concentrate the discussion 1 shall fooi^ œi tlie positions of 
Barboure Popper and Davies* But before tumin^v to the attributes of 
theories a word, is in order concerning social criteria*
15*1* SOCIAL CRITERIA
In our modem society solentlfio and technological research are 
governed by the money forthcoming from various bodies* The question 
therefore arises as to what criteria are utilised in deciding where 
and how to spend money* Weinberg suggests that there ore internal 
criteria os to how well a particular branch of science is carried out, 
end external criteria which ask lAy a particular line should be 
pursued* (Cf* Rose & Rose 1971 o p»215«) Concerning the intemg^ 
aspects there are the related questions of the ripeness of aaiy given 
field for scientific exploitation; and the competanoy to do so* 
Gonoeming the external criteria there are involved questions of 
technologl.cal, social and scientific merit, the technological and 
social btmefits that may accrue from a portioular li%ie of research* 
Tills view sees science os governed largely by political and pragiaatic 
factors centred on the utilitarian side of science such that 
reseoT'ch becomes stifled* '
jâ,6_LuS&jaBBS«B Cci'o 17.1.)
Barbour reduces the criteria by idiich a tlieory may be evaluated to
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three areas «« agreement with observations ; the internal relatlcmshipe 
between oonoepts; and the eon^rehonsivenese it displsys (of © IgéO/b» 
p o 3 44-i a } o
15*2G1o Observational Fit oonoezma the relation of a thooxy to the 
available data# A liieory must cut acazoss the observable world at 
some point if it is not to remain meenixigless © %ilte validly he 
notes that 8 "llEpiriciaJ. agreement is a crucial property of any 
acceptable theory©" (ibid p©143o) Thus he argues that from the laws 
of planetary motion plus information eonoeming present positions» we 
can calculate fuMre planetary events» which can. in turn be checked 
with theory to provide verlfi(?ation or refhtationo
15o2o2o1o Gonsioteney - refers to a desired absence of logicalcrcSZcMsssiKxst» T.-re^i$&«m=&cyj3xiJ:r=su^r.^£Rîs::i)o,z;«syld:>
contradictionso Logical consistency is a required, though not
sufficient, condition for a statement to be identified with physical 
reality© It is perfectly feasible to malce logically consistent 
statements that are manifestly false, or do not refer to reality*
Apart from this principle of eonslstency (or non«'Contradiction) ii; is 
lm%)osslble to think or talk about the world ©
jjj#2 a2 o 2 © Ooherence refers to the fact that a theory must 
satisfactorily fit into the larger body of scientific theories end 
laws; what Itegoncai calls the 'mltiple connectione® between concepts 
within a theory and with other theories accepted as valid® However 
I would question if this (or ooYisistenoy) is purely an internal criteria® 
There are internal and extornaL ooneistency and. coherence®
- according to Barbours
"©ooosignifies the smallest number of independent aoeiimptions 
(for eocample, the Ooperaxicgm theory was simpler than the 
Htolemazie in requlzùng fewer asswiptions which were ad hoc 
that is, not derivable from the l\mdame.ntal structure of the 
theory®)" (ibid p®145*)
He notes however that sinxplieity is wider than this and points to
Cohen and Magel. *s reference to 'an ^calculable aesthetic eXeraent®'
Thus Einstein was not bound by data or any apparently ezucisl experiment
of his day (oogo Kichelson—Borley), but sought "rather for the
symmetry of frames of reference in electromagnetism# * ® «used only
03cper5;mental, foots that hekl been Imomi for fifty years®" (ibid p*145o)
15 0 2 «3 * ...Cgm^ reqhensiyeness ® I find Barbour m'lolear at this polfit©
His two aspects under tlxis) heading; do not seem adequately distinguished®
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15*2*3*1» Initial Generality* He seea under comprehenalveneee the<i!r3iÛiïW^S«Æ^i.ï#>ï4l.rCKn«î%-SEi?tt-iVaiyÇ¥:T«a5ï^aiiR-l ’^a=&îriVS'«5» •*-
Initial generality of a theory; Ite "ability to shoif the underlying 
unity In apparently dlveree phenomena#" (Ibid p*146#) But thle
oeoB^ to involve aspects of coherence and canslstenoy*
15.2.3.2* Frnltfulnees. Secondly he considers fruitfulness or 
fertility^ "tlie value of a theory for suggesting now hypotheses, latm, 
concepts, or experiments*" (ibid p.146.) He relates this to
Margenau's concept of •extensibility* and Toulmln's concept of 
•deployability', seeing the basic issue as being that of refinement or 
development of a theory* But while fertility of a theory may have 
iK^ortant social, polltioal or teohnologloel impllçatlons» I find it 
difficult to see what it has to do ifith criteria for determinlng the 
validity of theories* To emphasise this is to tend to instnmentalism 
(which Barbour rejects) for under fruitfulness can regard as final, 
theories lAloh are false from the outset.
15*2*4# Mdltional lif^ atures* In concluding his discussion Barbour 
malces tliree points. (a) The relatlonsliip of theory to data is not 
simple for in any single theory whole network of ideas and concepts 
is bound up* 8o it is never possible to test a single theory in 
some crucial experiment* (b) It follows that ^  theory oari ever be 
finally proven true* 111 that can be said is that it gets closer to 
the knoim datag that It displays better agreement and is more coherent 
and comprehensive than rival theories# But certainty is never 
achieved, and he cites the Instance of the chemist Arrhenius receiving 
tlie Mobel ixriae for woric in the electrolytic theory of dissociation, 
and the same prise going to Debye for showing the inadeguaoles of 
Arrhenius' theory. (c) F^ inolly he notes that tliore is a wide variety 
of Influences on the scientist for, after all, It is men who select and 
formulate theories* Personal judgement enters the estimation of data, 
and the Importaïioe given to various aspects * Therefore he concludes 
tlmt the criteria he has listed "may not yield any clear-cut 
conclusions#" (ihld p*148#)
At the outset It needs to be noted that Popper Is not interested 
in words and their raeenlngs, but in problems. He is not interested 
"in making the meanings of words •precise•, or In •defining' or 
•explicating* them*" (1972/a, p*401#) This frees him feom becoming 
bogged down in a linguistic debate and enables him to drive through to
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eosmntlal questioRFio Bsoential questions for Popper reelato theories 
to truth « "I regard only otsi'beRioats or theories and the queetions 
of their truth or falsity æ  important." (ibid p©4Û2©) Popper 
assumes a "reollst aaiti objectiviet point of view©" (l972/b» poiHo)
He aims at truths
"For om? aim as Gcieratie'te ie to d:i.s cover the truth about om? 
problem; and we must look at our theories as serious attempts 
to find the trutho If they azre not tzue» they may be» 
admittedly» important stepping stones tomxtis the truth» 
Mstrumemts for further discoveries « But this does not memi 
that we oan ever be content to look at them aa being nqthiw: 
but stepping stones» nqthlm? but instrumentog for this would 
involve giving up even the view that they are instruments of 
theoretical disopvBrieag it would commit us to looking upon 
them as mere instruments for some oboervatlonol or pragmatic 
pi^msQo" (1972/ag p®245#)
iiut it io an aim that gcsh mover bo scientifically resolved© There is
a dis tine ti(m to be drm-m between seeking truth, getting closer to
truth» and actually finding it* (Of® ibid PPo3“3ûo) It is a renmant
of the ©ss©ntia3-ist (of.ll.lg 11 #3o.) approach that seeks to define
words or concepts :ln a definite end precise manner g it is tied to the
2idea that we can prove or justify the truth of a theory©
I have grouped the followii&g discussion of Popper's position 
round the following fallibility; relevance g content and pnzobabllity; 
teotsdness; and verisimilitude @ The Popperian approach suggests 
primarily the testability of a theory In a situation of potentiel 
refutecInesB» but also p.tzLlises eoncepte of eR'tpirical content» 
explanatory power with respect to previous data» simplicity and 
verisimilitude» and these I hope asze adequately covered#
While scepticism and relativism are to be
2o This approach fits the Dooyoweerdign approach that each mode of 
nieanMg has an irreducible mid uBdefinable nuolçsus or keraiél®
However aJ.though we c&mnot define :ln en esseatialist manner it is 
necessary that we make distinctions if problems aro to be aolvod end 
confusions avoided® Back of this is the 'undeniable facts that 
whatever the theoretical activity engaged upon, man needs a point of 
view© If I am aolced to record what I im now escperienolng' I shall be 
confused by the diverse possibilities of this miblguouG request® M  
I to report that I am now typing; that I hear voices outside; a car 
druawing uj)g the constant ticking of a clock; the content of the 
voices I hear; or thsit these are extraneous noises imd distract mo 
from the taok in liend? The list is endless» and evesi if 'bho request 
to report could be carried out it would only load to a collection of 
lureelated statomeiTbso Bcience needs a point of view and theoretical 
problème®
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opposed as philosophical bases for approaching sclonoo or morals, there 
is nev@rtheleB8 au element of truth in them® Tlila Icemel is the 
single fact that there Is no general criterion of truth (within the 
cosmos)# While the choice bettreen theories lo not arbitrary, while 
there ie objective truth» while tliere are ways of deciding tlmt one 
tlieory le nearer to the truth than another# it remains that we do err 
In our choices, we make mletal^ ieep we mlaa the truth, or fall short of 
Ito We ere falllbleo Popper illustrates this vrlth reference to
the discovery of heavy water and heavy hyrogm - first, separated by 
Ifroy In 1951 (of* 1975/b, Vololl po574a)9 Before this nothing was 
more settled and definite in the field of chemistry than our 
knowledge of water and Its oonstltuents — BUO* Water waa actually 
used for the 'operational' definition of the graneaa# After Urey'o 
discovery it was seen that what was believed a ehemlcàlly pure 
etmpound was in effect a mixture cf chemically Indistlngulchable, but 
phyoloally different» compounds =« with VGrl.ous densities, boiling 
points, freezing points, despite the fact that previously water was 
used as a baae to define all these points* Wo must ccmclude that 
science la falllblG because science is a human activity® 80 there 
can be no absolute scientific certainty or authority#
15.3=2# Relevance# Science must endeavour to give systematic 
interpretation of phenomena and not merely accumulate unrelated 
descriptive generalisations. We therefcxRe at all times seek for 
information that is interesting and relevant to the end for idiioh vie 
strive# 80 theories are subsumed under projected goals and exhibit 
a highly selective status within the range of possible theories#
Popper oomments# "we prefer an InterestMg, daring, and highly 
infoasnative theory to a trivial one#" (l97^&p p#217»)
.l&.l'Æ.lu Ta. aa essay oa tetlosislity.
aa& the Growth of Scientific itnowlscige ’ (iblA pp«215f«) Popper 
presents several theses, the first of which is that "we can know of a 
theory, even before It has been tested, that if it passes certain tests 
it will be better than some other theory#" (ibid p#217«) This is 
based on the content of the theory and the potential satisfaction or 
progressiveness before testing# his study of content is based on 
the simple concept that the information of the conjunction 'ah' of 
any two statements 'a' and 'b' is alxfoys more than, or at least egud 
to that of any of its components# Tims writing 'Ot(a) • for the
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oontent of a statement and •Gt('b)* for the content of and
•Gt(ab)' for the content of their conjimotion» we have8
CtCa) 4 CtCf*) ^  CtCb) ...0.(1)
which Is in contrant to the corresponding law in the ealon.lus of 
probability where the Inequality slgjns of (l) are inverteds
p(a) >  r(ab) ^ p(h) **.*.(2)
The two lawe (1) and (2) together state that as the content IncreaaeB 
so the prohaMlity deereacess
"o « content increases with increasing luprohability© * ® #Thla 
trivial fact has the following' inesoapabX© consequences ; if 
growth of teiowledg© means that we operate with theories of 
increasing content, it must also mean that we operate with 
theories of decreasing probability. Thus if our aim is the 
ailvanoement or growth of îmowledge, then a high probability 
cannot be our aim as wells %ese jtwo aijas„£ire Incompatible®"
(ibid p.218.) -
jxœbabiliti: This leads Hopper to conclude that 8
"a.««since a low probability means a high probability of being 
falsified, it follows that a high degree of falslflability » or 
refutability, or testability, io one of the aims of science ■=» 
in fact, precisely the same aim ao a hi#i inforaaative content®" 
(ibid p.219«)
Thus only a highly 'lestable or improbable theory is worth testing.
Th;le is seen historically in that the progress of science ImB been to 
increasingly more general, theories which have a logically lower 
probability factoro The more open a theo2:y beeomee to testing the
more it is open to refutation and therefore improbability® The 
theories of Eepler and Galileo were united and superseded by hewton's 
theory which was more general and more testable* Bimilarly the 
theories of Fresnol and Fsszaday were united end superseded by Maaafell; 
while Mewton mid Maicwe3.1 were in turn supGszseded by Einstein* But
severe tests equally may lead to refutation, and even where this ie not 
achieved» oonfiraoation may not be achieved either» Lavoisier's 
famous experiments which indicated that the volume of air in a closed 
space decreases while a candle bums, or that the weight of iron- 
filings Increases g do not oonfiran the oxygen theosz^'' of combustion - 
but they do tend to refute the older phlogiston theory. Thus it 
would seem that soienoe progresses from problem to problem of ever 
increasing dexrbh and complexity while stsrtiïîg all the time from
2 %
problems and not from observations » though observations may give 
rise to a problem#
Basic. ..State^ rits a But to return to the question of
empixdc£il content - EOt* This appellation 1b given justifiably» 
according' to Popper» to what he calls 'basic statements ' $ This io 
seen, lie argues, from the fact that when the empirical contents « 
EGt(tg) and 3HGt(tg) of two eispirioai theories and are
related s'ueh tliats
ISCtCtp < EOt(tg) <,....(3) 
holds, then the measureo of their logical contents will also be 
related such that3
also holds ©
TMe ie based on a class of statements which are assumed to have
(:^"bid p*586#) This is, of 
course,Popper endeavouring to establish a g-romd of noi>^ met£iphysioal 
statements on which to build science * This must be questioned for
Popper himself has to szel&m his 'unquestloYied ' emjjijzica.1 statements 
such that they too or© up for question @ Poi>per does in fact 
criticise the empiriciet view of absolutely given perceptions or 
obserevations of data which earn be built on as if on solid roclc. All 
observations syid perceptions are in effect themselves interpretations© 
Mever'kheless we mms'b establish some set of basic statements which are 
not called into question all the time* So he wszitess "Eyery test of
a theory, whether resulting in its corroboration or falsification, 
must stoj) at some basic statement or other which wo decide to accept#"
*’* »:t£ir.«ax»7ï*iai:-3iÆs-<4i.Lus3«jxssvsrtiSiix;..«K;3i
(1972/bp p«104«) If this is not done we become caught 'hi an 
infinite regresB* For Popper these basic statements mist satisfy 
the following conditions 8 (a) given a universal statement with no 
initial conditions, no basic statement is deduclble; (b) nevertheless, 
a universal statement and a basic statement can contradict one smother< 
fills is only feasible if we can derive, a negation of a basic statement 
from the theory It contradiotsm Prom this esid (a) it results that a 
basic statement has a logical form such that its negation cannot also 
be a basic statement» "Basie statements are therefore© o ©statements 
asssszting that mi observable event is occurring :m a oerts&in 
individual region of space and time." (ibid p»103»)
however expesziencG never provides justification of a basic
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atatement# "Bbcperienoee oan motivate a decioion# and hmoe an
acoeptmioe or rejeotion of a statement, but a basic statement cammt 
be justified by tliem mo more tliam by tlie table®" (ibid p®105<
Tills la related to the point already næade that any cbaervatlon Is set 
within the matrix of some worldview, some category of selection and 
12a5a2p 12o5e5*)e
Eemce Popper differs from the 'ccmvemtlmiallet' In aaaerting that 
etatemente decided by agreement are mot miiversal but aingalarg end 
from the 'poaltivlat* In asserting that baelc atatemcmts ere not 
verified  by immediate experience but are rather, logically apeaklng, 
accepted by an act of choice® Tlie convtmtlcmaliBt accepte imlveraal 
atatementa goveamed by a principle of eiii^ liolty (aeathotlc motives 
are crucial) but for Popper the prime concern ie the severity of teste, 
though not the verification of tests ae for the poeitlvictc (cf® ibldp 
pe109a)@ Ma oanmot verify 'here la  a glass of water' because • glass' 
and 'water' are dIapoBitional terms demoting phyeidal bodies wliieh 
exhibit lmfk»lllm behaviour# 80 he cgmcludesa
"The empirical baele of objective science has nothing 'absolute' 
about It# Science does not rest upon colld bedrock * The 
bold straotupe of Its theorlos rises, æ  it imro, above a 
swamp* It is like a building erected on piles# The piles 
ere driven dwxn fleom above into the swamp, but not down to any 
natural or 'given' base; and If we stop driving the piles 
deeper. It is not because we have reached firm ground# Ve 
slüQfly stop lihon wo are satlslfed that the piles ere firm 
encu#% to carry the etrucWreg at least for the time being*" 
(iteâo p»111o)
And in a 1972 Addendum to this he adds$
"(1) term 'basis' has ironical overtones@ it is a basis that
is  not firm * (2) I  assume a re a lis t and objeotivist point of 
view» I  6 y  to replace perception as •basis' by c r itic a l 
testinaz* (3) Our observational experiences are never beyond 
being testedg and they are impregnated with theories# (4 )
'Bemio stat^ m^ents' are 'test statements'» they are© 111m eCll 
language, impregna'bed ifi'bh theories»" (ibid, p«1'M=)
But whence now the 'imguestloned empirical character'? (1972/a, p»386«]
It ie aecesssry 'bo bear in mind that tlie data of experience is 
always Interpreted In the light of tliieorles* Popper aclmoi-jledgee 
the insist of Kant in pointing out that our peroelvlng of a thing 
occurs in a total situation or context* Indeed to ar^e that tliere 
must be some uninterpreted data, (acme ul'bimate material @ does not "Wee 
Into account that the process of interpretation Is In part 
physiological a Thus even fo r Popper, the idea of the existence of
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milnterpretGd data is a tlieoiy "not a .faot of expeazience, and 
least of all an ultimate, or 'baeie' fact#" (ibid ##587*) So his
basic statementB are not statements of iinMteszpræted data but facte 
seen in the light of theories "they are soaked in theory, as it 
were." (ibid p®387o)
15 .AJ-o, - Tec teflness o (Of* ibid p®390o) Mb already noted the question 
of testechiGSB oooupies the centre of the etsige for Hopper® Ife 
concludes that the oriterion of progress of Imowledge is tied to the 
Moreaee of its testability g and also its osQjlanatory power with 
respect to evidence Imoim end unknown* It will be remiombered that 
the thesis he is presenting is that we can 'imow of a theory, even 
before it has been tested, that if It passes certain tests, then it 
will be better thasi some other theory*
There are according to Popper certain requirements for gettJjig 
nearer to the truth* (a) Any "new theory should proceed from some 
powerW..©. .un% M  about some oaonectioii or
relation between hitherto unconnected things or facts or new
'theoretical entities'®" (ibid p«241*) (b) Any new theory should be
Mdepesidently testable, not only explaining all the esplioanda it was 
designed for, but also having new and testable consequenceB g it must 
yield predictions which have not so far been observed* Tills is
necessary tp enable fruitful explora-tloas and advanceo. (e) Popper
sees as a separate requirement that a good theory should pass some new 
and severe teqt® The nuabes? of tests carried out is, of course, 
Irrelevant® The law of diminishing retmms applies to repeated tests 
of the same nature as the collapse of the Mewbonian worlcV^ picture 
aiTiply indicates® ■ But this third requirement is seen, as necessary to 
the advenoG of science# As well as helping to eliminate ad hoc and 
trivial theories it ia supported by the followrlng arguments# First3.y 
if we have an independently testable theory, wM.ch happened to be true, 
then it wou3.d yield siiGeesafuX predictions which though not Bitffioient 
conditions for the truth of a theory are nevertheless necessary* 
Secondly if it is the aim to strengthen the veriBirtiilitude of theories, 
then, it is necessary to seels to reduce the fal.sit^ ' content eud 
strengthen the truth content® So his third requirement is divided 
such that .it is required of a good theory that it have successful 
predictions and that it is not refuted too soon®
ïoppes’s anaifes? is that an "easox'tlon,
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pro};oeitim, statement or belief is taziie if, and. onlj’ if, it 
Goreazosporide to the facts®" (1973/% VoloII p«369*) This, of course, 
leaves 'bho problem as to what are the facts* It is neeoBBary to seo 
that knowing what -bzuth means 9 or under what conditions a etatement is 
termed true, is not the same as, and must be distinguished from, 
hiw:hig a ifay of ascertaMing whether a specific statement is true or 
false* teith is wider than linguisticaX precision for Popper* He 
also rejects criterion philosophies o3.aim:ing that 2
"I 'believe that it io the demand for a jirldieninn..of jtroth which 
has made so many people feel that the question 'what is truth? " 
ie immiswerable « But the absence of a c2?ites?ioB of taeath does 
not render the notion of truth noîi'^ -sigknifleant any more than 
the absence of a criterion of hea3.th renders the notion of 
health leant » A sick man may seek health even though
ho has no criterion for it* ini erring man may seek truth even 
though he has no criterion for it*" (ibid p»3?3o)
Here Popper fails to distinguish 'The Truth* fro® scientific truths* 
Thereo may indeed be no general internal criterion aa he and TazzsM 
claim for truth, no long as by this is meant scientific formulations « 
But it cannot be extended to the concept of idi.0 Truth, and it is 
precisely here tlmt Poppor's acknowledgement and rejection of the role 
of revelation becomes decisive (l972/a, %)p*27'-29#)
Scientifically spealcing a stater>ient is true for Popper if it 
oorrewpondo to the facts; it is nearer to the truth if it corresponds 
more closely th.an some other theory* A statement *a' therefore gets 
closer to the truth than a statement 'b' is, and only if, its truth 
content increases without a corresponding Increase in the falsity 
contento Thus Mevjton is nearer the truth than Kepler, tho'agh this
does Slot màltc M s  theories *tru@*a
envisages 'bliree schools of philosophical, approach* The first is that 
of the Terif3.oationistS or justifieationists who contend that, more or 
less, what cannot be supported by positive reasons ia not worthy of 
belief or consideration* Then there are what he terms "the 
disappointed justifieationists the irmtionalists and sceptics 
(ibid pw280«) There ax’e many here today® B’is third category, to
hh:U„G Ï would point to the need to seek for the full orbed truth 
of the Interwovenness of the whole of creation as meaningful only in 
the face of the Creator* It is feasible that a' linguistic 'lie* may 
bo 'true* in torms of its ethical, juridical or pistioal components «
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%hléh lie hi'iiîBelf belongs g is that of the *falsifieationists '^ \#io 
concentrate on the question of evidence for or stgalnat .m the arena of 
principleQ (Ironically the résurrection and ascension@ to name but 
two religiouo events^ eœe In principle open to testing.) The thrust 
of this school is ’baaic'flly that we oan give positive reasons which 
would justify the belief that a theory is true® The Theist would 
not assent to this as a criterion of truth^ though it could be adhered 
to as contingent to sclcmtlfic activity®
'Hie task of science is the search for truth (true theories) though 
it is not just any truth but interesting or relevant truth that is 
sought. We seek truth that will have- a high quotient of esqjlanatoxy 
power9 which logically implies that It is Improbable truth (of* 15ô5ô3o1o). 
In tiio search it la crucial to clearly distinguish between objective 
truth and subjective belief. There is an objective character to 
theories and Popper contends that his idea of verioimilitudeg 
triitKlikeiiesSg or ap%)ro%imatlon to the truths is an objective idea 
that ”ïiTust be sharply distinguished from all such subjective ideas as 
degrees of belief or emivictiong or pea?sua s long or apparent or seeming 
tmithg or plausibility9 or of probability in any one of its subjective 
meanings a” (ibid p«402®) ^
Popper g however g wishes to use the original subjectivist term of 
verisimilitude in Cicero) "in the objee/bivist sense of *llko the 
truth^(ibid x3«404)-= Hie idea of verls3.mili‘fcude is therefore the 
Idea of a degree of truthllkenesa ^ of better or worse correspondence 
to the truth; or of greater or less lil-ceneBs or aimllmzity to truth*
Tills allows for degrees of trutlxlj.keness g the idea of one theory 
(hewton) being' nearer to the truth than another (Kepler) which In turn 
is nearer than another (Ptolomy) ® Popper carefully delineates this 
idea as ai&amaut&G one mid 
(ibid p*234*)
In connection ‘id.tb. verisimilitude the main problem is the realist's 
problem of truth the correspondence of a theory to the facts g that Is
4« He notes the confusion of truthlikeness and probability is a 
traditional one 9 tracing its history thszough Homer ^ Xenophanes, and 
Parmenides. He sees the transition from the Platonic paradigm to 
the copy (the idea of the changing and becoming world made by the 
creator as a eopyr, likeness g whose original is the eternally wiohang- 
lag Being that Is) as similar to PareBiidec* idea, of the transition 
from the Way of Truth to the Way of Seeming® In Parmenides g he 
suggests that doze, (omjiion) stands in direct contrast to aletheia 
(truth) and is associated diepara^^ingly to mortals, (ibid Pe399f«)
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t'jith reality0 and here It Is cmeial to keep the objective coneept of 
'verlsimilitud© to the fore® It mmst be kept free froia subjective 
ideas* Truth is finally allied to correspondence with reality and 
Popper helpfully summarises the relationships between the objective 
and subjective views of scientific knowledge In the folltming table 
(ibid p.227.)
Objective or logical ox 
Ontologie al Theories
Subjective or Psychological 
or Epistemologiea3- Theories
«frrJtt.TïKüTC.'ïS wsj'ïssK-'tTtts-iin.cviSEiSïsya?-’: a-sTxwsÆiu'caJTi^ 'ïXTiiVïaÆtr.'ait-.as^ sswracfeïiTO!»
truth as coocreopomkmoG with
the facte
Objective probability 
(inherent in the situation g and 
testable by atatietical tests)
Obj cctivo randomness 
(statistically testable)
eguiprobablllty (physical or 
situational syimnetry)
tuTuth as a property of our state 
of rirb'id - or kiiowledge or belief
Subjective probability
(degree of rational belief based 
on our total kvioBfleclge)
lack of knowledge
I lack of knm-iledge
Po%)per thlxdcs of the riglrb-tend^ s^ide of this table as *a, lapse's a 
Eliot alee g though he recognises a oompa5f?able table where the 
eX):Wtemological side is not based on error® Thus (ibid p®228«)s
truth
testability
explanatory or 
predictive po'wer
'verisimilitude '
conjecture
empirical test
degree of corroboration 
(that l8@ report of the
results of tests)
However^ In our scientific activities we mmst not confuse a 
corroboration with absolute truth value g for corroboration can only 
occur with respect to some system of basic statements®
The above discussion of the views of Bsnfooire and ïPopjier indicates 
the eoHrolexiiy of this area; that any fomulation is highly subjective 
and dexiendont on what features are conceived to be iioportant*,
15«4a1* Testability® This will imninga cm questions of refutedness 
gmd precision a hot only should a scientific theory be testable^ but
it should preferably be easily teeitedg within limits 5 by relatively 
few expérimentée If millions of tests were generally necessary our 
scienti.fie textbooks would be full of theories awaiting ©osie dogree of 
comprehensive testiJig® Thus simq'le theories which have been well
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tested RUGoesefully over emne range of variables ere looked, forg end 
when fo^ md. called, even thou^. they may he broken when tested,
over greater reiiges or in new eltuatlone. The munher of oonflrming 
teste le Irrelevant (of* J^ ewton's theorleo of motion)* We oan 
obBerve the sun on thoneande of oooaeicgiB without observing an eolipseg 
hut It would he foolish to hold with high oonfldenoe that the path of 
the moon never lay between earth and sun*
It is therefore clear t3mt the assumption of the adequacy of 
measurtsmient can he misleading* This assimption oan mean that given 
enou^ data we can. eliminate an infinite number of hypotheses @ leaving 
a finite number from which we can selectg say by some method of 
simplicity ordering* But the use of purely emplrloaJI, methods can 
only justify the usage of rational numbers in describing results g 
Tfihlch fails to account for the ooourrence of hypotheses integral to 
science with irrational numbers in their ezpresslon •tT* and •©* 
cannot be readily explained by observational data*
Similarly the assumption of nonf-statistioal methods, outside of 
the statistical approaclaes, is misleading, for It assumes that a 
scientist drawing the best fitting curve has only one set of results 
to follow* This ignores the difficulty of repeated experiment by 
the samop or another, scientist which may present more than one set of 
data, Scientific activi'ky seoms more aligned to the testing of 
deductive inferences than to the Induction of simple generalisations, 
sucli as given by the postulation of scmie best^fitting curve.
In any scientific measurement there is always a margin of error «» 
as an engineering student 1 well remember working in the metrology 
laboratory and measuring the same object In different ^ foys, ifith 
different tools, and obtaining many inccmpatible results (Cf. Gayler & 
*)hotbolt 1968), 8ay we obtained a measurement of 5#5 %flth an 
experimental error of ^0*1, then all subsequent measurements between 
5.4 and 5*6 are in agreements 80 we concluded that :lndefinite3.y many 
theoretical facts were consistent iiTith a given set of experimental 
conditions. It would tWrefore seem clear that testing is not 
adequate by itself as a criteria of theory validity and that some 
comprcmlse should be, and is, sought between simplicity and fit of data.
"There is no need to seek rigour here; simple la%fs of mechanics 
not tslcen to be disconfirmed by the experiments conducted 
in sophomore lab sections, where experience quickly confirms 
that few sophomore experimenters ever produce observational 
data that coincides with tihat the already expected theories of
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physios predict," (Ackerironn IgGlg p.129«)
Isqjerisent osii disprove theory “ but so what?
13«4i>2« SafetyÎ Stremrkhs SlaTpliGity. How are we to choose between 
hypotheses of uneguol strength? It i© all very well to say that 
simpXieity decides hetwooii theories of equal strength, but when they 
are unequal such a criteria, is not so obviously valid* Caution 
woiîXd seem to indicate that wo choose the wealcer of two theories, the 
hypothesis that asserts the 3.east, because it la less 3.ik'ely to fail® 
However g such an approach ouiokly degenerates Into absurdity by 
settl^mg mi tlxeories which toll us nothing •-» their beam is too broad in 
terms of the ssaraMlght analogy (cfo9»3*2»3«)« Ho we then turn to 
the strongest theory not falsified by the evidence but go:lng beyond 
immediate evidences? The problem here is that for every hypothesis 
strong enough to go beyond the evidence there is an equa3.1y strong 
opposing hypothesis (cf* ibid p«129®} This combines to indicate that 
questions of safety and strength, though desirable qualities in some 
degy.'ee, are not competent criteria of choice between theories of unequal 
strength® Strength and safety only can be decisive between theories 
of equal simplioity, thougti they have non-<1.ecisive ifeight elsewhere*
This brings us back to the question of igrpl icity o ( Cf * 14 o 2 * 2 « )
This concept is central, to some de^ geee, in nearly all the views I have 
oome across* ^  a
oahHot be reduced to mere brevity of 
encpresslon; nor can it be a reduction of all factors to Imotm predicates 
as this would inevitably esceliide anything new; nor is it a question of an 
lîypothesls alone, but the context of the theoretical structure *
Some (e*g* Popper) have endeavoured to formulate a workable rule of
eimplieity as a criteria for making inductive Infereaices, This sees
simplicity ordering in tormia of the number of parameters in the equations
being seen as possible hypothesis with respect to some set of data,*
On this definition the expressions s y w Ax; y « A® sin x; y a A .log
(i -1' % )g are all equally simple* There is only one arbitrary
parameter, ®A*» Similarly the fol3,owing are more complex, having tvjo
2arbitrary parameters s y ^  A«x 4- B*x *| y s A* sin Bx*
But there is a numerical simplicity and subjective intuition that 
envisagea y t-s â/x^ as simpler than y es ; or y .àx as simpler
than y iUlog(l -i- -> 0*21 sin x), even though all have only one
arbitrary pmxameter* It is an area where common sense has a role and
304
we mist o:L^8#^Mc^'io%3j^
;bbB mwiG^io^ œ?.jiQa^^ic%U Ü:a appare:<it diXonmia for simplicity 
ordering is tlmt wMle 1/3 is earlier in one scale than I/IO, O0I is 
ew?ller than 0»3333»a*« in another®
The problem of simplici'ky can 'bo further seen in the question of 
emrve>'d.‘ittingo In the normal model a satiefaotory hypothesis is seen 
aa a curve passing through, or near to, each point m  a, plena or graph® 
Obviously i'j& can draw an mfinite series of such curves, but science 
seeks the best? moat useful? true forfiiiila? and the tradition îms been 
that the simplest curve is the on© that should be soughij® But 
Ackermasm objects th&t there is mi implicit a^ asuiiiptioii of contanuity 
here which limits the functions avail able in an memner#
"The difficulty is the followings If the results of experiment'- 
ation are taZcen quite simply to be points in a plane, there 
does not appear to be any reason why the curve drawn throu^i 
them should, be continuous g except that most scientific laws to 
the present Imve, ae a matter of fact, been oontiimous @® # 
Polynomials, of course, are continuous curves, and attention 
to them exclusively seems to promise hope for an application 
of the intuitive notion of drmring the 'smoothest ' curve 
through a sot of points as a possible explication of inductive 
simplicity." (1961, p®127«}
Popper eeems certaln3,y to think in terms of polynoml&ils to the 
exelusiosi of other functions; yet all scientific functions are not 
polynomials. But it seems easier to ignora functions such as y
sin %s y log xg and-y - e^ when considering' simplicity in terms of 
mmue-^ -fittlngA
In some balance must be EsaintEtinerl between .fit and
simplicity, while noting that in scienoes "The laws encl. theories for 
which liiore is .’ï.ndireot evidence ofteîi are 'more simple than* the 
alternative interpretations that are In closer agreement with 
observa.tion.al evidence»" (Lose© 1972g P«161*) Simplicity will 
Include economic as we3J, as aesthetic elements :related to symmetry, 
small integers and paucity of assumptlonEi However, as the logically 
simpler theory is not always the mathematically most oimple, debate 
will continue and definition will be difficult* Nevertheless there 
is eons.idorable agreement in practice as to what ocnsti'tutes a simple 
theory» Davies (1975, p#80f») lists the following as examples of 
simpl.e theories involving few parame'kers and small, integral powerss 
Avogardo's Law; Inverse Square Law; Jiadioaotive Decay Law; Constancy of 
Maes of Electron; Ohm's Law^; Hooke's Law; Gas La,w ©tc««
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Basic Criteria» The rest of this chapter wil3. adopt the 
criteria advocated by Bavios (1975) generality, simplicity, precision ; 
testednoBs and refuteclness » Wiat follows is a sunmary of his 1975 e
Generality, » or the imificatiçm of existing concepts within a 
theory ie tied to the Idea that the greater the unification then the 
more basic that theory is held to he» 8,lT#l_icltyg 'o', M s  already 
been mentioned® Precision, 'p', involves the predictions that can he»-j.î«.Aa353P«jLr:a^.'viirfwa4jtiS5i*^ ^  *** &-
made* The following list of predictions are in decreasing rnxler of 
précisions x A§ B>x>A; x >A; x is significant; ©OBie x may occur in 
the next few years* feeteckioss» 't^gconcerns the number and zeangetX'3Tj3TC%rrrP.ttfKT C3 V »»
of tests with respect to relevant experiential conditions *
Hefuterfoess, *r*« io a measure of the doubt experienced :ln H* andc a z io a  7.;^ -.:^ -* %i:uaL *  ***
refers to inconsistency with, established data» Because a theory has 
been refuted does not mean it is necessarily i-jrong, or that it should 
be discarded* For Davies a hypothesis has approzxiiaate rating 
g^1 #5; t<2»5% laws have ratings of t >4? g ^ 2;
(mvies 1975, oh#$#)
The confidence we have in a given theory is not Eilmply a measmro 
of its consistency with data, or tied to 1;he idea that it has somehow 
been 'proved'« At the same time it is clear that we hold some 
theories with much raore confidence than others, and tMs depends on 
several factors the integration of *g%, *8'g end ® If
we think of the imather we may be moved in Britain 1;o entertain a low 
confidence in predictions by experts on the basis of frequent 
ref utations y yet in other parts of the world 'we might be Impressed by 
the precision of predictions»
Gonfidence in theories is obvioxisly related to externril featureB 
related to testednoss and rei\iteciness« Shoroforos
Confidence Odds on ( 0*0*0*) s f(t)/f(r)
The factor *t* is in the nraiierator as high *t* with succèss will 
increase confidence ; wM.le 'r* is M  the denominator as any 'r* wi3il 
decrease confidence, though a little 'r* may be acceptable and not
5* (from p»305) Ohm's Law (the electrical cm‘rent flooring through a 
body at constant temperature is proportional to the applied voltage) 
is accurate for metals and solutions of salts in imter. However, 
certaJza oils show ooiiB'Mei?0.hlo deviations and predictions have been 
found not to hold® Ohmic theory has been iriodi.fied to a more 
complicated theory in euoli conditions (though we still hold, to Ohm's 
Law aa time for most applications®)
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overthrow the theoxy® Now, while we eeii, for example, calciilate 
m©;l.hGmatieally how m;.Gh more probable Kewton'*© 'theory became after the 
discovery of tFraiiiis 1b the predicted place, we ooimot mathematloally 
o@l.ou3.ate the probability of exi Initial theory® In equation (1) the 
weighting given *3?* is strong hocaiiae any refutation iflll considerably 
weaken om? confidence, while *t* is not so strongly weighted» Vie 
accept a llttlo *r® in practice as in the unescplained disorepaiieies in 
the motion of Ifeasms and Neptune.
Now include *s* in  equation (1 ) ouch that i t  appears in  the 
denominator the higher the s im p lic ity  the less lik e ly  wo are to have, 
or expect to have, accurste predictions» High s im plic ity  can f a l l  
over in to  over^sim plifioatlon. 81milar3.y we include *p* in  the 
denominator ae the narrower the beam (o f searchlight) the , less lik e ly  
WG are to pinpoint our object* I f  we reduce the précision, required 
we con become more confident that prediction and experimental resu3.t 
w ill agree. Next we turn to  generality® Theories wlrlcli try  to  
encompass a very wide range of concepts in  on© theory are of low 
confidence o I t  sB&nm u n like ly  that history can be explained solely  
in  economic terms, or that £i3,l human relationsîîi-ps en?e to be under­
stood on the basis of sexual behaviour® Such sweeping generalisations 
no doubt leo/1 to siuple or elegant théories, bub th e ir a b ility  to 
predict accurately is  GosreesponJJngly impaired* Thus *g ' also comes 
in to  the equation in  the denominator such that g
Ge0#0. - f(t)/(f(g}mf{8).f(p)»f(r))
I t  is  necessary to sharpen (2 ) by comlxlning i t  wlths
'^ase.tiTO speculative and rather subjective assessments, .firs tly  
of the form of the functions, and secondly of the numerical 
values to insert in  these# As Bertrand Bussell expressed i t ,  
'lo g ic  and mathematics w ill have to be supplemented by certain 
ezctralogical principles.'" (Davies 1975s p*98«)
Davies gives to each of the attributes gaSgPgt^r an assigned veJ;ao 
within the limits 0 to 5« This is, of course@ highly subjective and 
not very precise* These values lâll be deterrmiîiecl by our own world-­
view asid how it intezcprots the world, our belief in conBistency and 
OUI? expectancy of regularity» Having determined these magnitudes 
Davies correlates the confidence odds bÿ' the .formulas
o X n  % 10^ ___VroUftOffl " ■ “.,70 d  ry
10^ X % 10^ X 10^
.According to Davies th is  equation is  an e x p lic it version of equation ( 2 )
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arrived at by trial and error* and erwor gives mi empirical
évaluation by checking with «eepeot to general belief# The equation:
purely en%)lrioal; rather similar to the Beynolds 
ymmher In fluid flow#»«.The strong dependence on the te%% r 
corresponde to Popper's heavy wei^ting of 'refutednees' 
againat a theory# The relatively low dependence found for 
the simplicity (e/2) may he compared with finding that, hecanee 
of the hands of forces in nature @ there exiet mmiy sianple 
theories ifAd-oh make fairly correct predlcticmB, eo tliat hi#: 
elmplicitsr s In a tlieory redncee only moderately in our 
Gonf^ idenoe in it#" (ibid p*l64#)
I'fhile equation (3) gives a ouhjdotive probability in teasne of the 
G.O.O# theory, it Is not an ezpsæssion of norma], mathematical 
probability# Bather it covers t M  prior, subjective probability 
that we entertain conceamlng consistencies and regularities In nature 
and our beliefs in relation to tills®
In relation to mathematical probability thecK^ y we can derive a 
Goniparlson in the ohange of probability with the empirical equation 
(3)9 and we write the latter in a way applicable to a new test;
ü.O.O# S3 prior subjective probability x (10^ ^  *»oo(4)
A logarithmic relation is needed to relate the credibility to the 
confidence odds «= that is credibility between 0 and 1 1:o the figure of 
conl'idence. IVhen G #0*0# is very hi# our de#ee of confidence tends 
to 1 and we consider a theory to be 'true*^ # The CŒiverse applies# 
Davies therefore proposes the empirical relations
Degree of Confidence a 0#05 log.®Q (C#0,0#) 4» 0#50 ##*#^ #(5)
end by substituting from equation (3)9
D#0#a« Œ 0#50 (2t «" (g 4' s/2 t p t 4:!^) ) 4- 0#65
15#6# nmia pwaacTiaN
Tills refers to intellGotual elegmrice and aesthetic gpLality, as 
opposed to its utilitarian or fertility quality* It is less 
interested in any relatlogmhip to obseaTvations as in the confIdence of 
a theoiqr where testedness and refutedness are critloal* The 
attribute of precision also enters in that between theories of equal 
8ii#licity the one iidiioh has the more definite claims la taken to be 
superior# Eenceg
Inner Perfection f(g).f(8)#f(p) ###*#####*a##e*»##(7)
In slm3.1ar fashion to the G#0#0# the inner perfection Is made explicit
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in the foU.owlng equation g
Scientific Inner Perfection Bating f/'»Sop /200 »««a»(8)
whea?© the faotoa? 200 1b ai?bitro3?ily chosen to place the ratings on a 
BGole from 0 to 1 »
'To37 Newton'b theory', for relativity theory, and foz* atomic 
thoo:cy, for exuiaple, the 'inner perfection' will 'foe hi.gh, 
because the niiification of concepts, the siiiiplicity and the 
preeeision of the predictionB ore all high for these theories*
For agtrologioal théories, on the other hand, the generality 
and. precision are ‘both low, so the 'inner perfection* of such 
theories le low." (ibid p.101*)
It is evident that scientific theories are evaluated with respect 
to internal and external factors» The tn.ith of a theory is related 
not to reality in the first instance, hut to the axiom system in \àid.oh 
it is planed* Thus the shortest distance between two points is a 
straight l.ine for a Euo3J.dean system, cmd this is true ivithin that 
axiomatic fraDietmrk* But it is not necessarily true to reality* 
Scientific truth, relates to questions conooming the consistency 
lîet\')'oen thooi^ y and observation and expGxdïiïentg taking into account the 
other diverse criteria that have ’been mentioned » 3}ut afisolute truth 
is not determined by scientific means; science can ne.ithar prove nor 
disprove its existence by appealing to observation*
It is however inoumbent on us to make this distinction 
consoiously and not be blinded by any scientific claim to give 
absolute truth» Bcience deaJ.s with aspects or modes of being/ 
meaning, and not with oonorata reality in its ehkaptieal wholenesB *
In the arena of our existence and in the face of God we can, and do, 
have truth which hae been revealed to us* This is Popper'a 
stumbling; block that gm ultimate source of knowledge necessitates 
revelation (of* 1972/a pp#27"30*) but it can be .no obstacle to the 
Theist* God is there and has spoken in M s  works and words, therefore 
we can Imow true truth truly* He is there aaid Ke is not silent»
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PQSTSCEIPT TO PART II
I hope Part II has indicated that there ie no one perspective on 
science, no one conception of its character or method. Thus, 
despite the general incantation and appeal to 'the* scientific method, 
there is no such thing. This sug^ j^ests that there is no neutral 
standpoint even in the most objective of sciences, that there is no 
ultimate objectivity that cmi be appealed to for there are always 
problems of perception, value, validity, saiom systems and worldviews. 
This implicitly points to the hidden foundations that this thesis is 
concerned to Mghlight. It seems to me that positivism is a non­
starter today; that there is a metapliysical basis to all scientific 
thought and character. Out of my brief survey of the ontology, 
exjistemology, methodology and axiology of science I would suggest 
that scientific thought roots back to a 'religious* motive in the 
'heart* of man. There cmi be no autonomy of theoretical thought, 
only a pretended autonomy or assumed autonosiy, for faith undergirds 
all thinking* In the final analysis science cannot be isolated from 
the coherence of life, and while theoretical abstractions from the 
coherence of reality are made it is only when theories are placed back 
into the concrete coherence of reality that they possess meaning and 
significance.
#
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P H B P  A C 13
In giving a flavons of attitudes vis A vis solenoe I aii aware of
exeluding thinkers from Roman Gatholleism, Harxlam and Eastern 
Myetioism* Even %&thin Protestantism I am ecmscious of omitting 
several important contributioBs» The ohoiee was to eay very little 
about a considerable number of theological stances or to review a few 
in more detail® Having decided that the latter option would be more 
frultf^ il it meant the exclusion of the thought of men such as L.
Gilkey (1959; 1968/bg 1970), A.Rlohard8on (1963; 1968; 1974), W. 
Pamiehberg (1976), B«lasealX (1956), M.Jeeves (1969), B.Esmm (1971 )$ 
VePolythreos (1976) end many others*
After a generalised survey (oh«l6) I concentrate In chapters 17 
to 19 on four basic responses* Chapter 17 deals with 1*0* Barbour 
and 1I.M* Mon?ia and seeks to reflect diverse theological, options» 
Barbour ie a eelf^oonfessed Liberal and Process theologian; whj,le 
Morris is a sell-confessed Fundamentalist® Chapter 18 reviews 
briefly the thought of T»F* Torrance who seems to me to present a 
more balanced approach than the extremes of chapter 17® Chapter 19
concerns what is knoim as the 'Heformationsl Movement •« It Is
partly historical and ie included for two reasonss it is the tradition 
within which I locate my own thought ; and it provides a suitable 
bridge into Part IV.
O m  final words If there appears to be undue concentration on
conservative thought thie ie due to the fact that non-conservative 
sources are often guilty of rejecting thie position out of hand 
without examination# This is intellectual dishonesty, not to 
mention academic enobbery, and I have sought to redress this situation ^
There is also, in defence of a conservative weighting, a wider corpus 
of literature dealing with the question of science 'end* religion/ 
theology/Bible in the conservative position than in any other*
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16*0. Introduotory Review.
So far wo have looked at a little of the historical and 
philosoiihioal foimdatioBB of scientific activity in faith and 
religion* I now wish to turn to the response made to the question 
of the relationsMp between science and religion* Several models
of this relationship have been posited (of* 9*4#)# There is
widespread allegiance to the warfare model, which though wmiing in the 
academic vjorld is still a powerful popular myth* The divorce 
model is held by many today and is enhanced by the methodological 
approach of Bohr and/or linguistic analysis which seeks to divide 
science and religion into complementary realms/langiAages. The concept 
of symbiosis sees an enkantioal a?elationship between science and belief; 
that science itself is a religious quest which is of necessity based on 
certain pre-soientifio assumptions*
A cm?3ory glance at the relevant literature quickly reveals a great 
diversity of vieiqpoint from Liberal and Neo-Orthodox tlirough typical 
Evangelical to Orthodox Hefozmed. Within those basic theological 
divisions, mid cutting across them with apparent abandon, we find the 
influence of existontis3.ism, lin^ u^istio analysis and other secular 
philosophies•
16.1. BITOIGE BIFALMB (of* 9.f*2.)
16.1*1* Neo-Orthodoxy* Neo-Orthodoxy, existentieulisni and linguistic 
analysis all combine to separate science and religion into separate 
compartments such that by definition there can be no conflict (or 
compatibility for that matter) between the two. Meo-»Orthodoxy 
emphasises a distinct revelation such that God is îmowii only as 
revealed in Christ emd acknowledged by faith® Karl Barth denied the 
very concept of a distinct general revelation and natural, theology 
through his equation of revelation and reconciliation; any search for 
a re-creation which did not imply reconciliation being seen as cut off 
from grace. For Barth general revelation and natural theology were 
inseparably united, although Brurmer did not go all the way v/ith this 
(cf. Xîerkhouwer 1971* pp.21-61.) It seems to me that we can, and
should, make a distinction between general revelation end natural, 
theology in that God has revealed Ei-mself through His creation and in 
malcing man in ilia omi image; whereas natural theology is concerned with
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the attempt to arrive at God deductively from the evidemcea of 
creation as a result of autonomous rationality (of. 5*2*)^ I 
question Barth's claim that nature does not revesil God and woifld 
tentatively suggest that when he and others are faced by passages like 
the 'nature Psalms ' $ or Romans chapter 1, their elseaeeiB dominates 
their exegesis# They claim that science deals with finite causal 
relations within the temporal processes while revelation deals with 
the meaning of personal existence and the status > and significance of 
world processes* But it does not follow that science is of little 
consequence for theology, or that theology should more or lees neglect 
that realm# Such a distinction forgets that it is man who engages 
in theology and science, and man is ever a creature of God called to 
bring all things into the eervice of the Kingdom. It forgete that 
at heart man is religiously directed for all of his living, and that 
therefore certain scientific statements can be inoompatible with the 
Christian revelation* It is a tragedy of our century that so often 
theology has abandoned or retreated from whole tracts of man's living.
It nearly seems a god-of-the-gapa aientaXity which has secured a final 
realm from the invasion of scientific dieoovery by erecting a field of 
InvestigatIon which is by definition exclusive of science* Yet, the 
Neo-Orthodox stress on the sovereignty, transcendence and purpos©ih3.iaesB 
of God is a valid corrective to the ïdhara-l Imaanentls&tion of God.
lÊ!dÆâiuS®aâ.S.ÊÎiii^2^ieS- Concomitant with the above, thouîÿi 
having a more diverse appeal, are the secular philosophies of linguistic 
analysis and existentialism* Im the Anglo-American culture 
Wittgenstein still exerts a powerful influence and much of modem 
philosophy follows the spiral of linguistic analysis. Different 
spheres have been attributed with their own distinct languages# So 
scientifio language is seen as used for prediction and control, an 
Instrument for yielding results; while religious language is seen as 
divorced from the world of observations, free from testing. Genesis 
is not true physically or historically, but we are to act ae, if the 
iwrld were a creation for this gives us the appropriate attitude.
The other dominant philosophical influence which cuts across 
theological positions is existentialism* There are, of course, 
distinctive thelstlc and atheistic branches of existontiallem (cf.
1. The crux of this is the relationship of nature and grace. For an
excellent brief analysis see Veenhof (1978) -of* Appendix A*
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Sire 1977* eh.6*)« Here we find a etroBs on religious involvement 
ae against scientific objectivity - the distinction of WBion and I-It. 
Gilkey actually argues that religious questions are always 
existential3 But this loses the ontological reality that stands 
prior to any existential reality.
Both Neo-Orthodoxy and existentialism seem to reduce nature to
less than it really is; both seem cauglit in a dufilistic motive of
grace-nature such that for the former, nature merely takes on the
statue of an imredeemed backcloth afgainst which the drama of
redemption is played out, while the latter sees it as unredeemed and
impersonal. The corrective to this is a unified motive which will
see the totality of creation — spiritual and material •» under the
guiding and controlling hand of God. God made all things suid
considered that they were 'very good' ; and that which He deems 'very
good' should not be reduced by man to a backcloth for some higher
sphere of his own categorisa/fcion. ¥e therefore need to seek a
unified worldview; we cannot rest content with a dichotomy in our
2
existence which threatens to tear us apart. The Bo’vereignty of God 
as creator, the doctrine of oreatio-ex-nihilo, the continuing 
providence of God, and the idea of man's calling' to labour as well aa 
to worship, all seem to point up the need for a coherent interpretation 
of all of life and thought. J® D. Bettis writesi
"The scientific enterprise of explaining becomes especially 
dangerous when it leads to sohlssopkrenio dishonesty.
Dishonesty results when this reduction!sm produces a cleavage 
within a person between the meaning of an event for liirn and its 
scientific meaning. Then one saysg 'as a sociologist, I must 
say that we have here an example of social stratification, but 
as a religious person I must say that we have here evidence of 
the hand of God at work'. He has removed himself from the 
data into a compartmentalised schi^ oplironia." (1969* p#7*)
This eeœch for a unified motive is not confijiad to any 
theological label. Both Harvey Gox (1968), a morJ.em liberal radical, 
and E.Bohuurman (1976), a reformed orthodox, note that technology and 
scientific development are possible only on biblical premisses* Cox 
cliaims that "the biblical faith (is) an indispensible precondition 
without which contemporary scientific teetoology is unthinkable(1966,
2. Bee. *Na,ture and Grace in Bavinek' by Veenhof (1978) for the thesis 
that grace is neither hierarchically above, nor abolishes, nature, but 
affirms and restores it.
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13.261.) . It-is the biblical view of creation and man's place in it
that 'disenchanted' the world of nature, saw the worth of human work, 
and the possibility of change. Technology is a culturally formative 
povjez’ which helps to define and shape the world in which we live, as 
well as condition our perception, of that world. But it is the 
biblical doctrine of creation out of nothing that frees the world from 
benign and demonic forces. Again the biblical faith clearly 
indicates the ojall to mmi to offer up all his labour to God, whether 
mental or physical* Man is a uniky; not merely a soul in a body.
Yet technology and science are not ends in themselves within the 
biblical worldview* They can only be evaluated within a context*
They are not self-sufficient. It is only the introverted and myopic 
technologist who drives on regardless of the consequences. It is 
not just any activity that is welcomed before God but solely that which 
is to His glory and purpose* It may be asked what science or 
technology glorifies God* In general I thirds we can say that certain 
activities clearly felfil the cultural mandate, wklle others (such as 
representing man as a mere mechanism) are hostile to God's revelation. 
¥i.thin e?jeation technological science aims to dominate In creative 
solf"«'expression as man seeks to unfold his hnageness of God, as he 
reflects on his divine origin mid given humanity® (C.f« Behuurjiian 1977* 
PI>641"**63-^ ) WitMn fallen creation technology will also assume the 
aim of liberating man from servitude to matter* This v/axTus of the 
need a,t all tbnes to be aware that we deal not simply with cjzeation, 
nor yet feJ.lon creation, but with a creation that has fallen and now 
stands under the redemptive work of Jesus Christ.
"Hence the alert Christian, aî-ive to the full implications of 
the Gliristian vision of mang will look on technology with a 
restrained and carefully qualified optimism, seeing* it as at 
once a great potential good, for man by nature and yet :In the 
hands of fallen and. selfish human natiu:e an aJjaost equally 
potent rlnstrument for evil." (W.N.Clarke S.J. 1968, p.292.)
16.3. m m  ¥oe:q ) council of cmj}.^ Gims
The W.C-.C. project on 'Science end Faith' has pooled diverse 
theological opinions to make certain general reooiBmendations * Much 
of what is said In their official organ - Anticipations is reflective 
of this diverse background and similar to the criea of many in the 
secular arena (perhaps because often the two are one and the same). 
Nevertheless it is easy to concur wi*fch the need to beware the 
increasing invasion of the individual's privacy by modem technology
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and the increasing control of radio® television and major publioatioBs 
by a few powerful people; and in the call to choose simplicity of 
design coupled with ease of mainte nance and a general lowering* of the 
overall impact of science on the environment. Much teolmology is
3imdoubtedly destructive and the church is called to stand against this.
The following are some of the problem areas listed In recent ¥.0.0* 
reports - automation; the loss of unskilled work (to which we could 
add the loss of skilled work); genetics; ecology; nuolear power; 
weaponry - nuclear, biological, chemical® subliminal; anthropology; 
mad over-population,^ I%ch of this concern locates in ecology.
To take an example we can refer to food production. The current 
problem is that availability and distribution to areas of greatest need 
do not equate c. Under the direction of economic market forces 
surpluses in the West are stored or dumped while others starve. In 
this sense technology calls mankind to greater responslbillty. Man 
could not be blamed for famine on the other side of the globe when the 
tools of production end communication were not sufficient or efficient* 
But nowo»®.|
At this point the basic weakness of the W.Ü.O. can be noted - 
namely in adopting a problem-centred approach and a utilitarian 
theology, while lacking any coherent or systematic philosophical 
critique or basis. Its voice is a confused one, reflecting 
conflicting philosophical end theological options* It is a 
theological coalition attempting to integrate secularism (of. 16.6,) 
end theism.
Yet it would appear that technology has tended to an universal 
character which transcends ideological boundaries. It has become a 
complex system governing human living with an effectiveness that demands 
rigid subordination of men to time as determined by the rhythm of the 
machine-economy, which in turn is governed by the impersonal logic of 
production and consumption. Thus it leads to a loss of the intrinsic 
creational value of nature, of the aesthetic and mysterious dimensions, 
and returns full circle to a distortion of individual identity. But
3® Of. Anticipations, May 1974 No.17 to May 1976 Ho.22 
4* To these I would add the dangerous motivating philosophies and side- 
effects such as depersonalisation, the impersonality of power, the 
utilitarian logic, *khe powers of science, technology and organisation
(cf* oh.26.), the subordination of family life to the rhythm of 
machine-eocnomy, the suppression of freedom by regimentation and state.
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positively science has iiEproved health, raised living standards end 
created more leisure. Bo as theologians respond to science gmd 
technology they must note the currently v/idesproad response in the 
seculaa? arena which is asking questions suppressed in the euphoric 
optimism of earlier generations, (But they must not simply echo 
these questionB and tag on a religious veneer.)
Out of the loss of confidence in science has arisen within the 
scientific commimity a new sense of social responeihility, a wider 
récognition of the. limits of science as a way of knowing and an 
interest in the new.ethical concerns arising from man's increasing 
power over nature, Btioical problems includes the traditional ones 
of abortion mid euthfanasla; the question of experimentation on human 
foetuses, in.cluding the transplantation of ova fertilised outside the 
body; the artifioisü. prolont^ation of life by mechanical means where 
fomexly the patient would have died; organ transplants ; sex control of 
offspring; genetic engineering — for exsmp3.e in the direct 
manipulation of genes to replace defective ones with the attendant 
danger of unintentional change; behavioural control via drugw, electric 
stimuli!, payohosurgei^F and other methods of psychological 
modification of the personality.
Gex*tainly this W«G.G. concern with ethics,! guidelines is to be 
w©3.oomed* We can do many things, or shortly will be able to do so, 
but what we c m  do and what ifo should do are not synonymous. Before
any ethiea], guide can be given a valid worldview must be established 
if we are not to be left to a vague attempt to muddle tMough. We 
need a %'iorldview that will present a unified motive for thought and 
action, which will guard against eill reduetioniom and materialism, and 
facilitate a, profound study of the questions of mean.ing, tamth and 
ultimate value* The ¥.0.0, repoz*ts often seem diffuse in this arena.
16 .4 * lE A D m m m  respohsjëb
Beveral responses may be referazed to as inadequate -« but he3.pful 
in highlighting what will be for me a valid response.
16.4.1. Positivism. Despite the change© in the philosophy of science 
we find in many queuîters a longing for good old-fashioned scientific 
positivism among theologians. For example I)® Evans tells us that $
"A scientific assertion should be logically neutral, comprehensible 
impersonally, and testable by observation." (i960, p.111.) To 
maintain credibility he then wealcens this tight statement so that
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'assertion* is used 'loosely', and 'objective assertion* means one 
whose tamth or falsity is 'in principle* eetablislmble by "maximal 
inter-subjective agreement*" ( ibid p*111*) Neutral means the 
opposite of seXiVinvolvement and acientific language should be 
neutral (of* Part II*)* This Is necessary, he argues, because if 
It were not so scientists wou3,d disagree on the basis of personal 
ommitments* But Is this not precisely what does happen - 
scientists do disagree, and they do so on the basis of basic 
commitments to different paradigms? Later we find that Evens telle 
tie that: "Scientists rightly seek a language which ie as neutral ae 
possible****" (ibid p*113*) But there is the world of difference 
between claiming neutrality and seeking to be 'as neutral as 
possible'* Indeed Evans himself notes that even scientific training 
involves attitudjnal training such that no pure observation can be 
made* Despite this, he wishes to cling to M s  basic thesis, of the 
neutrality, lm.pereonality and observability of science in distinction 
to religion which is deemed to be self-involving, not logically 
neutral g and neither impersonally comprehensible nor testable*
But surely the root of Christian belief is in historical events, 
in A God who has acted in a reel way, presenting a truth which is true 
whether or not the Individual believes it* In fact Evans negates 
(he even notes be is doing so) the fact that religious faith, like 
scientific faith, is in principle testable against reality*
Further problems arise because he equates religion with theology*
All of life is religion (cf# 20*1*) although there is a specific 
abstractive discipline known as theology which has as its distinctive 
study God g as opposed to the distinctive areas of study of physios, 
biology, history etc* which ie not to say that theology is 
exclusive of physios, biology or history, and vice versa*
16.4*2* Romanticism* A second distortion is seen in the almost 
pagan reverence for nature that has sprung up in some quarters 
concomitant with the ecological movement* ¥hile it is certainly 
right to question the grievous misuse of nature today, nevertheless 
the natural world Is there for man to dominate, cultivate, build up 
and preserve*
Another form of romenticism is the Idea that scientific 
technology solves all ilia given enough time - whei*© the machine 
replaces Christ as Saviour* This is a naive approach that
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mideresti.îaatea the depth and complexity of the political and social 
raii>mif;lcatJ.onB of technolo®* and science today® Teolmology nmst 
never be Been as solving probleDie but simply as giving men a means to 
certain ends® Man himself must decide, under God, how he will work 
this cut in culture
16*4*3« Status-Quo# A third distortion is the longing to adopt the 
status-quo# Unfortimatelj 1;he church all too often is seen as a 
resistor to cliange in society. Ohmage is not necessarily good in 
itself® hut neither is the etatus-guo.
16.4.4. The Mew Biblical O?heolo^ ?:y. T. Derr in 'Ecology and Human. 
Liberation'(1973)» a ¥.0.0. publication, looks at man's relation to 
nature and some of the views that have arisen in the face of the 
modern situation. H© notes a new biblical theology that has arisen
which seeks to reinterpret the Bible away from the older traditional 
imderstsmdlng and make It say things hitherto wmotioed. To the 
command to love God and neighbour has now been added a third command 
- to love nature. Man Is called to love his environment emd deliver
it from pollution; nature is seen to have inalienable rights. But
it would seem that a proper -understauiding of création end the 
cultural Emmdate (cf. 24*2.) would be a better approach here.
Indeed the motive fox* this reintex’pretatioïi seems to come from 
outside the Bible altogether, being an exajnple of the world dictating 
to -the Word how it should be in-terpx*eted rather then' allowing the 
(haspel to speak to the v?orld« Nevertheless the motive of -Wie 
re-risionists ’to achieve relevance seems attraotl-ve. But we cannot 
x*e-do theology for every cultei’ai whim that comes along® nor can we 
simply feed our Bibles tMough a apeoifio 20th century- grid and come 
up with what it has been saying all along. It is all very well to 
see the worth of nature in Luke 12;24a,g but the point of the verse is 
only seen lAien we read it in its wîioXe contearhg "Consider the ravens s 
they neither sow nor reap, they have nei-bher storehouse nor bam, and 
yet God feeds them. Of how more_ v ^  are yqu than the birds:" 
(Lk. 12;24. HSV«)
Derr goes too far in his criticism by seeking to reduce nature as 
exclusively for ‘bhe benefit of man; and vimfing passages such sb 
Rommis 8;18-25 in a pure3.y perBonalistic context#
(tîf.16.4.2.) Here the hasio
aim resides in hostility to our technological society and a guest for
a return to nai;ixre as the realm of the sacrerX# Teehnolo®r is Been 
as demonic, the imrk of man; nature is seen aa saored, the work of 
God# Here we can place such diverse movements as the coimter^ 
culture; romaritioSÿ like Walt Disney, who tend to pantheism; and 
deism® This vievj is more of a grass-roots reaction than, a serious 
theological option* It is evidenced in the love to get away from 
it all, to get *haok to nature' — replete usually for such camping 
trips with the latest tectoological labour-saving* devices I More 
seriously could he considered great religions, siioh as Taoism (but 
it is oaught in quietism end social Diactivity)*
I.G. Basbonx (e.f.. 1?.1.) a3.one with L.C. 
Birch (19683 1975? 1976*) makes this a powerful force^ especial3.y in 
the At its roots stands the figure of A*N* l^ Diitehead who
presented a theory of pan-psyohlsm with m  exceptionally limited 
concept of God« Reality wa^ seen eis a continuous flow of events 
such tî.iat a natural law was evinced to describe a rela,tlvely stable, 
recurring pat'bem in a process, but did not establish any in.feHible 
behaviour of some particular entity» 'Beiîig' tended to lose out to 
the process of 'becoming'. This obviously has difficul.ties in 
squaring with 1;he biblical view of God and creation, not to mention 
common-8 ense. It Is difficMt to see how pan-psychism aiiplies to a 
stone «• and the answer that the mental qualities are so 3.ow that they 
become insignificant is unconvincing# Again® all ‘bhings are seen 
as having free choice against God - but what about stones? God Is 
so limited as to be nearly uxarecogi.aisable as such» He is neither 
omnipotent or omniscient, so immanent in the world that He has lost 
all transcendent qualities. Some even see God as carrying out a 
series of experiments to tzy and get tilings 'right thus moving the 
cosmos from a primitive to a higher evolutlonctry state.
It is very difficult to reconcile this with any form of 
traditional theology# The whole concept of biblical desacralisation 
and îaistorical reality is swept aside In a retmm to paiv-peyehism#
Also swept,aside is the uniqueness of man and the sovereignty of God 
who no longer can prevent evil even when ho imnts to* God cannot 
exist apart from the world which takes on an eternal dimension — 
Barbou5? attacks the concept of cr'!eatio-ex*H!.ilhilo and becomes 
immasaent within its processes* Thus all ima^ e^ry such as 'Maker* and 
'Potter* is excluded#
Hot all process thinkers are of course as radical as tliis.
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Mrœh sees man as spiritually unique while holding to his continuity 
with nature in biology, mind and culture; while Barbour tries to 
close the gap he recognises between process philosophy and Christian 
theology. It is difficult to worship the process God* Overall 
It would seem to me that there is a basic incompatibility between 
the philosophical premisses of process thought and the Christian 
faith as revealed in the threefold Word of God*
16*5. OGNGERVATIKB-BVAMGELIOAL BB&P0N8B8
Barbour confidently asserts that conservatives treat the Bible as 
a scientific textbook (cf* 1968/a, p*4.)g then, having written them 
off , claims that "Scriptural literalism ie no longer a major issue 
between science and religion." (ibid p*5*) The first Idea io 
erroneous, Some evangelicals say categorically that the Bible io 
a scientific textboc^ ; others state that it ie not; while others 
claim that it is not a scientific textbook but makes assertive 
statements that are scientifically valid. The second statement of 
Barbour ignores a vast body of literature and academically qualified 
opinion which tries to harmonise Scripture and science* He may not 
agree with this, but it is unfair to pretend it is not there. In 
effect he va’ites off the Creation Research Society of the U.S.A., and 
the recently formed Mew ton Scientific Association in the U.K. - both 
of which have high academic standards; as well ae individual scholars 
such as Morris (of* 17*2»), Eushdoony, Heinze, Jones and many others. 
However to have listed these bodies and men iimoediately highlights an 
evangelical preoccupation with evolutionary controversy.
The debate on evolution tends to produce more 
heat than li^t, and also, rather sadly, has tended to displace other 
important questions in the field of science and belief.
ItuidamentMism has failed to understand that Genesis is concerned to 
present a Creating God ifho is sovereign and transcendent. It has 
reduced Genesis to an evolutionary debate, reading* 20th century 
problems into an ancient iwiting and assuming that it answers 
scientific questions because we are a scientific culture.
16.5*1.1» Anti-IWlution. Unfortunately the evangelical field is 
dominated in literature - though not in worldview (of, 16*5*2*) - by 
a strong and vociferous anti-evolutionary campaign. This is reMily 
disoomlble from evangelical booklists. This movement has produced 
a flood of booklets wMch serve as sources of mmmnition for 'Gospel 
witness', as well as more reasoned end balanced statements.
321
Unfortunately the more reasoned worke tend to get loot in the deluge 
of minor hooka, often iwitten by non-Boientista »
As an ©xaâBpl© take B.C.O. Watson's 'The Great Brain Eobbezy'
(1975)® This is eBamtial3.y a bad precise® with additions, of 
Whitcomb and Morris' 'The Genesis Flood' (1975)* Watson defends an 
age for the world of about 7*000 years as well as Ussher's chronology 
end dating of Adam, But deeper then this ie the impossible 
philosophical tangle he seems to get into. In the early part of the 
book his thesis ie that Ghrlstlanlty and soienoe ere incompatible ; 
that science (conveniently reduced to evolution) is wrong and to be 
rejected by the believer because the Bible saya things differently.
But then, having undermined the authority of science he turns to it 
(in carbon dating) to prove the Bible correct! Over the piece one 
is left with the impression, because of the way in which everything is 
treated in absolutes, that unless one disbelieves in evolution (rather 
than a positive belief in creation) then one cannot be a true 
Christian - a rather unfortunate emphasis,
16,5*'^ P3^o™%olution, However it would be wrong to think that
this is all one-aideci, E,J, Berry, Professor of Genetics at London 
University, recently produced a small book entitled 'Adam and the Ape*
(1976) in wliloh he attempted to expound Genesis 1 and 2 in context azid 
at the seme time describe current tliougjit on biological evolution.
Thus he presented a theistie evolutionism which contended that God 
placed lïis image in an already existing human-like animal. Another 
work in similar vain which defends theistio evolution is Victor 
Pearce's *¥ho Was.Adam?' (1976), He claims as his central theses 
that (a) the Adam of Genesis 2 was a 'Mew Stone Age man, the first to 
carry out the Neolithic cultural change to farming; while the men of 
Genesis 1 was Old Stone Age man but probably died out; (b) that the 
genetic code represents part of God's spoken word of creation® which 
allowed Him to recode cells when Adam was made; (c) that the 
Incarnation Involved God's recoding of mm% to make 'the Word made 
flesh' 0 Other prominent evangelicals who would adopt a position of 
theistio evolution are Emm and MacKey.
16.5.1,3. van de Fliert# Turning to more strictly defined
Reformed Orthodox circles we find the same reflection of values and 
confusion vis a vis science. Many exhibit a flat rejection of 
evolution® but again there are those who® holding to the "belief in 
the Holy Scriptures ae the reliable Word of God"(van de Pliert I968,
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p,5*) maintain that the Bible does not give any outlines for 
historical geology* Tan de Fliert, Professor of Geology at the
Free Umiverslty of Amsterdam# argues ■ strongly against Whitcomb and 
Morris'^  'The Genesis Flood' claiming that it is erroneous to tMnk 
that belief in the Word of God can be based on® or controlled by® "so- 
called scientific reasoning", (Ibld,)^  When we treat the Bible as 
a scientific text "we lose the Bible as the reliable Word of God 
completely® beeauao we then make Its teaching dependent on the poor 
state of our scientific Imowladge today,,, «which will change tomorrow!" 
(ibid,) Belief in Scripture should not be tied to scientific thought 
and any attempt to unify our scientific geological thought of today 
with the account of the early chapters of Genesis "represent© a 
o^£gasàÆ2E^Î&SSMfflu°lj£âgBS® overestimstion whioh Is aa (ÿeeat 
as that of those scientists who completely reject God as the Creator," 
(ibid,.) God's creative act is not something that can ever be open 
to man's scientific control, Whitcomb and Morris® argues van de 
Fliert® imply that the Bible teaches the very principles® fundamental© 
and detail© of human science In general® and historical-geologiosl 
science in particular*
"This conception (ec* the equation of reliability to 
scientific reliability) ® however® implies i%ievitably that 
science and God's Revelation in the first chapter© of the 
Bible are placed on the same (scientific) level,,," (ibld,p,25*)
This® he feels® is tragic for it bind© an eternal and unchanging Word 
to temporal and transient values. In effect the fundamentalist 
places a ^qience in that he requires scientific proof/
harmony for hi© faith something "far more dangerous for Christian 
religion than the scientific development itself," (ibid® p,25*)
"I ask myself what kind of a religion is ohrlstianlty when 
scientific geological- facts could prove or disprove the 
reliability of God's Revelation to man!" (ibid)
80 instead, of the human scientific enterprise being worked out within 
its proper ©ptiere as indicated by Boripture® fundamentalism suggests 
'a colossal overestimation of soienoe. ' He conclude© that the 
Bible is outwith the reach of scientific control® it is no scientific 
book® and is therefore laidifferent to the results of science.
While there is much of this that I oggree with® it seems to me
%  CfT^Site'a EGsponsie (1969) and van de Fllert’a reply (I969) 
in this ongoing debate.
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that van âe Fliert falls into a graco-imture dualism® in this eaeo in 
form of Seriptitre-soienee* If followed out in other area© - social 
and ethical for example — we %-roiild have an eternal revelation which 
was no earthly use to man for it would he silent concerning the 
existential affairs of man. Xet we do well to note that Christian 
faith is based on the special revelation of God in Christ and 
Scriptmzep and not in the general revelation of God as imcovored in 
paai't through science.
(of» 1977).
®'e question of soisnos and belief
in the evangelical camp goes much deeper then the evolutionary debate* 
Indeed we must centre our attesxtion on the current crisis of the 
evangel,leal world,view* Valuable work has been done in this area by 
Eichaz'd Russell in em unpublished postgraduate thesis entitled 'The 
Growijxg Crisis of the Evangelical Worldview and its .Resolutions*' 
(1973) Russell haxiieelf is a philoaopheivsooiologist and 
characterises himself as a Dooyeweerdian ohaxismaticî From his
research he has established that evangelical iaa3.es tend to read 
natural, science subjects® while females reed art subjects* In that 
mey.1 dominate 'The Universities and Colleges Christigffii FellowsMp* 
(formerly I+V.F*), the S5?ts are consequently played dovrn as of 
restricted and secondary interest In Ilf e—involvement * But even in
the evangelical g university trained scientist® the emphasis is not on 
true refleotiv© loioifledgo but on a perv£isive pragmatic utilitarianism* 
This is seen in the duebistic metaphysics whloh :1a embraced® accepting 
a clear division between life as an, evangelical concerned to witness 
to the * soui-saving-gospel ' end life in the secular la.boratory*
Russell equates this separation with the grace-imture dichotomy by 
Ockham of quite discontinuous ma^ ÿoitudes ® re-interpreted in tezmo of 
the xjez^ soimlity-sclenoe motive of contemporary hwiianism* This 
results® for example in MaoKay, In a division bo'bween Christianity 
(:ù?eedo5iî) and mechanistic universe (determinism)» (Cf. ibid p*73<» )
Basically the policy pursued is how to reconcile Ctoistian faith 
with oscular science (inclusive of secular premisses)* A typical 
example is Rhodes contribution to 'Ghristianity in a Mechanistic 
Universe' (note the title) where he argues that g "The realm of 
science is the realm of the whole imiverse® of all existence*" (in 
MaoKay 1965® p*35*) But in this scientific activity Christian
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faith playa no part for all scientists must seek to make the 
hypothesis 'God' superfluous in their discipline; when they thisik aa 
scientist they must olmt out their Christian faith. Mote the 
repeated way MadKey will say® 'talking as a scientist Ï say,#,.'® 
hut as a Chrlstiem I say further (of, 1974» p»3B*) There is 
this other- added dimension. Science is seen to give an objective 
view of reality® the view of the detached® unoommitted observer; 
faith gives' a subjective view® the view of the participant, Thus
IM.m.aitd. moleme.m§umWll%'_emlm.lm.W;La™aaeats:Mr a-aproacMa 
to reality, Each sphere is complete and self-sufficient and we 
must "beware of 'mixing our models*® of using observer end 
participant language interchangeably," (Miodeeg In Haokay 1965» p*44*)
This sha3.1 be criticised under 16,5,2,2,
(Shis affects a much teoades spoctram
than the evangelical,) The idea of complementarity is derived from 
Bote's view of the relation between particle and wave theories of 
light® although the discussion is often put in terms deriving from 
the later Wittgenstein who emphasises the irreducibility of languages,^ 
With Bote there seems no way to combine the two concepts - wave and 
particle — in one unified model, Em?ly on the idea of the atom 
with its particle like electrons making up a mini-soXar^systeia was 
pioturable# but the atom of quantum mechanics is not picturable, The 
atom is not merely inaocesslble to direct observation® not merely 
unrepresentable in the classical terms of space, time and eauselity 
as we know them® it is totally outwith sensory terms* Positiviste 
see this as a pointer that all medals should be discarded and theories 
treated as "oalculational devices for correlating observations," 
(Barbour 1974» p*72,) Barbour sees it as a warning against 
literalism, yet not a call to reject models,
Bohr gave us the principle of complementarity § "A complete 
elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse points of 
view which defy a unique description," (1934* p,96*} H© asserts in 
this connection that the more a particular experimental arrangement 
makes waves evident, then the less evident becomes particle behaviour*
6* "D i the Tragtatus he had argued that a ll languages have a 
uniform logical atrueture, which does not necessarily show on the 
surface» but which can be disclosed by phlloaophical analysis*,# 
Early in  his second period,**he came round to the diametrically 
opposite view, The diversification of lin g u is tic  forma* .actu ally  
reveals the deep structure of language «, .(which) has no common 
essence#" (Pears 1975* pp,13*14#)
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A second theois concerns the Interaction of snhjeot and. object «* but 
aponts'jieoUB nuclear disintegrationB have weakened this erg^ ment# 
hike Kant, BoM* shares a pessimistic view that the. conceptual 
liîjîitation of man prevents him from ever imovmig the dlnæ an. eich« 
Crucially he also holds that the principle of coirtplementarity can 
be extended to other phenomena such as mechanistic/organic models in 
biologyfreewill/determinism in philosophy^  love/hoXlness in 
theology#
MacICay (cf. 12 *3 *5*) picks up this theme and argues that tv/o 
descriptions m?0 oomplementarjr if they have a common referent^  if 
the logical preconditions for their'use are mutually exclusive 5 and 
if each model is in principle exhaustive within its framework. In. 
this way he sees science and religion, as complementary accounts of 
onei complicated szeality. Denis Alexander (1^ 76% p.31f) puts it in 
terms of differiîig maps# A map servos to represent rea3.ity though 
it is not that reality, nor the cause of that reality# A map’s 
®goodness^  depends on how closely it corresponds with the rea3.ity it 
seeks to represent# However maps are different and while on© seeks 
to give geog3?aphical dot ail, (mother may seek to indicate ethnic 
divisions, population density etc... Whose various mops are 
complementary descriptions of different facets of reality.
Mow all this has a certain plausibility for all shades of 
theological opinion# But while I would defend the fact of 
disciplinary irreduoibility, X would also maintain that there ie a 
philosophical and religious stance wMoh x>emea,tes all disciplines# 
fhat leg whiX^ rell^ g.! Is
no^ .„ There seems to me n.o philosophical or religious justification 
fo3? an uncrii;.lcal acceptance of a religion-'science dichoto:o>y*
It should Î10 noted that in Bohr’s construction, complementarity 
applies only lAen dealing with the same entity and the same lo^ ?ical 
tv$)e# It Is for this reason that some reject Bohi?’s model of 
coraplementa3:ity in favour of the VJittgensteinian concept of 
a].tamative lan^ a^ges with respect to science and religion. But 
whether the approach of BoM? 03? Wittgenstein is utilised it is 
generally done so within a dualistlc motive of pe37sonality®'>Bcience.
In this wa.y the structirral and aspectual diversity of the -unity of 
creation is lost sight of; the unified wholeness of creation split by 
dialectical ideals# All that is left Is a realm of atondstioally 
free individuals who are in opposition to a mechanistic universe.
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BVaaigelical Motives in Science. The evangelical motive In 
writing about science and religion is generally apologetical - to 
pares en t eithear a platform on which to build the gospel (add grace to 
nature) or a defence of creationist views. Typically such writings 
attack the philosophy of naturalism (which is viewed as the material 
Vforld of physios and biology coupled with the mental world of 
psychology as exhaustive reality) as the yardstick of reality. But 
a rigid dichotomy of science m?.d faith is maintained,
16.5*3.1. E.B.D. Clark. The basic content of Clark’s ’The Universes 
Plan or Accident?’ (I96I « cf. his 196?) seeks to investigate some 
•odd points* as science advéînces our understanding of nature. The 
exitropy law is seen as pointing to a ”clock (that) must once have been 
wound up." (1961, p.223.) The solar system is seen as something
different than would have been expected from a chance pro<îuctlon; in 
chemistry "we found positive confirmation that the plan theory was 
correct" (ibid p.226 }; and the natural selection of biology is argued 
to be quite inadequate in that it would undercut teleology. From 
these and other diverse scientific areas, Clark amasses specific 
•evidence* for which the only logical interpretation is seen to be 
design. Against the objection that, science changes, he æ?gues that 
the "best science of every age has led thinkers to the same or a very 
similar conclusion." (ibid p.228.) This particular work is therefore 
basically a book of natural theology « and while concedixig that it 
does *3.ot reach the Christian God, nevertheless Clark at the end of the 
book moves, in a gigantic leap, from argumentation to evangelical 
proclamation .
16.5.3.2. of similar intent is a recent took by
Alexander entitled 'Beyond Science* (1976) which was incidentally
given a favourable review in 'Mew Scientist*. As the title 
indicates the pu3."pose of the book is to use science to gjet ’beyond 
science * to the upper realm of grace, the arena, of religious concern 
as a superaddition to the world of science» The book is, however, 
an excellent critique of many aspects of modem scientifio activity 
dealing vdth the p3?oblems of genes, sex and society, chemistry on the 
brain, life and soul, determinism and fa:eewill etc.. Alexander, 
who has worked on the biochemistry of nerve structures, clearly 
recognises that science is not neutral in that it is a human activity 
under the control of man. "Mo science is xieutral, but some 
investigations are less neutral than others." (ibid p.43*) He
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attacks total theories which trÿ- to explain everything. Suoh 
theories arise from time to time which seem to explain so much that 
they receive wide %)opular appeal, hut on examination they reveal that 
there are no facts which cannot he aocommodated into their system,
Sueh models can never he proved tnrcng, hut while aeethetiogdly 
pleasing should not he designated as scientifio (of, 14*2; 15*4*2*), 
(Freud and Darwin stand outside true science for not providing 
crucial experiments in the realms of tm.th/faîé.i4y* ■ In science 
there is no finality hçoause our techniques of investigation are 
open'ronded, Thus, like MacICay, he goes on to picture science and 
religion in a complementary manner. Utilising MacKey’s Illustration 
of the flashing light at sea (of* 12,5*3*) he aaserta that g "Meaning 
and mechanism are two aspect© of one and the same reality," (ibid p. 
53*) 33ut this is a false division stemming from a failure to 
appreciate that the flashing light is qualified in meaning as to its 
Gomnmnioative content g  and not its optical properties, There is a 
meehanisni involved at that level from the heart and mind of the sender 
and a resulting action (hopefully) in the receiver. It is logically 
improper to view the meaning on a human level and then reduce the 
mechanism to another sphere of meaning *« for there Is meaning at the 
physical level as well, hut that is not the qualifying meaning in 
this case.
But the hook is not oonoerned primarily with science and correct 
scientific procedures, Rather science is utilised to undermine 
materialistic and positivistio approaches to reality by pointing to 
the element of human involvement, the lack of any true autonomous 
reason, This is then used to point ’beyond* the lower realm of 
science to the ’iïï^ ortant’ and *meaxiiiigikiX * questions concerning the 
God of creation and salvation, Thusy while much useful material is 
presented with respect to scientific concerns ^ this is primarily an 
evangelistic book*
16*5*4-, EvanRelieals and Philosopliy. The Evangelical and Reformed
intellectual climate may fairly be ©aid to be dualistlo. There is 
little attempt to unfold a particularly Ohristianly orientated 
philosophical stance, but rather a récognition of a'higher realm of 
grace and a lower natural realm of the secular life of man. In 
practice reformed thought follow© the two-realm theory of buther.
Bo Golin Brown (196#) in writing about ’phllosopliy and reformed 
theology’ singles out a© the philosophers of reformed thought - Barth,
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van Til and Schaeffer. But they are theologian©^ %%ot philosophers. 
Meanwhile professional philosophers sueh as Dooyeweerd, Vollehhoven, 
Hart and van Hies Ben are left out or confined to a footnote. (Of ibid 
p.264f.) In feet Brown never even considers the possibility of a 
systematic Ohristimi philosophical stance - religious involvement in 
philosophy being reduced to a philosophy of religioxi (after the form 
of linguistic analysia). In fact he claims there Is no such tlxing 
as general philosophy today, but only philosophies of..*. One 
reviewer suggests that he finishes up vacillating between pietism 
(grace) and intellectual lam (nature) "without bavin,g uncovered the 
true relation between commitment to Jesus Christ and theoretical 
endeavour." (R. Russell 1973» p.81.)
But, as is obvious, the philosophy of religion today is largely 
dominated by views deriving from other phlloBophical areas especially 
logic and epistemology. Thus Broim opens the door to the 
sécularisation of all of life, including religion, for the lower 
realm of nature eats up the higher realm of grace* Theology becomes
dependent on the efforts of liberal humanism rather than the 
revelation of God and the enlightening of His Spirit*
Similarly A. Holmes (a philosopher) in • Christitanlty and 
Philosophy’ (1964) fits the grace-nature model, following a pattern 
of grace and nature as in the new evangelicalism (of. ibid pp. 6, 12, 
26*)* Here religion is one phase of human life, philosophy another 
and so on, each with different goals and methods. So religion,
philosophy and science are merely complementary, and while biblical 
faith may exclude certain philosophic options (e.g. materialism) it 
gives no particular positive direction to theoretical thought# In 
a later work, Holme© (1969, p,29f.) moves over to favour a 
* per spec tival view’ of philosophy which leans to some degree on 
Booyeweerd. He pictures the possible options as the ’Ancilla 
Theologize ’ which would subordinate philosophy to theology (Augustine 
and Aquinas); the ’Disengagement Theory’ which preserves pure Christian 
belief and the autonomy of simplified philosophy (Occam and Luther); 
the frustrated Reason Theory* which sees the best of philosophy as 
Inadequate for faith (Pascal , Kierkegaard and Blondel); the 
•Fulfilment Theory’ which avoids the problems of disjunction anp. 
conjunction by picturing a dialectical process where Christianity is 
absorbed into the Absolute (Hegel and Tillich) ; and the 
•Perspectivat Theory’ which emphasises the guiding influence of
Christian revelation and redemption over philosopliioaJ. and scientific 
inquiry (Booyeweerd and G. Olarlc) #
16.6. sEGuimim<i!»aiKaeai^Jitea*4#MWî*mî*sis^
L. Gilkey wftes that a "Beoiilarism is....the cultural Geigt 
within which all forma of thought, including the theological, must 
operate if they are to be relevant and creative." (1968/a, p. 192»)
He argues that secularism is the pre#*rational hasia of all 
contemporary philosophy; that it e^ cists on the level of presuppositionap 
that it ie qualified by the concepts of natureliam, temporalism, 
relativism and autonomy; and that it has lost all sense of ultimaoy.
Mow undoubtedly the all—pervasive influence of secularism la upon our 
culture, but that we should how dow to it as Gilkey suggests seems to 
me disastrous. Ohristianity must fight to assert that Theism should 
be the cultural Gelst within which all must take place, and that as 
long m  other forms of heart-directing faith exist, they mist do so in 
antithesis with Theism. Theism caimot be subordinated under, or 
synthesised with, secularism* Christianity asserts in all ages that 
reality cannot be reduced to the material or temporal or relative, to 
which some spiritual dimension can be tagged on* It argues that 
there is a created cosmos with mi eternal and temporal reference, 
with an absolute Origin and reference as well as a relative reference* 
Within this creation there is the law of God upon all men end absolute 
autonomy is therefore a negation of truth and reality.
Having said this it must be conceded that secularism has influenced
all facets of modem society, including theology* At root 
secularism affects the heart of men, serving to motivate and direct 
his life and thought. Hero we confront not certain specific 
unbiblioal or antl-rovelatory theses, but a Zpitf^lsto the dogma of 
theoretical autonomy. But in reality no sphere of man’s being can 
be divorced from service to God who is Lord of ’all* - including 
thought* In summing up the entire law Jesus pointed to the need to
love Cod with all our mental activity as well as with all our heart, 
soul end strength. This must mean that whether it be the theoretical 
thoughts of a physicist or the theologians reflection on the Word, they 
should both properly be directed from and to God. If not, an idol is
worshipped, for behind all man’s thought and action lies the
motivation of the heart. It is from thence the streams of life 
radiate* In the Fall man became ensnared in a lust for Independence
from his Creator, a desire to be something In himself. But the
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ozmot be Independent of what it reflects; it cannot be any«- 
thing itself, and this is why in a real way all lame knowledge of 
reality and of self is vitally dependent upon a knowledge of God*
The rebellious heart seeks the absolute within the relative, seeks to 
isolate an aspect of the creation and to raise it to the status of an 
independent being and consequently deify it. Yet &m aspect of 
creation can have no meaning except in its universal connection with 
all other aspects and except in its. basic and determinative relation 
to its divine source.
Üeoularism and Theism possess an antithetical confessional 
character of prior commitment. Christianity confesses a sovereign 
Creator, a fallen creation and a redemption acconq^ lished tîrirough 
Jesus Christ. Secularism, though talcing ideologically diverse 
forms, confesses the autonomy ' of man’s rationality and has a deep 
commitment to a principle of neutrality. A commitment that one 
Christian writer sees ass "a colossal prejudice." (van Dyk undated,p.2.)
In a real sense man’s life is religion, in the sense of his total
service to God or to an idol. Undoubtedly Christianity became a 
%)erson&%l, private religion confined to church walls, private home 
life, missionary ende^ ivour, morals and devotions, and not to man’s 
work qua work, whether mental or manual. But religion is not shut , 
up to some special temporal realm such as the worshipping cultus.
It is the basic motive of the heart of man that constitutes îiis 
religious foimdation. As the basic motive come under the influence 
of secularisation, so also has science come under the same influence 
such that "....science, secularised and isolated, has become a 
Satanic power, an idol which dominates all of culture." (Dooyeweerd.
1954, p.1.)
A clear statement of the antithesis has been blurred doim through 
the centuries by the dualistic concept of na'bure-grace. Despite 
the attempt of Aquinas to synthesise the two they quickly broke dotm 
into an opposing and mutually exclusive relationship under the impetus 
of Op&hamistic and Averroistic nominalism, Science was relegated to 
the sphere of natiiral reason with serious implications for the
7* 1 am using ’autonomy’ in the following sense, accepting that
there are certain ’limited’ autonomies (e.g. in axiomatic systems) 5 
When a man believes himself to be autonomous he believes that he is 
law unto himself, that he is free from any law except that which he 
puts on himself I he believes himself to be self-detessnining and 
self-sufficient in his theoretical thought.
331
sovereignty of God g the dootrlne of coMoon grace asid the nature of 
man# Despite a renewed vision of these facets in the Reformation 
•under Galvin the insigîit of a unified motive of creation, fall and 
redemption was soon overcoiae by synthesis motives# Melancthoxi’s 
educational reforms had a humanistic philological spirit which, led to 
a new scholasticism; Besa restored Aristotle to favour and once aga±u 
the church virent to Jerusalem for faith and Athens for wisdom *
So the door was opened to secularisation which proceeded apace
imder the influence of modem human!Eim which claimed that it was
merely the logicgil outworking of science itself® Buts
"There has never existed a science that was not founded on 
presuppositions of a religious nature, nor will one ever 
exist# That is to say in effect that every science
presupposes a certain theoretical view of reality which
involves an idea of the mutual relationships which exist 
between its various aspects, and that this idea, on its 
ovm part, is intrinsically dominated by a central religious 
motive of thought*" (l)ooyeweerd 1934e p*11*)
In the field of science and technology the spirit of secularism 
is at one and the same time victorious and confronted with a growing 
crisis® This is clearly seen in a work such as Toffler’s *I*liture 
Shock’ (1973) where he oscillates between technological opt.iiyiism and
pessiml&mi (ef# pp*292-3, 326, 403? 423s 439s 440* — of
1972g p*278*) Again there are those who appeal to science as a
neutral arena where the facts prevail, v/here objectivity is the 
watchword (all shades of positivism, tecimologisra); while on the other 
hand I'le have the views of men like Polmyi, Kidjn and Popper who 
contend that there is more involved than merely the right application 
of some scientific me'bhod which leads to pre-determined results 
constrained by fact* These three thinkers have made a trenchant
attack on empiricism and the idea of neutral observations wMch 
construe such an important part of secularism*
There is a dangerous scientific elitism, coupled to a self—
gagging religious divo2;*ce of science and religion, which ttoeatens to 
siibouîæ all scientific thought under secular thought# I# Asimov 
and others contend for the future of mankind to be guided by the 
scientific community. Paul Mirlich and B.F. Skinner also sffirra
this elitist concept of science - a science which is viewed as the 
high priest and saviour of maidcind#
Secularism stands opposed to Theism* Theistie thought must seek
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to speak to the whole of life and thought, not to retreat or to adopt 
the ways of the spirit of eeeulariem# It must seek to expose the 
totality of the system where all in the global village from war to 
education is under the dominating spirit of secularism, and present 
a radical Ohrlstlan alternative* An sütemative which is not just 
a personal, private retreat, or some added dimension, but ae something 
which offers radical renewal and reconstruction for a fallen world.
For what secularism omits is that the cosmos is created and fallen and 
redeemed now end not yet ** the Kingdom is here and still to come.
As well as a clear proclamation of this Into our secular culture we 
are needing to point up the latent hypocrisy of the system# An 
hypocrisy enjoined from the discarding of any Christian debt with 
respect to the positive impetus to science, and from the Increasing 
gap between principles and practices.
In the final analysis the tragedy of secularism is that it leads to 
the alienation and dehumanisation of man. This follows of necessity 
from its premisses of a closed universe and autonomous rationality 
which construes man as less than he is, making him to drift on the 
ocean of uncreatedness cut off from his source and goal# Ironic^ly 
having set out on the path of secularism whereby God is dead or 
irrelevant, God does in effect become as such# Han reflects the 
idol wiiich he chooses to follow* he appears to be autonomous, to be 
secular man — but this is an illusive delusion far removed from 
ultimate reality. But then ultimate concerns ere of no interest in 
a closed universe. Thus he is caught in the absurdity of searching 
for answers where there are no answerb *
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m o ium Fw rniim gAL
». BARBOtm (Of. 15.2; 16.4.6.)
17.1.1. lesuos In Scieiaoe And Hellaion (of. Baaîbour 1968/1).). In 
this work, one of two "books by Barbour that I shall look at, he sets 
out to examine the methods of inquiry in soienoe and religion; the 
relationshiï> of man with natures and God with nature. He suggests 
that today most liters see science and religion as deeply contrasting 
enterprises (under the influence of linguistic analysis and 
existentialism). Mille Barbour has reservations about the concept of
complementary languages he is prepared to utilise it as a "first 
approximation" (ibid p«4 .) of the relation between science and religion, 
Indeed his ar^ gument seems to rest fairly heavily on this idea* But 
he goes on to m^gue that we cannot rest content with a total dichotomy 
and suggests several parallels in methods and models « the similarity 
of the Interaction of eaqjerience and inteïTpretationg the utilisa,tion of 
analogies and models to express deeper concepts; end the ir!ipox*tance of 
m i authoritative commimity*
"Personal involvement in science cmd in religion differ in 
degreej, "hut there is no absolute dichotomy of ’objectivity* 
versus ’subjectivity’, since the îmower makes an import mit 
contribution to all knowledge*" (ibid p*4 *)
Hence we should seek an "integrated worldview" (ibid p*4#)# This 
oven follows from independent complementary views, for these must bo 
views of the one reality* This takes us into broader metaphysical 
realms and a certain aîïibivalence in Bgirbour’s thought emerges*
"To be sure, religion must never be identified too closely 
with a metapî^Bical system or forced to fit into a neat and 
final synthesis that claims to encompass all reality*
Scientists, for their part, legitimately resist any imposition 
of alien metaphysical systems imported from outside their own 
work* But both scientist and theologian inevitably use 
raetaphysicaS. categories whether they intend to or not; and 
each can contribute to tent ativ© attempts at a coherent "view 
of reality's without any violation of M e  oim lute^ p^ lty*"
(ibid p.5.)
In this statement we appem? to find a clash of concept between the 
first two oentances and the tMrd; between endeavoxming to keep 
Etetophysics at QSïïm length and acknowledging that it is bound up with 
both religious and scientific activity* It would seem better to 
accept the full Ijaplications of metaphysics; to appreciate the
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presupposxtional importance of them for both scientist and theologian#
Having studied methods and worldviews, Barbour defends the 
importance of a theology of nature# In  much of modem theology 
♦providence’ refers to God’s acting in history and says little or 
nothing about His acting in and tlxrough nature. This is wrong# 
Barbour does not advocate a new naturaJ. theolo^* but a theology of 
nature. 80 he re-exareihes God’s relation to the world where, in 
place o f the Mewtonian world, a dynemio* growing, evolving universe is 
pictured. Continuing creation is embraced as of the essence of the 
biblical picture « not creatio-ex-nlhllo - end as consistent with an
i
adapted form of Whiteheadian Precede Philosophy#
With respect to man’s relation to nature, Harbour attacks any 
reduotionlFjtic view which assumes ‘that behaviour can bo exhaustively 
deterîûlnecl. by the laws governing only a component pert. Rather, 
complementary loxxguages become useful for aclaiowledglng the distinct 
eharacteristies of man and soiencse without falling into a dualism.
Thus mind and brain are not two entitles | purpose and mechanlem do not 
exclude each other; freewill and. deteriiilnism are merely the differences 
of participant and spectator language#  ^ "In general, ’either/or’ 
dichotomies turn out to be not mmtual.ly exclusive competitors but 
alternative types of analysis useful In difforfeg contexts#" (ibid p.?#) 
On this basis he seeks a unitary vieif of man wMch will recognise 
levels of conq>lexity* Man is not a bociy-soM. dualism as this fails 
to appreciate the essential imier unity of the human being which both 
science and the Bible point to* Hen is "gin. intégral self, a 
psychosomatic being incorporating many interrelated levels of activity." 
(ibid p#7«) It is pertinent to note tîiat tMs definition of man 
leaves little room fo r the image of God, for the spirit/soul, but 
seems to reduce man, not to a single aspect of meeming, but certainly 
to aspects of temporality#
In place of .reductionistic or dualistic views, Barbour sees the 
basic approach th3?ough the medlim of complementarity by xdiich xfe may
1# Logically and theologically it can be critiques that God’s 
relation to nature must stand at the ground of a proper theology of 
nature. Thus a theology of nature doss not, as in Barbour, precede 
the doctrine of God. That it does is evidence of his immanentistio 
motive#
2# It may validly be thought that this is itself a cognitive reduction 
of profound problems*
seek to enalyee some of the basic structurée of reality# A certain 
eclectic pattern emerges, for as he himself notes a cLlsleatical 
method is being employed seeking to. synthesise various schools#
However M b  use of complementarity Is more restricted asid cautious in 
’Myths, Models and Paradigms’ (of# 17*1*2.)*
Ihen Barbour discusses the parallels in science and religion he 
quickly turns to his own line of thought in ’process philosophy* as 
*An Inclusive Metaphysical System" (ibid p#128#)* In this God ie 
seen primarily as the ground of order and novelty in the world.
Basic to this is the primacy of time where "the world is a process of 
becoming" (ibid p»129*)| where transition and activity are seen as more 
basic than penaanonoo and substance* ReMlty is composed of 
dynamically Interrelated events and mot some eelf-sufficieixt static 
substance* From this he derives that; "Nothing exists except by 
participation" (ibid p.130.) end that reality is in effect an organic 
process* Process is seen to imply both temporal change and inter- 
connected activity# The basic model is no longer a Mowtonien 
machine but a Whiteheadian organism# But while Whitehead emphasised 
the interdependence of each event, he also emphasises the individuality 
of each part, maintaining a real pluralism where each event is the 
formation of a new unity from the initial diversity#
Within process thought creation Is seen in a continuing model which 
rejects all natural theology m  seientifi,cal3y and theologically 
inadequate# But while he seeks to avoid a god^ -’of—the-gaps mentality, 
his reductionlatic concept of ’religion* (of. 17*1«3*) leaves 
’religion* open to a psychelogical^^aesthetlcal-ethioel explanation# 
However . I would agree that the doctrine of creation is esaentlolly an 
affinaation of our relationship to God and not a fundamental hypothesis 
concerning' the origin of the universe. Within the created order, 
then, Barbour seeks to develop a theology of nature which is neither 
dualistic or reductionistio but where two-language views can give an 
helpful start to understanding the profound metaphysics of different 
levels* Only here can we adequately incorporate the continuity and 
discontinuity between man and the lower forms #
It ' ie significantly with reference to nature that Barbour draws 
out the concluslens of this book. Ife asserts, with traditional and 
process positions against existential views, that God acts in nature. 
This is a timely warning against the intériorisation o f Christianity»
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"V/e can accept the existentialist thesis that religious 
problems should not be approached in the detached 
objectivity of theoretical, speculation, but tMs does not 
mean that we must avoid reference to nature. God malms a 
difference in events, not just in our way of looking at 
them. If the ideas of ’complementarity’ or ’space* are to 
bo introduced, they should be taken to refer to different 
aspects of reality, rather than to different Interpzzetive 
perspectives; and we should go on to explore the 
relationship between 'bhese aspects, rather than accept too 
readily a sharp dualism of isolated spheres." (ibid p*454#)
It might be thought that the concepts of Barbour here bear close 
resemblance to the concepts of sphere distinctiveness in Dooyeweerd 
(of. 19»7*4*) However Barbour is tied to a linguistic ^malytioal 
tradition whereas Booyeweerd follows a more Heo-Kantian tradition#
In any cas© it is clear that Barbour sees two-language views as 
advan'b%'0ous and that levels of actl-vlty/analysis are not mutually 
exclusive.
It is when w© turn to God’s soverei^ity that we fi&id process 
thought inWequate. He contends thats "If existentialism ends by 
abandoning God’s sovereignty over nature, ïieo»orthodoxÿ> iieo-Thomism, 
£ind Pollard, at the opposite extreme, have overemphasiEiGd divine 
omnipotence." (ibid pp.456-457*) The power of God is to be seen as 
a limited power - limited to an influence for love and goodness.
This certainly leaves scope for the reality of suffering and evil, but 
it tends to create an eternal metaphysical dualism of good and evil. 
God is effectively limited to a persuasive influence.
"The world malms a difference to God, and time is si^ ailficant 
in his experience; he responds to new events and is a 
oontisming influence contributing to both order and novelty... 
... would make God a more effective luf3,uence but not an 
oîMiipotent ruler." (ibid |>p.457*='458*)
Even granting Barbour to be right here it seems to stretch Scripture 
to claim that this is the God revealed there Î One wonders in what 
sense we are any longer talking of the Ohristien God, the God 
revealed by His Word in creation, Christ and Scripture.
To me it a-ppears that process thought seriously undermines the 
rea3.ity of a sovereign God. Perhaps significantly the last 
paragraph, which I quote in full, is as followst
"Does tMs restrict God’s power over nature? As human beings
our own action on stones is meohmiicM, whereas our action on 
other persons ie pereonaJ,; Kiust we not hold that (ksd, too, acts 
on stones mechanically or not at all? The pa3?allel breaks
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dovm^ howover, because wo are external to the stone, whereas 
God as source of all Initial, subjective aime is conetitiitive 
of its being® The stability of the stone ie in a.cooManoe 
with God’s purposes as souroe of order. Yet even In the 
|j).an:Wate there is mi Infinitesimal element of new 
potentiality, which <mly the long ages of cosmic history 
ocifld disclose; ’continuing creation’ has been a slow process, 
if we take the scientific record seriously* It. is in himian 
Jjlfe, howeverthat the greatest opportmiities for God’s 
iiiffiiewoe exist today* And it is in religious experience 
and historical revelation, rather than in nature apart from 
man, that divine initiative is most clearly manifest; our 
conclusions m  metaphysios and on theological method here 
support each other. Both experience and history point to a 
God who acts not by coercing but by evoking the response of 
his, creatures. But these same sources remind us of the 
inadequacy of all our models - for there is no adequate 
analog^ ' for God* Only iîi worship and reverence omi we 
aolmowledge the mystery of God and the preterasions of any 
huraan system that claims to have mapped out his ways."
(ibid p*463«)
Tills bears all the s%ieculative marks of process thought — speculation 
that has neither scientific basis (such as continuing creation, for 
this process Is eo slow as to be undetectable but is assumed g;ratuit- 
ouBly) nor Sexlptural fomdation.
(«f. ISarteia' 1974)0 Here we fitid
a development of his thought within the realm of the philosophy of
science and Its relation to theology® Up to the 1950*8 positivism 
dominated i&i science « but even after Popper et al enmirlclsm still 
dominates. BEpirioism claims that soionoe starts from a. set of 
pnblloa.lly observable data wM.ch is capable of description in a 
neutral/pure observation language quite separate from theoretical 
assmiptions ; that tlieoriea omi be verified or falsified In relation. to 
.’fbced ox%)erimentELl data; and that the gïiqIqq between theories is a 
rational m d  objective procedure in line with certain objective 
criteria (cf% 16.4*1*)*
WitMn this context, and bearing in mind the dominance of
linguistic analysis, Barbom? notes that existentialism and positivisRi
both provide a sharp contrast between the object of science ajtid the 
study of religion, and goes on to make the point that science is not 
as objective as positivism nor religion as subjective as 
existentialism (cf« ibid p.5* )* He suggests that in science 
theoretical model© are mental constructs devised to account for 
ceiH:ain phenomenathey do not give literal ' pictures of reality, nor 
are they useful fictions, but partial/provisional ways of ima^ gining
what is not obamcvable. Religious models are aloo aneXogioel w ith 
respect to our experience in human life# But while certain parallels 
exist between the flelcls of science and religions
"I do not believe g however* that the tena (ae« complementarity)
should he extended to call science and religion 
* complementary’5, since they are not talking about the seme 
phenomena and their models are of differing logical types 
serving differing funetions." (ibid p.8« «• of# 16*5*2#2*)
Tims ho builds up a basic approach o f ’critical realism* which applies 
to both science and religion as follows (of#
soimoB
1# The influence of theory on 
observation; the lack of a 
neutral language#
2« lo fal 8ifloatlon of scientific^ 
ally comprehonsive theories* 
great resistance, thought 
anomalies cannot be ignored
indefinitely
3« In the choice between paradigms 
there are rules of aeseesmant 
independent of the paradigm.
RBblGIOM
The influence of Interpretation 
on experience#
Hence Flaw’s demand for a 
cru c ia l falsification
condition Is  imreasonable,
In the paradigm choice there 
are no rules, but there are 
criteria of assessîaent#
These three facets «* diverse languages, the role of models, and the 
role of paradigms — are seen by Barbour sa combining to support 
critical realism# (of. ch#11*)
jldj& J j L W s m . In BO ienes he pictees a«gmgd^moaela which 
are ccmstructed and used in the laboratory; loMcM models which are 
formal deductive systems ; matheimtical models which are somewhere 
between the first two* that Is models lyhlch are symbolic 
representations of quantitative variables; and theoretical models 
which are Imaginative mental constructs, (ibid p.31.)
According to Rarbour# if in science a model gives a theory by 
which to correlate patterns in observational data, then in  religion a 
model gives beliefs to correlate patterns in  human experienoe (of. ibid 
p*49«)* This however suggests that religion ami science are 
separate; that religion deals with the personal, interior world of 
feeling and experience as distinct from the external world g and that
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beliefo have no ©ignificmit role in ooienoo* But doeo M s  
’religious’ eategory equally apply to psychology or sociology which 
are also correlations of experiences on the 'basis of certain beliefs #.
however this basic distinction, a.oting as a ground-motive- colours 
all that is subsequently said concerning models in religion. It 
indicates that despite the claim that religion is life-orientating, 
that it "is, first mid last* a way of life" (ibid p.66.)* he operates 
in a dualistic concept. Hence religion is seen in aspectual or 
subjectivistia terms# Religion is concerned with himan experience 
such as (a) awe and reverence; (b) mystical union; (e) moral 
obligation; (c1.) reorientation mid reconciliations (e) interpersonal 
relationships; (f) key historical events; and (g) order and creativity 
in the world. Mote that (a) to (e) are cleOTly personal 
subjectivistio ternis, amplified in that (d) contains no primary 
reference to God for man is reconciled to himself, able to accept 
himself; (f) refers to the corporate response of the community to 
certain historical events; and (g) also is seen in a subjective way, 
the key being the influence of the teleologlcsl argument to awaken awe 
and reverence. (Cf. ibid pp#53ff#)'^
With this background he critiques the religious instsTumentalisBi of 
Miles (1959)» nnd the view of Eva%is that religion is the expression of 
attitudes, before turning to Ian Remsiey and the concept of ’Disclosure 
Models *# Rmnsey sees models in science mû. religion derivilng from 
analogies between observations — there ' are resemblances betvieen 
patterns in the world c'md patterns in the behaviour of fathers that 
leads to the model of God as Father# But Reims ey puts his main 
emphasis on the way models ore disclosed (of. Barbour 1974» p#57«)#
"The contemporary use of models in science or theology — models 
which axe not picturing models — points us back, then, to that 
moment of insight where along with a model there is disclosed 
to the scientist or the theologian that about which each is to 
be, in his characteristically different way, articulate,"
(Ramsey 19^4» p.20.)
3# Of. Ramsey (1971 » pp.202-224») and Sinnema, (1975, pp.1-24#)*
4# H.Caaieron (1976) notes that the finiteness of man means that 
certain situations are more likely to be disclosure prone of God.
"It does seem likely that specially favourable focal points of 
onoounter with God are not dispensable...«Some situations then must be 
regarded as having a higher suggestiveness rating (H.S.11.) in the way 
of ministering to our awareness of God at any time, and promoting 
fellowship with Him, than others do." (pp.34*35»)
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Barbour, though not rejecting disclosure, does not like this Idea, 
contending that flaehea of Inspiration mre normally of no uee#
For Barbour models seek to interpret religious experience, to 
express attitudes* to evoke dlBcloeures, end lastly to oonntract 
metaphysical systems (of. 1974» p#64f.). This order of treatment is 
ourious in that one would have thought that the metaphysical, system 
wêUld come first as that wW.oh governs the other areas. ■ After all, 
is not a metaphysical system determinative of, as well as determined 
by these areas?
17.1*2*2. 'Paradiana. Today sees a profound discussion on the 
paradigmatic aspect of science. In the wake of positivism come the
insight that all data was theory-laden, that theories were not simply 
verifiable or falsifiable, and that there was no clear criteria of 
choice between rival theories* While Hagel, Braithwaite and Popper
tried to hold to some basic objective data (cf* 15.3.3*2.); others 
like Kuhn, Hanson, Polanyi, Feyerabend and Toulmin posited that there 
was no bare data. Feyerabend (1976) contends that every theory 
possesses its o m  observation language making comprehensive theories 
incommensurable (cf. Barbour 1974, P*95f*)* This ie seen in the 
uncomparablenees of Mewtonian and Binstelnlan systems where in the 
former mass is an unchanging property of a body, while in the latter 
it ie a property of the relation between a body end a frame of 
reference* These are different paradigms.
When a conflict of theories arises vre cannot withdraw to some 
arena of pure-obeervation-language* But can we perhaps withdraw to 
an observation language that is not immediately questioned? Yet, 
while a theory may be revised in the light of observations; 
observations are also revised in  the light of theory* There is no 
sharp line between the two*
Against IWm, Barbour suggests that ’normal science’ is more 
diverse m û  ©elf-critical; that there i© in effec t a gradation between 
’normal science’ and ’revolutionary science’ and not a sharp line.
In a new paradigm the old is  not totally discarded. Thus he concludes 
that the following are the criteria of assessment in  science. (a) 
All data are theory-laden, but rival theories are not incommensurable 
(of* Feyerabend) even if something like a gestalt switch is  involved, 
(b) Comprehensive theories are highly resistant to falsification, but 
observation does exert a degree of control. A research programme
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•is more resistant than a theory. (c ) There are criteria of 
assessment but no olear«-eut rulee for th e ir imamblguouG use# • (d)
There are metaphysical ass'amptions aid ontological commitments, but 
these too are open to change# (C f* Ibid pp«112—118»)
80 much fo r aoirniGo — what about paa^ adlgmo In  relig ion? Here 
too, Barbour argues, we ’see aa’ ,  we do not simply ’see’. An there 
is mo uninterpreted data so there Is  no im interpreted experience, and 
therefore no immediate relig ious Imowledg©* lots here the confining 
of re lig io n  to a subjective sphere and science to m% objective realm — 
the one deals with data, the other with experience (but can experience 
not be data and vice versa?) - even although he c learly  recognises the 
ro le of assumptions of a metaphysical nature in  science* But more 
important perhaps, there Is  no meaningful concept o f the Word revelation 
of God entertained by Barbour* Hie discussion is  in terms of man 
coming to the world and to his experiences* But is not the Ohristlsm 
position that of a God who comes to man, who has given to men His 
Imagenessg His revelation^ and will give him His Spirit to lead him 
In to  all the tru th . The tru th  which Is  the reality of what is there, 
not a fte r our interpretation, but after God’s*
Barbour conceives that historical revelation end relig ious  
exporlenoe are the basic sources of theology. But I would contend 
that the special revelation of Cod in  Christ and Scripture (th a t Is  
historical revelation?) is the priim ry field of theology •» His 
revelation in  the oonsolenoe, the manishness of man, and in the world 
are secondary sources# That is , I  cannot accept Barbour’s Liberal 
perspective on revelation . (Of* ibid p*134»} Under his construction 
s c ie n tific  events also become revelatory# In  affect Scripture is  
reduced to the status of a ’re lig io u s’ bock; it loses any sense of 
divine insp iration , or exercising any normative ro le  over men* Here 
we have a Immem God end a very human communication to deal with*
This is  borne out in  the c rite ria  of assessment postulated with 
respect to re lig io n  (of* ibid p*142f*)* ¥e are to assess relig io n  
by means of how well social and psychological needs are fu lf ille d , by 
eth ical norm© and actions, by sim p lic ity , coherence and extensibility, 
and comprehensiveness* Thus the subjective features of science are 
simply more so in  re lig io n  and the objective less so# The concept of 
true tru th  is  threatened *
Barbour then presents four inadequate paradigms — the monarohical
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raodol of the King and. the Kingdom; the clei.stie model o f the clook— 
malcor and the eloek; the model o f one person to m?.other; and
the ^ ^^t; model with respect to axi agent and his actions * After 
briefly die eus sing each of these Barbour suggests that the Christian 
model is in fact a f if t h  alternative - namely the nroceea model.
Here is pictured "a Jûoiet^ of %-M.ch one member ie pre*«emineiit Imt not 
absolute. The uriiverse is pictured as a commmiity of interacting 
beings, rather than as a monarchy, a machine, m  interpersonal 
dialo^ iUG or a cosmic organism*" (ibid p.l6l.) The following 
quotations give a flavour of his position.
"The god of process thought is not immutable and independent, 
but changing nver completed, even though his essential 
nature does not change. Temporality and becoming 
oharaotoxdse, all ,pa.rtioipents ,ln the community of being.
Between God end the v/orlcl there is interdependence and 
reciprocity® in the process view..*.God is not self-sufficient 
or impasBlble^ for he Is involved in time and history^ but he 
is not totally within the temporal order." (ibid p*l62.)
"Process thinkers reject both omnipotence and predestination.
If there is genuine freedom end novelty in the world, then 
even God cannot know the future until decisions ha'^re bean 
made by individual agents.” (ibid p.163.)
"To the Ohristian commmity, then, Christ ia more than a 
historical exemplaa?; he is a model for God.#" (ibid p«.l67*)
Without further* quotation it is clearly evident that process theology 
and traditional concepts of the sovereignty of God are divergent.
This position can be criticised as follows. (a) It uses as a
starting point (which is also necessm?ily its end) the self-
destructive synthesis of modem man’s presuppositions; it assumes the
autonomy and indepenclence of mature and man, and man’s freedom to
subject the world to his own categorieB* (b) Barbour compromises 
seriously the sovereignty of God* Tims while on the one hand he 
affirms God’s transcendence, he negates this by denying the super­
naturalness and absolute transcendence of the biblical God, (Cf. ibid 
p.1 3 7 #) This lias led to the movements position of ’panenthoisra’ - 
that all things occur ’within God’. (o) The idea of God as a 
personal being is dissipated, ho is reduced to the principal aspect of 
the whole of things* (d) Any biblical base is denied even if a 
biblical overtone i© invoked to dress up the position,
17.1.3. Science and ReliMon. Mow to turn to the question a;b the 
heart of all this - the relation of science and religion. In fact
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Barbûur give© a good initial definition of roligim. "EallMcm. 
broadly defined. Is total lifa-orientatlon in response to what is 
deemed wortlay of ultimate oomeeam and devotion*" (1968/b,^  p«tO*)
Science is seem to refer to the natural sciences, except for certain 
tangential, comments# la subeaqnent practice, however, he negates 
this definition of religion by erecting categories of religious 
assertion which reduce its total impact# Beligicn in effect is 
confused with theological assertion and reduced to am aspectual 
character#
.1.7,#.1,#3.;#.1.» Methode* Barbour coneequently mWme the following 
cmclusionB concerning the methods of eoienoe and religion# He notes 
that both are selective# that both entail a two-way Interaction of 
experience and interpretation ; that both have a recogniseble community 
%7hlch sets paradigms over the pr©eu.ppositional arena; that inter— 
oozmected networks of concepts are evaluated together* But there 
are differences for religion is more subjective, has more personal 
involvement than science; revelation through historical events has, of 
course, no equivalent in science; the pmq^os© of religious language is 
to awaken and manifest worship mid self-commitment | and finally 
religion is not testable in the same way as science# 80 religion is 
basically involved in aetor-language, while science involves spectator- 
language, although "the contrasts are not as absolute as most recent 
theologians and philosophers have maintained#" (ibid p*268*)
1 ?» 1 # 3 jWels* Gonoeming the use of models In science and 
religion there are also similarities and differences# Both are 
similar in that they share the characterietlce of being analogical in 
origin, extensible and comprehensible# they have a similar status, 
being neither literal pictures nor merely useful fictions, but rather 
symbolic representations of aspects of reality; their use, in that 
scientific models order observations and religious models order 
experienos* There are differences in that religious models serve 
non-esognitive purposes; they evoke a more total personal involvement; 
they appear to ‘be more influential than the formal doctrines derived 
from them, whereas in science it often appears the other way round#
(Cf. 1974. p.69. - 0f.i4.ll 14.3.)
17.1.3.5. CKltima. Share are Bevesai prohlomB Xfith this isajmer of 
oompariag and oonteastiijg the methods/models of soisnoe and religion. 
Barbour’s concept of religion in practice is narrowed doym from its 
original definition to a complementary sphere of being, and in the
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process confused with peychcMeestheMo-etMeal aspect© of megmlmg# 
InitlMly he defines z'eligixm as of ul’bâmate llfe^ -^ 'oreientatiiig oonoem 
aiî-d therefore exercising a directing end foiming motive over all of 
man’s activity,, yet reduces this to Eierely an aspect of man 8^ 
activity. Ho longer does the concept of religion, possess radical 
life-orientating povfer as of an ultimate concern over all spheres of 
meaning^ over al.l of life, but is reduced to th.e realm of ’trust* and 
•loyalty* (cf. 1968/h, p.266*). Religious life is reduced to 
worsMp, to an ultimate concexvi that is effective over only an 
aspect of life (cf* 2 0 .1 #  «» especially 2 0 ^ 1 . 1 * 1 * ) o
In my view it is misleading to compare religion and science in 
this way# liie function of religion is to direct and control the
whole of life, including scientific activity. Religion (of some 
form — either directed to or away from God) provides the ground- 
motive of the heart and consequently of an individual’s scientific 
activity. Religion cannot therefore be set off over ©gainst soierxce
£md a neat list of similiarities and differences da?a\m up, for it is 
integrgil to science. However we may be able to compare and contrast 
statemen'üs from different spheres of meaning (although I am not 
convinced of the value of tMs, for what purpose is gained in oomparixig 
ethics and history-, aesthetics m'^ d logic?) Let us also remind 
ourselves tha,t while It is convenient to refer to science as ’natural 
science’ this is in effect a reduction of ’sclentia’. Properly 
speaking theology is a science (scientia).
'jhixbour refers to the question of testability science is 
testable, religion is not. How this may hold if he is comparing 
some physical law which is open to experimental examination and some 
existential feeling of £KTe* But we cannot extrapolate from this to 
a generalised statement oonceming ’science’ and ’religlm*. After 
all, ell spheres of meaning above the analytical act nozmatively and 
not objectively as do the lower spheres. Therefore history, ethics 
and aesthetics cannot be tested in the same way m  physics. So 
Barbour’s claim that testing "is likely to seem crucial to the 
scientist as he defends the disinterestedness of seieïxee" is a 
distinction between ’science’ arid the ’humanities*. But the 
hnmanlties are not religicm.
Tho differences Barbour notes are essentially of deCToc — ’more 
tlien’ — and not of logical type. Thus it seems to me the whole
eo&terprlse of la a falao pathway which confuses th®
fundemental religious mature of all ©cientia* (Of# 18*5»)
Two more Gritioieiis ean be noted# Barbour eviacea a false 
distinction of data (re# science) and expexdencse (r©. religion)*
Even on 6ls own tezms ’experience* becomes the data of rreligion, while 
in science the scientist has to experience bla data* Likewise his 
distinction between obsorvatlon and oxperienoe la wioleer* (Cf* ohs* 
13-15») Secondly, Barbour would appear to be open to van de Fliert’s 
criticism (of# 16*5*1 *3*) of placing too high a status on science and 
allowing it to effectively govern Ms  religious views»
However I would note the helpful role that Barbour gives to 
philosophy* He notes the importance of it in clarifying the 
relationship between science and religion and wMle I reject hie 
development of tMs I endorse the |japo3Jtance of a philosophical.- 
religions understanding in any approach to the question cf theology 
end the natural sciences*
Morris is Included in this study as one of the foremost 
conservative evangelical scientists m'itlng Im this field today* He 
is a Fondameixtalist and accepts this designation* Unfcrtiuiately for 
many it seems sufficient to say ’Ah PimdamentM 1st ’ and thus dismiss 
Morris (and others) without a hearing, prejudged by the banner under 
which he marches# But this is not good enough and is In reality a 
ccmdeBmatim on those who would eo dismiss him# It is 
unintelleotual dogmatism that refuses a fair hearing (of* 16»5»)»
It is a criticism of modem Liberalism that it ignores Morris while 
the ’secular® ’Open Univorsxty’ can note in one of Its courses that 
his work ’The Genesis Flood’ (co-authored with J* ¥laJ.tcomb) is a 
respectable and serious attempt to argue the case for a universal 
flood# ¥o should not dismiss this position without proper 
reflection* Indeed Morris presents a coherent, consistent, simixle 
and empirical position which can be difficult to refute if the 
parameters within which he writes are accepted# Again it is wropg 
to ignore a position which has so many advocates, especially within
5* This is an example of Schaeffer’s thesis that in any dualism 
(science ^ d  religion) the lower storey (nature/eoienoe) will ©at up 
the higher malm (religion/perseaality/grace) and destroy it* Gf* 
Appendix A,
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the ocientrLfic comrrimiity, for it is not just p„ imttei? of a few 
junior ©clontists,, but himcTreds of well-qxrEullfied sn.tho3?it,ieB in their 
m m  disoipline© who bob no problem In aocepting the Bible ’literally’
Cm it© graBMa/îîico—historiesl eenae# ^ Gonoexning his qualificationo 
to dioouoB the topic of science and the Bible Morris %'^ ites s
"Having studied most of the basic sc;Lenees, having be'icnged 
to many ec:lec.tdfic societies and associated with scientists 
aixd intellectuals dally for thirty years, having taught in 
five great xmlvmrsitlea for tv/en1ïy«->slx years, having read 
thousmds of books and articles on various scientific 
subjects - and. at ■ the same time having aver^ îged over one 
hour every day for twenty-ee%ren yeaars in the ©tndy of the 
Bible — he is firmly convfeeed that every word of the Bible 
is inspired by God, abso3.ixteXy free of error, with
Izmumerable maries of divine inspiration tlneoughout its
pages*" (19689 pp*3e4.)
is the attitude of Moxrcis to
the sciences? In one essay he tells us tlxat ’ImowXodge * is concerned 
with the awreness of the fact© around us as they are; while ’wisdom* 
relates to the iixterpretatioxx of these facts* Then he tells us that 
the former apprwivsates to science, the latter to philosopîjy, though
in the final analysis both true knowledge and vrisdom come from God
alone* {Of* 1972» p»111») He approaches the word ’science* in its 
formal meaning of lutowleclge (ecientia); it involves facts which are 
observed and laws wMch £ire determined* Furthers "The scientific 
method involves experimental reproducibility, with like causes 
producing like effects*" (ibid p.ISI») Science therefore "Is
inference or speculation or extrapolation*" (ibid p.151.) 
At this point one tends to thinlc he has read little philosophy of 
scienoQ after the 19th century*
Tnî.e science for Morris Is confined to the mesei.?rement and study 
of present phenomena and processes* Only dîita gathered in the 
present, or accurately recorded in the historic past, may be validly 
cM-Ied upon in scientific activity* This sinrict BaoonSasiism is
6# Ho3?ris ■ is representative of ’The Creation Eeseai^ 'oh Society’ which 
was formed in 190 in Michigsui as a committee of ten aoientlsts, and 
now eludes several hundred full members - membership being limited 
to those hairing graduate degrees in science* Their statement of 
belief zbicludes ^ (1) that tho Bible is the Written Word of God, end all 
its assertioïis are historically and scientifically true; (s) all basic 
typoi-i of living 'bMnga were made by direct acts of God during the 
OreatioB Week and whatever biological changes that have occurced s;lnce 
then are within the original created kinds f and (5) that The Great 
Flood described i.n Genesis was an historic worldwide event* (Gf. 
D.O.G.Wataon 1975» p*104.)
utilised to attack evolutloiiaa:%r theories which deal with what is 
outside the historic past, and which rely heavily upon inference and 
spéculation* But one may feel justified In asking how he manages to 
exclude inference and extrapolation from his oim speciality of 
iiyciraulie engineeringî However, while holding to the containment of 
science to present data and processes he nevertheless maintains that 
only the creational framework allows full gmd complete understanding* 
This follows, he argues, because "meaning Is inextrioably inteî>*related 
with origin and destiny." (ibid p*153«) Apart from tliis ho wishes 
to contain science In isolation from tho past or futmze and from 
presuppositions * He concludes:
"To a considerable degree, therefore, a Christian study of 
physics or chemistry or other science can proceed along the 
some lines as a treatmeîit by non-Gteistians* The same 
textbooks omi be used, the smne experioiental apparatus, the 
smie methods, provided only that the study ie limited to an 
elucidation of the actual present properties and processes 
of the data of that science. But as soon as intrinsic 
memiiîigs or origins or destinies are brought into the 
treatment, there will inevitably be conflict between the 
uniformitarian and Christian world-views*" (ibid p.153#)
¥hl.le accepting that extrapolation from the present into the past &md 
future will occur, this is seen as outwith science and belonging to 
the realm of faith or philosophy. Extrapolation "involves 
assumptions and presuppositions and Is therefore basically a 
philosophy, or even a faith." (1975» p.aocvi.) This means that 
science is related to a datum: of bare miinterpreted facts, while 
proauppositioxis are seen as an additional realm involving philosopliy.
Bo when discussing tho Flood ho sees neither the ’uniformitarian’ or 
•biblical’ approaches as .scientific! However in the area of 
scientific theories he allows that moral and emotional considerations 
have asi important role to play* Indeed tho fixial decision between 
comxîoting theories "is ultimately a moral and miotlonal decision."
(ibid p.329.)
Unlike the approach which would envisage a Book of Mature and a 
Book of God operating within their respective spheres of meaning,
Morris sees the special revelation of God as oxeroislng: a crucial 
directing .'Influence over the la,tter.
*9'...when one subconsciously identifies with natural revelation 
M b o m  intes^retations of nature emd then denounces 
theologians who are unwilling to mold Biblical revelation into 
conforïJiity with his interpretation of nature, he is guilty of
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serious error* After all, special revelation supersedes 
natural revelation, for it is only by means of sxjecial 
revelation that we can interpret aright the vjorld about us,
(ibid p*458*)
But OU5? view of special revelation is surely also an interpretation, 
and what happens if wo are in error there but correct with respect to 
an interpretation of general revelation?
Tho major work of Morris in this field is ’The Genesis Flood* « 
co-authored with J.hliitcomb, This book seeks to attack evolution in
general and defend the Genesis account of a world-wide flood in 
paz-’tioular. As part of their argujBent there is a trenchant attack 
on the ’principle of unifomnty* # But while they have been said to 
imdenaiïie the principle of imifonnity without which science cannot 
exist, this is not in fact what they are saying as they have been at 
great pains to point out, ' They realise very well that m'd.formity is 
a basic premiss of scientifio inquiry (of, Morris* appeal to 
reproducibility as of the essence of true science). But the false 
faith of uniform! tarlanism is defined asi
"•♦♦the belief that existing physical processes, acting 
essentially as at present,, are sufficient to account for all 
past changes end for the present state of the astronomic, 
geologic and biologic universe. The principle of uniformity 
in uysen'b processes ia both scientific and Scriptural (Gen,
8 582), but comes Into conflict with Biblical revelation when 
utilised to deny the possibility of -past or future 
miraculous suspension.or alteration of those processes by 
their Creator," (ibid p,xx,)
Hence the fal.se faith they attack vjith respect to uniformity is one 
which has the character of anti-theism, evolution and ma^ terialiem, 
rather then the true faith which is directed by the God of creation 
and revelation, (Of, 7«1*4*)
The Bible io given absolute pre-eminence, accepted in a literal 
way — although Morris seems at the seme t:hae cax>able of pecullm:' ' 
analogical Interpretations, While the Bible is not regarded as 
primarily a book about science it nevertheless is held to omitain 
"sources of modem scientific truths, and no scientific e;ï?rors,". (1972, 
P#21 » )
QUOTE A5"The Bible, with this perfect claim to absolute divine 
authority, does very clearly establish a f3?aîiiework of 
interpretation within which men are expected to formulate 
their understanding of the data of science. It is most 
reasonable and most gracious of God to do so, since it is
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quite impossible for man, with hie study of present 
processes, to îmow anything for oertMn about the prehistoric 
past or the eschatologie future# Only God can toow these 
things, and we aaze able to know the truth about these matters 
only through faith in God’s statements conceiving them.
Ther-efore, the Bible-believing Christian goes to the Bible 
for his basic orientation in all departments of tazuth# The 
Bible is his textbook of science ae well as his guide to 
spiritual truth#" (ibid p.llO.)
Thus he BiaintainB that the Bible not only gives a sound basis for
imderstanding religious truth but pixysical tmrbh as well# The Bible
serves as a textbook for aoientific priziciples and the basic biblical
fraîïievrork is pictured as centred round key facets of history sueh as
the special creation out of notlifeg' in six days; the Fall; the Flood;
the vrork of redemption in Gh3?ist| and the eschatologie return of 
7Christ#
JiIâ2ji2#Jte^Bib^ Despite a cautionary
note ‘iihat the Bible does not contain detailed teclmicaX descriptions 
or mathematical foximlations of natural phenomena, • he entitles a 
chapter in one book as "The Bible Is â fextbook Of Science." (ibid p. 
108.) Indeed his whole apologetioaX method centres round an appeal 
to the "great number of scientific truths that have lain hidden vdthin 
its pa.gos.#." (I96B, p#5*) A facet he appeals to as clear evidence 
of the Bible’s inspiration by God. This leads him to adopt a ' 
procedural rule that anything froKi the realm of scientific inquiry that 
seems to contradict the Bible is to be labelled as not true science!
(Of. 1972. p.107.)
Morris is naturally not content to leave his claims of specific 
scientific îcnowledge hidden in the Bible hanging lii the air and he 
develops several sœem where he sees modem science corroborating the 
Bible. This appeal is widespread and includes astronoïny, geology, 
meteorology, hydrology, paleontology, physiology, archaeology, taxonomy, 
anthropology, medicine ©te.*(cf* I968, p.5f; 1972, p.llBf.)
17.2.2.1. Astronomy. In astronomy for many years men sought to 
number the stare, but the Bible all along maintained that they were 
without number (Jer# 35|22). The Bible sees the earth as a sphere 
sitting in space (is* 40;22* Job 26;7)« Appeal is even made to the 
detailed data -.Felikovsky adduced to support the long day of Joshua,
7# This does not do justice to the essential pro—theoretical nature 
of 8c3?ipture# Gf* Sinnema (1975)#
350
©3.though Morris rejects liiB Interpretation of tble ae tmscientific 
and wibiblioel# Î3mt it gives support» in its detail, to the 
Mhlioal texte (Of* 1960» p®22«)
1%.2#2*2# Hydrologye Morris makes frequent appeal to the ^hydrologie 
cyole* as being accurately recorded in the Bible* Water Is 
precipitated, as rain or snow, drained off by rivers into the oceans
and thence raised by evaporation into the skies and carried by the 
wind back to land (of* Ecoles* Job 36;27—29* 1972» p*25f*)
"It is remexkabl© that not one of the great number of 
Biblical references to water is out of accord with the 
findings of modem science* On the contrary# there are 
many references which seem to reveal a modem perspective, 
so modem in fact that it would seem to be inexplicable apart 
from divine revelation*" ( 1972# p*25#)
(Of* Jer. 10;13* Prov* 8;26* ?s. 1^5;7* Job 26»8* 28;24"27. 57*11.)
:Shergy* Turning to the plgrsioal sciences he notes that the 
fundamental fact concerning them is that they are non-physical in 
ultimate essence. This was declared long ego In the Bible but only 
oomparitively recently has it been acknowledged by modem science 
which today has abandoned mechanical concepts in favour of nan*- 
mechanical mathematical concepts* (Of# ibid p.112*) 8o Morris 
develops several analogies between science and Scripture with respect 
to the concept of energy. He appeals to different forms of energy ** 
light# sound, heat, electrical and chemical «« to indicate how God's 
upholding hand maintains all things iii existence* But his textual 
evidence often appears vague and strained* Me cites Jeremiah 20*9 
as an example of electrical and chemical energys "Then I said, I will 
not make mention of Him# nor speak m j  more in Hie name. But ' Hie 
word was in mine heart as a burning fire shut up in my bornes # and I was 
weary with forbearing, and I could not stay." Similarly M s  texts to 
show evidence that the physical form of energy known as stress and 
strain la In the Bible may fairly be âeac-iâbed as tenuous*
"There seems to be an implication# spiritually speaking# of 
this form of power released by the Word in luke 16si é# 17 a 'The 
law and the prophets were until Johns since that time the 
kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into It* 
ted it is easier for heaven end earth to pass# than one tittle 
of the lew to fail*'' In this passage it is noted that as the 
Word Is preached it exerts a pressure upon its hearers# causing 
them to 'press' into the kingdom..*" (ibid p*55.)
H© interestingly discussee the word 'power' in Scripture in the 
light of a possible understanding of it as referring to energy in a
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mamier* Time he writes of Hebrews 1|5.
"ted the Scripture quoted above apparently says that the lord 
Jesus Christ is the ultimate Source of the infinite power
ior energy) vîhich# revealing itself through its outworking the Word)# is the agency by which all the pîiysieel I0 •upheld*. Here is the modem discovery of the equivalence 
of matter end energy, expressed I9OO years ago# and further 
teaching that It is the living Word of God which supplies the 
power for keeping the matter of the universe from 
distetegratteg# and for enabling it to manifest all the 
imltltudlnouo physical phenomena that constitute God's 
creation»" (ibid p*46«)
While agreeing with the genera,l point here I would hesitate to me3ce
the claim that the text evidences the equivalence of matter end energy,
This reads too much into it»
lot sùrprlelngly Morris attacks the attempt to
push the date of creation back into the dim and distant past* The 
Genesis genealogies give a date of about 6,000 years ago, and while 
this figure "Is subject to reasonable Increase" a date %f about 
15,000 B»ü» for man's creation would probably represent the outside 
limit " to which breaks in the genealogies could be stretched# (Of. 
ibid p«50«) To bæk this up he attacks modem dating techniques «» 
techniques which one must admit leave many questions unanswered | for 
example# assuming a uniformity that the evidence suggests does not 
prevail# Thus radiocarbon dating is attacked:
"#»#the fact that this method rests upon doubtful 
presuppositions and needs to be used with caution may
be Illustrated by a recent incident# Hr# Stuort Figott# a 
British archaeologlste reports that two radiocarbon tests on 
a sample of charcoal indicated a date of 2620-2650 B*G. for 
an ancient structure at Hurrington Walls in But
oompel3wimg archaeological evidence called for a date 
approximately 1,000 years later I" (1975 e P*43»)
Morris defends creation in six 24 hour periods and the fact that this 
creation would of necessity have a built-in time dimension# (Of 1972, 
p#42a) While this leaves the philosophical problem that création 
could have taken place five minutes ago with men being created with 
built-in memories, this is not to be accepted even though no on© can 
prove it wrong* (Of# ibid p*109#) It is not acceptable because the 
Bible indicates otherwise - not because it appears an absurd idea#
Morris boldly contends that attempts to harmonise the order of 
creation and modem historical geology èvaporatecn inspection of the 
details» For example,, the Bible tells us that all plants, even fruit 
trees, were made on the third day, while fish and other marine
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organisms were created on -feh© fifth* Historical geology reverses 
this order* The Bible sees birds end fish created oxi the serne day; 
paleoiTbo'logy teaches ths;b birds were evolved from reptl3.es long after 
the origin of marine 3if©t» (Gf# ibid p«53f*) Thus he concludes that
modern historical geology is wrong, appealing to the Genesis record, 
and the lew Testament for to attack Genesis is to attack the words of 
Paul# W m  and even Qhrlst (cf* ibid p*58*)o In effect he maintai^ ns
that creation, is not open to scientific examination of any kind for 
all present processes relate to the providence and maint e nance of 
creation by God not to oreation per se»
T7*2»2#5* Evolution and Themodvnavaics (cf# 7a4*2«)# With reference 
to evolution he iwites:
**Thus it seems evident that if evo3.iition has taken place on 
any largo sca3.e at all (that Is, of coursep progressive 
evolutioïi), it must have done so g&t complete vaillance irlth 
the indications of all modem genetic research and indeed with 
all basic jdiysical law* Host of the proffered evidence for 
evolution can be better intes^ preted in the light of the law of 
deterioration p miû with fas? better* scientific basis a"
(1968, p.55.)
Eero I'/e see 3?eference to the *law of deterioration*, or the second law 
of thesTraod^ maimios* Morris indeed appeals strongly to the first and 
second laws of thersmdynam3.es * The first law (energy conservation)
indicates tîmt creatsÆn oannoi; now be taking place* The second law 
(entropy) indicates that all is now deteriorating# being degraded, 
waxing old l.tke a garsient* Morris appeals to the universal vMidity 
of these laws and quotes many authorities from other scientific 
disciplines to back this elairi up* (Of* 1972» p*122* 1975, p*222f*)
first law states that no energy can be C3?eat©d or destroyed, 
although its temporal, form may change* In c:æation God brought 
energy into being, and therefore #ls period is of an intrinsically 
different character from that which now prevails. It is therefore
imX)ossible for man to extend his preheat knowledge of basiic processes 
to d©te3?mlae th,e events/sequences of crea,tioa* This Mo:m?is claims 
"is the fundamental fallacy in modem evo3.utioaary philosopîqr**
(1972, Bp.95,48.)
%.G second law of energy d.etez'l03?ation states that in any real 
process where energy is transferred in form there ie an irret3?ievable 
loss to a heat s3nk •* energy is not destroyed but deteriorated to 
become less usefhl or available for further work* Ivi a closed
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system, orcte will decrease imless energy is introduced into the 
system# Therefore he comoludoa that the imiveree is rmming doim, 
growing aid# This compares favourably with Sesipture (cf« Ps* 102; 
25f# Heb, 1 g 10-12# Earn# 8g20**22#) and is the exprasslŒi that 
something has gone wrong In God's creation* If the first law refera 
to all processes since creation| the second law refera to all 
processes since the Fall# (Of. ibid pp*51,95#)
Attendant on these two lews Is one ohvlous glaring problem for 
OTolnticnaæy thought and Morris points it mp with great relish.
"A very interesting emomsly is evident here# Biologists for 
the most pai/t decry vitalism, vigorously denying that there 
Is any sort of 'vital ener^' present in organic matter, 
energy of some radically different nature from the ordjnary 
forms of physioal energy# Such concepts as those of 
•creative evolution', 'orthogenesis, *' 'enteleohy,' and the 
like are anathema to most life scientists*
It is contended that all organic processes most be 
explained in terms of obemlstæy and physics# This means 
that the basic laws of ohemletry and physics (notably the 
first and second laws of thermodynamics) must be as' 
determinative in organic processes m  they are in inorganic 
processes, These laws postulate quantitative stability and 
qualitative deterioration, rather than evolutionary growth 
and development, And this quite clearly Indicates that 
evolutlmk is invalid as a guiding principle in the study of 
biologic processes," (ibid p,1lè»)
Morris, then, hangs a lot tm the first and second laws of 
thermodynamics, This is not as dangerous as might appear at first 
glance for these two laws are probably the most felly demonstrated
and e%perlment:ally verified laws that we know, (Although we might 
add a caveat that Hewton's laws at one time also bore this 
character yet wsre eventually overthroœ#} He writes s
"These laws are basic in every scientific system or process.
As far as science has bemi able to shovf, they are universal 
in ©cope, with no exceptions known,,**If men had been willing 
to develop their scientific systems on the basis of Biblical 
presuppo8iti<ms, however, it should have been quite obvious 
all along that the basic phyaical processes were those of 
conservation end decay, as now foŒmellced in the statements 
of the first end second Xmm of tliermodynamlos # The Bible 
does not, of course, state these principles in the mathematical 
sy%zd)ol8 or technical jargon of modem physios Imt the basic 
truths are quite clearly emuiolated," (ibid p,114*)
But hindsight Is easy, I would suggest tlmt It Is easier to read 
laws back into tlie biblical text than to deduce them from It, If
the Bible ie a scientific textbook as Iteris claims should be abl©
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to deduce theecï laws out of the text and not simply recogfi3.ee them 
after the phyolcl&t has unfolded thorn w.ithout recourse to the Bi.hle*
The pTohlem Is whether we see some interaction between biblical 
material and the aoienoeo» or whether we maintain a, rigid 
coift|)a,rtmenta3.1sation* 'Bils le quite a different giieetlon from that 
of the relation between theology and the other sciences for that is 
the relation of one scientia to others# But with respect to the 
'Bible it is whether It bears on only prtJ-abstractivo affairs; on 
that ]>liis theology; or on that plus the sciences «
17*2* 5, C3?itique» The basic aim of Morris is wiachaniedly 
evan^ selistic (of* l6o5«5#)# He is concerned to jp70V©p by 
illustration from science» the veracity of the Bible* But while he 
makes the claim that the Bible is a scientific texijbook» he is really 
concerned to show "khat as it is ocientifiealXy reliable it is clearly 
div;hiely inspired and the reader should admowledge it as such and 
anooept its saving' gospel (of* I96&* p*5e)* Hnfo3:'tmm#ely this means 
tha;b he in effect belittles the very book he endeavours to exîialt» for 
if the Bible is all that he claims, then It hardly needs vorifioation 
from the scientific actlvltlos of man*
Again we o m  strongly question his idea that 'hhero is a substratum 
of science which is free from :bifluence by speculation and 
presuppose.tlmsio Ee seems at cross^ 'purposes here, claiming that
there is 'science' (imowled.ge) which ie the present facts as they are; 
and. yet on khe other liand maintaining 'b'tmrb only in a creational context 
of the believing mind can tajiie nie^ mlng imd purpose be understood#
But Is he then saying tha-t there are facts without meanlzxg or context? 
One certainly must distinguish between the science© and philosophy, 
between data and interpretation » Xmt it is false to divide them such 
that so3.en.o8 deals with facts wM.le faltli/%;hilosophy deals with 
preaiippositionsa After all.» so:lence in all Its divisions rests on
faith which is directed ei.ther to, or away from, God and has its 
p^ resupposltions and 'presupposlta'(of# glossary*,)
Gmat play is made of the wealaioss of the X^ rAïiciple of bh:lformity 
with reference to the Flood but then he is .forced to slide 
t entail singly around the problem that 8 "all things con tirai© as they 
were from tlie beg;;bmteg of the orea-tion*" (2 Pet* 5|4®) Again, in 
Quote A (p#349) Morris confuses two quite distinct .ideas the Bible 
as providing a, general frainework within wh3.ch the sc3.ences may be
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pursued; mid as providing specific scimtifie detalla# While 
agreeing to the v a lid ity  o f the former (of# Peart IF ), I  have strong 
objections to the latter in eny deductive ©enae#
Priding himeelf on a atrict literal interpretation of Scripture 
he mekea haelo 'elGQgetloal* laisiritesrpretationa# In dealing with 
the creation and fall# he clalme that the Bible clearly teaches that 
sin and death entered aa a result of Mam's dis obedience# Tills# he 
then claim©, contradicts the theory of fossils of millions of dead 
creatures# rami end enimal* from the period before the Fall* But the 
problem he sidesteps is that if we follow the text carefully we find 
that Mam was told that in the 'day' he dieobeyed God he should die 
(Gen* But he did not die physically and the obvious memilng
Is that the Bible is more concerned to discuss the spiritual state of 
man* The problem Is spiritual or theological, not primarily 
pJ'iysiesl or M.ological, and it is wrong to make biological deductions 
from a spiritual eomnentasy*
let the basic problem is not one of textual Interpretation^ but 
the relationship of science and the Bible* At one moment Morris Is 
appealing- to science to vindicate the Biblical text; the next moment 
he is assuring us that historical geology is wrong simply because it
does not equate with the Bible as he sees It* Thus the vindication 
he seeks from science is at best ambivalent for it is manifestly 
Inadequate to %"ule out of court specific Instances In this way,
iSfellarly in the Creation lieseareh 8oolety% creed we find that all 
sfetements in the Bible are historically end scientifically true*
But this leaves no room for the fact tlmt the Bible records the 
words of tho Evil One (prince of liars), the speculations of men 
(infallible?) # aa well as clear* cases of accommodation#.
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la.û* MTmmoTioM
T, F* Torrence argues that Karl Barth combines the quest of the 
fathers concerning the 'being of God* with the questions of the 
Reformers concerning the *aots of God*# As the latter lost 'being* 
in functionalism and subsequently their ontological base, so Torrance 
calls us to go beyond Barth and create a closer tie between natural 
and revealed theology; we are called to invent "new cognitive 
instruments#" (1972* p.246.) Torrance thus stands in opposition to
the modem theological streams flowing from Bultmann and linguistic 
analysis# He attacks Bultmam's flight from space and time which 
disearâ.o the "place of historical facticity" as an "obs o leeoent 
survival out of the uncertainties and anxieties of the late nineteenth 
century." (1969/a* pp#46-49*) Linguistic analysis, while b o  long
dominant, is now clearly seen to be derived from an "outmoded 
particulate view of nature." (ibid p.49*)
18. 1.  HISTORICAL o m v im
Torrance makes a perceptive critique of the history of ideas and 
penetrates to the deeper underlying cultural clianges when dealing with 
•science* and * theology* * He notes three great periods of 
scientific change - the cosmological change of Ptolemy; the shift from 
Gopemious tîmough Newton; and the modem change in relativity and 
quantum theories. The first of these occured at the same time as 
the spread of the Gospel from the Hebraic into the Hellenistic culture; 
the second witnessed the Reformation but saw no basic change in 
theology vis a via science, there was adaption* but "the essential 
imagery and the basic conceptuality of Christian doctrine did not 
change." (1975* P#47*)
"It must be noted, however, that it was not change In science 
or cosmology that constituted the real difficulty for 
theological statement; it was something much deeper in the 
culture and thought of the times, the axiomatic assumption 
of a radical dichotomy between the phenomenal world of the 
sensible and the real world of the intelligible *" (ibid p47*)
Problems arose, not so much from science, as from the diverse world- 
views that came to be synthesised with Christian theology.
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18.1.1. The Hefoi’fïiatlon. The Reforsiaation was the hiBi;oriea.l event 
which gave Impetus to the birth of modem science. Here vras the 
o^mcial shift f3?om tlxe priority of thought to that of 'being* or bzuth. 
In. rejecting the Ïioïfian notion of tradition and its intelleotualised 
concept of truth, the prrlneiple of true objectivity began to emerge. 
There was a passion in the Reformers for truth. They:
"...were ready to sacrifice pleasant illusions and traditional ' 
preooncGptions for the stdce of the truth* They were 
determined to let the truth declare itself to them, the whole 
truth and nothing- but the truth, irrespective of what it 
called in question in themselves." (ibid p.268.)
The Medieval world may have had the conditions for modem science to 
emerge but it waa the Reformation that made its birth a reality* (Of. 
ibid p.62f. 1%9/b, p.59f.)
18*1.1.A. Chmigo (of* 5*5«1 5*5.2.). One of
the g3?eat Reformation contributions to science and theologgy was in 
replacing; the Btoio«-ba;bin view of God as *deuB sivo natura* by 'bhe 
biblical concept of God as Creator emd Redeemer. The Patristic
period, seeing God as impassible and changeless, conceived creation as 
existing only as objects of the Qt©3.Tial knowing and willing of God,
’thus losing* the distinction between Creator and creature. It had 
become firmly entrenched in Medieval theology that creaturely 
existence was directly grounded in the eternity of God and tMs 
etesmal frmtowork left little room for any real contingency in nature -
•t
a facet which had to be recognised before modern science could begin.
So while the recognition of orderliness in the wiiverse is very 
ancient, the recognition of the orderliness of the contingent seems to 
have arisen out of a Reformed theology.
"For really free cjuostions to arise, there had. to take place 
a radical loosening up end questioning of the whole 
medieval synthesis, and because tliat synthesis was knotted 
tight in and through its doctrine of God and nature, it was
at that point that the real shift in outlook liad, to telco
place, before the great transition from a mainly static to a 
largely dynasiic mode of thinïcing could begin either in 
theolqgf or in natural science*" (l969/b, p.62.)
I am not sure
that I follow Torrance's argivnent here, or if aia reading liis terms in
a different light* He seems to argue that nature emd grace were
1# It is useful to compare Torrance with Bavinck's anlysia of this 
- of. Veenhof 1978
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boui'id up pre«R©fomation and that the Eefomation, in distinguishing 
them, attacked the medieval o^ jnthesls without falling into a 
dichotomy. (Of. ibid p#65f. 1975» p*64f«)
"In tï'i0 Augustlnim. trad5.tion the imivorse was regasrded as a 
sacramental raa,orocosm in which the pliysical. and visible were 
held to be the counterpart in time to oteinal mid heavenly 
patterns» As such the world had significance only so far as 
it reflected or illustrated eterwal patterns, but it was not 
worthy of attention in itself*
Hith the Reformation, however, there emerged a new outlook 
involving the primacy of grace as the turning of God toward 
the world*
This way of distinguishing and relating the realm of grace 
as the \my of God and the realm of natiu:e as the course of 
creation in its distinctness from God bore jjminense fruit# . 
for it at once disenchanted the world of its alleged divinity 
and yet claimed the world for God as his creation*.*«In the 
realm of grace, grace ha© dominion and precedence .isi every- 
tiling, for man's salvation is due to God alone and even his 
icnowledge of God deprives its possibility from God's grace 
and condescension; but in the realm of nature, man ie by grace 
given dominion and precedence, for all things are under his 
comand." (1975» p*69*)
But it is precisely in the Augustinian attiiude to the world as 'not 
wo3?thy of attention in itself* that I would argue that we have a clear 
divisioii of a realm of nature lying below the importantly conceived 
realm of grace. ‘ta?x’ance seems to push the Heformation view throiudi 
too faa? and give autonomy to man in the realm of nature (of. ibid p*66*). 
But it depends whether this dist:inction between grace and nature is 
with reference to two different entities (man's life before God and 
his life in the world) or with reference to two different kingdoms 
(light emd darlmess).
Torrance sees the Book of God as of grace and the Book of Nature 
as of nature (ef. Calvin and Bacon). Thus the Reformation gave a 
new significance -fco the world as 'khe 'object* of divine attention in 
contrast to the Medieval negation of its importance. X would contend 
that the Medieval emphaeds was a dichotomy o# grace and nature and that 
the Reformation reconciled them in a imity under the motive of 
croation, fell and redemption* In effect I think Torrance and I say 
the saïæ thing in different ways «• thoiigh I would not wish to read the 
Bsrthieai triumph of grace into creation in the same way* (Of.
Bcrkhouwer 1956.)
Tl'iis acceptance of the world opened the door to secularism, the 
forgetfulness of God.
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If ay was opened, up for the developraoïi'fc of empirical 
sGieïice which ie inhibited so long aa men looks only away 
from the world to God to find its meaning in its 
pa3?tioixjation in divine.pattoms* But once this outlook 
is established and the primacy of Grace undermined, there 
arise tendencies toward BeiBm**..or toward agncBtieism*.**
:Both these tendencies are fostered by what we may call 'the « 
religious materialism' of Protestantism * * « " {l969/b, p*67#)
Torrance entpounds this with reference to Sb?anois Bacon, suggesting 
that in the distinction of grace and nature Bacon saw his religious 
duty being to develop natural science to a process of active inquiry 
and real discovery - not by mere contemplation, Imt by experimental 
inquiry which was guided 'by a duo'*
(of" 1975» p.67f. 1959/13» p.75f.).
The Reformation gave to the world the modem emphasis on imbiased âncl 
distote%*0sted truth, that is the scientific spirit*
"This was a paseioxi for the truth from the aide of the object 
which Indicated a repentant readiness to i^ ethink all 
p3?aconceptione and presuppositions, to put all traditional 
ideas to the test face to face with the object, in order to 
distinguish what is objectively real from our subjective 
states*" (1975, p.67.)
We might object that to some extent this originated with the 
huïnanlots of the Renaissaxioe; but for Home truth was corporate 
subjectivity, while Protestantism gave to active 3?eason its 
individualistic form* IJnfo3?tunately under the influence of 
secularism this degenera,ted into autonomous a elf «-legislating reason.
The Heforfsiation could stress the g3?eat objective fact that 'Ctodst 
died for Eie*, focusing p3?imarily on the object of our salvation; but 
all too soon this focus would be transferred from 'Christ' to the 'for 
me'. (Of* 1969/b, pp*79»81.) ^ Thus the historical truth of the 
Christian faith became only that which man could envisage for himsolf, 
that which he could control* Yet tlxis is not the only line to 
Protestantism for there is another which has always sought to submit 
"all 'b?adltion to the criticism of the Word of God as heaixl in the 
Bible, and therefore to reform its own judgements and thinlc through 
its theology in obedience to the objective revelation in Jesus Glirist," 
(I975g p.69«) Protestant theology ie caught in a struggle between
2* Of* Appendix A — Schaeffer's thesis that nature 'eats' up grcice*
5* TMs 'clue' negates a simple Baconian bucket to Bacon.
4* Of. Kant's 'Oopemicaxi Revolution' which installed the
Bclf-loglslattog ego*
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self-centred mid Word-centred thou#it.
18.1*2# Beoiileriaatiên (of. 16.6.). After discussing these insights 
of the Eefosnation, Torrance notes how they wore lost in the hnmaii- 
ising motives of the (cf. 5*3*)# (of* 5«4*3#)
made a clear distinction he two en 'immdue Intelligihilie ' and 'mxmdus 
senBihllie' as that between thtogs—In-themselveB and things—for#%s #
(Of# 1969/a, p«43«) Here spaoe-tlme became the a priori of man's 
knowing and the point of absolute rest taken to be in men* "Then 
the only God man n m  or will have is that \fhich he poatulatea in M s  
need and morally appropriates for liimeelf." (ibid p*44*) For Kent, 
objects oonform to om? Imowledgts of them; we approach nature not ee 
pupil but BM judge, although the ding-an eich is a reminder of the 
limits of reason# This is a combining of the lief curation emphasis 
on the majesty of God* the order of nature end the littleness of man* 
with the Renaissance emphasis on the rights and powera of man* his 
freedom end rational autonomy® Torrance rightly opposes this Kantian 
idea that we eonstraln nature to act in our limits# (Of* ICiüm who 
elMms we constrain nature in our paradigms.) He claims that 
specific problems arose fkom the phenomenalism started by Galileo and 
developed by Locke and Kant — a phenomenalism also due in part to the 
confluence of Newtonian and Cartesian thought# Protestent thought 
lapsed back into scholasticism under the influence of Newton's concept 
of absolute time and spaoe linked to a divine sensorlum. This was 
aided in the development of science by abstraction from observational 
-experience and its quantitative organisation of Its data for pragmatic 
ends; hence splitting the object and the subject* being and knowing* 
and leading to a destructive stress on abstract concepts and their 
logico-deductive control# Hume* of course* in his radical critique 
of causality led to Kant's transfer of absolute epaoe-time from the 
divine seneoriura to the human mind wMch imposes Its laws on nature 
rather than draw them out of it* Thus instead of the humble 
question of the servant * man ends up putting M e  question to nature 
after the prescriptive mmmer of the judge* (Of* 1972* p.240.)
«1^1® attacking Kant, Som'siiee
seeks to reinstate Boren Kierkegaaicd* seeing in his thought the 
recognition that authentic subjectivity alone gives true potential 
when it collides with the divine Subject* lie sees him as in effect 
prefiguring the conceptual revolution of Einstein. "And so a 
hundred years ahead of M s  time Kierkegaard devised a way of thinking
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by abaïicloning a point of absolute rest and moving kinetically along 
with the timth in order to understand it.** (ibid p»246*) Einstein 
is in fact decisive for Toizranoe, being the pre-eminent character in 
bresdcing up the mechanic tic universe nndea? the pressure of ©Xectro- 
BagEietic field theory and the failure to explain it mechanically; end 
in following the Newtonian method of fjreely inventing a new cogfciitive 
instrument to unfold the created order of the universe » 'Free* in 
that it was not arrived at mder logical procedmzes from specific 
p3?emlssos; 'invented' "under the pressure of the nature of the 
universe upon bis intuitive apprehension of it#" (ibid.p*241*)
Hence Einstein was able to set before the astonished world of science 
a new way of thihktog that of mathematical Invariance This 
broke dox-rn the problems of Kantian phenomenalism and Maefeian positivism 
and established "a genuine ontology in which the scientific mrlnd was ^ 
at grips xfith objective stiructures and the totrinsic intelligibility 
of the universe." (ibid p.242*)
18.2# Tomap moiŒDGE
Part of man's dominion over creation is exercised through M s  
logic xfhereby he is able# by using his God-given mtionality, to 
exercise controlling power* (Of . 1969/b, pp*225-826.)
18.2 .1 . fe i3 teBçejmâ.Cai§£eia£^ Soreanos follows the
Humean distinction between 'existence statements' and 'coherence 
statements'. David Himie divided statements into (a) those refexing 
to external, independent facts* and (b) coherent series of statements 
(of* 1975» p*58f*}« The former relate to oxtriimio meaning and are 
denotative g tlioir trutîi residing not in themselves but in the 3?eality 
to X'fhich they point or coj^ respond* They reach out beyond themselves 
and are therefore never complete* Acts of totuitlon 'lia behind 
them and the^?' are therefore open and Indefinite, depending upon the 
nature of the existant *» though we must not limit existants to those 
of sense-oxperienceu Ihdstence statements, then# refer to matters 
of fact and are raached through experlinental and moral reasoning (of* 
1969/b, P»164*) On the other hand there are coherence statements 
which a3?e propositions with respect to ideas reached throxtgb abstract
5* Mathematical invariance refera to the cognitive instrument via 
which the mind reaches inherent ©truetore iîi the universe; refers 
also to the Invariant structure in nature xfliich is irrespectivo of 
any or every observe!?.
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ox demouBtra-tive reasoning. Hhile in eeience the former dominates, 
newrtholeBB there can be no purely theorotic proof» likistenea mid 
eohereiioe etatementa meed each other» and the oohorenea statements of 
om? axistenoe statements are to effect om? scientific oonatruetions or 
theories (noetic models)# (Of. 19?5& p*53f#) There is no dichotomy 
hetxmen the two types of statements; coherence statements never stand 
isolated from existence statements end that ie why something like 
7 mathematics^  cannot rodiica to mere tmtMogy (cf« Ibid p«60#)@
The loMo of existence statements is simply the logic of question■iniiifc wÉWnMwiw'' [ i n i» i imMiiin r wiw i >l iKi i * r i i i * i » ' i n r ii h r i'> w n >rtir'i fi iK f t  m m wrnm m 'M M im rii r i i w ir i*  f n t ,  < *  v  * *
and answer; and the basic question refers to empirical knowledge —
•Mmt do we have here?* In oesenoe this is a logic of reference, of 
heuristic induction and discovery* We receive our structures and 
categories® not from behind us bb from axioms» but from to front (of# 
1969/b» p#226f.)* Naturally we nrnst analyse existence statements to 
see if they are •^ recognition statements * or 'psychological oonstmcts*; 
and seek to refer them ooherehtly to groups or sets of statements (of# 
ibid pp*23&"239*)« Bssause of this refertog fonction existence 
statements remain open concepts g the analogues into which they are 
bu5.lt forced on us by their correspondence with respect to the 
disclosures of the real world, though they are never replicas or 
transcripts but perspicuous forms throng whicli we discern the world#
There is also the loffic of cohermice. .st&temxentB # Individual 
existence ststements cannot unfold their meaning to isolation but 
need to be bound together if they are to pertain to the real xforld — 
they must cohere# This Torrance sees as the province of formal logic 
miii not tovclved ' to the active process of togulry; here we Investigate 
the general rules of derivation between individual sets of 
propositions where certato propositions necessarily follow from others#
must also disttoguish between closed and open concepts even if 
the line between them may often be blurred (of, ibid p#15.) #iile 
closed concepts can ultimately be reduced to clipped prepositional 
Ideas, there are other concepts which are too big for us and which vie 
cannot neatly delimit# Torrance illustrates this two vmys# Firsts 
from Bysmttoe art where Christ is often represented standing on a 
dias which to depicted such that its lines do not converge as to 
normal perspective but diverge# "Here the concept of Christ while 
definite at one end Is toftoltely open at the other, but it ,to a 
concept#" (ibid p#.15*) Seconds he drmm on modem physios which has
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to deal with elasaicaX oonoepts miü quantum effects. Tim former are 
closed but quantum is open (Heisenberg) #
Thus Torrance la cabled to suggest that knowledge only comes in 
the interaction of the subject and the object, and scientific 
Imowledge can therefore never escape from being an arbitration between 
thought and being* Overall he distinguishes three logical levels:
"(i) the fundamental level of cur actual knowledge of things 
in accordance with what they are, (il) the level where we 
test and formalize this knowledge through some sort of 
calculus into a coherent system, and (iii) the level at 
which we interpret the formulations of this system and 
deteimlne its mode of connection and consistency#" (ibid p*259*)
16*2.2* What Is Seience? With the foregoing in mtod, how then does 
Torrance conceive science? Ife writes*
"Scientific. knowledge is that in which we bring the inherent 
rationality of things to light and expression, as we let the 
realities we investigate disclose themselves to us under our 
quéetiŒiIng and we on our part submit our minds to their 
intrinsic connections and order." (ibid p*xi#)
This quotation clearly indicates that Torrance tends to the Baconian 
empiricist tradition#
Torrance acutely perceives the problem of a vague abstract called 
'science'* There is in fact no such thing as 'science' only the 
individual 'sciences*, including everything from mathematics to 
theology# Nor can we, in studÿing these sciences, abstract • science' 
from the aetoal process of inqu,iry and discovery for there is no one 
scientific method# Ih order therefore to come to gripe with the 
sciences we must leam how they have come to be what they now are.*
If we are to build on the foundations of the past we must get to know 
the past. This Is significantly part of Torrance's strong 
historical treatment of all that he deals with# The actual work of 
the sciences is carried through by the specialist working within the 
parameters of his sphere of meaning, and presupposing as he does so a 
•scientia generalie*, that is, like his specialised research, tied to 
what is known# (Of# ibid p*115#) Each science is bound up in its 
own particular sphere# "Experimental science can never transcend 
its starting point, or its own limited instruments and therefore 
attain to God's knowledge." (ibid p«1G0#) Problems arise from the 
extension from a special science to the generalised speculations of 
philoBopiiy# ¥e Biust beware of confusing philosophy with 'soientia 
generalis*#
i f  ara -to lessm,
we Ernst question openly with no uilterior motive or wo will sl5.p by the 
proper object® Qpeetionlng follows two ps;bhx?ays — the 
•interreogative* and the 'problematic • ® ^ The oorozolatee of 
Interrogation are scientific discovery- and theological révélation » 
Meverlîheleas it is not «.imply a matter of aslctog questions of the 
external world» for the questioner is questioned even before ho begins 
to think® (GiV ibid p#1S3*)
Torrance rejects an a p rio ri approach to îmowledge# He claims 
that "geniito© c ritic a l questions as to the possibi l i t y  of toiowledge 
cannot be raised in  abstraoto but only in  concroto# not a p rio ri but 
only a posteriori»" (ib id  p*1«) ■ Xet he is  w ell aware that each
specialised d isc ijilin e  starts frcaa -pre-abstractive Imowleclge and 
assumes the re a lity  and in ves tig a tab ility  of its  om propei? object, 
and that i t  may be Imom more deeply. Thus i t  would appeas? that even
JÿS aa„il
involvement o f, pro'-abstractive and cmoia3. a n rio ris * But his basic
claim remfiins th at: "Real statements are statements that axe forced
upon us by the pressures of objective .reality#" (ib id  p . 174*) Thus
his emphasis is  amy feom idealism  » or the approach o f modem
philosophers of science such as Popper, Lakatos or Kahn, to a
refom ulation of a more tra d itio n a l B ritish  empiricism and a
cor.responc1ingly greater stress on the rea l world and true objectivity#
7This is  indeed a vatoablo cor5?eotion to the dangers o f idealism*
As he applies th is in  theology we fin d ;
we are to think s c ie n tific a lly  in  theology» that is , 
a posterio r i and re a lis tic a lly , wo have to thinly out the 
problem of our theological statements from w ithin our actual 
knowledge of God in  Jesus C lirist on the gp?ound of its  omi 
real and in trin s ic  coherence#" (ib id  p#186#)
Bote the ecmation of 'scientific* and %  posteriori*. But is he— «rs-wwBWP^ieueeaâi’itirw'swTJilBC.WjKy#
contending tîist we caïi dmw out of Scripture an unbiased picture 
undistorted by eisegesis?
So he sees the attempt In modem science to clarify "the deep
6» This division seems to approximate, to the IWmian division 
between revolutionary and normal science - though Torrance does not 
follow Kuhn's sharp distinction*
7» Torrance seems to me to push this too fax - cf« 12*5*4*
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objective ra tio n a lity  In  the mature of things" as challenging any 
theological attempt "to traxiseend the mibjeot-ohjeot relation sh ip  sm 
an Irrational flight from objectivity and rigorous, exact thinking*" 
(ibid pp*8-9<,) ^ In solemtific theology we are to begin ifith the 
actual kno%fledge of God and not some Independent theory i^ hich w  eeek 
to actualise end fill out with material content. We do not start 
from an episteaiological in v e s tig a tim  but from the re a lity  o f th at 
which is given* This does not mean th at we are left w ith bare 
objectivity for there are the trad itio n s  we have received agatoet 
which %iew toowlecig® will be assessed « (Cf * 1973» p«44 ® )
Thus Torranoe develops a powerful corrective agatost the 
oplstemcloglcal starting point of much modem thou#Lt and drives 
through to the radicallty of the given, tli© ontological base that must 
precede any true order of knmjing#
"*##there can be no true oogdp cppmoscendi (order of knowing) 
which ie not based upon an ordo easendi (order of beitig) . 
conceived entirely as grace, and the ordo^isscî^i reaches 
its true destiny in the ordo co^moscaij^iïbirD.llé*)
Lurking behind any question we put lies the fact of our existence» and 
therefore in a real sense every form of thouglit entails. the being of 
the thinker# It is from this attack that Torrance drives through to 
point out why Reformed theology is based on the interaction of faith 
and grace through the Word* Hence he turns back to one of his 
central themes the Oalviniem emphasis that without the vertical 
relatlomsMp of man with God, men has no authentic place on earth, no 
purpose, and no meantog* This holds, not just for theological 
questionsq but in the totality of life® (Of* 1969/a» p#73*)
18*3* SCimriFIO TmOLOGY
(of” oh.13 ana ch. 14.). What sse the 
selentlflo features to theology? There Is an application of the 
general scientifio method which Torrance sums up as including the 
following facets*^ (a) The respect of objectivity’s a proper 
devotion to the object which will not accept as genuine that which 
does not correspond to reality* (b) à scientific theology will be
8* At this point I em not clear of M s  interpretation of modem 
science which seems to also adduce pointers for the opposite argument 
i*e* a retreat from objectivity (Heisenberg).
9* (Me might ask how this equates with the dictum of Torrance that 
there is no science but only the sciences to their diversity.
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rigorous, disciplined, Eiethodical and organised knowledge, governed 
not by îiypothetical ©peculations but by the material content of its 
knowledge (of# 21*4*4*)* (o) There is a basic seaxch for elemental
siDiplo forms in which to reduce the multiplicity of knowledge* This 
is the application of Occam's rassor and has been well demonstrated in - 
the work and writings of Einstein (of* 1969/h, p*118*)* (d) There
is the role of inquiry* Tox’ranoe accopts that the Socratio method 
has a place but that it is not sufficient to reveal newf ïmowledge*
The Socratic method provides a sharp distinction between philosophical 
thinîcing and the natm?al sciences, BÎming to ola,rify what we Icnow (of* 
Kuhn's 'nomal science*)* But this does not lead to discoveiry,
Science must be rutîiless and unrelenting in unfolding the true na.tur© 
of the object and in Mlowing ourselves (in openness to the object) to 
be 'told' by the object what we cannot unfold ourselves (of. ibid p* 
121*) — "unless we loam to put our questions openly and without 
ulterior motives, they will be directed past the object; they will be 
blind questions*" (ibid p.123*) Aj>plying this procedure to 
scientific theology he rejects any logico-deductive argument from 
fixed premisses. (Cf* 1972» p*244*)
scientific requirements of theology? (a) The total Lordshtp of the
object of our reflection* Tliis is the one "all—determining^ *
assiBBption fo r theolo^ (of* 1969/b, p.131.). The Kingdom of God 
involves an eiiisteraological inversion for He vfhom we study is the Lord 
of our knowing — even though it is we who know* The field of 
investigations îms control over its researchers, and this holds in a 
more rigorous way than the general principle of the constraints of 
given reality*
(b) Another requirement stems from our need to personify the 
object of our theological Imowledge* Jesus Ghrist is not a bare
object but a living person who communicates His Word to us* So we 
axe led into a Dialogical theology (of* 17*1.2*2.) which can proceed 
only by continual reference to its source in the Word and deriving its 
content from this Word* We need to accept the parameters of this 
dialogical relationship for to attempt to transcend them would be an 
attempt to step outside given reality* '^Theological inquiry can be 
conducted only in direct encoimtor with the Word emd in the mode of 
activity sot up within that encounter*" (ibid p*134.)
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(o) Â third requisite is the o b jectiv ity  of the Object (of# ibid 
P»135f.) Her© the object of our reflection hae a double o b jectiv ity  
as God and as mam, as eternal Lord and human fozm* ¥e accept that 
ultimate o b jectiv ity  la  beyond ue for we are bound in creaturely 
subjectivity» (d) There is the centrality of Jesus Christ as the 
self-objectifieation of God on our behalf which entails that our 
systematic in terest ie  • that of servant (not master) before objective 
knowledge* Man is head over creation» but he not head over his Lord, 
God is never merely Object; He carmct be reduced to a neat logical 
system# (e ) There ought to be a démonstration in  line with the 
nature of the Object of our study#
Theological statements have a timfold character — paradeigmatio 
and economic# They are paradelgmatic in the sense that they take 
images from the visible world and point beyond to divine realities# 
They are not exemplars (of* Kuhn) but basicMly oetensive; revelatory 
of the divine economy* They are economic in that they are not the
product of our o\m thought but derive from the ordered action of God* 
Here we must guard against treating b ib lic a l images as shaply names/ 
conventions which have no root in reality; and against trying to push 
through from them to God Himself in the strength of our ovm thinking 
(o f* 1975, pp#49**51 •-) • ¥0 muet guard against theology becoming a,
synthesis of fatth and some fleeting pMlosophieal concept; we are to 
avoid merely seeking to bring the Gospel irito lin e  with modem 
concepts# In theology, as in the natural sciences $ "Real statement© 
are statements that are forced upon us by the pressure of objective 
reality" that is God's reality* (1969/b, p#174»)
18.4. OP GOD
18a4._1. t’he mMtnate Somce. tessinoo strongly emphasises the
Galvinian starting point that without Imowledge of God there can be no 
true knowledge of anything* (O f. 1975# p»101.) "Creation out of 
nothing means that the ereaturely world is utterly distinct from God 
yet entirely contingent upon his w ill."  (ibid p*273«) Man is 
totally dependent on the grace of God* Created out of nothing he 
has neither being or origin in  himself but is created and upheld 
existentialXy by God* Man is in the image of God; his life is but 
reflective of God's action*. Torrance goes on to re fe r to Galvin's 
opposition to secondary causation in theology exiii the tendency, 
becoming widespread in  his day, of replacing God with 'Mature'* But
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Calvin, rooted in the biblical view and Hebmlo thought, maintained 
an essential relation of all things to the will end action of a 
gracious God* So not only does man depend on God as M s  Creator, 
bat he depends on Him providentially from moment to moment® (Of* ibid
9.105.)
We begin with the knowledge of God and not gm eijisteBiologlcal 
prograiMie* This knowledge is a rational event — reason is our 
ability to recognise and assent to what is beyond us, a,s well as our 
capacity to behave in terms of the nature of the object* It is a 
icnovfledge timt is precisely that Hmowledge® in the proper formal 
sense of tlmt word, conceptual both with reference to cognition and 
expression* (Of# 1969/b» pp«9*^ 11#) God lies behind all truth, even 
th.e most mundane of worldly truths (of# ibid p#141®)* The truth of 
God is a truth of being but may never be reduced to a sot of ideas for 
this would imply the conversion of universale into abstrait entities; 
nor can it be reduced to a set of statements for tMs would imply that 
we cou3.d state in statements how they are related to what was stated! 
(Of* ibid p#143«) The truth of God deals with that which is final 
and ultimate not with that which is provisional and relative# Galvin 
saw — in the claim of Jesus to be the Truth - Christ being clothed, os 
it were, with His promisees with His Gospel (institutes 20$3 "-of. 12. 
5*2 ïny thesis.)
The logic of God in distinction from the logic of man entails that 
we always begin with the Grace of Christ in His giving and Incarna,tion 
of Himself for us#
"This unconditional priority of the Truth and the 
irreversibility of His rela,tionship to us may be called the 
LoaIc of Grace# that is the way in which we are bound to 
think the Truth in accordance v/ith Hie nature mid action as 
Grace." (ibid p#207*)
It is in the inteimal rolationehip of the divine and hiwtan in the 
Person of Christ (Torrance is an advocate of Ghalcedonian Cliristology) 
that we find the normative relationship for all theological reflection 
on man and God. We must not forget that the divine mid human are 
united in One Person who is One Word* "Since He is Person and Word 
the forms of Imowledge that arise in us are correspondingly personal 
and verbal (or propositional)#" (ibid p*207*) Therefore in that 
this knowledge is personal and historical it is not free and 
autonomous, but arises in cex'tain delimited spheres and follows co3:tsln 
given paths. It may validly be gathered from this that the
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Incarnation is of ozucial toportance for Ton?ance and indeed he 
claims that apart from the Incarnation of Gtoist there is "no actual
10
interconnection by word or deed between God and man#" (1969/a, p.78.)
18*4*2. The Word. As well as the objectivity of theological 
knowledge there is prioi? to it the actuality of the knowledge of God. 
Any pretence to autonomous, reason can only be viewed as "a diseased 
ferm of ratioBfJïlity* where reason Mis become introverted. (1969/b, 
p.26.) Theological knowledge turns on what is it is
XqgicM. it is theo-nomous thinking which pivots only in the 
revelation of God. In revelation the given fact is not mute - the 
Logos is met as Word and is to b© heard; met as a truth to be 
acloiowledged, and not just as something to be rationally inte3?proted. 
Therefo!?© we are called to distinguish be Ween the self-in terpretaloJi 
of the Word, end our interpretation of it. (Of. ibid p.30.)
"ITnless we have a Word from Gocl, some articulated 
communication from Himself to us, we are throim back upon 
ourselves to authenticate His existence and to make Him talk 
by putting our oim words into His mouth an.d by clothing Him 
with our oim ideas. That kind of God is only a, dumb idol 
ifhich we have fashioned in our o m  image.»»" (ibid p.31*)
It is a failin?© to sit before that which is received and submit to 
it, oombinod with a failure to grasp the relevance and interaction of 
true subjectivity and true objectivity, that has led much modem 
theology to degenerate into autobiographical statements by theologians 
who "get sucked d o m  into the whlrl-pool of their own 'self- 
unci.erst©iriding% from wliich they begin and with which they end, for 
within the darkness of tha,t vortex they lose sight of all daylight 
above them." (ibid p.312*) We are not to be centred in ourselves 
but in the given Word of God.
In the light of man's dependence, as opposed to some pretended 
autonomy, Torrance indicates how we must always be thrown back on 
Scripture. Holy Scripture is "the source and norm of all our 
theological statements." (ibid p*192 ** ef.p*195«) We are called to 
live from the centre of truth, not self (of. 1975# p#87*)* Hut 
Torrance clearly distinguishes the Word behind the words.
Theological statements are bound up with the Word to which they refer 
and from which they derive, such that they % o  not have their truth to
10. This overstates his ease for while true with 3?eferenoe to the 
Kediatorial- work of Christ to redemption, it is not so with respect to 
His Médiato??ial work to Creation. Here Torrance foülows Barth.
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themselves hat in their referents." (l969/hp p,268®) The Bible is 
to he hemzd as the Word of God even wMle we acknowledge it in its 
iMan expression as limited and imperfect«, Nevertheless g
"*.**it is inseparably conjoined with the divine Word as to 
he the writtesi Word of God to man, and is brought into such 
a faithful correspondence with the divine revelation that 
it mediates to us in and thi7ough itself the exemplary 
obedience of Ckf?ist as the authoritative pattern and nomi 
for the obedience of the Ohureh in all its tliinking and 
speaking." (1975# p*140«)
Faith is the 3?eorientation of the reason to thc% self-reveleition of 
God; it is the rational response of man to the Word of God « there 
being no fMtli-reaeon antithesis. To3?rance again uses tM.s theme to 
push tteough toi claim that genuine theolof^ is suspicious of all
thought for it is based on what is given and is therefore 
truly a posteriori and empirical* (Cf* 19&9/b p#33*)
"We all have our presuppositions, our antecedent ideas and even 
theories j, but v/hen we engage in theological thinking we are 
summoned to renounce all other presuppositions in 
eoncentration upon the object. This is thinldlng that freely 
refuses to bo fettered by a nriorl dogmatisms drami from 
anywhere outside of what is given to it, whether those 
pr^ JBUppositions or dogmatisms com© from some logical system, 
or metaphysics or natu3?al science, from our own personal 
satisfactions and desires, or even the Ghureh. True 
theology is free from all theso and genuinely open to tlie 
self-disoloourD of its object.” (ibid pp.34-35#)
We are to be open to the •self-tLlscloain?©' of the object; we do not 
detach ourselves from it but submit to its revelation. ”J.t is 
sheer atta,chment to the object that detaches us from our 
preconceptions...” (ibid p.36.)
Æ  There can never be autonomy fo r man.
There is a tension betifeen our desire for freedom and om? factual 
dependence for ell things upon God - end paradoxically Torrcance 
becomes ensnared here. He tails us that when we are confronted with 
2 X 2 « 4? no decision is demanded from us for here we are faced "with 
what is timeless aid necessary." (ibid p«214*) Is this, then, a 
Platonic form? sn a priori? Elsewhere, after appealing to Frege who 
noted that arithmetic became meaulngloss when tom away from its link 
with language, and Godel's incompleteness theorem, To3?rm,ice points out 
that even the apparently autonomous proposition needs to be related to 
have mean tog. Thus the bald proposition that 2 x 2 4 is
meantogless if it has no referme© to concrete reality. (Of. ibid p.274.)
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So wliile the doctrine of God and 03?eation allows full i>laoe to the 
other sphe3?es of Imowledge, the lndei>endenoe of the other sci.ences with 
respect to contingent reaLitieag they also delimit them and indicate 
their derivation from the Creator* These doctrines suggest that any 
sciemce will fece insuperable problems if it seeks to absolutise 
itself* Autonomous reason is a deseaaed form of rationality (of# 
ibid p*25f* and p.283*)« Significantly at the very beginning of his 
•Theological Science' he states that: "If jknowledge is to be more than 
personal opinion*««.there must be control of our personal intellectual 
construct ions by something which is not controlled but received*" (ibid 
p.viii.)
There is also the individual dependence of eimh sphere of science, 
Theology and the na,tural sciences each have their own proper 
objective - though they overlap in that both operate in the saiE© 
rational structure. Each is called to develop its own mode of 
inquiry in line with the distinct characteristics of its field of 
investigaticsi - but always in relation to the will and grace of God,
(Cf. 1972, p.233.)
Torrance sees real iproblems in modem thought and particularly in 
theology's loss of an ontological base* He sees the revulsion from 
objectivity as a, false reaction and mieh of existential and 
anthropocentric theology as a retrograde stop, (Cf,1975, p*267#) 
Theologically the "root problem*6#*is the sin of the hwoan mind."
(ibid p*278*) The original sin of man to be as God is still 
widespread; man wants to impose Ills will on the imiverse» still 
wishes to dictate the type of Oinrist he wants*
Wo are called to a critieaJ. reassessment of om? attUîude to 
nature (To3?3?ance rightly counsels aigainst the substitution of 'nature* 
for God); and the place of subjectivity in lœovdedge* The inqiact 
of Planck, Einstein end Heisenberg has been to show that scientific 
propositions are statements about what we can do as well as about 
nature Itself* Modem science has shown, the need to take 
subjectivity more seriously than traditional empiiricism or positivism 
iias allowed, Thus while in science wo create statements in inter­
play between subject and mute object; in theology statements are 
pronounced by God and. only thereafter by man*
In the light of modem scientific advances@ some have called for 
a fundaifüeïàtal abandoiKEcnt of the traditional Christian frame of
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reference g eeeilng it ae bornid up with an outdated cosmology# But 
here Torrance, while the champion of Einstein, perceptively notes 
that the problem is not the chsngtog outlook on cosmology, Imt rather 
the profound and disastrous dichotomy erected between the senalhle 
and intelligible worlds9 between the world of the creature and God, 
(Of. ibid pp.26l~263.) ’’
Torrance makes the crucial distinction  that the question to deal 
with is not 'science and religion*' but •science and theology*# (Of# 
1969/119 p .x v il# ) III both theology and the natural sciences there is 
a confrontation of the same problems: namely (a) how are we to 
genuinely re fe r our thou^te and statemente beyond ourselves; (b) how 
e m  we acquire true knowledge of reality without a se lf-d is to rtio n  of 
it; and (o') at the same time retain the full eigmifioance o f om? 
pBxsanal involvement•
He envisages modern theology deriving from John Galvin from whom
"there emerged three primary features of modem scientific thinking#”
(ibid p#3clli#) (a) Galvin reversed the Medieval questions of 'quid
sit'sj 'an sit* end 'qimle sit* to •quails eat?' Time, argues
Terrence, he entered a genuine interrogation not governed by a -priori
abstractions; he started questioning the actuality m  opposed to the
essenoe and p o ss ib ility* (b) He notes how Galvin emphasised that
theology starts from a situation where the knowledge of God and the
knowledge of self are already bound up together* We cannot discuss
God in abstract* (c ) Within this re la tio n  our knowledge of God
must be tested, traced back to its  true ground, referred to Him and
not ourselves* This pattern Torrance sees duplicated in modem
science which also starts with the Interrogation of reality by
empirical approaches ™ Involving (a ) and (e) above* . In coimeetion
with (b) he suggests that quantum theory, the Interaction of the
12observer and the object observed, has this emphasis* Bo he sees
a clear psrallelism  between the methods of modem theology and quantum 
theory where both physios and theology now deal with the old
11* A degrés of tension is created by Torrance between the
recognition of the influence of the subject and the claim that in 
Theology (a science?) we simply sit before what is given, the child 
before the 'facts'*
12. ¥© ou#it to note that tMs particular line of argument ie now 
placed in a secondary role of* Nagel* (Of# I969/B, p#xvi«)
antimonies between subjeot/object* being/aot, end determinisro/
1%
freedom,
Torranoe (refering to Kant) clearly reoognises the sphere 
Bovoroigpty of the individual Boienoes; each diseiplin© being subject 
to its own true sphere of meaning# Nevertheless each is an aspect 
only of the whole and he invokee the idea of complementarity in 
quantum mechmiics (of. ibid p*102*)* (Of# 16*5*2.2.)
Like others, Torrance is prepared after a good starting 
delimitation of the problems to be drawi into a diseuBeion of the 
siBiilaxities and differences between theology and the natural sciences* 
Though his sub-heading indicates a more careful approach - 
•Similarities end Differences between Theology and the Other Sciences.' 
(ibid p.286.) But throughout the word 'science* tends to be more 
referable to 'ns'bural sciences' and he does not seem to work out in 
practice the full implication of theology being a 'science',
18.5*1. Similarities Between Theology and Other Sciences.
(a) Theology and all other sciences are essentially human activity/ 
inquiry - there is the assumption of an intelligible object, the 
possibility of a rational investigation. Both follow the basic 
scientific method(T) of active exploration and experimentation, moving 
forvîsrd from premisses and data to new understandings which may be 
deductively assessed. In this way we are safe-guarded from confus­
ing the ontie structures of reality with our own noetic models#
(b) There is respect for the objectivity of facts* We proceed only 
through reference to external reality, (Of. ibid p*28S#)
(c) Neither theology or any other science works with a pre­
conceived metaphysics* Here Torrance concedes that the very 
language we use, whether in mathematics or theology, is already 
metsphysies-laâeni but argues that the scientific method of respecting 
objectivity calls this metaphysics into question. While 1 agree 
with the desire to let objectivity speak I do not believe that 
metaphysical presuppositions are easily mtoimtoedlilte this (of* Part IX.)* 
Again I would went to suggest that, while certain assumptions may be 
called into question at a given time, not all are called into question 
at the same time end so challenge the basic heart-directing world and 
life view.
13* We might note that this is too neat a comparison; nor does 
quantum theory constitute physics!
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(a) Torrance seeo a parallel in that both tîieology and the other 
sciences eventually come up against a line beyond which they cannot 
go* While Wowing that there ie this line and therefore that there 
is that which is beyond, nevertheless all that we can do is 
"scientifically maintain a respectful silence*" (ibid p*291*)
(e) Finally there is the problem for both of relating the language of 
their discipline to the langimge of ordinary life*
empirica]. science we are concerned with statements subsequent to the 
forced interplay between subject and mute objects but in theology wo 
deal with statements that God has pronounced and only afterwards 
reflected upon by men* (Cf* ibid p*98*) (Mote the confusion here — 
empirical science is contrasted with theology; yet Tora?ance tells us 
elsewhere that theology is an empirical science!) Basically he
argues that there are differences with respect to objectivity and 
subjectivity*
¥hi.Xe in classical physics the object was seen with respect to 
determinism, this hae now vanished in modem pïiyaics where natural 
science does#
"•••not come up against anything that is in terms of itself, 
and BO must always refer facts to other facts behind them in 
an endless regress and operate with an essentially relative 
conception of truth, but in theological science we do come
up against ultimate objectivity and our thought is given a
final term of referenoo*" (ibid p*297*)
Theological science deals with the ultimate object, a-final term of 
reference* In natural science the knower and Imoim are both 
creatures ; but in theological science we know, not the creature, but 
the Creator* There are also differences in subjectivity, although 
here it seems to be a matter of degree (of* ibid p.303*)
16*5*3* Einstein's EpifrraEB# Toj^ rance haa a wide and profound 
interest in Einstein and uses several, of Einstein's epigrammatic 
sayings to MgMight ojTueial issues* Three can be noted*
(a) God does not play dice (cf* 1976, p*10*)« IBiile many have taken
this to refer to Einstein's stand against the unoertatoty principle
as an explanation of actuality, Torrance sees it as intending to
■«MW W HWNMWM
14* Ho also sees a basic similarity in thoolo^ y^ and the other sciences 
in that they give disclosure models rather than picturing models*
15* Tora?ance here follov/s Heisenberg's interpretation and not 
Einstein^* Cf* 27*4*1*
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a basic belief 'hi the objectivité of the -univeroe quite 
aepamte feom mental hjq>otheses«
(T>) fiPiLdmg.^ ot.Jigag,.MiL.j?6MrfLÆ,.h^  (cf. ibid p.14.). If
the first saying refers to belief that there is an immanent order in 
the imlverse ? this sa^ 'in^ g "stands for the no less profound conviction 
that the real secrets of nature, the reasons for that order, cannot be 
read off the patterns of its phenomenal surface." (ibid p.14#)
'fheolosé, like science, is called to penetrate to deep objectivity or 
it will fall back into abstractive dualisms between the natural and 
revealed Imowledge of God where God*s revelation becomes detaclied from 
its ontological roots in the Incasznation of the Word.
(c) God is dees but not devious* T&iis expresses the simplicity and 
steadfastness of the universe which shines tîn?ough its complexity and 
subtlety; "the universe is not arbitrary or evil," (ibid p,18,)
If these facets were ilmdemental for Einstein*s scientific outlook, 
they are every bit as basic for the theologian as be seeks to unfold 
the mystery of God*s revelation to man in Christ# (Of course 
Einstein*# God wo# in no way the Ghristien Godî)
18,6, BOm OHmCAL GàYïmB
Mow while I agree with much of the central thrust of Torrance I 
must enter several caveats in addition to those already noted. It 
seems to me that he overdoes the parallels ho draws out of modem 
science into the field of theology. Ho seems guilty of attributing 
to Einstein*# theory of relativity the status of being tm * absolute* 
and ’final* theory, a chaa^ faeteristio that Einstein himself refused to 
give it. Yet TmTance confidently assorts tïmts "Holativity theory 
defines the whole universe, and it ie nonsensioaL to ask what is 
beyond everything," (1969/a- p,50#) But what happens if/when physics 
moves on and relativity is superseded and left behind just m  
Mewtoniasi mechenisBi has been relegated to the realm of a useful tool? 
The critical pivot of my criticism is that theology should be 
concerned to develop its o\m sphere, recognising its isnreducible 
elements in the context of sphere universality (see glossary), % y
pick on the particular sphere of pîiysics with which to compare 
theology; w3^ not pick on the analytical, historical, juridical or 
aesthetic spheres of meaning?
Similarly in M s  interesting discussion on the problem of space 
and time in connection with the Incarnation, he finishes up
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confidently asserting tïmts "This relationship between divine freedom 
and contingent necessity in the world ...«ie exactly analogous to that 
foimd in the variational principles of physios##," (ibid p.6 6#) 
ïikaotly analogous! This agajn evidences the too rigid a connection 
that Torrance endeavour# to make between theology and quantum theory* 
Puz'ther he tries to define 'space* thuBi "#*.space must be defined in 
terms of bodies or agents conceived a,o active principles, melcing room 
or creating space for themselves in, the miiverse*#*" (ibid p#69*)
But this quite fails to define apace* A définition should not 
contMn t W  olemente of that wMoh is being* defined* Yet in the 
above definition the concept of space la either implicit or escplicit 
isi the terme 'bodies* and 'room* as well as in the repetition of 
’apace* * 80 * space* ie defined as space 1 Mow accepting the
Booyeweerdian analysie, each sphere has an irreducible kernel and is 
therefore qua sphere imdefinable* It is this property that helps to 
distingnish it as a distinct mode of meaning that cannot be reduced to 
another*
Yet despite such criticisms, Torrance gives a valuable and timely 
corrective to memy dangerous tendencies in modem theology and makes 
a real contribution to the study of the interface between theology sad 
the other sciences — even although it must be said that he tends to 
reduce the other sciences to the physicaland physics to relativity 
and quantum theories# But there is a real penetration to the 
ontological problems which exposes the weaîmess of the modem 
preoccupation with epistemologioal questions. Mot that he negates 
epistemologieal questions, but seeks to grotmd them in the reality of 
the given creation (cf. 1975» P*116*) God. alone is the source of all 
true Imowing and I wholeheartedly share his emphasis on the necessity 
to enthrone Goci as the Lord, of our Imowing (of# 1969/b, p*131*) 
recognising that we elwaya stand in danger of the sin of the
mind, of usiîrping the rightful plaoe of God by placing ourselves at 
the centre insteail of Him who alone is the true Arche (of# 1975» p#107«) 
80 Torrgmce seeks to avoid any destructive spithesia with the latest 
intellectual fashion: (of# ibid p*174*)
But 1 must depart from him in his attempt to play down the role of 
presuppositions (of# 1969/b, p.33#)* He himself notes the problem 
of a t32ue objectivity when we are fa-cod with the legacy of tlie 
traditions in which we stand (of# 1975# p#44*); and in the light of
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the fact that our present knowledge preseribee for ub certain goals 
and patterns, (Cf« ibid p*57») Yet despite this he appeals for a 
sitting before the facts, olaiming that relentless interrogation will 
allow ns to umierctit even our presuppositions, In this he rejects 
any a priori#, but it seems to me that he himself accepts sn 
uïiexamiiîfôci Baconian presupposition. Mow undoubtedly that he stands 
in the empiricist tradition is of great value in exposing the weakness 
of idealist tendencies, but It does not negate the' fact that be does 
stand in that tradition and does make assumptions that Imve devolved 
from the standpoint of empiricism, Perhaps at this point I might 
suggest that M s  presentation seems to me week In its consideration of
conceptual aa opposed to experimental side In even the physical 
sciences* This Is seen in his Baconian treatment of Einstein as 
opposed to the viewpoint of Popper or Kuhn, Again I would imagine 
he is in difficulties concerning the philosophy of perception and 
physiology and education, Hy criticism will be worked out in 
Pert IVt
In the end I am unlmppy at bis comparison end contrast of
theology with the other sciences* He starts by telling us theology 
is a science, em empirical science g that there is no such thing as 
’science* only sciences *« but then precedes to contrast ’theology* 
and ^empirical seienca** It is a better andysls then Barbour or 
Morris, but I remain unconvinced, not in the details, but of the 
whole enterprise as it is presently construed,
 ^ •?(*■ • is* 4Î'
# *
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G# A* Ooulson contends that "a 0!n?istian philosophy of the 
natural aoiencee ie much needed»" ( 1968, p*58,) He notes that 
Scientific Hunmnlsm claims that science .!me no preaiippoaitions, wliile 
religion ie full of aosumptiona; that eolence la haeed on facte, 
while religion is baaed on fancy; and that scientific laws are 
impersonal and therefore irrevocable# But, as he goes on to point 
out, science does have presnppoBitiosifs involving honesty. Integrity, 
hope, enthusiasm, passion, humility, oo*operation, judgement; soienoe 
is not a,'Collection of facte, but what men mMm of the facts they 
aelectg and scientific laws are not simply found lying about in the 
lœiverse but are conceived/imagined by men# Bnfortimately these 
philosophical ©vertonos are neglected In school today and so children 
are indootz^ inated into the tenets of scientific hnmanlsm# Therefore 
it Is crucial that a voice be raised setting forth the Ghrlstlan 
heritage of science and proclaiming a Ghrlstlan philosophical stance 
on wMch theoretical thought may be built# Something of tliis is 
seen in the final response I Msh to examine# Ebown as the 
*Befo33mtional Movement*, I find myself in broad sympathy Mth it.
The movement Is largely dependent on the foundational work of 
Green van Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper In the last century, and 
developed in the 20th century in the philosophioal researches of 
Herman booyoweerd and Dirk Tollenhoven# Though originating in one 
of the traditions of Dutch Calvinism this line of thought has had 
considerably wider practical impact. It involves a radical 
disjunction from hummilstic philosophies and attempts to develop a 
Christian stance vis a. vis specific disciplines, particularly the 
foundational discipline of philosophy# Here stand philosophers 
like J#P*A.Mekkes, 8.U.^uldema, K.l»Bopma and H.van Biessen; with a 
new generation which includes professors Jam Dengerlnk, Egbert 
Gchuurman, H.Hart and Al. Welters. In other fields there are 
Professor OeSeerveld in aesthetics; the late Professor H.R.Rookmaaker 
in art history; Dre. R.GoudBwaard and A#Cramp in economics# Despite 
the abstract and philosophical Interest of the movement it has had 
considerable Impact in a more popular vein through the work of Dr. F».
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A* Bohaeffer at L’Abrl in Switîaerl£md, snd hi. the more popular side 
of ïiooîüiîaaIcex**B work# However it ia ±ti its radical pMlosophioa-I 
approach that several insights devolve on the present s'budy of the 
religious end theological foundations of the natural soiencse# This 
is particularly pertinent in that at the root of the problem •« the 
discussion of ’science* vis a vis ‘religion* * there is often a lack 
of a clear philosophical basis# ’Religion*, ’theology* and ’faith* 
are confused with one another; while ’science* is ahiit up in mi 
objective field (speotator language) instead of unfolded hy faith#
Hen in the Xiefoisnationa3. Movement who are dealing specifically 
with the question of the natmial sciences include two philosopher^ 
engineers, H.van Hieeseii (1953? 1955» 1973/a,h and e*) and B#
Bohuurman (1976; 1977#)» Btrauas (undated) and Ihiyk (1970) in 
mathematics; and Btafleau a physicist# Stafleau’s main interest in 
the pMlosopliy of the Cosmonomic Idea centres in (a) the distinction 
and correlation of law and subject ; (h) the notion of typicsiity, both
on the law side and the subject side of reali’fcy (structures of
individuality, individual things end events); and (o) the notion of 
modal analogies#
19*2# m o PRHGimBQEB, (F OOMCT GM€E
19#2#1# John Calvin# The movement is rooted In the tradition of the
Reformation# The Reformers saw the to’fcsli'teian character of sin 
and while this ’corruptio totalis’ was never reduced to the poimlar 
myth of calv;lniE>tdc siH'^ pesslmismp It did emphatically take account 
of the Ball affecting the whole of man’s being, including reason.
Thus for Galvin the ’lumen naturale ’ was blind in itself# Yet he 
did not posit an exclusive antithesis between Ghriotian and non- 
Christian thought (cf. Inst# 1;5?14#)« We are not to depreciate 
the gifts God has given to raen, for under the power of common grace 
God bridles the power of sin end allows the aposta.te mind true 
insights into creation (of# Inst# 3|2;14-17#)* From this embryonic 
doctrine of comnion grace, and other facets of his theological system 
(of# ^*53 and 18#1*1# my thesis), Galvin, recognising the worth of 
physical creation, gave back to science its lawful, domain imdor 
Christ who was not only individual but cosmic redeemer#. Galvin
also restored to science its> iïvlispenaable liberty# Bclenoe was to 
be pursued in its. a%)propriate sphere of intea^ est with no interferenco
1# Of# ’Perspective* Vol. 8, Mo# 5» Bept/Oot 1975*
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f3?oîïî other realms; the ohuroh and state had no jiirisdiction over 
l>XiysicB or astronoîûÿ\i
In Calvin ’oonimon graeo' had not acquired the status of a 
teohnioal. term as it woiild under Kuyper. Indeed controveroy has 
raged over Euyper’s remark tlvit the dootrine of comiion grace is an 
indispensable Calvinist dogma (of. Kla-pwijk 1973» P*47*)«- Hut 
Galvin nowhea^ e presents it as àn independent tenet of faith and in 
the ’vm’ious Reformation Gateohisms the doctrine is at most, here and 
there, presupposed# nevertheless it may fairly be said that wider 
common grace Calvin saw God upholding creation (of, Inst* 2;2;16 and 
2;354«)a carlYig for humanity (3g14§3«)? disjjlaying M s  goodness (3124; 
2 end 3|20|15#); preserving the church (1|17|7»11*)b and removing any 
vestige of escouse that man night present before M,s Maker (l;3î1s 
3|3|25s 1|5|14 and 3|25|9#)* For Calvin this last aspect was one 
of the most mmclal reasons miy God upheld nature, cultt&re end science, 
Blessed with so many gifts and possibilities man will never be able to 
prove before God, or his own conecienee, that God has not revealed 
M:lmselfa
Ga3.vin*s position with respect to oxu? study aiay be suwnod up ao 
followa# (a) Sin pervades the totality of huma^ i existence; (b) God 
has His reasons for restraining sin in man end society; (c) God 
continues to bless the imconv©2?ted with diverse gifts within the order 
of creation, including knowledge a¥id luxdex’Btending; (d) non-cliristian 
thought does not refer eitîier to a remnant goodness or to the self- 
sufficiency of human nature; but (e) witnesses rather? to the God who 
upholds His goodness, g3?ace, sovereignty and righteousness in a 
f&llen wor3.d*
a ©  tmly modem emphasis
of common grace begins much later in the nineteenth century in the 
figure of Groen van Prinsterer (1801«76). Opposed to any 
scholastic dualism he contended that pMiLosophy' was a deri%^ ative of 
religion — though he did not reject the possibility that non^ cSiristian 
philosopîiy may surpass non-christian religion in veilue* Glai.ming 
that CXiristianity-was the source of religious enlightenment, he did 
not simply mean that God made Himself îmom in a general revelation, 
but interpreted general revelation in an historical fashion euki 
maintaimsd that it %‘/as the 3.ight of the primordial revelation in 
Paradiso# Thus ho could even ©.claiowX-edge good in hhlightenr/îeïit
philosopîiy « a philoso;phy’ he b itte r ly  opposed as a system# With 
wonder he notes the treasures that the non-cîn?istian mind has 
unfolded. A wonder that leads him to thankfulness and o ritio a l 
distm ice. (Cf# ICLapwijk 1973» PP«49"*51»)^
j.9,.5-.j a a m m u ^ T O m i
Ktiyper refers to his worldview as Meo-Calvinism and artioulated  
its  prinoipl.0s and praotieee both as a theologian and primG-nrniister 
and a t a grassroots leve l through his long editorship o f the d a ily  
'Standard* and weekly 'Heraut* newspapers# Idko Calvin ho sought 
to put the s e li-g lo rifio a tlo n  of God at the centre of his theology# 
But while the former contended against Eommx Catholicism, Aiabaptists 
and Emianists ; Kuyper's concern was to set fo rth  the claims of Christ 
fo r the en tire  oui.tore, free from any Anabajybist isolationism#
Like Groen, however, he was Influenced to  some degree by 19th century 
romantic, h is to rica l IdeMism*
faith. (cSEasim 1976, P.1811-.) fallovi.hig
Augustine he asserted that fa ith  was a strao’to a l part of being human, 
A ll men exhib it fa ith ; i t  is  not a question of the relig ious having 
fa ith  and unbelievers none* He further aa?gued that fa ith  was the 
root of science, an argument sustained on tlireo grounds# (a ) 
Observation is  based on fa ith  as to its  p o s s ib ility , re lia b ility  and 
instrumentation; (b) mrioms, which are necessary fo r science, are 
grounded in  fa ith ; and (o) only in  fa ith  is  there a motive to and fo r 
science# (O f. 19#7#1.)
19*3#2» Universal Slai# (Cf# ib id  p*183f#) Euyper saw fa ta l effects  
in  three aresxj of msm’s life #  (a ) He saw the destsTUctive work of 
sin in  the mind of mmia i t  oorrodes the mind such that we are subject 
to unintentional miotaîîes; i t  leaves us oscposod to self-delusion; i t  
diGto2?ts the powers of imagination; i t  maJices us suspect to the e v il 
from other minds; i t  exposes the soul to s p iritu a l i l ls  as a resu lt 
of phyeical i l ls ;  i t  destroys our relationships with others; and i t
2# Appreciation Is  coupled, w ith the warning; "that a ll the good and 
exoolient becomes corrupted tlirough the direction given to it# "  (Groens 
In  IClapwijk 1973» p .31») With that thought in  mind we may talce 
cognlsfmce of his statement th a t8 "On a Christian basis one can be an 
eclectic thinker in  a good sense#" (Groens In  ib id  p#31»)
3# (a ) In  a fu lle r  treatment of th is  movement Herman Bavinck would
have to be discussed as a central fig u re . (b) Wmt follows concerning 
common g3?ace is  largely draim from ICLapwijk (1973) axxd Sâuidema (1972) 
as w ell as Kuyper# (c ) Because of the c la rity  of several quotations 
I  have resorted to secondary sources in  a few instances#
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alienates v.b from ourselves# (b) He saw a destructioB of our moral 
motives. The greatest treaeon, as T»S»BXiot put i t ,  ie  to do the 
r i^ it  deed fo r the wrong reason# (o ) He saw a darkening of man’s 
understanding aooruing from sin.*
19.3.5# Common Graee# I t  le  in  the vjork of Kuyper that we find  the 
doctrine of oomion grace formalised as the very foundation of sooiety 
which alone maîcee history and culture possible# He points out that 
G alvin’ s embryonic doctrine did not arise from philoaophieal 
invention but from the m ortal character of sin#.
"Yet apperr?ently th is  confession o f the mortal character of sin  
did not square w ith re a lity , There was in  the s in fu l world 
outside the Oimrch so much that x/as b eau tifu l, so much to  be 
respected, so much that provoked envy. This placed the 
fem ulators o f the Reformed Confession before the dilemmas 
eith er to deny a il tM s good against th e ir b e tte r knowledge, 
and thus to e rr w ith the mmbaptistsg or to  view men as not 
so deeply fa lle n , and thus to  stray into the Pelagian and 
kminiexi heresy,.»*the solution of th is  apparent contradiction, 
that also outside the Church, among the heathen, in  the midst 
of the world, God’s grace was a t work, grace not eternal, nor 
unto salvation, but temporal end fo r the stemming of the 
destruction that lurked in  sin»" (iCuypers In  E.L.H.Taylor 
1970, p.59f.)
Cmmon grace makes science and culture possible because even when men 
deny God end His goodness they are nevertheless (while outside the 
covenantb1 bleeslng of p a rtic u la r grace) s t il l  enabled to love, honour 
laws, be ra tio n a l, compose music and lite ra tu re ,  promote science*
Common grace, them, has a purpose of Its  oxm* I t  does not pave the
xfay fo r some neutral appreciation o f c u ltu ra l a c tiv ity  but rather 
provides a mandate fo r Christians to  blaae the way in  the cu ltural 
arena -  in  science, a rt etc»*
But the issue is  coiaplex and apparent contradictions appear in  
Euyper’s work* Hhile stressing common grace he c le e rly  presents the 
pre-eminence of p articu lar grace and the Kingship of Christ as the 
Mediator of redemption. Hence we cannot use th is  doctrine to  
ju s tify  a view o f c u ltu re , or involvement in  i t ,  as something &long^  
side fa iH i in  saving grace* "The only thing Kuyper’ s doctrine of 
common grace cen ju s tify  is  the acceptance of a d ia le c tic , polar 
relationship between the domain o f common grace and the domain o f 
particu lar grace*" (Zuidema 1972, P«5T*)
I t  ie  generally accepted th a t Kuyper’ s thougiit 
on th is  m atter passed through several stages* In it ia lly  (about 1874)
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he wished to explam tlm obvious apparent success of the world (in. 
the face of his refommd dociirlne of sin and grace) on the basis of a 
Batumi Imowledge of God as the re s u lt of general revelatio n* This 
position tended to a scholastic viexrpolnt, especially in  the idea of 
a natural îmowledge of God as some kind of teldge betxmen church and 
xforld* This tended to a natura-graoe dualism#
question is  placed on a wider canvas in
M e study 'Do Gemeone Gra-tie* (1895)* In  th is work he revived the
ax'chaic form of grace in  lii© Dutch laxitguage, that is  g ra tle , to 
represent comum gszace and to distiugjixish i t  from fgenade which referred  
to saving grace# Kuypor now sax/ coMon graoe as of independent 
character end content, quite d is tin c t from particu lar grace, fo3z there 
was a coBiïfion grace of God to those who remained imder sin#
P articu lar grace meant God made a new beg;imiing through the Incarnate 
C liris t; common grace meant God perpetuated the old throu^i Christ as 
Second Person of the Trin ity#  Furthermore, comnon grace has a 
negative and a. positive function# hogatively i t  serves to restra in  
sin , to conserve the things of creation in  being despite the Fall#
P ositively i t  is  seen as referrin g  to the yet to be developed
p o ss ib ilities  that man has in  his creational ce llin g  to unfold and 
ru le creation# This again, treads close to a dua3.is.tlir: 
construction between comaon and partiou3.ar grace as a d istinction  
between earth and,heaven, creation and re-creation, cu ltu ral a c tiv ity  
mid salvation. Ip.apx;ijk notes 3 "There is  in  a ll of th is  the three;!; 
of a sp iritu a lis in g  dualism xM.ch e3q>2?esses its e lf in  a. sepæ;ate 
directeflness to the hereaftea? mid to the present#" (1973» P*54*)
Yet, as IClapwijk also notes, there are places x/here the solution to  
th is  problem breaks tlnrough even fi^ om the pen of Kuyper# G iirist, 
through His cross, bears not- only the ilxture but also the present; 
C toist has a ll power in  heaven mid in  emeth* Thus G îiriat is  also 
king of common grace and Kuyper can give his famous aphorism th at: 
"There is  not a square inch of our xrhole human existence of x/hich 
C liris t, X/ho is  sovereign over a ll, does not say: Mine I"  (In  lO-apwijk 
,fb M  p .54.) '^
Yet Kixyper x;as open to critic ism  in  his pMlosophieal d istinction  
between the essential basis of particu lar gi/acc as supematm?al and
4# 'BiIej quotation appears regulaafly in  discussion in  Eoglish and 
tallies several s lig h tly  d iffe ren t forms#
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■belonging to the arena of glory; x/hllo res tric tin g  conimon gracQ to 
the realm of creaturehood^- This has ju s tly  been c ritic is ed  as a 
diialiB tic/B piritualistio /esclriato log icM  conception where the m ilty of 
the Christian lif e  is  fragmented suoh thtrh salvation does not tru ly  
.‘Involve the 03zeatad order®
This may seem fa r removed from the concmms of natural science* 
Yet i t  is  csmoial fo r comon grace is  a pivotal, doctrine with respect 
to the creational, order -  and science is  very much concerned xji'fcli the 
structures of creation* Time Kuyper can claim that science is  God’s 
own creation (c f#  Elapx/ijk ib id  p#54») Science is  the fru it of 
common grace® But sin has darkened the reason of man and. therefore 
xrithout common grace a ll science ends in  to ta l deceit and illu s io n *
"VJlmt does i t  mean that our thinking is  darkened hy sin? 
lo t that vie can no longer thinîc lo g ica lly  or ohsesrve with 
our seîxses* I t  means that x?e no longer see things in  
th e ir mutual oonneotions and divine origin* Context tmd 
origin is  not simply read o ff from things. Our s p ir it 
could s t il l  sense these relationships as long as i t  stood in  
a liv in g  re la tio n  ifith  God, but just th is  property is  lo st 
because of sin* We can B t ill see various parts of creation 
but vie no longer understand its  u n ity , orig in and purpose*
Here v/e can c ite  one of ICuyper’s famous images § Man has 
become lik e  an insane arch itect who, shut i.ip in  a c e ll, peers 
out of the x/indox/ and stores at the v/alls and spires of his 
buildilng xfithout being able to imderstand the motive of the 
s'bmcburee" (Klapwijk ib id  pp«54™55«)
But in  coiMioB grace God has provided fo r the va lid  s c ie n tific
a c tiv ity  of men such as P lato , A ris to tle , Kant and Barx/in.*^ Thus 
x/ith appreciation to God and not to nten, Kuyper can see the worth of 
pagan and profane thoiaght* Yet he gives a reklical critiqu e o f, and 
opposition to , non-oliristian ecienoe# He divided science in to  the 
physicaJ. sciences and humanities, xdth no sharp asiti‘bhesis in  -fche 
foamer but a clearout antithesis in  the la tte r* This memit an 
arabigaoua approach to non-ehristian thought.
fln a l stage is  reflected in  Ms 
famous Stone Foundaition Lectures -  in  1098 (Of* Kujfper 1931)* Here 
he again talces coguigance of the value of the non-christian thought 
x/orld* Far from being xjritten  o ff i t  is  to be seen of v/orth mid 
in terest fo r the G M istian*
ammimKnftirmmw iveiMi *#,,1
5* Kuyper sees these men as those xrho have shone as "stæzs of the 
f ir s t  magnitude*" (1895$ V o l.III, p*498*)
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"PreciouB treasures have eome doxm to ub from the old 
heathen civilisation* In  P lato you fin d  pages xâiich you 
devour# Cicero faeolnates you and bears you along "by 
his noble tone end stirs up in  you holy sentiments»*#".
(Kuyper 1931* p«121*)
Box/ever he now saw the basic systems of Ohrietlan and non«*ohristian 
thought in  both natural science and the humanities as o f essentially 
antithetical character* He developed this throng# the two 
irreconcilable mentalities involved# On the one hand the non- 
ch rls tia n  views the x/orld as normal (the formalist view); he refuses 
to  see aixything other than the n atural world around | he liv e s  in a 
closed universe* On the other hand the C hristian (the àbnoiæiallst) 
realises he lives In a fallen x/orld* that things are not now xtot 
they imre meant to be$ • This Is not a clash over the data of 
science* nor is It a clash between faith and science*
"lot faith and science therefore* but txio scientific systems 
or If you choose* txm s c ie n tific  elaborations * are opposed 
to  each other* each h a v i^  oiw fa ith , lo r  may I t  be 
said that I t  is here science x/hicli opposes theclofar# fo r im
have to do x/ith two absolute forms of science* ‘both of x;hlch
claim  the xjhole domain of human laiox/ledge* and both o f x/Mch 
have a. suggestion about the supreme Being o f th e ir own as 
the point o f departure fo r th e ir w orld-view ." (ib id  p.133*)
So Kuyper posits an antithesis between regenerate and unrexonerate 
sc len tia  (cf * Kuyper 1898* pp#28-32* 49*"51#}-* Accepting the 
biblical doctrine of the F a ll of man it fo llo im  th at all o f l i f e ,
including sclentia and scholarship* has been ra d ic a lly  affected#
Sin affects not only moral q u a litie s  but theoretical thought® God’ s
work of re b irth  and rmnmal in  the lives o f men is not therefore to
be shut up to some ’ re lig io u s * sphere* the eimrch or our p rivate* 
devotional lif e *  Rather* in lin e  xiith the biblical conception of 
the radical unity of man in  h is religious root (h e a rt), regeneration 
is of crucial iniportance fo r the true exercise of theoretical thought.
This does not mean that ülucdstisn and ^atheistic physicists are 
Implao ably opposed In the teohnioal d e ta ils  of tlw ir  discipline. 
Special grace does not give the Christian a b e tte r understanding of 
technical matters and we must remember th at all physicists qua phyelos 
work in the realm o f common grace — common to regenerate and 
unregenerate * In science the difference between the C hristian and
the non-™cliristiaïi is  not apparent in the normal a c tiv itie s  of 
weighingj. measuring or counting (of# Kuhn’s normal science?)*
Kuyper held that observation was non-abstract in  character and that
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looking tln?o’Ugh a ïiîicrosGope or telescope tras merely a fom of 
observation#. But the diffœ^ence between the two mentalities 
became cimoial x/hen facts were interpreted* Indeed true ' seience 
only emerged for Euyper in the interpretation* In xjeighing etc*
particular grace has no effect, hut in intexq^ retatioB psxrticular 
grace has a decisive effect for the Gtoistian is i^rounded hn the 
as swaption of God as the final, and self—contained reference point.
So for Kuyper the battle x/as to he fought at the level of human 
coBsciousness and not in the arena of scientific data* (Cf. C.van Til 
1957, p .2 7 .)
Some have sSjnply read off from Eimior's sa-ki-
du alistio  statements the claim that he is  opposed to a ll forms of 
d u alis tic  thought. This must he questicmed. Zuidems?. contends 
that Kuyper*8 ’natiœe’ (re * coiomon grace) and ’grace’ (re . 
partioM ar grace) fim ction as poleir opposites* Thus v/hile he wishes
to avoid a dualism of tv/o to ta l antithesis which w ill exclude one 
mwther such as lig h t and darkness, tru th  and erro r, nevertheless his 
thought "rides on a dual.ism of tx/o contrasting poles wMeh at once 
a ttra c t and repel each other." (Zuidema 1972, p .68 .) Hence he can 
ta lk  of common grace in  contrast w ith particu lar grace such that the 
tvjo realms take the fona of a dualism and ax>pear to œcolude one 
another (o f.’ ib id  p.77»)*’ This is  am plified by the res tric tio n  of 
common grsvce to the domain o f the v ia ib le  and temporal j to the 
orig inal creational stnm tures and ordinances.
But it x/ould be manifestly unfair to accuse Kuyper of the dwilism 
of sacred-secular. Common graoo is after till still grace; it is 
still imder God; it is not neutral* Indeed for Kuyper there is no
'neutral sphere* in the life of man xjhioh may be seen apart from God, 
but only God’s creation oa it unfolds itself in history. In our 
criticism of any common-particular grace dichotomy we should remember 
that Kuyper xToul.d have nothing to do with a two-level theory of ta/uth 
x/hich sought to divide the religioixs-ethical from the scientific life 
of man* "What is true religiously imwjt also be so scientifically. 
The seamless robe o f truth may not be torn assuoder." ( ll. van Til 
1974, p.126.)
Hence Kuyfper struggled to transcend his polar patterns of thought 
and drive tlorough to a deeper unity (cf. the quest of Einstein).
Mnat he xfished to shoxr was that 8
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mid nature belong together and that you eaimot see 
the rioimeee of graoe if you do not see haw its root fibers.
©veryitere penetrate into the joints and rifts in the life 
of nature* How this eomieotion you oamot see if ’gra,o©* 
makes you think first of the salvation, of your soul and not 
first and foremost of the Qhri^ t. qf God  ^ It Is for this 
very reason that Seripture oonstently reminds us that the 
Sayior of the world is at the same time the Creator of the
world I in fact, that He could only become its Savior because
He was its Creator." (Kuyperg In Zuidema 1972, p#99*)
In the final analysis we must loam tiiat soience la not vitiated 
by subjectivity - the modem ’heresy’ of the philosophy of science - 
but by eiri» It ie here that the question of antithesis develops 
between truth and falsehood* Those living in a closed universe do 
not, and will not, recognise the deleterious impact of sin on man’s 
capacity to advance hie knowledge. Her is this a conflict between 
science and faith since faith Is the presupposltlcm of every science, 
the foaaml function of the life of the soul x/hieli is basic to every 
fact of human conBciousness, The ccnfllot ie not between faith and
solence, but between two scientific systems each with Its omi faith*
Nor can we oppose science and theology for each absolutely claims the 
totality of knowledge, The confrontation Is not in the field of 
data ner so but at the level of human consciousness »
One of the best modem critiques of Kuyper’s doctrine of common 
grace is from the pen of'B.ÏÏ. Buidema who xæltes thati
"Kuyper’8 doctrine of common grace is there for the sake of 
his doctrine of particular grace; and first and foremost for 
the sake of his doctrine that particular grace gives birth 
to Christian action which is ae broad as life and which is 
not only impossible end not forbidden, but possible and even 
mandatory.» With this doctrine he summoned God’s people,
"the church organism" to distinctive Christian activity, to 
activity oro Eege. to "antithetical" activity especially, not 
in the. last place in the form of separate organisations »"
(1972, Ï.59,)
Later he adds:
"A full plclmre of Kuyper is not given unless it is also 
shown that he did not halt before M s  se3.f—impooed problem, 
but broke through to the confession that truly Christian 
action is possible also in the domain of ocmmon grace."
(il»ld p.96.)
Thus we ccmie full circle to the fact that despite hie polar 
opposition of common and particular gxaoe., Kuyper in the end sees the 
only centre of commm grace in the particular, or saving, grace pro 
liege. Ultimately the fruits of common grace are to be brou#it 
eschatologicMly into the coming Kingdom.
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Bohllder has been called "the ggreateat cultural theologian in 
Reformed oiroles einee the days of Kuyper#" (ïï# ys&i Til 1974» p#137*) 
But he differed radically from Kuyper 3Xi 'rejecting the doctrine of 
Gomnon grace and substituting for it the ecawaon mandate doctrine#
In the common m&izidate of Genesis to man he perceived that there wsæ3 
to he mi evolution and development of creation abetted ■ by ■ the 
cultural activity of man# For Bchllder the instlî.ict of cultmze %/as 
implanted in Paradise ae a God-given and God-glorifying activity#
.After the Fall this :instinct became egotistical and self—glorifying# 
Through aim g men fell in love xjit-h himeelf and with the tools of his 
culture#
So ScW.lde3Z rejects common grace and the idea of a coimncn terrain
6sîiared mutually by believers and unbelievers# ' This, he claimed»  ^
vras to avoid constructing a neutral area, betxjeen ths contending forces 
of the xmrld and the church# The l^ all did not result in a division 
of the xrorM into W o  sectors#. The cultural mandate and the urge to 
dominate creation are still caramon in the experience of man# So 
there is still one nature but a twofold use of it; one territory but a 
tx/ofold development of it; one oulturaJ. urge but a txiofold cultus/al 
striving® Gn the one hand Godless cultural striving never truly 
ripens or ie fulfilled; instead of a science being unfolded tsruly it 
is marred and paralysed# He furthca^  (îsrdtieises the idea in common
grace that xre are i/ermitted to develop and subdue the earth xjhile God
holds back the ful3. effect of sin# Much more positively, he argues» 
x/e £îre ’coninianded®» not merely *pm:mitted’» to cultivate and subdue 
the earth# Thus Bohilder seeks to break out of the antithesis 
between God and the x;orld» Like Calvin, Groon and Ki%yper, he shares 
the vision that the whole of the life of mm: is lived before the face 
of the Lord# Writing of Bohilder, Henry van Til aeiyaa
"For we have a Oiiriot, %/ho as king, observées not only how %/e
pray, but also hex/ x/e handle the spade» the hamner, the book
and needle» the brush and whatever instrument we may x/ork 
v/ith, to draw out of the x/orld what God has put into it#"
(1974, 9.147.)
6. Of. H. Hooksem (1973) who redacts the whole idea of coarrnm 
grace e,nd ooimnoa mehdate from within a Reformed perepectlTO,
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In ‘Reformatlonal ‘ thought the most siguifleant figure In the 20th
eeYitury Is Herman Sooyevreerd* He contends that non-oîiristian
sclentia and xAiilosojAiy ought to he appreciated inasmuch and insofar
as it is confronted %/lth 'states of affairs’ which conform to the la\iH
stniciaire of creation and xdilch therefore force themselves on every
man* The atheist still lives In God’s creation mid Is confronted
by God's incontrovertible states of affairs* Hen aiay give noxi
measiing and sigkiificanoe to certain states of affairs, but such
possibility is al-ways limited and never arbitrary* fiie meaning men
give to states of affaira is alx/ays contained v;itMn the framev/ork of
8the ♦dlvine'^ ieaning^ stlpiilation'* God alone is Creator and thuB
the final law atul nieaning-giver of creation# In his philoeox)hy of 
the Gosmononde Idea, DooyeX'/eerd tlms solves Kuyper *s problem as to 
hoî>r to arrive at a CMdstocentric yet non**scclesiastioal3-y orientated 
vimf of culture* He does so by making a sharp distinction between 
religion and faith such that while M s  viexj of cultixre and science is 
religiously rooted in Clirist, it does not imply any direct 
connection v/ith ecclesiastical bodies or creeds#
19*6# mSBELL - D m m s
Paul Heljjfî® a professional philosopher, has attacked the ‘Msterdam 
philosophy' ooYitendliig that it "derives its almost magical appeal from 
certain dominant metaphors," and has had "the effect, not of allox/ing 
Scripture to influence vm?ious areas of life, but of limiting its 
influence*"^ Helm seems concerned philosopMoal3.y to defend the 
linguistic analytical tradition, and theologieally to defend the 
centrality of an individualistic soteaziolo^ y# Thus he concomitantly 
defends a neutralist position 5n the realm of nature* Praising 
Kuyper's "maguificent and truly liberating" vision of the ou]_tural 
mandata he olaiais that this stress is misleading in some of its 
modern proponents such as Dooyeweerd (cf* Helm 1973» p«5*)«
Richard Bussell az'gues that Helm reflects a clear duMism v/ith no 
internal relation betifeen faith smd îmowledge (1973$ p*86*)# H© 
contends that much of the problem stems f]:om Helsi'a oonmiitment to
ITT^'s^lTittlo here concerning Dooyev/eerd as X x/ill draw heavily 
from him in Part IV - cf* 19*7*
8. hhil© a radically apostate %forldvie%*r motivates non-cMistimi 
thought this in no x/ay negates God's p3?esence in such thought*
9# Of# 'The Banner of Truth* Issue 118-119$ July/Aug 1973» P*35»
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linguistic analysis as a neutj/al criticism and clarification of 
moa/iing. For Helm there is Christian commitment in the realm of 
grace but not iï3i the realm of ne/bure xihere only the moral and 
spiritual aspects of natural activity are to be seen as involving 
Christian commitment#
This debate has broken out afresh in ‘Third Way'* In an 
article entitled ‘Developing a Cîn?istiïm Mind*, Helm argues that 
truth is independent of mind and that traditionally three inadequate 
Christian attitudes have been commons (a) the ti;o v/orlds mentality 
v;hioh divides the spiritual and secular; (b) the idea that everyone 
shaa:es a ‘set of truths about the xjorld* %/hich obxl be Icnown for 
certain (such as mathematics, laws of nature etc») and that the 
Christian adds ‘another layer of truths * to this; (c) the narrow 
viei'ipoint that nothing cmi be knoxm except from a Bcriptueal basis*
Then Helm calls for an interactionism between Scrixjture mid the 
theories/findings of the secular disoix/lines* (This immediately 
suggests that he is not entirely free from (a)/(b) above*) He 
welcomes a policy of interactionism because it obviously alloivs for 
the comprehensiveness of Scripture x/hile at the some time allowing 
for its wievenness, While Scriptixre says a lot about guilt and 
forgiveness; a little about the geography of the Middle Fast; on many 
matters it is silent* "Paradoxical though it may be, it seems that 
the teaching of Boriptur© about m&my matters is that it has nothing 
to teach about these matters*" (1977$ p.8*) Interactionism also
recognises the theologically undeterminate oharaetes? of Scripture 
x/hich therefore avoids equating it x/ith a pmzticular theory in the 
secular realm; it recognises the centrality of hermeneutics in the 
liglit of the non-self-interpretatioii of the Bible; and it recognises 
that there are som?ces of îmoviledge outside Scripture*
A fevj x/eeks later a sharp rebuttal of this argument appeared from 
Russell* He sees, despite Helmi's initial reference to the inad.equacy 
of a nature-grace dualism, the x/hole policy of interactionism ao a form 
of "duallstic na'ture-^ p/aco mentality." (Russell 1977» p*7#) The very 
metaphor of ‘two-x/ay traffic* betx/een the Cln?istian mind and the 
secular realm x/hich Helm posits smacks of dualistic thought* Thus
Russell critically exposes the antimonies in Helm’s argument. He
accuses him of seeking to deny any division of sacred-secular but then 
tacitly operating within a dichotomoiis mentality* While Helm seeks 
to construct a neutral hermeneutic out of the secular realm (i.e.
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lingiilstlo analysis) and apply it to Boriptiirce» Hiiosell suggests x/e 
must "xmderstand that the Christian religion is a whole x;ay of life 
for the people of God x/ithin the covenant, rather tiian a way of
individual devotional life and xmrship#" (ibid p»9*)
19*7. FROM THE CQBHOMOMIG IBM
In this section I x/ish to outline some of the basic concepts
%'7hioh devolve from the CosMonomio Idea on this S'fcudy, and v/Mch frame 
ray thought» This is not an ergojïient for their validity, but merely 
a brief statement of some of the central facets*
19.7.1. The Hellgious-Faith Mature of Bcientia,. (Cf* 20.1 and 20,2.)
"The x/ay of îmox/iedge certainly leads through the seimes, but 
it extends farther. It is also continued from the sense 
tlirough the neiTves and the brain, and back of these out of 
our sensoriel avenues to that mysterious something which x/e 
call our consciousness, end, in the centrum of that 
consciousness, to x/hat vm call orn? ©jgo."(Kuyper 1898, p#41#)
It ia not enough to stop at the senses for the question as to hox/ the 
ego a3:3?ives at some degree of certainty concerning perceptions will 
remain. What rnxst be concluded is that the ego believes. So 
faith becomes the starting point for any observation or demonstration, 
as imll as bringing a motive to the construction of science itself. 
General conclusions %/ould never be reached if faith head not postulated 
their idea and desirability, Despite the logical necessity of faith 
it is îill too often overlooked,
"....in scientific investigation faith is virtually taken as a 
quantity that can. bo neglected, because it is the same in all, 
and therefore makes no difference in the conclusion. This, 
of course, ought not to be ao, end an ever stronger protest 
should be 5’aised against this superficiality x/hieh is so 
unworthy of the name of science; but the false antithesis 
betx/een faith and science is so generally current, that they 
%'/ho value science most, as a rule, prefer the removal, of the 
last vestige of the leaven of faith." (ibid p.44*)
Interestingly the az’guraents of Kuyper here can be fvnply backed up 
from the x/ritings of Einstein x/ho talks time and again of the 
religious feeling apart from x/hich science is impossible - a feeling 
for the harmony of natural lax/, a feeling for the intelligent ordering 
of the universe, and an aspiration for objective îmox/ledge that can 
only be ultimately explained on religious g3?ounds. (Einstein 1973» 
p,40f.) And despite his pm:theism, Einstein points to the 
Judaistic-Gteistian tradition as containing the highest principles 
consistent x/ith these religious feelings. Goulson suras it up x/hen
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he seyss "Science itself must bo a religious activity." (1971? P«44*}*^  ^
If religion ie the total response of a man to his total environment, 
then science as a facet of that environment .ie a facet of that 
religious stance*
Booyex/eerd and Tollenhoven posit the religious core of man’s 
existence as the determining factor in all of life and thought,
The humas: ’I' stands i:: throe relations - to the modal aspects in 
which it ftuxctions; to its fellow man (l-Thou relation) ; and to God, 
Ckily this final relationship, manifest in the deepest essence of the 
selfhood? is essentially determinative. If God is not acknov/ledged, 
it is inherent in the na.ture of man to replace the Deity x/ith some 
idol? some (pretended) origin (as^ che) xohether internal or external to 
his oxm being, This bond betx/een the ’I’ and God/idola is religion; 
the collection of a sneaning of creation to the Being of the Arche,
The heart of every mm: is religious», and for this reason the selfhood 
is celled the religious root of our existence. So Booyex/eerd malœs 
a sharp distinction betxreen ‘religion’ and ’faith’, "The religious 
X necessarily ehox/s itself in the faith aspect m  it does .1:: all the 
other aspects* Tîiis is true for all people x/ithout exception," 
(Kalsbeek 1975? P»157#) Seorveld writes of this as follox/ss
"By religious motive thei:,,,,Booyex/eerd means the actual 
transcendejit dyiiami a ** * .which tftes hold of a person’s heart, 
fills and dominates? consciously or unconsciously, his every 
action, Religious motive is the moving pox/or, the dynamic 
x/orking of God’s Spirit or m: idolatrous Spirit at the very 
roots of man, x/ho so captured x/orks it out x/ith fear and 
trembling mid curiosity," (1965/a, p,194»)
Hence any unqualified objectivity in science is an illusion for 
all human activity is characterised by subjective elements at the 
centre of which lies a religiously directed fa,ith of some sort,
Faith In the existence of the object to be investigated in the 
condition sine cma non of all science. Thus science can be seen to 
possess proBx:pposition,s axid moral commltmeixts that point to an ordered 
universe smd xmifying hypotheses for which no proof can be presented. 
Distinction needs to be made between *x>resupposita.’ and 
’presuppositions ’ ; the former are univorssl axid necessary x/hilo the 
latter are ttie subjective viei/ of the presupposita, (cf* glossary).
In the breakthrough to the world of nuclear physics the
10, Or conversely, as the physicist Richard Bchegel stated its 
"Indeed, in m: effective way, science ia for many the religion of 
ox?r Eige," (1967? p,254*)
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following xma written of Permit
one member or another hesitated and seemed doubtful, 
then the Truth fell from Fermi’8 lips; v/hat he said was 
'an article of faith', he put the heretic back on the right 
road - he vim infallible,. In short, he wao soon called 
'the Pope', (de Latil 1965$ p«41*)
Of faith there can be no doubt; of infallibility certain error*
The Arche* A starting point la necessary for any statement 
or theory* The question is whether the starting point will bear the 
weight of the structure built on It. Is the arche rook or sand? 
Einstein noted that a "In order to construct a theory, it :1s not enough 
to have a clear conception of the goal# One mist also have a formal 
point of view.#**" (1973# P*320«) Or as Booyeweard put its
"This fixed point from which alone* «*v/e are able to form the 
Idea of the totality of meaning, we call the ^^ /eMmadlan 
•point of philosophy# However, if ws have found this 
Archimeâlan point, our selfhood makes the discovery that the 
viexf of totality is not possible apart from a view of the 
origin or the arch® of both totality and speciality of meaning. 
The totality in 'which our selfhood is supposed to participate » 
may indeed transcend all speciality of meaning In the 
cdberenoe of it© diversity# Yet it, too* in the last 
analysis ' remains meaning# which cannot exist by itself, but 
supposes asi, an 411
m e m W  is A g ,  ■|;teaus?i.. ana to an origin.,," (1969s Tol.I, 
p.8f.)
Wo cannot begin in science until we have chosen this starting 
point, and this factor la reoogniacd even by those who have little 
time for formal religion (of# Tlieobald 1969$ p#iB#) The problem of 
knowledge and truth is that for m y  degree of certainty to be
entertained a starting point in the noa*»cosmo© is required* and this
is /Impossible as long aa sin confines man within the conseioumesB of 
the cosmos# Thus ultimately the only starting point big enough is 
that given to man in revelation frost God (cf# Popper 1972/a, p*29f*)| 
and in on ax/areness of the self-consciousness and self's relation to 
its Creator# On this question m m  will either presuppose God as in 
all and through all and above all; or he will presuppose himself as 
the basic z^eallty of being#
It is not enough to write as Planck does that:
"Religion and natural science are fighting a joint battle in 
an incessant, never relaxing crusade against scepticism and
against dogmatism? against disbelief and against superstition,
and the rallying cry in this crusade has always been, and
always -will tes »ûa to God*." (1950, p.187.)
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Thés© are well laioxm words and quoted ax/pi/ovingly hj many Christian 
writers {©ago Goulson 1971? ^#83#), but they fail to detect the 
Inadequate philosoph3.oal nature of this Êîtatement* We immt start 
feom God and see all as x/ithin M e  power and under Hie hand is: 
creation; it is not a question of reaching out from the sinful 
finite to the isiflnite being of God.
ntLOtJBssgSleiaaagea:- («f» 21.1.4.), mstmotion has to
be- made betvjeen theoretical and pretheoretical thought {common, 
everyday thought). In the former the theoretieian abstracts from 
the totality of being; he is discriminative asid aïmlytical? sîkl 
endeeivours to maintain a certain distance between î-dmiBolf gaid the 
object of his investigations® This ie as true for the theologim: £is 
the mathematician. In pretheoretical. thought a person escpeieiences 
closely llfe-ln-ito-totality or fui/noss* This does not mean that c\ 
sharp delineation need be draim between the two modes of thoxjght - 
Dooyexireerd does? ybxi Biesèen does not* The psychologist possesses 
a certain theoretical knowledge about a child; the mother also knows 
certain things about the child in an /Intuitive wholeness# To posit 
the question of whether the psychologist or the mother ‘Imews’ the 
child best is to present a false dilemma - both truly 'know' the 
childp but in different %/ays*
Bclentifioally? of course, pretheoretical thought is Inadequate; 
yet at another level it has been said that "science is merely common 
sense writ large#" (Popper; In Magee 1973/^ ,» p*102«) But common 
sense ia neither unchanging or infMlible? and %/hat is comion sense 
for one generation (man cannot fly) is not necessax'ily so for another# 
As Popper writes 8 "It is part of common seise to be critical# It ia 
part of common sense to submit our common-sense views to criticism; 
and science is, simply? the result of this criticism#" (ibid p.102 — 
cf# Einstein 1973$ p#293«) theoretical thought la critiqued by
theoretical thought.
Mmtever the science It aWtracta the totality of being, and 
.it only has meanWl %/hen it replaces the aba1)ra.ction back into the 
canvas of the %/hole* There is real danger of a loss of meaning in 
the process of {abstraction and the absolxxtising of the relative.
1^..*7.^.&: (of* 23*4#)* This is m  integral part of the
phlloeopî'îy of the Ûosreonomic Idea as developed by Dooym/eerd? though 
the concept is by no means original to him* There are certain
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spheres of re a lity , x&loh though not existing {mtonomcmsly, have a
11certain particular cha/cacter and stmiotnre. One of the error»
men have made is to try emd explain all of created rsa-lity from one 
of these aspects (cf* Appendix E)* Each of these spheres is 
characterised 'by some specificity? a modal moment or nucleus which 
cannot he fm/tlier reduced in This does riOt mean that each
kernel exists iri and hy itself? but ra/dier that there ie an aspect of 
oïiipiricaJ- reality whose modal meaning can en].y reveal itself witMn 
the inter^odal meaning^’Coherenc© of all other aspects® The spheres 
ha%’'o a specific hierarchy of order and are connected by ’anticipatory* 
and ’retrooipator-y* moments ™ the former regulative and the latter 
conetittrbive (cf# glossary)® Tim© the modality ie
charscte^/dsed by the modal moment of tra/iscendent certainty regarding 
the Origin of all being end meanings the etiiical by love of one’s 
neighbour# the juridical by retribution# the aesthetic by harmony; the 
economic by thrift# the social by social intercourse| the linguistic 
by symbolical signlficaticma the Mstorical by caltuz'al processes of 
development! the by theoretical, diatinotlon; the sensitive
by feeling and sensation# the biolqgioM by organic life; the ?:hysical 
by ©ïiergys the kinematic by movement; the spatial by extension; and 
the mmmrical by discrete quantity*
“ o^« S'i-osssxy.
12jJj>A!&s.AvMSS^VM:S^SsM M  - glossaEy.
1.9.*:7®.4-<73.æ.,W m psis -  of, glossary and 21*4*4* A ll structures in  
creation are mutually Intertx/ined and inten/oiren in  an universal, 
unique and miba/eal^ able fa8hi.on, The importmioe of th is  concept is  
ixidicated in  the index to  Dooyei/eerd’s ma#um opus where there is  
over 12 pages of references to i t i  (1969? Tol®Xy? ppa51™64#)
,1,9, 5.^1 Gormon Grace - of» glossary and sections and 24*2,1®
19.8. Tmmi FOÏMMi poims
19.8.1. Linguistic An^ysls. above features are Integra], to this
study, but here Ï  w is h  to re je c t a pa^rticulaa? philosophical tra d itio n  
x/liich exercises a strong influence <m the thought of many In the Anglo-
11. It must be emphasised tha,t this system is not a finalised 
a.7?rangement* rather it Is a x/orfclug model open to development, and 
iOooyoMeerd M/xiself has ra/lsed the mvnber of spheres from fourteen to 
fifteen and changed the ’psychic*' to the 'sensitive ' sphere*
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12American cultur©. Undoubtedly language is neoessstry and man alone 
within physical creation is a verbaliser « It therefore behoves 
any serious argument that it entertam a certain degree of precision 
and rigour in the use of language* Language, written and spoken, is 
necessary to hold concepts together, to give them body, and to 
communicate them; but to descend to a debate about x/ords themselves, 
and the meaning structure of words alone, seems a retreat from 
reality* Popper at the start of his 'Logic of Scientific Discovery' 
gives a telling quotation from Kants
"I for my pert hold the very opposite opinion, and I assert 
that whenever a dispute has raged for any length of time, 
especially in philosojAiy, there x/eis, at the bottom of it, 
never a problem about mere %/ords, but always a genuine 
problem about things." (in Popper 1972/b, p*13«)
Or as Popper himself put it in a radio discussions
"To this I can only says I have spectacles, and I am cleaning 
my spectacles not/* But spectacles have a function* and they 
function only when you put them on, to look tlirough them at 
the world. It is the same with language. That is to say, 
on© shouldn't waste one's life spectacle-cleaning or in talking 
about language, or in trying to get a clear view of our 
language, or of 'our conceptual scheme*. The fundamental 
thing about human languages is that they can and should be 
used.,.." (In Magee 1973/a, p.173«)
19.8.2* Truth.(of# 12.5 and 15*3*5*) l#iile science can never attain 
exhaustive truth, %/hile it is not, and never will be, truth Itself, it 
nevertheless moves towards the disclosing of truths of our existence. 
It might seem naive to suggest that propositions are either true or
false, but in our day this issue has become clouded by the intrusions 
of the linguistic analysts, and others, xAo by the manipulation and 
dissection of language posit all sorts of oonumdrums.
I make tx/o points: the first in the realm of the sciences and 
covered in the following quotation from Davies i
"General scientific theories can never be established as 
absolutely true, in the way that mathematical propositions 
are true; but certain theories, particularly those of lower 
generality, have been so repeatedly confirmed in spite of 
extensive sharply defined tests, that we regard 'biiem as 
true...*" (1975# p.22.)
The second point relates to the apparent separation of verification 
from the content of religious belief, especially as found in some
12# There is, of course, much that is positive in the philosophy 
of language, especially in a creative thinker like Hoorn Chomsky*
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modem f o m M  at ion©. But as Besisant complalîiog
"**.%/hen I om told that it is precisely its immunity from 
proof which secures the Christian proolxmiation from the 
charge of being mythological, I reply that immunity from 
proof can 'secure' notMng whatever except imiunity from 
proof, and call nonsense hy its name*" (1965$ p*78*)
ïïndouhtecily there are problems between science and Christian faith - 
but the approach to be pursued ia critical examination, not evasion#
19*8*3* Traclitions# In philosophy, science and theology moat<toee*^î*i#fl*i»W*<liWINW*/WweWiy*lB*âtiW]H#*FlWSWFieKIV — IM m ' V
theoreticians seem* able to discern the distorting influences of the 
various intellectual traditions on their fellow coîixmentatora #
Generally they seem to regard themselves exempt « But no one can
thisik in isolation from his environment or be absolutely original, no 
one can posit an entirely nex; system of thougiit» or some basic new 
starting? point* This does not, of course, mean that we must bow to 
the received traditions - criticism is cal-led for* Christian thou^t 
is required of tlie Christian scholar' no aiiaiter what field'he is ;in; 
but he must also be ax/are of the InfXixences of the intellectual 
traditions in X'/hos© line he stands, and on the effect of the current 
environment on him. Then in the light of this strive to bead those 
traditions into paths conformable to the Word of God*
"Oliristians of x/hatever tradition**. *have to recognise in 
principle the dé facto influeîice of the Western 
philosophical tradition in their o\m thiiilîing. This means 
that we are all to some extent synthesis thinkers - meaning 
by that term the intermingling in a eliig/le pereptsctive of 
both biblical and imbiblical patterns of thought** « *the task 
of philoeopiiioal reformation* as opposed to attempted evasion 
or domestication, is the only alternative for m y  Christicux 
%/ho x/ante to fight synthesis*" (Wolters 1975/a# p.14*)
Reformation is called for and not revolution or acquiescence; and 
this will mean "working along the grain of history, respecting what 
ie good in the tradition and bending it aroxmd to move in another 
direction#" (ibid p*15*) Thus the OMlstim: scholar is ever 
x/orking for that which is ‘seiaper reformandal and not simply 
'reformata' #
P0BT80EIPT TO FART III
I hop© I have Indicated something of the problem of labelling 
vieim as Liberal, Evangelical or Reformed# I would note an 
appEirent confusion of ternia between 'science* (as traditionally 
•understood in our culture) and * sclentia*; and between 'faith*, 
‘religion* and 'theolo^*. X find it impossible to follow Mor3?is® 
viex/ that the Bible is a scientific textbook; yet X also find 
difficulty with the concept of an analogy between science ‘and* 
religion/theology in the %/ork of Barbour mid Torrance# It seems to 
me that the attempt to compaa:© disolpliîxes in this vray is futile for 
each sphere of abstractive reflection is unique in itself#
Eddljagton, once remarkeds "Those who look over hie (sc# scientist) 
shoxilder and use the present xxartially developed pictw/e for purposes 
outside science, do so at their om: risk*" (1930, p#353*) Each 
discipline has m. imiea? kernel of meaning that is irreducible and 
therefore unoomparable with any other sphere in a theoretical manner - 
although I %/ould empliasise the modal anticipations and model 
z^eciprooations that do exist (cf® glossary)* iJhile there may be 
points in coirmion in that all theoretical activity is and
therefore reflects man’s hwsanlty; oiming allegiance to some overall 
x/orldvievj; and that spheres qua spheres cænot be reduced to one 
gaiothor - this is merely general oonimeht# ‘ I believe that we should 
talk about the re Mtiomship of the religious heart of man and sclentia, 
but not about theology and science %/hich are diverse branches of 
sclentia# Mevertheleea a caveat is necessary in case it be thou^rb 
this advocates that disciplines do not interact# A sphere (or mode) 
is not a discipline ner se and undoubtedly disciplines interact, 
enrich and enlighten one another# Yet I remain unconvinced of the 
attempt to examine science and draw theological analogies from it# 
natural science and theology should both be carried out in the light 
of the Word of God* This is wîiy my interest is not in developing a 
theology of science (or theological science) but in a theology x/liich 
makes science a creative possibility and gives impetus to scientific 
activity — recognising that it and science are both sclentia#
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P R E F A C E
T«ww:a
Having noted various Ohrlstlon asesponeea to acience I now wish to 
set dom my oim views of a Christian perspective conoeimlng the 
religious and theological foundations of soience* I mmt stress 
that %/hat I present is open to development. Many of my oonoluslons 
are tentative. One typical area where my mind has changed at least 
twice in the last three years concerns the distinction between 
ahetraotive and pre-abstractive thought (of. 21.1.4®)* In taming 
to the final part of my thesis I would draw attention to the 
proceeding: sections g 3*5; 4»3$ 4*4$ 6*2§ 9,4; 11*6# 12*5; 16*5*2.2; 
18*1.1; and oh* 19*
Chapter 20 seeks to clear up some of the confusion concerning the 
nature of religion, science end philosophy* In chapter 21 I turn to 
the epistemologieal base necessary for all sclentia, namely the 
knowledge of God, end how this bears on our knowledge of self and 
reality. These tx/o chapters constitute a development of the 
religious foundations of science (of* Part II), What follows can 
be understood under theological foundations ■** excepting chapters 23 
and 27 which bear equally om the religious and theological aspects*
The fundamental basis which subsumes all the diverse theological 
facets is the doctrine of creation by the ontological Trinity — 
chapter 22* Chapter 25 discusses the theological end philosophical 
connotations of ’lax/e of nature'; while chapter 24 continues this 
theme end also introduces the motivating doctrines of cultural 
activity «» common grace? cultural mandate, and man as God's office­
bearer* The principles gleaned from chapters 22 to 24 are then 
applied in a more practical \my to the environment (chapter 25) and 
technics (chapter 26), Here vm see two aspects of man's use, 
domination and submisBlon of the creation* The latter topic of 
technics introduces the problem of the dialectic of freedom and pwer 
%/hich leads into a more theoretical discussion of this in chapter 2?» 
Thus chapters 25 and 26 stand together as two areas of practical 
conoem; %/hile chapters 26 and 27 stand together as concerned with 
the problem of the dialectic of freedom and determinism.
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OIIAPPER 20
  Ml IM,I W in*immfI
a m  EELICtIQIJS m b  philosophical BABIB of 8GimG]3
It is imperative to iDriefly discuss certain fundaiïtental questions. 
Hence in this chapter I focus on the questions s itot is religion? ; 
what Is science?? and what Is philosophy?
2 0 .1 . liw f IB  m iaxoM ? ^
20,1.1* The Hature and Scope of Eeligious Xilfe. One thing is clear 
from Scriptures the Kingdom of God is as hroad as creation and must 
not he limited to, or confused with, one area of tha,t creation.
There Is no confusion of the institutional ohU3?ch (which is not a 
creational, ordinance hut relates to the ’^©demptive v/orlc of God iflthin 
creation) and the Kingdom (territory and rule) of God. liquating 
church and kingdom confuses the implications of the kingdom for the 
totality of life.
Confusion will also he inevitable when one begins with the 
presupposition that the order of creation is split into two realms of 
a higher and lower character* ibiyone holding such a dualism, no 
matter what he does or thinks, will operate within and from out of 
this two-realm view; not only will he start with an a -priori split of 
reality, he will start from such a split* It follows that all such 
thought will rearrange the various states of affairs within creation 
to suit this worldview*
**The result; in one fell swoop (executed at the very beginning, 
or accepted as 'done*) the total life of man before God - 
Eoligion ™ is reduced to nmn'a eultie life in the 
institutional church* In this way ell the non-ecolesiastical 
areas of life are denied the character of religion, of direct 
service to God* The oreation-order is 'split* into two realms 
or regiments, a 'spiritual* realm of the church, of grace, of 
faith, and a 'worldly* realm of the rest* of the state, of 
commerce etc.’* (Olthius, J«H* 1970, p#118.)
If religion is not to be reduced to church plus devotional life, 
what is it? Hooyeweerd contends that religion is g
"...the innate impulse of human selfhood to direct itself 
toward the true or tovjaaxl a -pretended absolute Origin of all 
temporal diversity of meaning, which it finds focused 
concentrically in itself." (1969e Vol.I p*57«)
1* The thesis here presented utilises the concept of religion in a 
different manner from normal - namely that 'life is religion'.
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opnemm of^in^x Ë^ Ê. 
of human existence* transcends all the diverse aspects of temporal 
real_itx (of# Tillich). It is not in essence a temporal phenomenon 
and can only be approximated in the concent3?io direction of our 
consciousness and not in the divergent direction. This means that 
any attempt to arrive at the content of religion from a 
phenomenological sense is not possible. True religion can never be 
explained by a mode of being, such ao the psychological or historical, 
for true religion is an absolute self-surrender. All :nen make such 
surrender for it is the created nature of them to do sof either they 
will surrender to the God who is there or they will think they-axe 
something in themselves end surrender to an Mol, an absolutiaed 
relative. Science tmfolds reality in terms of theoretical 
abstractions and therefor© teaches us neither a îmowledge of a deeper 
unity, nor the origins of our abstractions. It is only religion 
that motivates the search for unity and origin for it is it alone that 
compels us to concentrate the relative upon the absolute ground of 
all. Thus true religion drives men to the knowledge of God and self ; 
wMle idolatrous ground-motives compel an absolutiastion of that 
which is rela.tivo, a deification of that which is created, Wien 
someone absolutizes a relative aspect of created reality they can no 
longer con^rehend any of the aspects of reality In their intrinsic 
character, (Cf, Taylor, JS.L.H. 1970» P«358.)
Eeligioxx Is not something aspectual in life but undergirds all of 
life. Commenting on 1 Peter 2;7f» P.M. heare x^ites@
"There is coneiderabl© boldness in the lauguag© xfhioh describes 
the Christian Church as 'a race*, 'a nation*, *a people* - 
when in literal fact It embraced members of many different 
races and nations...«Yet it must be remembered that there was 
a distinct tendency in the micient world to think of religion 
as the essential basis of community, and of common religious 
observances as the determining feature of nationhood axid the 
one really significant factor of homogeneity," (1947» p.9 .^)
80.1.1.1, Religion and Morshiu. lothing may be excluded from 
religion. This distinguislies religion from worship, for while 
religion involves the whole of life, xmrshlp involves only a part.
Hon are called to worship God, and to #ieir ’daily task where they are 
to oarxy out their wo3?%c through faith «md seek His gloxy, "The 
entire life of the believer is religious. Prayer is therefore no 
more %)ious than work. To worship is not more pleasing to God than 
to be engaged in science," (Spier I966, p.5.)
20.1.1.2. Heligion and Paith# Religion is distinct from vrorsMp 
and from faith. Faith .teiotions in cosmic tiriae and is hound to the
temporal coherence of meaning with the other aspects of our 
existence. I'lhile Rooyoxvreerd makes this crucial distinction he 
nevertheless notes that the direction and content of fai'kh are hound 
up with the religious ground-motive by which it is directed. Such 
faith is possessed hy everyone? the unbeliever exercises faith just as 
much a.s does the believer, only his faith is misdirected * As the ■ 
highest of the law spheres the modality of faith possesses a maximum 
of rc-itrocipationa but no anticipations (cf. glossary). This holds 
xrhether faith is understood oiiristiehly or misinterpreted in a 
humanistic sense. (Of® ibid p.lOOf? Dooyeweerd 19^9» Vol.I p.90#)
VJliat is fai.th? The problem is the idea tacitly posited that
since ïmowledga is specific and certain, and faith is not the
equivalent of Icnowledge, then syllogistioally faith is not certain.
jAs 0. Guinness puts its "The way people talk about faith, you would
think that rationality, inquiry, investigation, understanding and
■proof all joined hands to form a circle of knowledge, leaving faith
outside in the cold." (1976@ p.29.) But in order to know anything
at all we ïîîust first of all eiesume certain tilings in faith. If we
do not first step out in faith xfe can know nothing. Thus
paradoxically in the final analyeiB reason can never justify itself.
"nationality is part of our greatness, but it a3.so serves to keep us
humble because rationality itself imist be assur/SGd by faith." (ibid
p.91.) Mor must we think of doubt as the antithasis of faith,
The opposite of faith is unfaith, or misdirected faith. Doubt is
the state of suspended judgement, a half-way house between one faith
and ano'bher. ¥e see something of this M  the original, meaning of
the Greek wosxl skeptikoa — inquirer. So faith and reason must not
be posited in a grace«»2iature dichotomy for the two only exist in 
2interaction.
As BooyeX'foerd writes, conooxning the importance of a clear insight 
into the modal, function of faiths
2# If we consider Lao-Tse's famous question we see something of the 
limitations of reasons "If when I was asleep I was a man dreamisig I 
was a butterfly, how do 1 knoxf when I cm mmXze that I am not a 
butterfly dreaming X am a man?" (in ib.id p,41.) Reason alone can 
never stop the d.izzying implications of this.
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"âocordiîig to the order of creation this terminal aspect was 
destined to function as the opened window of time throng, 
which the light of God's eternity should shine into the whole 
temporal coherence of the world. That this window îxae been 
closed hy sin, and cannot he opened hy man through his oim 
activity, does not mean that it cannot he disclosed hy the 
Divine power of the Holy Ghost. It does not mean that s:ln 
has the power to render this essential terfninal teiotion of 
temporal human existence unavailable as an instrument of God's 
grace in Jesus Oiirist, so that God would he obliged to create 
a new organ of believing outside of the 'natural' order of 
creation. Sin cannot deotro3?’ anybhing that is implied in the 
order of creation. Otherwise it would he a real counter- 
power over against the Creator, wheizeas in fact it derives its 
power only from creation itself." (I969, Vol. II p.302.)
Nevertheless faith is a, modal function within creation and not the 
religious dunasflis which transcends functional character and 
determines the content and direction of faith. The habit of looking 
on faith as equated with religion is what leads to the reduction of 
religion to an aspect of life, Thus wo find that the ker%ial meaning 
of the temporal sphere of faith flowing from the hef*rt of man can only 
he theoretically approximated as "an original triuiscendental certainty, 
within the limits of time, related to a revelation of the Arche which 
has captured the heart of human existence." (ibid p.304.)
20.1.1.3* Eeligion and Theology. The soientia of faith is theology* 
Me must not confuse religion and theology. Theology is a specific 
abstractive discipline which reflects on (îod and the things which 
pertain (particularly) to God. In Christian theology the specific 
field of study is the Scriptures and the hlstory/doct"j?ines of the 
Clîi?istian traditions. Yet, lilæ all other disciplines, theology 
needs a philosophical fomnclatlon. Hither it will adopt a«MM «S » 4UH MW» M W  # # *  Mmm W M WOf «KH MV7» m m  «tKT ^
hihlieally founded philosophy or one of the diverse autonomous 
philosophies. This philosophical base is requisite for it alone 
gives a theoretical insight into the inner structure and the inter­
lacing coherence of the vtn?ious aspects of our existence - of which 
theolo^ gy is hut one abstracted aspect. Philosophy seeks to give a 
stemoe vis a vis the whole of reol-ity as ox)posed to the specific 
disoiplines which are ahstraotod aspects.
We legitimately reduce re^ ility in theoretical investigations so 
that it may he G3r.a3iiined, hut we lose the tmie meaning of any aspect 
or mode of being if we fail to realise its place within the coherence 
of reality and overall meaning. This is why data qua data £io some 
sort of neutral zone is OTong. Bata is only meaningful data within
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the coherence of an overall worldview* Too often there is simply 
an uncritical acceptance of received Tforldviews with no radical 
attempt to e^ camlne and formulate our omi pMlosopliical awareness*
However the theoretical object of scientific inquiry can never be 
the full integral reality for the object of theoretical thou(#k as 
such can only be the result of a theoretical abstraction* Theology 
is a special soientia, as are physios, mathematics, biology, ethics, 
etc*, and therefore guard must be taken against making dogmatic 
theology into the mbiter as to the developing of om? life and 
world stance#
"#**dograatic theology is a very dangerous science# Its 
elevation to a, necessary mediator between God's Word and the 
believer amounts to idolatry and testifies to a fundamental 
misconception concerning its real character and position#
If our salvation be dépendent on theologies], dogmatics and 
exegesis, we are lost. For both of them are a human work, 
liable to all kinds of error, disagreement in opinion, and 
heresy." (Booyeweerd 1972, p*135*)
God does not speal^ , after all, to theologians or philosophers or 
scientists, but to sinners and calls them to repent and to live out 
their lives as imto Him* Bat conversely the simer is called as 
redeemed person to live as theologian, as philosopher, and as 
scientist before God, and in his academic life or daily toil to 
reflect the creational structures and ordinances of God*
20*1.2* Created Hofility Is Hot Self-Sufficient. Christian Theism 
holds that creation is not to be seen as autonomous, as some self- 
sufficient entity* The Gtoiotian scholar is called to avoid the 
idea that reason exists as some Icnovmand defined entity in distinction 
from God, such that it can fom an ultimate starting point. (Of* van 
Til, G. 1971/0-» p.21.) God has made all tliings, including mmi and
his reason, to be in relation to Himself and to each other* It is 
thus He Imparts meaning to creation. God alone gives this meaning, 
but He is not that meaning. God is above all meaning in that H© is 
eelf«*suffieient| He exists from and for Himself* Go Spier contends 
thats "The meaiiim: chaaracter of reality signifies that reality is 
relative and only God Absolute*" (I966, p.21$) Each aspect of 
reality, then, is an aspect of meaning but it is not complete in 
itself nor cax>able of integrating other aspects in itself. The 
attempt of man at theoretical autonomy is m  impossible venture for 
even when a man strives to implement it he can never place himself
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outside of his creational relationship to God* Man, even when 
rejeotiîig God, is still dependent on God for existence and meaning? 
he still lives In God's world* Man can reject in hie thought the 
law-03?der of God's creation "but thai: in no way obviates the reality 
of that law-struoture or that man is bound by it*
20.1.'^ .1. She faohe (of. 19.7.2.). She question of siasting points
ia oaTueial yet mmiy sim%)ly skip over thorn in an uncritical way, often 
ignoring a discussion here by stating that if someone does not agree 
with their starting point they are 'unscientific® - mled Cu priori) 
out of order* All possible starting points of scientific thought 
must be subjected to a radical criticism, for true critical thought 
does not allow the arbitrary choice of a starting point within a. mode 
of being* lot even mathematics is exempt.;
"In pure mathematics, the problem iimuediately arisess Hoi; is 
one to.view the rnutual reîationsliips bcWeen the aspects of 
ïiufftber, space, movement, sensory perception, logical thought 
and Sÿmboiicai signification? Different schools in pure 
mathematics such as loglcism, symbolistic foxmal-ism, 
empifioism and intuitionisra arise in accordance with their 
respective theoretical visions on this basic problem* «.* «
The first tliree schools, logicisBî, symbolistic formalism and 
empiricism, try to reduce the aspects of number’and space to 
the logical, the linguistic and the eensory-peroeptuaj. aspects 
respectively*" (Dooyeweerd 1969» Vol.I pp*47-48*)
There is a need to distinguish between iiltijnate and temporal 
starting points? euid bet'ween the Arche and the Archimedien points* 
Augustine and Galvin, for example, had no hesitation in starting from 
the self as a temporal starting point but this mist not be regarded 
as an assumption of an autonomous selfhood for they were well aware of 
the fact that while they cou3d start from the self reason outwards, 
this point (or origin) was in no way ultimate or integrational*
The modern antithesis to their thought is seen in Descartes who begem 
to reason from the self as the ultiBiate starting point with God only 
introduced to prevent a solipsism. (Of. van Til, G* 1969, p.ISO.)
The t:eue A.rohe can only be God* Ho is not however the 
Archlmedian point.* The ,Arche is referred to by the cosmos, and 
therefore lies outwith the cosmos? it is that on which the cosmos is 
dependent — the Creator* The whole question of the Arche is well 
euïïüned up by Augustine when he contended that there was no rest except 
ill God* God aZone is the Arche even when men construct fallacious
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origine within the feoimdary of ijie temporal ooemio horizon®
20*1*3-2» The Ârchimedian Point» The Arcliimediaii point le different 
from the Arche end has essentially two poles - one within man, the 
other external to man* The p&iradox is that man can only start from 
himself hy integrating about God or on idol; he can ohly step outside 
himself by starting from h5.mself * . It might seem that the idea of 
an Archimedian point within men is strange, but 'I* cannot transcend 
myself* Therefore in this sense the Arohimediam point for all of 
man's thought is seen to reside in the heart/soul of man. The 
Archimedian point is not rational thought itself, but is posited by a 
religious act of the self which tr;ansoends the intellect* It has 
been suggested that om? Arohimedian point is to be found, not 
rationally but existentially mid that this transcends philosophical 
thought* (Gf. Ka3.abeek 1 9 7 3 »  P * 3 B . )  For the Christian the 
external. Arohimedian point is Christ in whom we find the reborn root 
of manlcind, where wo find the rebirth of self. Thus our emphasis 
falls on Christ as the creaturely centre of a restored cosmos in idiom 
we participate in the restored centre of our iridividual existence and 
transcend creation* So the Ai:’Ghe and Archimedian point are sharply 
distinguished * There are, of course, also the false integration
points of hmiemistic thought which tend to be bousid to m  absolutized 
mode of being* The xion-otoistian position is tied closely to some
immanentlstic view, while the Gteistian position allows for a true 
integ3?ation imd traxiscendcnce of reality. (Cf* Dooyeweerd 1969, Vol.I
pp*8«-21*)
Hence the real starting point is not the rational self but the 
religious motive operative and directive in the heart of man. 
Dooyev;eerd outlines four basic motives in VJootem thoughts the Greek 
forrii-matter dualism; the early grace-naturo dualism; the modem 
freedom-natisre :forînulation of this; and the Cïiriotian motive of 
creation, fall into sin and redemption in Christ. As one or other 
of those gripe the heai't of a man, so M s  life and philoaopiiy will be 
directed by it. (Cf* Appendix A.) Man is either bound to the true 
Archimedien point of Christ or to a false idol, and ïfooyaweerd argues 
thats
"By seekin,g his God and himself in the temporal world, and by 
elevating a relative and dependent aspect of this world to the 
of the absolute, man fell prey to idolatry* Ho lost the 
true knowledge of God and true self-Imowl edge * The idea that 
true self—ïmowledge may be regained by an axis tent iali s tic 
philosophy, apart from the divis'ie WoM-rovelation, is nothing
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but the old vain Illusion that the huBsan I ie something in 
itself, independent of God who has revealed Himself as the 
Creator." ( 1972, p«190f<i)
Heoognition of the .faltMiseotioii of the
heart and the importance of the .techimedian point is found in 
various vn?iters« Wittgenstein writes g "The sense of the world must 
lie outside the world***.If there is any value that does have a value, 
it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case*" 
(1961, 6*41») G*CU Jung commentes "Me always require an outside 
3point to stand on, in order to apply the lover of criticism*" (1971, 
p*274*) f A® Gesîïus writes s “As rivals of the Creator, they liave 
inescapably been led to the point of reconstzuoting creation according 
to their om eoncepto»" (1971s p*72.) Me are therefore directed to 
examine the heart of man in its basic orientation* 8orij>turG gives 
aiaple indie action that the heart is the controlling centre of man's 
existence* This heart is soaiething other than om: fimotioning or 
feelings, and is to be distinguished froHi the issues of life, such as 
the psychical* Since the Fall and the coming of Christ there are 
two basic motives operative in the heart of man* Firstly there is 
the motive of apostasy from the true God where we find that the 
religious power of rebellion leads the heart of man to deify either 
himself or some ©sternal facet of creation* Her© Is the 
absolutizing of the relative even in theoretical reflection* In our 
modem culture this has teton a predomimmt form in the stress on the 
free autonomous reasoxi of the human personality and on the science 
evoked by this and directed to the domination and exploitation of 
nature* Secondly there is the dimemis of the Holy Spirit which 
through the work of Christ seeks to redirect the heeœt of man and the 
whole of creation back to its true Origin (the Father) * (Cf*
Dooyeweerd 1972, p.139*) Thus in the basic irwofold direction of 
the human heart we find ourselves driven back to the doctrine of 
antithesis^  There is no reconciliation between the M.ngdom of
l/'iM
3* The 'heart* obviously does not refer heaxî to the physical organ 
and the following biblical usag^ js can be noted g (a) it signifies the 
innermost being of man in contrast with external features (jer* 29,13% 
Joel 2?13*)| (b) it sign ifies the soureo of life (Jer* 4;18*); (o) it 
is the background of ail wisdom and reason (P-s* 90»12*)? (d) it is the 
background of all words and deeds (Mat* 12?34s 13,19*); (c) it is the 
baokgroiind of our emotional life (Prov* 13»13*); (f) it is the source 
of sin (Gen* 8?21*); (g) it is represented as the deepest centre of 
our entire tempora'J. existence where the renewing work of the Spirit 
of God takes place (Ps, 31?10*)*
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dfirlaiess and that of lights between evil and goodt, Therefore in 
principle the antithesiB is absolute, pexmieating the entirety of 
existence. (Of* Taylor* 1970» p*36?«)
In tixe sense that no one can occupy a position outside of hiiaself, 
our starting point cannot he separate from ourselves* Yet any such 
point îiaist transcend the diversity of modal 'be3ng which constitutes 
the cosmos* Such a point is found in the heart/soul of man# The 
heart;, as the datura of man's life, can never be neutral before its 
Maker, and the choice which the heart makes in life can never be 
theoretical, but only religious* The heart is the concentration 
point, the religious root of human existence* It Is directed either 
to God or ai'/ay from God, and here we are reminded of the Angustinian 
distinction between the 'civitas terrena' and the 'civitas del'*
TMs is not the relative anti thesis of logical, and non-logical thought 
but a. spiritual antithesis between the Spirit of God and the spirit of 
darîœesB* This is absolute* Thus Kohnetairai, who is not a 
member of the Booyeweerdian school, oa,n agree- that soientifio 
judgements can never ultlioately rest on theoretical evaluations but 
must flow from decisions in which the whole personality is iïxvolved* 
(Of* Kalsbeek 1973, P«47:f.)
No matter what activity man is enga^fi in the whole personality 
is involved» This is, of course, quite simply to reiterate the 
injunction of Christ thett we ere to love God with all our heart, all 
oua? mind, all our strength and s3,l ous? soul* This would leave no 
province of man's being in space and time that was not directed 
towards his Arche* Nothing is withdrawn from the life of religion 
before the face of the Creator* It would seem fair in the light of
this to suggest tWt it ie out of the heart, not out of i;he head,
that the Issues of life flow# "The heart remains the unseen player
on the keyboard of pliilosophical thinking*" (ibid p*51«)
To quote J*J« Louet Feisser, who is not a Booyew^ eerdiim^
"The PMlosopliy of the Cosmonomie Idea has dismissed the 
illusion of the existence of an, mprejudiced and autonomous 
philosopliy of Reason which fails to acîaïowledge its own 
presuppositions, but t-jhich nevertheless rejects out of hand 
every other point of departure as being unscientific # In 
this dismissal, in our opinion, it has mode a very significant 
contribution not only to the resxewetl of philosopMoEd 
reflection in general, but also to the rediscovery of 
philoscpMa Christiana, t-Axieh is not the hobby of a group of 
religiously biased BoJiian Catholics or Calvinists but deserves 
recognition as an aaithentie possibility of scientific
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MXosophy Itself." (in IMd p*51«)iji
20*2# imàT IS SGIMCS?
m,.2,l«_æhg_#50Sàj.q_'.gmMl. Ste gæeatsst problem in faoing this .
question is that in our British empirical oulture snci^ tradition, 
science is so often seen to deal with 'facts' quite independent of any 
significantf philosophical or religious influences* This "prejudice 
concerning the independence of special science in respect to 
philosophy seems to he nearly unoonquerahle*" (Dooyeweerd 19^9, Vol.I 
p.545#) Rearguard actions abte^ iipt to keep philosoplnjr and science 
separate, to maJjatain 'ohjectlvity' in science* This line of 
thought is advocated spec5.flcally with reference to the natural 
sciences which indicates how the concept of soientia has been limited 
to a certain, area; This tendency reveeds the attempt to construct 
an objective neutral- science in isolation from philosophical, 
religious and ldeologl.cal influences. It is often contended3 what 
cou3.d he more ohjective/neutral than mathematles or physics (of* 13*1.)? 
But as we have seen froiii the historij?- of science and the ciir2?e?it state 
of these disciplines, philosophy is of crucial dete^mi^nation» It
is my contention that.it is not possible to draw a line of demarcatiosi 
between soi^ice and philosophy In order to free science from 
philosophy (of. 15»3*3*2.).
"It would fflEike sense to spealc of the autonomy of the special 
sciences, if, and only if, a special science could actually 
Investigate a specific aspect of temporal reality without 
theoretically considering its coherence with the other aspects." 
(ibid Vol.I p.548.)
Modem physics rests upon epietemological presuppositions (of* 
Heisenberg's acïmowledg’ed epistemologlcsl programme) which ïiave had 
to fight the formerly ruling mechanical and Aristotelian concepts of 
nature. Yet most pliysieists seem to carry on their investigations 
with little aWfijreness of thei3? philosophical irap3.ications or ground. 
They simply accept a received philosophical system as æciomatic (cf. 
IMm's 'normal science ' ). This srarb of naivete must remain a 
dangerous l.uxury which no Christian scholar oazi affo3:?d«
The theoretical scientist is often inc“J.ined to maintain that in 
his routine constructive work — which may be dissociated from more 
speculative realms « he operates i?ith technical methods and concepts 
which are isxdependent of philosophical and religious choices. This 
is the appeal to 'reality', to the 'facts'* In spite of such claims
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the txuth of the matter Is that behimd all technicM methods and 
concepts are hidden apeoific philosophical postulates» It is thus 
wrong to reduce a real problem to a merely 'teobnical * one, for this 
ie. to reduce reality to an aspect® A specific pz'oblem in real.ity 
may well have a strong techni.oal ccasponent hut in i:he final analysis 
this too has a philosophical basis — the science of metrology could he 
msxrbioned here* In ecology v^q are concerned with a physical 
problem (how to create the right environment) and an ethical-spiritual 
proh3.erû (what kind of envir'omaent is desired.)* But we mxBt never- 
think that religious implications affect the latter hut ere 
iiioonsequential to the former.
20*2*2» The Ooherence of the Sciences * The appeal to 'reality* in 
scientj.fic s-ctivity is never truly free from pMlosophical«=religlous 
^prejudice® TMs follows in that it is impossible for any particular 
■ science (which is aspeotual) to grasp an event :m its full integral 
reality. Psychology, for exsBiple, gives tMs away when Aldous 
Huxley could remarks "Bignificently enough the patients of Freudian 
therapists regularly dream in Freudian symbols, whereas the patients 
of Jui'igian therapists silimya come up with archetypes*" (1963, p*80.)
The natui'e of the case is that as soon as a special science is bom 
it is confronted with philosophical problems relating to the modal 
structure of its special aspect which delimits its field of research, 
how it re3,atss to other modal aspects and to the cohering wholeness of 
the reality ' from which the aspect i© abstracted*
Under the disguise of philosophical neutrality the technical 
pragmatic conception of scientific activitjf is misleading^ for it 
fails to confess that It itself is a particular philosopMcal
indeed in every modal aspect of reality we 
can distinguish a general fimotloirmg coherence which bonds together 
the individual functions of things ^ events or rel ationships %^ is a vis 
Borne spec.ific modal laif-sphex’es* This coherence has an independent 
tuL'istencQ to that of the differences between these things, events or 
relationships which function In the same sphere*. We may also 
dletingviisit the typical stnic'tisral differences which are revealed 
within a modal aspect and which are to be seen i.n terms of the 
structures of .individuality of temporal s^ eality in its enJsaptiosl 
sense* Thus the functional coherence betireen phenomena :ln the 
pî-a^ '^Bical aspect of reality is to be abstractively viewed as indifferent 
to the ixitemal differences displayed by reality within its structures
411
of Individuality* Booyeweerd contends that "there le no single 
science, except pwe mathematics, wMch is not confronted with 
reality in its typical structures of individuality*" (1969» Vol.I 
P»934*) Ghemistaqr and physics, while quit© different, investigate 
the same aspect of reality and can no longer work merely with a 
general concept of function®
The physical aspect of reality does not allow itsMf to he 
understood hy our scientific abstractions apart from a subjective 
insight into the mutual relation and coherence of the diverse aspects 
within the overall temporal order* Interestingly a thinker from a 
quite different vievfpolM from cosmonomism notes s
• "The prima facie view is the judgement of our personality eta
a whole, in contact with nature as a whole; that is, a 
judgement in which our entire being takes part* But the
«Eanalytical or scientific view is a partial view*##®
(Illingworth I966, p*32*)
Abstract Nature of SGlenoe. Abstraction from reality is 
necessary for the development of thou^t, and as a division of labour
necessary for the development of life# But this never obviates the
character of science as abstractive# yet only possessing true meaning 
when placed back into the wholeness of reality - the wholeness of God': 
creation. All science "pre-supposes a theoretical view of reality, 
because it must continually appeal to it*" (Booyeweerd I969» Vol.I 
P.999») At this juncture we can note the distinction of Torrance 
between intuitive and abstractive knowledge,
"Intuitive îmowledap is the direct knowledge of an actually 
present object caused naturally by that object and not by 
another* It is îoaowledge that is Izmedlately evident, that
is, knowledge by virtue of which it can be known whether the
object exist© or not, knowledge in which the mind cannot fail 
to attain the truth unless it is obstructed. Intuitive 
knowledge arises, then, out of direct experience," (1979» P-79*)
(of, my theoretical thought), Torrance goes on to compare this 
with abstractive knowledge. He writes s
^^ Abstractive knowledge is knowledge in which we apprehend 
something not as it is in itself, but through abstraction 
from its existence or tteough the species abstracted from some 
other thing. In abstractive knowledge we do not have to do 
with immédiate experience but with Ideas detached from 
experience and related, to one another logically through the 
discursive reason," (ibid p,T9*)
In a-bstraotive knowledge we struggle against the basic premiss of 
rationalism and empiricism which would endeavour to begin with man
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alone in order to find a miifled meaning to life* But as Torrance 
so succinctly puts Iti "The 'autonomous reason’ is, of course, a 
diseased fom of rationality»" (l969/b, p*26 cf* Bichaxdson 1963»
p«248,) The trouble of rationalistic specialisation is that it has 
lost sight of the inner coherence of all things in God* In the 
final sjnalysis tjxie science relates man to nature end to God in thats 
"Man is seen as totally dependent upon Ood at every moment of his 
existence...ultimate ground is the Creator...The scientific quest . 
itself talms on its full oignifieance only within this context of 
creation*®^  (McMllixi I968» pp.40-41*)
Faith l© the foundation of every 
science* Scientific work is itself a religious activity (cf.
Kuÿper, Coulson etc») and there can be no conflict between faith end 
science - though there can be a olaah between a particular faith mid a 
particular view of science, bcWeen one faith and another* The 
religious nature of all of life, including science, derives from the 
nature of human life as religion* Han. is so created that he is 
forced to find meaning for 3J.fe either in the God who created him, or 
in some idol, some false surrogate of his construction* Both Ihi^ fper 
and Booyeweerd claim that ’life is religion’ — not that life is 
religious - to highli#it that it is not an aspect that is religious, 
but ell of life that is involved*
20*3* MEAT 18 BEH,080HIY?
20.3*1* The Nature and Scone of Philosophy. The Philosophy of the 
Cosmonomle Idea contends that no philosopher can exercise tîiought in 
an autonomous realm cut off from the revelation of God* Yet 
philosopher nor se is confined to the temporal and does not concern 
itself with supratemporal concerns. Thus it has been suggested that 
when we philosophise we seek to discern the structures of creation and 
describe than oystematioa3.1y* (Of# ICalsbeek 1975» 3>35*) Philosophy 
is concerned with disoemisig overall questions concerning the 
integration of particular scientific disciplines «• lne].uding theology « 
and no discipline can in fact exist in separation fa^ om phl-Xosophioal, 
religious and pre-theoretical thought. To exist separa-tely a 
scientist would have to be able to confine Mmself to some body of 
’facts’. But the moment you ask a man who contends that he only 
deals with ’facts’ to e^glaln M s  ’.facts* out will come his philosophy, 
It is impossible to study 3. part of reality without some overall view 
of the whole of that reality. Thus this must be seen as an
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essential facet of ell theoretical thought - whether it he ethics or 
mathematics - that some general worldview is involved, which directs 
thought and action* Theoretical» or abstractive, thought is never 
simply photographic but always interpretative# Science does not 
mecrely record reality but imposes ©n interpretation on it that can be 
either faithful or unfaithful to that reality* Any given theory 
either oorresponds validly to» or misconstrues, reality* At the 
centre of scientific activity lies a process of analysis, 
conceptualization and explanation as well m  description. This can 
be illustrated with reference to mathematics - the most ’objective* of 
the disciplines* Is arithmetic to be permitted to reduce the 
subject-side of number in a rationalist way to a function of the 
principle of progression? Con it justify the conception of space
as a continuum of points? Can it autonomously designate real
nurabers as spatial points, end so on? To simply ask such questions 
exposes the philosophical heart of mathematical thou#it# "No 
mathematician can remain neutral to them* With or without 
philOBopMoal reflection on his presuppositions he must make a choice#" 
(booyeweerd 1969» Vol#I p*549*) This is corroborated by Komers
"Since the philosophy of mathematics la mainly concerned with 
the exhibition, of the structure and function of mathematical 
theories, it would seem to be independent of any speculative 
or metaphysical assumptions* Yet it may be doubted whether 
such autonomy is even in urinoiule uoeslble — whether it is 
not*•.restricted by the mere choice of conceptual apparatus or 
terminology for dealing with the problems of the subject###*
In fact all the philosophies of mathematics so far put forward 
• ••have been either ezcplioltly developed within the frameworîc 
of some wider philosophical system or have been pervaded by 
the spirit of some miformulated Weltsmsohauung." (1971» pp#11«-12#)
It may further be argued that total objectivity is impossible for the 
selfhood always intrudes in any human activity# Thus as philosophy 
directs the general trend ' of thougtit, so also there are presuppositions 
behind that philosophy# Presuppositions that may» or may not» be 
consistent with the overall philosophical vieiqjolnt* Science» for 
instance» Is dependent on the concept of law and all scientists 
aolwowledge this even though some would like to reject the idea (cf# 
Harre 1967» p#107«)# There are presupposita that are coercive on 
man if he is to thWc and act? and at a secondary level there are 
presuppositions where choice is exercised (and these are essentially 
nothing but translated convictions#)
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20.3*2. The Booyeweerdian Critique. Booyoweerd presents a rsuiicaX 
critique at the frontiers of philosop%- which con he summarised here 
by his three basic questions which he directs at pMloeophicel 
reflection, and by his postulation of three transcendental ideas 
associated with them. The first question oonoems that which is 
abstracted from the integral structure of reality in the gegenstend 
(cf. gloBsm:y) relatimishlp arid which ie therefore characteristic for 
the stn^cture of theoretical thought. Thus he asks what the 
continuous bond of coherence between logical acd non-logical aspects 
of experience may be (1972, p*12»). The second question concerne 
the pre-philosophioal starting point from which philosophy can receive 
its total view necessary to bring together the aspects which are 
separated in theoretical thought. That is; ®®Mhat is the central
referenoe-point in our consciousness froja which this theoretical
synthesis can start?" (ibid p.19*) The third question concerns the
possibility of the critical self-reflection with respect to the 
selfhood. ®*Hqw ie the concentric direction of theoretical thought 
towards the ©go possible, and what is its "source?" (ibid p.22.)
This question emmot be solved without knowing the inner nature of 
the selfhood, without self-loiowledge (cf. ch.21.).
Three transcendental Ideas are correlated with these questions as 
essential for philosopiTy to begin. (a) An Idea coneorning the
mutual coh€>.reno© and relation of the various aspects which have been 
set apart in the abstractive procedure* (b) An Idea concerning the 
root(s) or radis (radices) of the various abstracted elements — or a 
totality concept. (c) An Idea concerning the selfhood and of the 
origin(s) of reality. These Ideas are spoken of as the three 
moments (for they are unbrealcably intemoven and correlated) of the 
transcendental Idea of philosophy.
20,^ 3*g. # e  Pretended Autonomy of Theoretical Thowdit. There is a 
widespread %)r@tended autonomy of theoretical thought. If all 
theoretical thought in m y  given field, that claimed to choose a 
starting point in theoretical reason alone, had in fact no deeper 
preouppositiocs it should bo possible to settle every difference In a 
theoretical manner# This does not occur in either philosophy or 
science* Proponents of different views — working out of different 
paradifps - inevitably argue at cross-purposes and a debate cannot be 
resolved by reason alone* As long as starting points at a 
pre-thaoretical level vary, ao €ilso will there be little room for
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a reaolutim of views at a theoretical level*
In modem Western thought the tendency is to assiime the ultimacy 
of the self* This is o3.early seen in the majority of philosopMoal 
schools and has led to a genoral relativism in eplstemology and 
metaphysics* Here lies the root of the lack of confidence in 
knowledge and truth, because man is the ultimate starting point - and 
it is correctly realised that man does not provide in himself an 
integration point for the cosmos* This move is found even in 
theological circles where it might he expected there would have been 
a greater resistance to the idea of the primacy of man# But 
theology, following secular thought, lias tended to move from studying 
as its academic field what God has said to man about man, the cosmos 
and mmself, to a consideration of what man has thought about man, the 
cosmos and God. To give another example; subjective idealism cuts
the subject loose from the object of knowledge, or denies the
existence of any construct beyond itself* Tiiis we have already 
seen in previous chapters (of# 'Part II), and here the logical 
conclusion of this position is noted; in sepm;ating the subject and 
the object of knowledge, idealism must also cut itself loose from God# 
It too is an assertion of an Independence of man from God#
Fian's desire for autonomy from God, the erection of self-contained 
and self-sufficient systems of thought, or theory, leads to an 
irreducible paradox fors
"To maintain this autonomy, they are obliged to seek their 
starting-point in theoretical thought itself# But by virtue 
of its antithetic structure, this thought is bound to the 
inter-modEil theoretical synthesis between the logical and the
non-logical aspects# Even a so-called formal logic cannot 
do without a synthesis between the logical aspect and that of 
eymbolica], signlfioation. # (ibid p#19*)
Attempting to avoid this paradox invariably leads to the 
absolutizing of one (or several) of the modes of being, wliloh is a 
reductionism resulting from the attempt to integr^ -te all modal aspects 
of tenqjoral experience as simple modalities of the absolutized aspect# 
But this approach has never been resolved and ,dualism has always 
crept in to the overall view# Mature and grace gave way to nature 
and freedom, and this is typified in the confrontation of the science- 
ideal and the personality-ideal * Thue Dsn-jin absolutized the biotic 
aspect; Wittgenstein the linguistic; Ayer the analytical and psychical? 
and Kant the ethical and analytical (of. Appendix B)* But any such
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abBOlutdzatlon ie itself an aot of faith. âs Stoker coiranents;
'®The materialist» for instance, may rightly contend that 
matter exists and that all ’things' are somehow related, to 
matter, hut how precisely does he know that matter is 
absolute, that of and through and to matter all things are?
The abaolAitenees of matter .he cannot observe or infer from 
M s  observations; only his religious faith, his sense of 
deity (with which he is ereationally endowed) and God's 
revelation in matter makes this ah3o3.utiaation possible."
(1971, p.51.)
Further, no absolutisation of a modal aspect cmi he justified from a 
purely theoretical standpoint. Hence an absolutisation cannot 
originate in theoretical thought itself, but testifies instead to the 
influence of oupra-theoretioM motives which "are masked by the 
Y>retencled autonomy of philosophioM thought." (hooyeweerd 1972, p.21.)
The problem of this pretended autononiy' of theoretical thought is 
that it is not critical enough of the 'I'» I)ooyev;eerd comments;
"...each atten^t to grasp this central ego in a logical concept 
and to define it with the aid of synthetically conceived modal 
aspects of our temporal expericmtial horizon a%jpeered to be 
doomed to failure....The central unity of the selfhood is not 
to be found in the modal diversity of the temporal order. A 
phyeico-peyohical I does not exist, neither a logical, a 
historical, nor a moral self." (ibid p.27.)
20.3.4. The Secular Philosophical Potions. In tersas of the more 
general seculm: philosophical scene in Britain today the vleigoint I 
would adopt wouM be a qualified critical transcendental realism — 
qualified by the reMity of the Creator and creational struc'tures and 
ordinances. It is evident that the scientific activity of mem which 
produces/unfoldc knowledgo is a social activity and therefore subject 
to the changes of society. But this must not be seen as a tendency 
to subjective idealism in science - science is not existential in 
that way for it involves the knowledge of things, of states of affairs, 
wliioh continue to exist apart from These intransitive objects
cf Iciowledge arc invæ^iant to our îmowledge of them. This view 
rejects classical empiricism which views îmowleclgo and the world as 
su3?faces whose poin/lîB are in isomorphic correspondence with science 
giving an automatic response to the stimulus of facts* It also 
rejects transcendental idealism which views the objects of scientific 
Imowledge as models, ideal,©, of the natural order. Here Imowledge 
is a structure rather than a surface within wM,ch reality is viewed
4# Of. Popper 1975, p|>.42ff. - especlMly hio reference to
Winston Churchill*
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and the natural world tends to heoome a oonatruot of the hiiDian laind*
A third option is transesndental realism where the object of knowledge 
is equated with the steictures and meohaniBins that genemte phenomena# 
Such objects are neither reduced to phenomena (empiricism) or to 
human constructs (idealism) hut are real structures in a real world 
existing independent of man* This approach leaves ample room for 
fallihility in Imman knowledge* he a, fallihist about Imowledge,
it ie necessary to he a realist about things# Oonvereely, to he a 
sceptic-about thin^p is. to be a dogjïiatist about knowledge**® (Bhaskar 
1975, P.43»)
It follows that it ie a mistake to a3?gu© from fche current state of 
science to philosophy# If philosophy is that which undergirds 
science then it is non-sense to so proceed for clearly we should be 
moving paîimarily in the opposite di:i?eation# Al'khough feedback end 
interaction will inevitably take place# But essentially the realist 
is interested in truth (cf# ibid p#l66»)# Yet care must be taken to 
avoid atomising truth# detail is oxxly a detail because it is a
detail of a greater whole# For this reason 'a fact' is more tîian a 
'bare fact', and an occurrence is more than a 'naked occurrence. 
(%uidema 1972» p#126*) The scientist is ever concerned, even in his 
special science, with the lawful eohesi'ence of facts, with their order 
and organisation* This does not negate ' the experimental method at 
the heart of modem science, but experiments are alw^s motivated by 
some prior problem and therefore always directed to a solution of 
theoretical questions which the scientist himself has formulated*
However a caveat is necessary at this 
juncture in case my view becomes associated with the secular humanist 
philosophy known as 'transcendental reMisra'# This philosopliy, in 
opposition to Kant, acîmowledges that the categories of thought 
sustain a relation to the ding^  an sich# repudiating the Kantian view 
that the thing-in-itself is unknowable® This viewpoint, because of
Its initial point of departure, misconstrues and rejects the pre- 
abstract-ive exx>erienoe of reMity*
Secondly, whl3.e I wish to stress the underlying role ■ of philosophy 
in. science it is beyond question, that man is not in the first instance 
a philosophical being*
"It is out of the question that any creature behaves at root 
philosophically in his totality or in his concentrating self­
hood* This is certainly beyond dispute with respect to the
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plant and animai IdngdcmB# Howewr, msm also la not a 
'philosophical being»' and also the man of philosophy, qua 
man, is more than philosopher, and qua philosophes?» cloee not 
find his point of departure in his philosophical activity# 
let alone in its results*" (iMd p#124«)
Yet philosophy is a force to 'be reckoned with even for those who are 
blind to it© Influence# A philosophy always involves a built-in- 
orientation to a total worlcliriew and it Is hecsmse of this totality- • 
tendency that Its directive influence on life must not be overlooked*
feom the Chsistiaa view-
point the salf-îoxowledg© without which no theoretical thought can 
proceed is, in the laet analysis, dependent upon the knowledge of God# 
Of course both self-knowledge and knowledge of God as the Origin and 
integrator of all meaning (or the eons true ti<m of some pseudo-origin) 
goes beyond the limits of abstractive theoretical reflection* It 
is rooted in the heart of mang it is centred in the religious fulcrum 
of our existence# This does not mean that this knowledge is shut up 
iii the heairt of man for by Its very nature it penetrates the temporal, 
sphere of our coasolousness * A real account of this is only given 
in the biblical revelation ooneerning the creation and character of 
man In the image - of God# God reveals Himself aa the absolute 
Creator end Euler and thus excludes every independent power which would 
rival Him» He-has given to man M s  image; "concentrating its entire 
temporal existence in the radical religious unity of an ego in which 
the totality of meaning of the temporal cosmos was to be focused upon 
Its Origin#" (Dooyeweerd 1969» p*55*) Thus there is a
fundamental dependence in the self-knowledge of man on the knowledge 
of his Maker#
Tim human 'I' or 'Ego' (or self, heart, soul.) of man functions in 
all the aspects of temporal oreatedness# But it Is not exhausted 
by any single aspect, nor does it coincide with the collective 
summation of the modalities# This hcman self stands at the centre 
of three relations# There is Its relation to the modal aspects in 
which it functions (including the psychologloal) ; end its relationship 
to others# In both these relations — to the diverse aspects of 
creation» and our neighbour the deepest essence of the selfhood is 
involved, but it is not determined by them* The essence of the 'I' 
is determined only in relation to God - or in whatever the 'I' 
considers to be God# This bond between the selfhood and God (or 
idol) ie religion# "Religion is 'religio'» l#e#, connection between
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the meaning!? of creation and the Being of the Arche»®® (ihid p*104*)
20.4. PltOFOBrnOIS OOMOMIIG RELIGION; SCMCEa PHIL0SÔPH1
20.4.1.. lieXifilpn. There will, over all life and thought» he the
recognition that there is no autonomous province, no erea of neutrality, 
There is a need to recognise that there is an organic relationship 
between faith and science which maïces the Christian faith fruitful in 
every avenue of life, subjecting all to the kingship of Christ. The 
Glmistian is called to deepen M s  understanding of the sciences in the 
confidence that the universe is the hord's and the fulness thereof.
Ho is called to wield the trowel and the sword. (Of. Spier 1966» p*11.) 
The trowel to achieve more clarity through scientific examination of 
God’s wisdom in His works; the sword to stand a^ gainst the intrusions 
of the kingdom of dorlcness.
The fundamental proposition under this head is that § life is 
religion. Holiglon is the root of human seXfiiood and as such is to 
be distinguished from worship, faith and theolo^.
20.4.2. Science* This does no*b mean that we construct science or 
philosophy from the Bible alone for in these areas we are confronted 
by the revelation of creation, qua creation, to man. It would be 
folly to bind science, now recognised as temporM and faulty, to the 
Word of God. The Word is not proved by appeal to sciontifie data or 
theories; nor is science proved by appeal to texts, though these two 
will be consistent in that science is a true reflection of the laws of 
God when it is faithful to reality. But science is not a ground 
for spiritual analogies.
*'That there is some analogy between nature and the Christian 
life may be supposed from Christ's use of parables from nature. 
However, it is a mistake to assume that the ' Christiasi* in 
Christian scientific endeavour is the discovery of some such 
analogies, perhaps vestlMa trinitis in the structure of the 
universe ." (lhmdsen**lmdated'»^
The task of the scientist is not to create or invent 'natural laws' 
out of a diversity of data; nor is it to devise models of the universe. 
That would imply the autonomy of seienoe which overlooks the 
creaturâLiness of the scientist. Within biblical perspective the 
scientist Is cMled to a discovery process which uncovers and explores 
the diverse levels which God has woven in one seamless web In His 
creation. Science must be a disciplined response to revelation? aîi 
attempt to rethink the thoughts of God after Him*
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I therefore moke the following propositions concerning science#
(a) Seientia is the abstracting activity of man’s theoretical 
reflection on God's creation#
(h) Science Is that moans whereby we fulfil in a positive manner God's 
cultural mandate to subdue &md control the earth# By it we 
understand the processes of creation and so are allowed (in belief In 
the constancy of God) to make predictions concerning the future 
activity of things, events aîid relationships wlthhi creation#
(c) Bcientia analyses conditions; it deals with the 'if such mid such, 
then thils and that will follow* type of situation# Gome conditions 
seem to be of absolute character (the objective sciences); while others 
are nosxaative (ethics, jurisprudence etc#)»
(d) Soientia cannot be dissociated from philosoplTy or religion* 
Dooyeweerd notes s "Bcience pre-supposes a theoretical view of reality, 
because it must continually appeal to it#" (1969 Vol.I p.559#)
20«4*|5,» PhiXosp-phy. Some significant features can be summarised#
(a)The unity and diversity of the cosmos must be founded In the 
sovereign will of God as Oreator, who reveals Himself siipreBiely in 
Ghrist, but also in creation and scripture.
(b) FMlosophy lies behind science and is the analyser of scientific 
activity — how scientists go about their work and what value the 
ecÆiolusions they draw liave for life.
(c) In a world where scientists love detail, the tEisk of philosopliy 
is to integrate science, to unfold the meaning of the minutiae of 
detail in their rela/bion one to another. The underlying unity of 
a3.1 cosmic events is found In the religious conmmnity of those who 
foil in Adam and are renewed, in Ghazist#
(d) Philosopher must be based on, and seek to unfold, meaning as 
reflective of God's djuiaaiic ,grlp on creation. The unity of the law 
which transcends all temporal diversity of the aspects of being must 
ba found in the demand to serve God with our v?hole being.
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GHAPT.® 21
THE EPISllMOBOaiCAIi BASIS OF BOIMgg
21,1* BOM mOBimB OF KNOWLEDGE ^
21.1.1. The Interaction of Khower# Knowiiig, Khpwable,^ and Knowledge*
It 1$ neeesaary to distinguish between man as lo;iower, acts of Imowlng, 
the knowable, and Imowledge if oonfueion is to be avoided. î-îan as 
Imower stands in the scheme of oroa-tion, fall and azedemption in Jesus 
Glirist even thou^ he embra.ees some other motive. He only knows
because God is there and has made liim a Imowing being® Each act of 
loiowlng is a unit and always unique, and therefore irreducible and 
undefinable as such. This points to the futility of attempted 
autononiy or self-integration. In Imovjingg perceiving and thinking
exist in enkaptical relation. Nevertheless the knowable is not
confined to perception, nor to things immanent. Man knows the things 
of God as it pleases God to reveal them to him; he ommot Imow the 
plan of God's salvation by mere cognition or perception, but only 
within the azavoaled Word of God. But man can Imow the external 
world without any special revelation of God for it is Imowable tlirough 
general revelation. The cosmos is not made knowablo by man, nor 
does man give it meaning. Man is meaning; the cosmos la moaning «• 
in dependence on God. The Imowledgo that man has as a result of the 
above is possibly true but never exhaustive for God alone has absolute 
Icaowlodge. Man's Imowledge is creaturely and derivative of God*
Having noted these distinctions it is necessary to note the 
correlation of these asjpeoto. By perceiving, man comes into contact 
with the knowable (tailing perception to include an examination of the 
Wo5zd—revelation). Man, however, only meets the Imowable by trusting 
it; in order to kîiow, faith in the Imowable is an indispensible 
necessity. Faith itself is a f£icet of Imowing without which man as
Imower would not meet the Imowable (of. 20.1*1.2.); it is a surrender 
to the Imowable by man without which he cannot fulfil his task of 
knowing. Out of this mem forms his theoretic realm by thinlcing.
®*Thinkinr^  has a remarkable control over its theoretical 
constructions. Left by itself, it can arbitrarily break up, 
take apart, aeparate, tear aseimder, as well as combine, join 
together, connect, and unite its theoretical oonstazuotiona, 
can analyse and sjmtheeise, deduct and induct (generalise and
1. I am indebted in this section to an essay by E.G. Stoker (1971 )•
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extrapolate), and so forth. This striking control has 
ooritrllmted mich to the illusion that human reason is 
autonomous* Bat w  should never forget thai; thinking is 
essentially hound hy the perceived îmoi?ahle cmd the task of 
Imowing." (Stoker 1971» P*28.)
21.1.2. teaiscendent and TransoendentM Approaches. The above 
quotation from Stoker comes from a suramary critique of two divergent  ^
epistemologiqal programmes which he seeïcs to hold together in a 
creative tension. These are the transcendent critique and the 
transcendental critique* The transcendent critique proceeds from 
its Qim preBïip3?ositionB and demonstrates the iiaplleatlone of these for 
the understanding of knowledge ; or uses them to orltioise other 
theories of loiowledge, or science. The transcendental criticaie of 
îmowledge starts from the acte, or functions, of knowledge and proceeds 
to the basic presuppositions; or investigates and exposes 
presuppositions in other areas* They thus follow opposite directions? 
the first proceeding from, the second proceeding toimrd, ha^ic 
presup%)Ositions. Nevertheless the 3.atter method Mil implicitly 
assume the former position* Stoker wites :
"Tlirough the use of the (ii) traaiaaendental criticism of 
human- thought Booyeweerd (a) starts from the distinction 
between the gmalytioal and non-analytical aspects of cosmic 
reality, proceeds to man's selfiiood (or heart) that brings 
about a synthesis between the analytical and ncsi-analytical 
aspects. End he thence demonstrates that the human heart is 
directed either towards out triime God or loses itself 
apostatioal3,y in the diversity of created reality, and he (b) 
critically investigates philosopMo theories (or systems), 
exposes the presuppositions on which they are based, 
proceeding to the religious ground—laotives that function as the 
ulthaate motives of the systems concerned*.*" (ibid pp.36-37*)
The two methods are complementary rather then contradictory (after 
Bohr, but not Wittgenstein).
nUîla-JS®JaES£ÈiSgÊ™^^ teaflitional Heformed
concept of revelation has been that it is the root of all knowledge, 
and, as Psnnenberg notes (1968, p*127*), the confinement of it to 
God's self-disclosuaze is a modem idea stemming primarily from Hegel. 
The logic of revelati<m necessitates someone who reveals; sometîiing 
that is revealed; and someone to whom.lt is revea3.ed* The logic and 
unity of revelation at the foundation of our knowledge exposes the 
central coherence of Imowing and the Imowable, and leaves their rad.ical 
difference intact* Revelation is the key to man's Imowledge axid 
four fields cmi be distinguished s (a) the revelation of God Himself to
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lEmeelf within Hie Trinity? (b) the revelation of God Himself to 
Hiiïiaeir tMough His works § (c) the revelation of God Himself end His 
rela-tion to all thingB to man in Hie Word and in His works? mid (d) 
the revelation of the created universe, including man, to man in an 
ultimate sens© by God* Gtoker claims (d) as his,ovm 'special 
probleai*? that is the problem for the philosopher and ecientist as 
opposed to the theologian (who deals with (c)). The basic difference 
between the seientia of theology end all other seientia is that in 
theology alone the field of investigation (the Woszd) has authority 
over the discipline and the researcher in an ultimate sense* While 
Goripimre gives paranieters for the pursuit of seientia, it is not to 
be seen as a textbook, on physios, biology, geology etc*® As Galvin 
commenteds "He who would leam-astrmomy, and other recondite arts, 
let him go elsewhere." (1554» P«79*) Thus, following this view, 
any fon:n of biblistie rationalism or mystioisBi is to be rejected.
Nevertheless (d) is grounded in (o) and impossible apart from it. 
Here man is confronted by the plan of God which can be îaiovrn truly or 
falsely depending on the hemzt-motive of man. The following 
qualification is maxle. In scientific research so much is abstracted 
from the fullness of reality and so much left out of consideration 
that profound. spiritual differences which might lie at the heart of 
researchers no longer exert decisive inf3.uenee on results within a 
limited horizon. Differences only become clear as scientists begin 
to philosophise about their' results. Fundaiaentolly, however, no 
clear distinction can be mad© between their work and their results.
(Cf, SCaJ-Ejljeek 1975s P.l69.)
m A  Pm-Theozetlcal Miought. ïii dîa-fcîBgiiishlne
these two modes of thought several terms are used for 'pre-theoretical' 
thought such as 'naive', 'pre-seientific', 'nomal', 'primal', etc..
I believe, however, that pre-theoretioal ie a confusing term In English 
as it tends to suggest some non-theoretical or ^ theoretical stazice 
vis a vis God and reality* But ' this ie not the oaae as this realm 
is cognitive as well as the theoretical. 1 wish, theszefore, to 
ascribe the designation of abstractive and ure-abstractive to this 
distinction. In abstractive thought a-bstracticais are made to enable 
work in the various modeilities to begin. The only theoretical 
pursuit where this would seem not to work is philosophy which is 
concerned with the integration of the meaning of being# But oven 
here (a) philosopl^ is concerned with abstracted questions concerning
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the whole; and (b) with specific abstractiono such a© the philosophy 
of science, ethics, history etc..
distmotion has
been criticised from some queazters as not philosophically rigorous in 
that it relies too much on the usage of "loose metaphors" # (Fræie 
undated p*6f.) But criticism does not obviate the principle,
Indeed it should be noted that there is no consensus in detail, in the 
eosmonomic school — van ïliessen» for instance, rejects the principle 
of gejOBBstend as stated hy Booyeweerd (of, glossaazy).
But there is a difference between scientific mentality end general 
living — not just a quEintitative but a qualitative difference.
Raymond Aron recently wrote5
"But what scientist behaves as a scientist when ho emerges 
from his laboratory or intervenes in the arguments in the 
market-place? And how could lie? Neither the results nor 
the in.spiration of scientific inquiry require us to feel 
compassion for the i&etohed, respect for the weak, recognition 
of the dignity of those who will never rise above the 
shadows," (1972, p*44*)
Again, Barbour notes that scientific language is symbolic, abstractive 
and selective in all theoretical coBMunlties; that for the abstraction 
knovai as physics a Bach Chorale is merely a set of molecular 
vibrations. (Cf, 1968/b, p.157») In other words?. In a scientific, 
or theoretical, discipline an abstracticvi from reality is made; 
attention is focused, on an aspect of reality and not on the whole.
Thus Einstein comments thats "Scientific thought is a development of 
pro-scientific thought"; thats "The whole of science is nothing more 
than a refinement of everyday thinking" ; and that we cabinet proceed 
without considering orltically,,, .the problem of analyzing the nature 
of everyday thinliing." (1973» pp.276,290.) Jacques Barzun records 
a confession of Huxley that a double view - scientific and pro- 
scientific - always intrudes. ïteloy had tried hard, at sunset, to 
see the phenomenon as that of the eaccth moving and not the sun sinking, 
but he could not - the sim set, ®'Science in this case enables us to 
add a vision, not to replace it," (Baxsuu I964, p.1l6.)
-21,1.4..2.- The Distinction£md the Character of Abstractive Thought. 
Abstractive thought — this sorting of details in the flux of 
experience - is not the only form of human cognition, for it is but a 
type of cognitive activity with spécial characteristics. It is a 
cognition which is analytical, antith©tl.oal and systematic.
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Abstractive thought approaches the object of its study in a critical 
and analytical Biamier that logically endeavours to set the object 
apart from the xdiole of reality, and systematically goes about 
dissecting, discovering mid understanding that object*
Por examples a physicist engages in theoretical analysis* To 
analyse means *to distinguish* (from the Greek analvein - to unloosen, 
to set free, to do away, to get rid of, to dissolve)* The 
physicist abstracts, sets free, or unloosens the physical aspect of 
reality5 and in his thinlcing provisionally eliminates all other aspects i 
He places the physical aspect of reality over against his tliinlcing 
fmd uses the resîdts obtained to make statements about the object, 
hoping that this will broaden human knowledge#
A table, for instmice, can be approached pre-abstraotively simply 
as it is encountered* ¥e may note its style, age and value in a 
non-abotractive manner «- but essentially appreciating the table in its 
wholeness and jumping unsystematically from one aspect to another* 
Abstractively, however, an economist would be interested in its value 
smd sub verse all other features to that end; the historian to its age 
and period; the .joiner to its construction, and so on. It follows 
that there is no essential contradiction between .abstractive and pre- 
abstractive thought, thou^ çh there may be. The two are complementary, 
jteTj^©«„d^fferen^^ Concrete reality is many-*
sided, yet it is a whole and undivided as we live in relation to it 
in its wholeness.
It is interesting that in talking about tMs Theobald (19^ 9# p.24«) 
falls into the trap of attributing non-theoret ioal qualities to the 
pre-scientific approach, but then doubles back to suggest that there 
can be no shaa?p distinction between the two perspectives. Similarly 
Frame (undated p*6f.) attacks Hooyeweerd for maintaining that there 
is a sharp distinction between the two views* He argues, as an 
example @ there is a scientist m^d a child walking through a field 
looking at flowers. Tîie scientist, as such, is involved 
abstractively while the child experiences the rich diversity of colour 
and form* But as I**ra3ne points out, the cMld could have been told to 
study the flowers and would thus operate gibs tract ively as well - and 
clearly the abstractive approa.ch of the child and the trained 
scientist are quite different* So he suggests that instead of a 
sharp distinction we should vfew these two activities as different 
ends of a continuum; that all thought is relatively theoretical as
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vîelX as relatively naive* The scientist îx i his abstraction can
2still see the rich diversity of reality*
At the root of this question is the matter of the gegenstend
relation which is seen to set the object of abstractive thought
logically over against the rest of being. The problem is that man,
(ma man, cannot cut himself off from that rea3.ity even in the
laboratory* I wish to suggest, for the moment, that the two
approaches are neither the ends of a continuwa nor to be
sharply distinguished (Uooyeweerd) «» but exist as distinct facets in
mixture*. Thus ell thought is relatively abstractive and relatively
non-abstractivei the two qualitative approaches existing in a mix*
Depending on other factors, one or other quality of this mixture will 
%
dominate*
Having stated this modification to Dooyeweerd it remains tîiat 
what he seys is extremely valuable for my present study* He opens 
his *Mew Critique* with these wordss
”If I consider reality as it is given in the naive pre- 
theoretical experience, and then confront it with a theoretiecjl 
analysis, throïtgïi which reality appemrs to split up into 
various modal aspects then the first tiling that strikes me, is 
the original indissoluble interrelation miong these aspects 
\fliich are for, the first time explicitly distinguished in the 
theoretical attitude of mind.” (1969s Vol.I p.3»)
In other words abstractive thought Is characterised by an anti­
thetical relation wheceby the logical aspect of thought is op]?osed to 
the non«*logieal aspects of reality* Hhile science directs this 
attention to some aspect, philosophy is directed to the totality of 
memïing of our cosmos. As science is affected by philosophical 
vie%'7s so 3n turn the philosoph3.cal view is affected by its religious 
root.
21*1*4.3* The Character of Pre*»Abstractive Thought* PMlosophy is 
based on pre-abstractive tîiought; ordinary experience is the base to 
which we must always return* (Of. Spier 1966, p*14«) Indeed Kant 
begins his * Critique of Pure Keason* with these words §
2* For about two years I considered this a reasonable formulation 
by lib’ame, even if h1.s argiment was not convincing — but I now believe 
that he does not allow for the qualitative difference between the two 
approaches. They different kinds of knowing and as such cannot 
occupy different poles of a continuum*
3# The idea of pure abstractive thought falls under the criticism 
levelled at ©ssentialism «-of. chapter 11 *
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”There can be no doubt that all oar îmowleclge begins with 
experience* For how should our faculty of knowledge be 
awaJiened into action did not objects affecting our senses 
pa3?tly of themselves produce represent at iane, partly arouse 
the activity of om? understanding to cou^are these 
representations, and, by combining or separating them, work 
up the raw materiel of the sensible icopressions into that 
loaowledge of objects which is entitled experience? In the 
order of time, therefore, we have no Imowledge antecedent to 
experience, and with exi^ erlence all om? ImoTfledge begins.” 
(1787, p.41.)
Dooyewoerd, wMle critical of Kant, agrees that experience alone 
provides a proper starting point*
"Halve experience is not at all a theory which may be refuted 
by scientific and epistemologioal arguments. It does not 
identify empirical reality with its abstract sensory aspect 
and it lacks the metaphysical notion of an objective world of 
things in themselves beyond the world of experience* Halve 
experience is much rather a pre-theoretical datum,, 
corresponding with the integral structure of our experiential 
horisson in its temporal order* Any pîiilosophicel theory of 
human experience which cmmot accoxuit for this datum in a 
satisfactory way, must be erroneous iïi its fundamentals*"
(1972, p*18, «« cf. Kalsbeek 1979» P*169*)
Concerning the movement from pre^ -^abstractivô to abstractive 
thought we find the following in Dooyeweerdg that whenever pre™ 
theoretical thinking is opened and deepened jjato theoretical thinking, 
this opening necessarily brings mi essential change | namely a shift 
from the enstatlc position of the analytic function in reality to the
antithetic opposition of this function over against the aspect of
inquiry. CChis opposition is necessarily accompanied by a 
theoretical setting apart of the cosmic meaning^^syetasls #. ^  (Of. 
Kalsbeek 1975» p*l63*) tAiat is left as the product of tiiis 
theoretical setting apart from reality (what logical thinking places 
over against itself) is, of course, 2)ooyeweerd.*s ge^enstend* For 
him naive thought can have no geaenstend. But as noted above
reservations are maâ,e against this concept « my postulation of a
miaciuroo
Inter alia the following; points are noted* (a) Prefabs tractive 
thougixt is not a, theory of icnowledge but a direct given* It fol.lowe 
that it cannot be refuted by theoretical thought itself (e.g. physios
4# This obsolete word is used in a special sense to distinguish the 
natural coherence of our integral experience of reality from the 
theoretical attitude implied in * synthesis ^. Gf* Booyexfeerd I969» 
Vol.II p.429f.)
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does not refute the ordinary experienoe that a table is hard end 
impenetrable); nor is it to be viewed as some sort of copy of reality. 
Tet pc*:e«’abstractive thought can be altered,, educated end deepened by 
abstractive thought* (*b) Ih?e^ »abetractive thoughts, while open to 
education, can never bo desticoÿod as such. As imderotahding
of his cosmos advances so this is reflected in what he holds and 
experiences i£i ords^ xary life* (Of. Booyeweerd 1969» Vol.IXX p»91*)
(c) It follows that pre**abstractive thought, like abstraetivos, can be 
orroneous (oiV ibid p.29»)« This is Inévitable in the light of the 
formiîig power of the social praacls on pre^'abstmotiv© thought. (d) 
Pre««>abstractive thought focuses on tilings and events, while abstractive 
thought directs itself to aspects of things and events. Hhen asked 
if the tree in sijf garden is still the same tree as of past years I 
can pre-abetmetivelj laiow that it is «* but It is a difficult matter 
to pursue on the level of sensory o^ rplanation, because tîxat deals v;ith 
anpects and not the concrete wholeness of the tree. (Of* ibid. p*3f.)
"The aubject-objoot relations of naive experience are, 
consequently g Amdamentally differenfc from the antithetical 
relations which characterise the theoretical attitude of 
thought. Subject and object axre certainly distinguished in 
the non**theoretical attitu-do, but they are never opposed to 
each oth©5?« Rather, they are conceived in an unbreakable 
coherence. In other words, naive experience leaves the 
inte^^al structural coherence of our experiential horiison 
intact. The theoretical attitude of thought and experience 
breaJ.cs it assunder by an asxalytioal dissociation of its modal 
aspects^" (DooyewGerd 197S, p.*17*)
A farther ex&mple may be helpful. A book flung on the fire is
consumed » VJhat do the sciences tell us is consxmied? The ' thing* 
itself is annihilated, but chemistry and physics can bell us nothing 
conoeming this 'thing* for as spécial, sciences they amst eliminate 
the pre-sjfostractive totality of the * thing* from their explantion of 
oombustioiia (e) Rre«abstraetive thou#it gives the qualify;mg 
ïiigdality of a thang or event, and this Is ossexitial to its 
#ie ore tical examination «
21.1.4.4. Summary. The difference between iXre-abstractive and 
abstractive thought can be summarised as the difference of intexition, 
systematic endetwour, the requisition of verification, and method.
All science, as such, hitmtionallv pursues knowledge and creates 
positive antithetical structures to tha,t end. Ordinary thought 
lacks this :intentlonal stmoture though of course it may create 
antithetic relationships without intent. (Cf.Booyeweerd 19^ 9» Vol.I p.
41 ») Boienoe seeks answers In a systematic way. Pre-sbstraotiT© 
thought may he systematio, hut if so it is not intentionally so#
Bcienee seeks answers to the why, the wherefore, end the how of the 
teiowahlei it seeks to fiœther understanding, description, explanation 
and the evaluation of knowledge, and it does this intentionally and 
eysteDiatioally® Thirdly | pre^^ahstractiv© thought may ixwolve
verification bub this will not be intentional or systematic. Bcieno© 
has however to intentlooQlly and systemtically make observations and 
draw oonoluBlons which cam be tested (of. 15*4«1*)® Lastly| while
pre««abstraotlve thought is not tied to any eoientifio method, science 
does employ certain technical methods in the pursuit of Imowledge.
Whioh is not to say that there is some specific method, nor that jme^ 
abstractive thought is irrelevmxt to the development of science and 
theory farmation»
"Accordingly science (including theology, philosophy, the 
partlculer. Inters and intermediate sciences) Is laiowledge 
which is by moans of technical methods, intentionally, ,©b
far as possible systematic (laying bare relations and 
coherenceT^Zdao far as noeeibl© verified (founded and proven) 
knowledge as such of the Imowable." (Stoker 1971» p«37*)
21.2. THE m e w m m  oF cop
(of.21.1.3.). roe ImowleSge
of God Is never the outcome of man's theoretical or general reflection, 
but exclusively the result of God*s self^revelatlon to man* This 
seems axiomatic «• God can never be true object of our study when we 
are dependent upon Him (of. Torrance - 18.4#)® This does not, of 
course, rule out the theoretical study of God «» theology «» which leads 
to knowledge about God and His works. This Is not to tie the 
concept of revelation exclusively to God's self-dlsolosure. Yet the 
knowledge of God is unique in its origin, object and eesenoe (of, 
Bavinck 1989$ p.24f*)# The origin of this disclosure of the Father 
resides in the mediating work of the Second Person of the Trinity in 
terms of creation, Christ and scripture; the object is different from 
all created objectivity for it is the Creator, the incomprehensible 
infinite which transoends the temporal knowledge of* men. Because 
of this difference In origin and content, it follows that the knowledge 
of God is essentially different. It is not the result of 
scientific rofleetion but of childlike and simple faith.
2 1 s g $ 2 fl.S S a Æ s m â â tim g -O lJ B » J !s e ^ ^  Msatg there
is fallen man who, even as such, knows God. Behind all superficial
430
arguments and présentations there is in msxi a deep ontological 
knowledge situation for God does exist. He has revealed HiDïself; 
there is a real objective gmd inescapable revelation in the creation 
of God; man is in His imtige and has a sense of deity and. therefore 
ÎÜÎOWS God triily. Thus even fallen man Imous in his heart the 
reality of God . though he suppresses and represses this knowledge, 
and^  in rejection of God^  absolutises the relative in the construction 
of some idol. But no one can escape being a creature of God, that 
creation is revelational of God, end that autonorjiy. is impossible*
Second? man a,s redeemed knows a fuller disclosure of God and of 
His pu%q)Oses. As redeemed, he aoîrnowledges his dependence; he 
acîmovrledges God as Arche mid Christ as the solo external 
Arohimodian point for the cosmos and so directs his heart 3n faith to 
Him. Cîirist is in the redeemed. Calvin opened his 'Institutes*:
"Our wisdom, in so far as it ought to be ' deemed true and solid 
wisdom, consists almost entirely of two parts: the îmowledge 
of God and of ourselves* But as these are connected together 
by many ties, it is not easy to determine which of the two 
precedes, and gives birth to the other* For, in the first 
place, no men can survey Mmsolf without forthwith turning his 
thoughts towards the God in whom he lives and moves; because it 
is perfectly obvious,, that the endowments which we possess 
oamiot possibly be from ourselves? nay, that our very being is 
. nothing else than subsistence in God alone#...it is evident 
that man never attains to a true self-knowloclg© until he has 
previously contemplated the face of God, and come dom after 
such contemplation to look into himself." {I56O, pp.7“8*)
21.2.5. Several Points Briefly Stated. The following points 
concGsming the îoiowlodge of God are briefly hoted* (a) The 
ioiowledge of God is by revelation alone, and not by theory alone* 
Theoretical thought about God is absolutely dependent on revelation, 
whether aclmowledged or not. (b) For Theism the basic contention 
with respect to the self is that God is the ultimate subject of ' 
laiowledge. (Of. 0. Van Til I969» p*130.) (o) There can be no
theoretical îcnowledge of God or the self bocaii.se the first involves 
man's dea^ ivatlon from God, and in the second man can never stand 
theoretically in relation to the selfhood in its fullness. (d) The 
ÎQiovfledge of God that we do enjoy is never anytîiing to do with the 
idea of God-as-suoh* God is never an 'object* that can be s*tudied 
in the way that we study aspects of creation. Creation is subject 
to man •* God is not* (e) The knowledge of God grips the being of 
man, and subjects him in all his aspects and fimotions to God, with 
no area of neutrality. (f ) The laiowledge of God is conneoted to the
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Word of God# ¥© oesinot separate the Word and God; the Word 
cormeets to Ghriot as the Aa^ chlQiedian point for all tzTue thought eaid 
livingfl. Hor is soripture merely some authoritative source of 
infonaation oonceamlng God, some Interesting collection of data, 
revealing Hl,s norms for God comes in the Word and therefore we are 
faced with an encounter. Oire resijonse to this encounter will lie 
not in our mind hut in our heart which la not to say tha,t our response 
is not reasonable and rational* This encounter does not, however, 
deterroine the being of the Word in any vray.: (g) The possibility of
any knowledge ^ in any sphere, rests ultimately on the Imowleclge of 
God* The crux of the Ciiristian position conoeming the subject- 
object relation is tlmt the very possibility of Icnowledge is 
unintelligible except on the premiss that all subjects of my loaowledge 
have their existejioe from God*
21*5. THE MOWLGBGE OF BBLF
Dooyoweerd has coMiiented that the words of the Oracle of DelpM - 
•Know Tiqrself• «« should be witten above the portals of philosophy. 
Such Imowleclge is immensely complicated* To start with the self is 
always active in the Imowing process, there are no independent or 
self-sufficient fonctions xAiioh come into operation in the process of 
knowing* Self-lniowledge is in fact a presupposita of theoretical 
thought itself and therefore cannot be gained by theoretical insight. 
The •!• can never be grasi>ed by abstract reflection. • For 
rùooyeweerd ell theoretical Imowledge assumes self—Imowledge, whille 
tMs in turn is only possible in areligious self-surrender to the one 
true God g or an absolutized, but relative, aspect of creation* From
this it follows yet again that theoretical thought cmmot be 
autonomous and that it must be dependent on some motive.
Kcowled^ of the self therefore, like knowledge of God, comes 
tWough the Wo3?d of God in creation, Chriet and scripture. O’he 
sciences oon never begin to explain the self*
"As soon as X try to gs^ asp the 1 in a philosophical concept 
it recedes as a phantom and dissolves itself :Uito nothingness.
It oemnot be determined by any modal aspect of our experience, 
since it is the central reference-point to which all 
fundamental modes of our temporal experience are related* A 
logical I does not exist, neither a psycho-physical I, nor a 
historical, nor a mo3èal I. All such philoso%)hioal 
determinations of the ego disregard its central character." 
(booyeweerd 1972, p.25*)
‘Bie question - Who is man? contains a mystery that man himself
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osnnot theoretically resolve. lIMouhteâly there are solentxfie 
vrays of obtaining knowledge about màn, but they never explain who man 
is in hie centra], unity of being# There are many spécial soionces 
which study men, but each examinee human life only from the 
perspective of one aspect or viewpoint of reality. Physios and 
ohemiatry, biology and psychology, historiography and eociology, 
jurisprudence and ethics, all provide detailed information concerning 
man. But none answers the basic question •* who is man in the 
central unity of his existence? The sciences cannot answer because 
they are bound to the temporal order of our experience, they are 
derivative of man, while man transcends the temporal order for he is 
in the image of God.
As with God, we do not come in the Imowlodge of self to man-as- 
such, as an entity by Maself. Man depends absolutely on God.
The meaning of man's existence is religious. Man is neitlier an 
individual in meaning (for the meaning of man is rooted in coKimmitj?'
- the story of Mam jmd Eve) nor Is man essentially collective. 
Individualism expresses the ultimate importance, dignity and worth of 
the individual in all aspects of life but negates the comnmal; 
whereas collectivism stresses the overriding ♦general will' of 
Rousseau. Individualism,, the child of nominalism, found 
expression in Hobbes and Locke, who has been seen as the spiritual 
father of laissez-faire economic individualism; while collectivism 
has two basic roots, the one in French rationalism, the other in 
German idealism*. In the former stand Rousseau and Comte, while in 
the latter stand Hegel and possibly Marx* Both these views of man •* 
individualism and, collectivism reside in a pretended autonomy of man 
and are inconsistent with a biblical pluralism# Han is only free 
and fulfiling his meaning when he lives in relationship to the God who 
made him*
21.4. THE mmmSDGE OF HBIALITX
21.4.1. Is Dependent on the Ehowledae of God (of. 12.5.). Hhile 
Descartes distinguished between thinking (cognito) and the body 
(extensio) with only a tenuous linîc between them, Dooyewaerd sees 
thinking m  m  internal activity in all aspects of existence. (Of. 
Kalsbeek 1975$ p.l6l.) l’Iîiile the knowledge of self is worked in us 
by the Word and is unbreskably connected to the knowledge of God, the 
same is claimed concerning the îcnowledge of reality - that is, of the 
world which we experience* M* Vrieze notes:
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"The Word of GocL imrlcs in us also mi understanding of what 
this reality la in which we live and of which we are a part.
In revealing Himself God shows us that whatever it is in 
this world aroimcl. us noticing is a substance, a 'bsr>ein*, a 
3:eality«in-and**b3r«itBel.f, but that it is alvjays and in sill 
of its aspects creature* dependent mi the Creator, not 
beiaig for itself but being for Him* in other words: meaning.
The nature of reality is that it is meanings it is thesze for 
(k)d, of God and tlirough God*” (undated p.8.)
HotMng is outwith dependence on God and the ter of Gael. It is 
critical to be clear that the ultimate subject of our predication is 
not a reality, or being in general, in wMoh God is some universal 
with reality providing the particulaa:^ . Tills would malso God and 
the universe oo-relative. Christians believe that the universe 
itself is derivative, both as a whole aud its aspects, of its Creator. 
Thus the unity and diversity of creation can only be understood as 
derivative of the mity and diversity of the Triune God as an 
ontological presupposition* (Of. G* v m  Til'197l/a, p.25.)
(W. (cf. chapter 23$ 24.1.)* The ter of God in 
the sense 1 am using it must not be confused with the Moral Law for 
that is on3.y a facet of the overall structure of la,w that God has 
given to His creation. Created reality is lair-ordered and law- 
structured, but even hore care Is needed for the tendency has been to 
posit this concept of law as if it were something that existed in and 
of itself* 33ut law is not autonomous either,, os man's reason and 
oreatioh ore not autonomous* Therefore there is no ding an sioh 
quality a.ttributable to the basic lavr-strueture of reality as some 
static given.
"God is taking His creation soifiewhere, He is driving it into 
a certain direction and He ie 'working' with It* 'I%r Father 
worlds'g Jesus said once* In other words, the tef does not 
only regulate tïrtngs a.e they are and exist, but directs them 
and arranges them and drives them toward the End wMoh God has, 
or rather: is# It is here that perhaps can be seen best that 
all aspects of reality ox’© concentrated in man-rooted-in-Christ 
to the perfect service of the living God.” (Vrieze undated p*9*)
Our relationship to this Law is that, as we are subject to it, 
it will be impossible for us to come to eny exhaustive concept of it. 
The Law transcends us and makes thought possible, therefore we ommot 
take the Law and examine it under a Eiicroscope, for any theoretical 
work is at all times possible only because of the Law and is itself 
subject to the Law* However God is not subject to the Law but
5* Gf<s. Critique of essentialism^
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rather these two « God and His Law - are to be seen such tlmt the 
Law Is oo-teiiBi.nus with the ohax'aotsr of God.
Here the word milling ie being 
used in a particular ways it is used to stress that reality meaning 
and not that reality has meaning* Stoker illustrates it this ways 
talce two blobs of blue, each of exactly the same dimensions,, texture, 
tone, etc#, such that they are exactly identical (of# 1971» P#45#)# 
tJhat is their Individual meaning? HotMng in themselves détermines 
thfit *» but both ere parts of greater wholes, say of different paint­
ings, end exercise meaning within the overall oontesct of their 
respective pictœzes. hhon put in context each blob has inseparable 
find simultaneously analytical, as well as perspective, moments of 
memrhig^ Stoker extrapolates this to point out that this holds 
for every 'thisig' in our created luiiverse#
"#.#,the whole of creation'and every 'thing* within it, as well 
ÊS every relation between 'things*, has not only analytical 
(intra^ 'cosmical) mecnlng moments but ' revela-tional meaning 
moments as %mll ; they are revelational of God end his plan, 
ultimately depending on God and on God's Imowledgo of himself 
and of his ooimsel. Hesfe we have thrived at the ultimate 
meaning moment of everything creaied# The rose in my garden, 
is, of course, a rose; but it is at once also a creature 
revelationsl of its origin, God and his eoimsel (plan).
This rose 1ms at once mid .inseparably meaning moments ;
ilmdamentally it is God's work.” (ibid p.45*)
It mi n^t be contended that this is simplistic in focusing on a 'good'
aspect of creation but does not apply to the evils of creation* But
the evil 'thing' is also under God for if we oamiot refer in this 
ultimate sense back to God then vje must posit an eternal dualism 
between good and evil*
This can be illustrated from the wlter of Eool,eslastee*. He 
had faced up to the reality that as long as he tried to integrate 
meaning 'under the sun' (within the cosmos, inside the temporal 
horizon) there wae no meaning and all was vanity*
"For what does a man get for all Iris hard work? Gt^ nerations 
come and go but it melœs no difference* J^?he sun rises and 
sets and hurries around to rise again* The wind blows south 
and north g here and there, twlst;lng back and forth, g:etting 
nowhere* The rivers run into the sea but khe sea is never 
full a^i,d the v^ ater returns agam to the rivers, and flows again 
to the sea#* «everytl'zlng is unutterably weary and tiresome*
Ho matter how much we hear, we are not content*..as I looked at 
everything I had tried, it was all so useless, a chasing of the 
wind." (Ecoles* 11: 2? 11* The Living Bible.)
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BisGUssing the meaning of creation, van HioBsea refers to Romms 
1106 - 'For from him mcl through him and unto him ere all tldngs* — 
distinguishing here between the qrlgln* existence and goal of 
creatux'ely being# (Of# Kalsheek 1975» p*8Df«) %#mt exists has not 
alwsiys existed, nor does it now exist of itself. All has come into 
existence thron#i the sovereign* will of God, and is maintained by Him 
existentially# OreatareXy being is ecmpXetely dependent being and 
-ie only integrated and realised yie a vie God# So It Is that we find 
the final goal of creation lies in service to God* This bond to 
whioh we are called ie the religions root of onr existence#
m em sim  o f Ommm m l-m . Cosmoïiani™, then, 
while rejecting a dualism within creation or heart-motive, points to a 
deep analogical duality % two layer theory of reality, thou#it and 
lnt03cpretati<m * There are two layers of realitya (a) that of God
who is absolute, all-sufficient and self-cmtalmed in Hia Ta?inity>, 
end (b) the universe of created, being which is derivative, self- 
insmffioimt and absolutely dependent on (a)* There are two levels 
of thoujsehtg (e) the a-13.—comprehensiv© of the infinite God, and
(d) the oreaturely, derived, thought of man who, in the image of God, 
can think Clod's thoiîghts after Mira in the finite realm* There are 
W o  levels of inteai^retatlpn of the universe g (©) the absolutely true 
interpretation of God, and (f) the interpretation.by man of (e)* (Cf* 
Stoker 1971» P®56*)
2M sM 8^«iSæ ateiîââa£L(LSS3^i.^ .;âaiEasgÈj’^ ^  (i^ m
PP*57*^ 70#J® There are, for example, Wo approaches to a building 
argues Stoker* The one sees the details of the plan (p) of the 
building In constaxrt relatltm to the mind of the architect (A) who 
designed it* The other view, at right angles to this, focuses on 
the contents (C) in relation to the plan (p) and explains them, their 
fimctions and pmrposes. The (pC) view will a3.ways, of course, 
presuppose the- existence of the (Bâ) approach even if It does not 
acknowledge it* Much of modern thought has focused cm the (PO) 
approach and avoided consideration of the foimdational (Pâ) aspect.
Gcmoeming the (PC) approach. Stoker argues that there are (a) 
empirioaX hypotheses where there Is ommcn. but limited ground between 
all men as they appx'oaoh the created order to examiné, quantify and 
qualify it* The eignlfloanee of any hypothesis here will, however,, 
depend on the role attributed to it within a higher and ultimate
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perapùobive* (l)) 'Bieso ara nn'lnG-lvBl kypothesea which concexra the 
raidioal di’V’arelty of created rea3.ity and wliloh are 
irredxicihle with:bfi a particular law sphere* Both these t^)es of 
h^otheses relate to the (PO) approach^.. However the principal 
l^potheeee will ba8ical3.y he co^etea'mined hj i;he choice of ultimate 
(pa) presuppositions*» mid here Chrietian and noiV’Cirrlstiau will 
disagree in principle# (c) There are ultijnate hvootheses wW.ch*  «4t » f  < a c r s T T O w t » W M i r . ? i » T r M , M W M > WKpi jw i wmt\ <i
relate to the (PA) approach per sc and not as in the previous cases to 
the (PC) approach# (Of* ibid pp.66,6%*) Stoker writes &
®'A j^ on*«Ohrietlaa (empirical scieutific and phi,losopM.c) 
methodology that acknowledges neither ult:Imate nor prlnolpal 
iiypotheses but mm%? empirical I%potheées (thereby 
Mx)lio;ltly r@duc:lng the former to the latter) and that 
accordingly maint&ine that any sort of hypothesis is aa 
relevant as any other, and likewise claims that it cannot be 
de'bermlned in advance to what conclusions any hypothesi.s must 
lead, excludes from the outset not only the radically 
diversity of created reality,, but moreover (as a haegatlv© 
miversed*} God (md hie counsel, his creation, providence, end 
gj^gice^ But this means that It reduces the ultimate luroothesis 
as such to the status of a me^ eiopirioaJ. hypothesis, *bhus 
fallmg prey to pure empiricism»’^’ (ibid p*68.)
He then goes on to e^ ejflain his * special problem® (of* 21*1.3*d») with 
the aid of the following diagram (ibid p*69*).
Godis îmowledge of himself and hie 
counsel is presupposed bys «•
G O B
Man Jisîowa the created imiveozse 
(including man)
Stoker calls the sides of the triangle %ertioal lines® and the bane 
a ®horisontal ® * This then enables him to call a transcendent 
apolog;eticaX theory of mai'i®a Imowledge of the created universe (l'^ïï) 
as relatlsig every fact asid every relation bo'bmen facts of the 
tmiversei as well as man's knowledge of It, vertically to its 
dependence on God^a knowledge of Himself and of M e  counsel (Q«H| G#»H) 
•« this compares with his (j?A) approach. His o m  special problem is
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put forward as a Biipplememt to tMe by arguing that a Christian 
theory of man's knowledge (althougîi neeeaaarlly presupposing the 
truths of the vertieal view of man's knowledge of created reality •« 
l*e* ïï«*G) also has the duty to turn to the right, as it were, and 
investigate man's loaowledge of created reality in a horizontal way -* 
i#e, This is a (PC) approach and yields specific
contributions to a Christian theory of Imowledge in addition to the 
(pa) approach*
A critique of non«Christian theories, according to Stoker's 
interest, follows the horizontal line* It can accordingly explain 
specific agreement between Christian and non-Ctoistian scientists aa 
well as the possibility of a profound co-operation between them.
But it will also expose differences and the necessity of a fimdamental 
divergence botwoon them on account of their mutually contradictory 
presuppositions * The horizontal criticism will furthermore always 
fall back on the vertical criticism because it is not ultimate and is 
in fact bound to the truths of the vertical oriticiem*
21.4*4. Mcansis* The term '©nkapels* was introduced by the Swiss 
biologist M« îîeiclenîie-în to describe the relationship between organs 
and the total organism within which they functioned* Dooyevjeerd, 
however, extended the term such that all atruotures found in created 
reality were seen as mutually interti'/ined in rni universal, unique and 
unbreakable way. This is not the relation of the whole to the 
parts, or the parts to the whole*
In the unity and diversity of reality there is a polar tension of 
dynainic character that must be maintained if reality is to be 
disclosed• Reality is diverse; but there are unities tîmt hold this
diversity together. Unity can be conceived of in different levels* 
Basically there is, according to Booyeweerd, the traneooamie (ground of 
unity which is absolute to @11 things, end which resides in the Arche* 
But at a creaturely level there is a formal unity whereby a realm or 
kingdom, for example the vegetable,, possesses a characteristic unity 
of form end structure which distinguishes it from all other realms. 
(Of* Appendix €♦} There is also a materiel unity at the general 
level of the organic, mechanic, the unity of @ piece of art, of an 
historic process etc*. I'inslly there is the unity of renalr. that 
unity of being which flows from the renewal, restoration end 
reconciliation of disunity such as in the family, once broken and
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diversified, wMob in réconciliation again functions as a xmit* 
3iiiiilat?ly there is the unity of repair of man and nature, man and 
himself g and man and God in terme of the significant healing which 
Christ brings to the fractured existence of man» (Cf# Stoker ibid p.44«)
There are different fomulationa of enlcaptical structure - the 
ejikaptical unity where tim etruoturas unite with one founded on the 
other g or with no founding eomiactioii; or in s^ abiotic foundation,
This last is correlative enkansis where the aspects aï?e reciprocally 
dependent, ïikamples of this £ire tlmt of a painting to the materials 
■usedI a tree to its siirroundings; and that of animals living together 
in herds, packs etc., A sculpture is an example of an irrevorsible 
f oundational enkapsls, The marble statue is in the block of mm?ble 
but not vice versa. Again there is the enkaptical subieot-obiect 
rela-tionehlp as found in a bird and its nest. There are fm?ther 
enl^ aptical relationships to be foimd in the interlacement of societal 
structures and in certain territorial aspects. (Of* ICalsbeok che* 26, 
35-37. 1975.)
Take an object which when examined reveals that it belongs to the 
genotype chair* which in turn belongs to the radical type utensil, as 
do lights, spoons, clothes etc.* Tills genotype can be further 
distinguished as an easy ehsilr, rooking chair, typing chair etc.*
The various ty^ pes of tmod or metal in their structure ere only external 
structural peculiarities ■which produce diverse types* Vdien we look 
at the materials we find wood, metal, leather, plastic, springs etc., 
which do not exist in nature as such* Man has processed the things 
of nature into semi-^ meixufactured products to be used in the chair*
The natural individuality structure of wood is enkaptioally bound in 
the structure of a semi-manufactured product in this case* Thus 
seiïki-manufacturod products obviously have a foimdational function but 
no trace of an actual typical leading function (or function of 
destination). They await further processing and are therefore 
oharanteriaed by their potential iiistoricotechnical function of 
destination wMch is opened and realised when they are made into 
utensils by this additional processing* (Gf * ibid p*195^ *)
Consider IlgO which, as watea?, is not the siviiaation of Its parts 
of liydazogen and o^ cygon. Her© etaxictures of different genotype -
®H* and *0® atoms - are enlmptically combined by memas of their 
electron constellations. The nuclei of the atoms do not change and 
essentially they continue to exist as hydrogen end oxygen atoms*
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They camiot therefor® he coneMered a© parts of imter hecaue© the 
melei hove not hooome water as euoh» 'Biose atoms exist quite 
Independently of water, Imt water cannot exist independently of them# 
This then is an example of an irreversible fomtdgvbioRal enkapsia.
It is important to realise that in the midst of this, man has an 
unique place# M# Vrieze writes;
"To graep the unique nature of ©nkapsis we must remember that 
the revelation o f God shows us that God has made mem the orown 
of creation.# This does not simply mean that man is a much 
hotter creature than other creatures or that he is more 
valuable then other créatures, hut it means specifically that 
man has a unique place in cosmic azemlity and that he. In his 
heart the ro o t, the deeper u n ity  of M e  existence «* transcends 
temporal reality in  this senee that he is not qualified or 
lim ited  to or enclosed within a temporal end function*»## All 
temporal structures * # #are directly or indirectly centred upon 
mm.« A ll of creation is unhreakahly connected with and re la ted  
to  man as creature of God, man precise? as hiage o f God# It is 
here th at we can begin to see something of the peculiar u n ity  
of cosmic reality# It ie this unity wliieli n w  finds 
©xpreseion also in the phenomenon of the enkapsle#" (undated pp* 
2?f.)
I t  eeeme to  me th a t can eay a fa ir  amount concGming the 
influence o f a person's basic commitment# The general framework of 
a person's beliefs will suggest certa in  types o f theory which he will 
fin d  acceptable; it will suggest which elemiente of a theory will 
function m  basic concepts in explaining phenomena; it w ill select the 
problems to  be solved and the data gathered to  that end# However
there is also a negative stim ulus in that a basic commitment (u ltim ate  
hypothesis?) will provide a lim ito d  horizon of ccxnoeptuallgatlon 
which restricts sc ien tis ts  to  Ignore data tlmt might in fact be more 
pertinent» Tliis loads to resistance to  change which, while often  
useful, is also harm ful; and leaves problems outside the 'paradigm' 
uninvestigated# These positive end negative features of a basic 
commitment e re , of course, not derived from any Christian perspective 
per se but have been amply justified in the work o f mmj historiens  
end philosophers of science# It ie out of these basic (pre«^ abetract) 
commitments that aeientista make judgements o f which îcind of theories 
will be regarded as possible candidates fo r descriptions o f re a lity , 
and define specific researoh programmes as critical in  the welfare o f
I am relieved  to  find confirm ation o f my view here in  a short 
essay by ¥#. Brouwer (undated)*
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the progress of science» ïïîîdoubtedly ebstractive elements play a 
'part 3 hut It seems to me that the basic comoitment of the heart is 
omciai. in such decisions*
VJhat can he said fa-^om a paarbieular Christian worldview? First
of all it would seem that the concept of absolute tra'tli, the 
ss’tablishiaent of scientific certainty, is a failed quest* This
idea wMch is ooaeomitant on the self-sufficiency of God aloïie is 
recognised in the non-Ohristian world* It follows that the 
Ghristian xwrldvléw provides, an generalised tezmis, negative limits 
rather than positive pointers to future scientific theories*
In terms of present theories a Christian worldview should enable 
some selection of which types of -fcheories are acceptable* For
©xsiuple it would seem to me. that no GMis'tian scholar could 
consistently maintain a strict psychological behaviourism however many 
valid points that theoa^ y makes, in that it clearly undercuts the 
Gluzistian commitment to the responsibility of men which cannot be 
reduced to heredity or environment* Thus while more than one 
competing 'î'.heory may be acceptable to the Ohszistifm, there are cea?tain 
cases which can be ruled inconsistent (cf* where I will look
at a possible Cbieistisn understanding of indeterminasicy)#. Bo
OM?istian views will project specific jaiterests within a given theory; 
that ie, help to define research programmes* Aga-isi, Ghristian 
coïîimitment aids definition of the basic elements in a theory* For 
example, in the science of human behaviour the Christian will also 
wish to include in his parameters the concepts of sin and responsibility 
as well as heredity and environment# Similarly we aro aided in 
identifying 'bhe types of data needed to solve certain problems tmd 
evaluate the methods to be used to obtain the relevazit data*
Two caveats should be made* Our basic commitment should not be 
the source of our data *» there should be an openness to change a 
preconceived order under 'bhe pressure of external data,* Becondly, 
the concept of scientific freedom should be prominent in Christian 
thought*
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CHAPTER 22
THE BmOIjQGIGAL BABÎB OF SCIMOEs CMIATIOI* CQSMQLOaY. G0BMÜGŒ4Y
22.0. imOBUGTlOM
There has been a tendency in the 20th eentm?ÿ’ to dissociate 
theol.ogioal and scientific mattes?© such that no cosmology can impinge 
on doctrinal areas. Bultmam claimed that? "The doctrine of creation 
is not a speculative cosmology." (1956, p.15* of, %ale 1952, p.52.)
Aulen claimed thats "faith in God as Creator is not a theory about 
the origin of the world through a 'first cause', etc. It has in 
reality nothing in coMoon with a rational explanation of the universe." 
(1948, p.181.) These comments seem to embody two ideas* Firsts
the biblical doctrine of creation is not a scientific cosmology.
Beconds the doctrine of oreation 1ms no implications for cosmology.
The former denies tîie identification of the doctrine of creation and 
cosmological specu3,ation (X agree); wîûXe the latter denies any 
logical relationship betimen the two areas (X disagree).
22.1. HXBTORXCAL PERSPECTIVE
22.1.1. Ancient Western Thought. In ancient times many primitive
views of the xmiverse were held. In Mesopotamia, before Greek
influence, geometry was not used to correlate astronomical observations 
mid the em?th and heavens were viewed as two flat discs supported by 
water. Later the heavens wo3?e seen as an hemispherical vault resting 
on the waters which surrounded the flat disc of the earth. The sum 
and moon were gods who controlled ter3?eatrial affaiim. Or the world 
could appear as a rectangular box «* the earth at the bottom and the 
sky at the top, supported by four mountain peaks In the ooraiors' of the 
earth. These worlds were seen as originating out of the primeval 
chaos of waters, and the heavens, earth, air and water were personified 
as gods — seen as the process of xmion between the male and female gods 
of the chaos. The yoxm^ jer gods continued this work of ordering the 
universe by word of coBBiand and spells. Later in Mesopotamian 
thought these younger gods used physical force to tame nature as they 
battled against the gods of chance.
Tlie Greeks tied cosmogony and theogony toi^ther, with the gods 
personifying the cosmic powers resulting largely from the process of 
love and generation. Matm?e was herself divine, a living organism, 
the divine source of all life, the gods included* For Tholes and
AA9
Heraclitus nature herself was the deity» But already in the pre- 
Socratioe there was a move to remove the gods from nature and to 
abstract and spiritualise them# This stood in tension with the 
strong earthy raattemees of their basic view (of# 1*5*)# For Plato 
the demiurge (a) had to bring together two existing aspects, plan and 
material; but (b) left the sustaining of the universe to the world- 
soul as the perfect Form could not be defiled by contact with 
material* Thus (e) man was made, not in the image of god, but in 
the image of the secondary powers* Man xma an Mage of an Mage*
In Aristotle the emphaeis on the invisible Pozms shifted towards the 
world of the visible* God was the prime««Bover In the sense of a 
final,, not an efficient, cause — but he was not creator* It wma 
from this source that Ptolemy drew, and formulated his earth-centred 
cosmology with its circular orbits and epicycles for the planets (cf* 
2*1 *4*-) »
22*1*2* Anolent Thouf^t* Rcom the # h  century onwards,
Taoists and others in the East held that the two principles which 
produced all things by their interaction were the Yin and the Yang*
The Yin was a passive, dark and female force, while the Yang was the 
active, light and imle counterpart* These two principles originated 
from the primordial mixture of matter and energy, and separated out 
from one another by gyratory motion* Thus the Yin principles gave 
rise to the earth and the Yang to the heavens; while their interaction 
gave five elements = water, fire, wood, metal and earth* (Of* Mason 
1962, pp.76ffJ
In Chinese thought several world systems were held* By the Han
period (&# 200 B.C.) there were at least three the Ka Theln, the Hun 
Thein, and the Hsuan Yah syatems# The former was the 'hemisphere 
heaven theory® which held that the heaven was a regular hemisphere and 
the earth an inverted bowl with linear edges such that It fcnned a 
convex square. The second xms the 'Celestial Sphere theory® and here 
the univers® was a spheroid* Chang Heng compared the universe to an 
egg, the yoke being the earth supported on water and the shell being 
the heavens supported on vapours* The tlilrd is the *Mpty Infinite 
Space theory® where the universe had no shape, nor substance beyond 
the earthly and heavenly bodies» This last theory waa associated 
with Taoists; while the second was identified with Confucianism#
These Eastern pictures have similarities to the early Western (or
Ancient Hear Eastern), but fefo fundamental differences stand out#
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First? the astaronouiioal calculât ions of. the CMnese xfere almost 
entirely algebraic, not g^eometrical, and therefore they did not dez?ive 
a picture of the configuration of the universe from this# Technical 
astronomy and cosmology were separated areas and ■ coomological 
speculation remained qualitative in character» Second? there was no 
divine Icm-giver controlling the universe and the cosmic processes 
were a matrix of Interaotiona between diverse objects of nature.
.gg»1.«3... ïn ' oontEast bo the foregoing the
biblical material stands in marked c o n t r a s t A t  first glance it may 
appear ‘bhat the Bible reflects a primitive geooentz*ic outlook common 
to 33abylonian, Phoneoian and Hebraic thou^it, but tills cannot be 
consistently maintainedè Undoubtedly crude liteï?alism Mil lead to
all sorts of conflicting cosmological plctm?es, but It seems clear 
that in the Hebraic eagression of this issue we have, not a series of 
world-pio'toes, but a worldvievr; not a detailed scientific explanation 
but a representation of the pre*^ *a,batractive appearance to man* , Bo 
the cosmogony of the Bible is lm?gely the oornmon-senee view of things 
from the perspective of man "" except in didactic revelation. In 
maz-iœd contrast to the ideas of the surroimding natimis the Bible 
de**deified nature*. Unlike the Greeks or Egyptians, nature in 
Hebraic though'^  was given n o  status of divinitySimi3.axly their 
God had no origin or boundsry «** He was infinite, eternal, the creator 
God on wliom man was totally dependent for existence arad preservation.
As Hookyaas writes: "The Bible knows nothing of 'Mature^ but îmows 
only 'creatures*., who are absolutely dependent for their origin and 
existence on the will of God." (1975^ p#8. of. p.15«)
22.1.4. The Intervening Years. By the Middles Jiges a oertazji impasse 
was reached. The Schoolmen made the earthi-centred theories of 
Htolemy Mtegral to their philosopiiy and theology. But Aquinas 
moved towards treating tMs as a, working- hypothesis# (Of. Hurd & 
KiplMg 1964» Vol.I p.64.) The problem was that any alternative 
which \'jæ ©/«centric to the earth was equated with atheistic chaos.
A world-pieture mid a wrldview wore being identified. But there 
was also a growing reaction against the oosmo3.ogies of Aristotle and 
Plato, even though imch of the truly modem era of science from Kepler 
on was still eau^at up M  thei:©. influences* Nevertheless, there v/aa 
a distinctive move away frozn the Greek idea of ortlerliness as an 
expression of Nature's oim intelligence to the concept of an 
intelligent divine ruler and creator who was independent of his
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oreation» (Of* 1*5* and 1*6*)
Iten the confXicting strands of thought had settled domi end the 
Platonic, Aristotelian and Pythagorean ghosts finally laid to rest, 
the world was left with the Newtonian, model as the 'final' explanation 
of the cosmos - or so it seemed* The universe, created by God, was 
a self-existent macliine subject to various laws of nature which 
governed its behaviour. This is still probably a popular picture*
But what room was there for mind in this picture? It was a problem 
which e^ cercised the great men of pMlosophy* Berkley, Hume, Kemt 
and He^l all. tried to resolve this fundamental problem ands "In every 
case their answer was at bottom the semes n£ime'iy, that mind makes 
na'kure; nature is, so to speak, a by-product of the autonomous and 
self-existing activity of mind*" (Oollingftmod 1965» p*7#)
BypothecM. This brings'us to the first 
of the 'modem® cosmologies which is associated with Kant and Laplace* 
Known as *La.plaoQ®s Nebular Hypothesis' it In fact originated with 
Kant* Laplace postulated the existence of a denser centazal region 
whose power of attraction piadntained the whole system wMoh he 
conceived in a state of rotation, relying on centrifugal fo3?ce to keep 
the planets in their places* ICant îiad ommitted the element of 
rotation, such that his system would îiavo been lacking any angular 
momentum* But neither? Kant nor Laplace explained wliy the four major 
planets Jupiter, Satum, Uranus and Neptune «» which account for only 
l/%th of 1?é of the total mass of the system should possess 9#^ of its 
angular momentum* It was to get round this problem that Moulton and 
Chamberlain became the first of many to attribute the origin of the 
playlets to a close encounter/collision between the sun and a passing 
star a tidal/catastrophe theory). (Of* 0<mderc 1964» p»565f*)
Piekiia.g up Aquinas* point about time and oreation, Kant found 
himself in an embarrassing position* To the question as to whether 
the universe had a beginning in time he found he had a proof which said 
'Yes *, and one which sal-d Kent also denied the reality of
space and time as empirical and real in the sense M  which physical 
things ar^ e empirical and 37ea,l* He wnt on to argue that the cosmos 
bears the imprint of om? minds — thus providing a climate of thought 
which would seem to underlie and make possible the theories of men
1* Kant's first important book was 'The X’heory of the Heavens'- and 
was subtitled, 'Am Essay on the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of 
the Universe, TzTeated According to 'Newtonian Brlnoiples*.'
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like Ïiünstelïi, Bohr and Eddington*
22.2. MOBMM 008M0IAGIES
22.2.1. Introduction. Toclay there is a new awareness that change is 
progressive and not cyclical; nature ie no longer viewed ae a machine, 
hut rather that which is developing, and while it may contain ot 
suggest machines, it is not itself a machine* Thus there has been a 
réintroduction of teleological, concerns, substance has been resolved 
into fimotion. It is necessary to be clear concerning the difference 
between 'cosmology* and 'cosmogony'. Gosmolo/iv is that branch of 
theoretical antronomy which deals with our Imowledge concerning the 
universe as a systematic whole. Goamogonv deals with the genesis, 
evolution and future of the universe. The one is baaed on 
obaeirvation and the fomulation of scientific laws, while the other is 
highly speculative » In practice the further we probe the more 
blurred the distinction becomes. Indeed the first real attempts to 
penetrate the sidereal universe were made by philosophers and not 
astronomers per se (cf. ibid p.565.). Due to this prominent 
philosophical nature we enter in cosmology into a more speculative 
æ?ea of science where theories come and go with amazing rapidity.
Indeed one soienco historian parallels eosmological theories today to 
the numerous and varied ether theories of the 19th century and claims 
that "they are in a sense the historical heirs" of them. (Mason 19^2,
9 .567.)
Cosmology ia not experimental in the some way as physios or 
chemistry, but is typified aa observatio nal. The Pj?inciple of 
Uniformity asamiea great significance (of. 7*1.4#)* We assume that 
the laws we do know, or think we îcnow, hold tliroughout' the universe* 
Hence a starting premiss is the assumption of far more than we have 
evidence for « but the alternative is to give up this branch of scienceJ 
The principle of uniformity has two forms - the naa?row, where it is 
believed that there is no preferred place in the universe but that the 
broad, features, including scientific laws, are the same from any point 
of integration; and the wide view which includeEi the fosmiea?, but 
contends that not only are the features the same at every place, but 
also at all times.
Coîï^red with other disciplines, and considering its historical 
lineage, astronomy was slow to gather momentum. Hot until 1782 did 
Herschel, with the aid, of toolmologicel improvements, see a double 
star; and it was only in 1832-55 that a finite stellar parallax with
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the earth's orbit as base was discovered by EendGi?Bon*(Cf. Pledge I966, 
ï>*290*) The existence of the galaxy was fi3?st deduced by Hersohel - 
but only about 1800; and not until I9I8 did Shapeley determine the 
centre of the galaxy and provide a serious modification to this 
picture* Mow it appeared that the sun was situated about 50*000 
light years fzîom the galactic centre, and neither the eas?th nor the 
soleir system was the centre of the universe.
Mow while some cosmological models had been constructed on 
Eewtonian piiysics, the modem cosmological movement cannot be seen as 
truly inaugurated until Beeliger and Neumann independently raised 
objections against the infinite Newtonian universe. (Cf« ÎCilmister 
1969» P#54*) Bssentlaj-ly their objection was that when the volume 
of a Newtonian distribution of matter tended to infinity the 
gravitational potential became non-existent as did the gravitational 
force. To Uiis was added the factor that the darlmess of the night 
sïcy suggests a finite universe. Indeed as early as 1825 Olbers had 
calculated tlmt if the universe were homogeneous and infinite, then 
the night sky wou3.d be as bright as the overage surface brightness of 
a star* (Hailey had noted this phenomenon in 1720.) It was 
difficulties of this kind in the Newtonian cosmology that gave rise to 
the interest in relativity for cosmology*
In 1917 Einstein trickled the pj?oblem aa to whether space and 
matter in the universe wore infinite or finite. Following Mach, he 
suggested that in infinitude of matter eacli object would have 
infinite mass and inertia. Conversely, if the universe had a finite 
boundary in Euclidean space, the matter inside would not be in 
equilibrium v/ith the empty space outside — thus baeîic instability.
So Einstein postulated that the luiiverEje might possess finite volume 
but no finite boundaries — much like a two dimensional ant on a throe 
dimensional orange. (Of. Mason 1962, p*568.) From general relativity 
he derived an expression relating the average curvature of space to 
the amount of matter in tlie universe, and then calculated the mass of 
the universe and the curvatures of its space, assuming tlmt the 
density of matter in owe own galactic cluster and others was the same 
as the density of the whole universe. This was all don© before the 
red shift of distant nebulae had been observed. Einstein fiirther 
assuiaed that the velocities of bodies was smell compered to the speed 
of light such that the spatial structure of liis model did not va3^ 
with time. He Bitter challenged tMa also in 1917.
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"He Bitter's Vforld was M.1 of motion Imt contained no matter, 
while Einstein's world was full of mattes? but contained no 
motion. Both were extreme models, and later they wore 
considered to be possible representations of the initial 
beginning, or the final end, of oosraio evolution, but not 
models of the univorso as it is»" (ibid pp.568-9«)
The special eases of Einstein and de-Bitter's models we3?e reconciled 
in 1922-24 by the construction of expanding models by Friedmann and 
Lemaitre* Such models could start from the Einsteinian model and 
expand asymptotically to the de Bitter form, or they could e?gand and 
contract. The question at the heart of all this was a could 
miifos^ mlty of laws be justified in an expanding univereet
It is clear that even if a theory could be found that adequately 
cove3?ed all data, tills would not necessarily give a true theory for no 
one set of data lias a unique solution. And in tliis particular area 
"the proportion of fact to theory has been smaller than Is usual in 
science, and the t3?ains of deductions have been unusually long." 
(pledge 1966, p.294») Cosmologies are highly underdetermined and 
this has led to a multiplicity of models within the cosmological field 
such that by 1952 de Sitter postulated nine main types of possible 
world models based on the conditions that both the cosmological 
constant and the curvature of space could be negative, positive or 
zero. (Cf. Mason I962, p.569.)
222.2.2. The Big 33ang/BupezTdense/or EVolutionary Model. This is 
usually associated with Gsmow's instantaneous creation theory which 
assumed that the univezrse started from an exceedingly dense 
concentration of neutrons v/hich decayed witliin half an hour to produce 
atoms. Gïmow, however, proposes no explanation as to the origin of 
this primeval nucleus « it is simply assumed* The temporality of 
tîie universe has been argued fi?om various aspects “* the oldest rocks 
on the earth are finite; radioactive decay suggests finitnde; entropy 
points to a time êuttow of finite magnitude.
There a5?e seve3?al problems directed against the siiperdens© theory* 
There the problems of g infinite density at zero time; the assumed 
given primeval nucleus; and the red sMft in the face of recent 
diseov03?i©B such as quasars and pulsars. As Shapeley ifrote of this, 
and the next, theorys "Both hypotheses have plenty of trouble ahead of 
them and a paucity of observations behind them." (1954» p*484*)
2. Presently this theory or 22.2*4. i© in favour wi'bh a gene3?al 
dismissal of 22.2*3.
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against the idea of a temporal, universe and proposes that matter is
continuously created» Matter lost by recession is replaced by new
mattei? such that the observable universe is mainta:Liied in a steady—
state - it has always been there and has neither? beginning or end*
The main advocates of this have been Bondi, Gold and Hoyle who have
shown that by modifying the General Tiieory of Relativity the observed
expansion of the universe can be accounted for as the result of this
creation of matter in the form of îiydrogen, as a prope2?ty of space
Itself# These thinkers extended into the dimension of time the
principle of equivalence of all observers in space 0 and this • perfect
cosmological principle* as it was oajled, led them to posit that
WÎ3matter was created ex nihilo continuously at the rate of 10 ‘ grammes 
per 0 *0» per second; or to put it another way, the creation of about 
one hydrogen atom in a apace egual to a, living room every few million 
yearsfl Such a rate ia of course too email to measure# (Of# Hoyle 
1955s PP.317-8.)
But there are p3?oblema • The theory has an ad 'hoc character about 
it to get round fiatp but must still face the question of whea?© do laws 
come from,* There ia the prob3.em of the creation of matter ox-nihilo 
wîiicli is blatantly ad hoc, as well as violating the theory of the 
p3?incipl® of the conservation of energy/matter# Again, the newer 
radio astronomy which reaches further into space has established that 
the number of radio sources in a given volume of space increases with 
the cube of the distance from our galaxy — a result contrary to 
continuous creation whleli indicated that the number of sources in a 
given volume should stay constant or decrease as the distance 
increased# (Cf* Mason I962, p«574.) The siewer radio data coupled 
with the intezgpretation of the observed brci^ itness in elliptical 
galaicies, 3?adio noise background data, observed heliimi-to-liydrogen 
ratios in nebulae and stars in our galaxy, has led Hoyle to modify 
this theory# But he still holds to creation ex nihl3.0e positing an 
infinite and eternal universe consistent with the obso3?vable data so 
far obtained. The problem is khat the previous and the next theory 
also adequately cover the laiwm data,# (Gf# Dingle 1954» P*519«) 
Interestingly, as support for this theory has diminished it has 
caused embarrassment in Russia where it was allied to a scientific 
Gonfisxnation of atheism#
449
22*2*4. The Osoillatzma’ Universe# This in essence is a zje'feum to 
the 03?eek concept of oyolioal processes (of* Goose 22#5#5#)* 
Oscillation of the universe Is finding wide acceptance and simply 
states that the whole universe expands out to some maximum radius and 
then cont3?aots to a minlmmii before once again expanding# tenovr, 
onoe associated with the first theory, is a prominent advocate of this 
view, hut confesses that M s  hjgothetieal formulation of an eternal 
oscillation is purely metopl^ rsical end has no objective scientific 
basis# (Gf# Gamow 19$3@ PP.25-4*)
22*2*5* Genergil Problems. Space pszeoludes a proper discussion of the 
many problems in this ea?ea but several are noted# (a) ïÿ/en'if man 
discovered some instrumental tool that allowed aoourate prediction and 
adequately comred all Imown data, even this i^uld not be enough for 
theoretical, science# (b)Tîie above theories deM with the origins of 
the universe by excluding Ca -priori) the possibility of a creator God 
who was, and is, oausitive vis a vis the created order# (Of# Hess 1976, 
p#29*) (c) The observable universe ie not necessarily the universe
observed, thus m@ld.ng predictions and data, relative# (d) ®ie above 
theo3?ies give no reason xfhy one thing happened rather ttei another*
(e)The second law of thermodynamics seems to militate against the 
steady state theory which cheats both conservation and eni;ropy laws.
(f) The act of creation pea? se oamiot be subject to the scientific 
1mm that %)æ?tain to oj?ea,tecl reality*.
99t5. D o m m s  OF OEMâTIOl ^
ïhlB ooïî-fcends that ell vias CEoated
about 6,000 years ago in six literal 24 hour days. This view is 
often wrongly identified with conservative Ohristl^ms though it does 
find wide support from fmidamentaXists.
22.3.2. The Linguistic Solution. TM.s proclaims that Genesis states 
the origin of the universe in religious and theological tezms (poetic 
and literary) Mone* It views Genesis as a purified lïiybhologioal 
Babylonian cosmology, but sees the religious truths ensMined therein 
as inspired*. It lies behind many modern views (of. 22*5.8*1.).
5* Tlie doctrine of oreation depends to a large extent on how the 
first two chapters of Genesis ere Interpreted and there have been 
diverse understandings of this. The limits of space again 
necessitates viiztually a listing of the views rather than a proper 
presentation of them« (Of* Hamm 1971,PP* 119-178*)
4* It may be possible to hold more than one view at one time.
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%%&B coiaes fcc® p. H. 
CfQsae t'ïîio ai’gaed tîmt eZl 02?gariio life is cycllcalg aad that ereatioii 
was a violent lato the cÿole of na'tee*
22*3*4. f^he Cæeatlon-Rulnatlon-Roozeatlon T'heonv# This has the 
advantage of allowing in the ’gap* between Genesis 1g1 and 1|2 a time 
scale suited to any gaologloal or evolutionary process*
considers the ’days* of Genesis as
periods of time»
FoXlow&g AugKstine, this envieagss 
the ’dayfj' as God~aiTriaefi (periods of reirelation) and not sœi-Ælvidea,
22.3.7* Roman Catholic Views. In 1909 the E.G, Pontifical
Commission listed among the ’fundamental. 'brnthB* of the Genesis story - 
the creation of o21 things by God at the start of time; the special 
creation of mai'i; the formation of the first woman from the first man g 
and the ■ transgressioti of a command given by God to the first man 
resulting in the Pall. ®he first Papal encyclical to deal with 
evolution (1950) divided man into body and a oui g  gx^ s-nting an 
evolutionary origin of the body^ but insisting on the special creation 
of Adam’s soul. So we find a, point of correlation between science 
and theology' in that the Homan orthodoxy links evolution in science • 
and the doctrine of creation by 'Wo tactual historical events — the 
beginning of the universe and the advent of man.
22.3.8. Protestant Views.* î'Ioo-Orthodoscjr loaow© no suoh link and the 
opening chapters of Genesis are viewed as symbolic expressions of 
religious truths on a quite different sphere from science or history# 
There is a radical disjimotion of soience and religion which leaves 
men like Barth and Bultma^m quite imperturbed by the discoveries of 
science.
Bitltmann^  sees creation as the 
constant action of God with man» but in no way involving a 
cosmological vision. His view is typically existential with the 
meaning of creation shut up to a. personal confession^ lie wishes to 
demythologise the idea of creation and point to its existential 
significance in terns of man’s dependence on God*
5* They tend to remove into an upper storey religious mysticism « 
cf.« Ap]3endi3c A» and Bujiae (1976$ p.32.)
6, Cf. the oxoe3.1ent critical monograph by Ridderbos (I960).
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”TIie affirmation that God Is creator cannot be a theoretical 
statement about God as creator Eiimdi in a general sense.
The affirmation can only he a personal confession that 1 
understand myself to he a creature lAlch owes its existence 
to God.’^ (Bultmann 1958* p#69#)
Similarly G13Ucey distinguishes religious and scientific concerns 
along existential lines — creation affirms existential dependence and 
not temporal origins g creation is a relationship entered into and not 
mi event as such; we are concerned with ontological dependence and not 
temporal Mstory# (Of* Gilkey 1959» p«260*)
%zom a different doctrinal basis Binmner (1952* insists
that the doctrine of creation is not an hypothesis about origins hut 
simply a form of the basic religious affirmation, that God is 
SovereigjTi* He draws a contrast hetvjeen God as the one ifho stands 
’hefore and above’ the world» and the world as viewed in Greek 
philosophy where God and the world are necessary complements*. So he 
affirms a rigorous dichotomy between Creator and creation# But with 
reference to evil and. suffering he clrives a wedge between God as 
Creator and God as Redeemer; between law and love* This means that 
his doctrine of creation is reduced to a confusing statement that God 
created the world; but that omr world cannot be identified with this.
722.3#B.2* Karl Barth# It is axiomatic for ,Barth that creation be 
seen as a revealed doctrine* and consequently that it be viewed within 
the COD.text of the revealed covenant between God and man* As God 
deals with man tiarough grsice* so the vei?y ground of creation is also 
grace* while its goal remains the glorifying of God# Hence there is 
an Inner Interwovenness of nature and grace (in dualistic motive?)*
But tills does not avoid the fact that the smae history of redemption* 
just like the history of creation is fundamentally non-historioal* (Of, 
2iuidema 1972* p*314«)^ Genesis 1|1 Is where the story of g3?aee 
starts for Barth indeed It starts even before this* for the covenant 
precedes creation* it is from everlasting* The eternal covenant is 
the inner ground of creation which binds creation and redemptive 
covenant in an inner unity. (Of* BerMiouwer 1956» p.55*)
Creation as saga discloses an event and not something ontlo; it is 
sacramental as well as salvation hlsto:cy* But . creation is not tied
7# As well as Barth’s ox® witings I x-rould draw attention to tx^ o 
useflil critical studies «' Zuldema (1972) mid BerMiouvmr (1956).
8, Barth» of course,. Is not ovmmmch interested in any scientific or 
historical concern as one normally considers such topics.
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to God, it la quite dlatizmt# (Gf* Barth 1949» P*55«) God created 
heaven and earth ’im tempore’ ae well as *oum tenrpore’» and it follows 
that the days of création are simply taken as days heeause when God 
created cresturely time He xfas creating in creaturely time# But 
basically he is not Interested in creation as an objective historical 
event, but in the concept of dependence it portrays* Striking at 
the heart of the Kantian ding @n aich he writes:
"##*heavea and earth are not a reality in themselves, which are 
understandable end explioablG Sxx terns of themselves, but that 
they, with man in the centre, as the meaning of their
existence, derive from God* belong to God*" (ibid p*60#)
Thus he views Genesis One as giving creation as the external basis 
of the covenant and Genesis Two as giving the internal 'basis, drawing 
out the Ohristological centre of his theology* Christ works In 
creations "The world came into being, it was created and sustained by 
the little child that was bom in Bethlehem###"' (ibid p.gG.) Holding 
could be clearer, and in a sense more refreshing a statement than this. 
But as I see it, he carries his exegesis too far# For Berth, Christ 
is the real ground of creation where God say© ’Tes’ to creation* So 
he reads Christ out of Genesis 1;1 and therefore our real mil original 
condition is not derived from the figure of Mam but from Christ*
Our being in Mam stands from the beginning in the light of the fact 
tlmt we arc in Christ#
Having espoused such views it is not surprising to find that he 
has iio clear conception of the Fall* The triumph of grace is from 
before creation and not after the ’good’ creation hàd faHcn# Hence 
when Genesis 1;51 talks of ’goodness’ it is nothing to do with some 
original condition but refers to a unique ’being good’ of the room 
which God had made for the unfolding of the covenant# Thus Barth 
denies that man ' is given a freedom to choose between obedience and 
disobedience! such freedom is not granted men; he ocèupied no middle 
ground between obédience and disobedience# Yet sin haa com© to pass,
has become reality* But the choice which man made was irrational 
and absurd, the impossible ' possibility of sin* (Of* ' Berïdiouwer 1956, 
p#62#j
The triumph of grace in creation implies a triumph over something* 
This hinges around his interpretation of Genesis 1 ;2 where he sees the 
’wae without form#*’ as referring to a past time, something that God 
had bypassed when he created the world# It is that which was negated 
by God’s creative act; it is the boundary of created reality, and only
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here does the im-godly said the anti«^ godly have izeallty» God» in Hie 
grac© m d  mercy» pushed this rea3.ity haok to it© periphery# In 
Barth’s view this excluded possibility receives a, deeply profound 
signifloaneej, for Bimp3,y in tha^fc It was excluded» It is a reality at 
the 'boundary of that xdiioh God did esTesite* Thus the oïiaos exists 
only at God’s left hand, not as His creature, Imt subject to Hi© 
power* Barth deals with tM,s at length (this .’das Hlehtigo’) seeing 
it as essentiel to M s  view that God oouJ.d not be gracious if not 
threatened# (Of# Ibid pp*56#72e) The Devil is essentially the chaos; 
and the eMos essentially a, kingdom of unreality# But dialectlc&illy 
the chaos is not only appearance, for in the attempt to establish a 
power of its ox-m, the kingdom of unreality, of chaos, is a, reality 
even if the reality of a lie*. (Of# ibid p*?8*)^
%'fhlle this is the briefest of summaries it jndlcates how divorced 
from any scientific Interest is Bexth’s formulation# Several 
objections can b© raised even if there are valuable insights here*
First it must be said that Barth does not seem to allow the passages 
he deals with to speak for themselves, such as in hie attempt to jToed 
Christ out of Genesis I5I# It might even be asked if lie exegetes 
Genesis 1 to 5 at all# In M e  over^ O^briBtol.ogialng he tends to 
confuse CMiot as mediator of creation and mediator of redemption* 
Obviously one does not want to undercut the identity of the 
ontological Trinity xAere all participate In creations but it is 
erroneous to equate the histoisy of creation and the history of 
salvation# This seems to me a cnioial flaw in Barth’s whole 
theological construct# It is a view which blurs the reality of the 
Fall and sees no clem: distinction betijeen God’s good creative act, and 
the Fall due to Emm’s free choice of disobedience#
I have long b M  the impression tlmt Baa^ rbh in his doctrine of 
creation tends to an Moipient Gnosticism in that he has little 
interest in natui?© and heods immediately fore a theo3*ogical anthropology, 
which in turn, heads at once for a soteriological ChMstology»
Pranter in fact speaks of his ’craeition dooetiem’# (Cf# fuidema 1972, 
P*3l6#) This stems, I believe, to a large extent from M s  a priori 
disjunction of religious concern from histoary and science per se»
22»3.#8*3* firooQBS TheolOf^ y (of # 16*4*6$ 17*1 •)* The process 
theologians mmber mien such as Birch and Bairbour, as well as V/Iiltehead,
9* Of# Barth’s ’Church Dogmatics’ m / 3 ;  IlZ/lg IV/l»
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Cobb end Hartsbome* They arrive at their concopta from a 
perBona3,istio model. In all approaohee a model of reality 1© 
crucial mid here. In reaction against the pliysical-empirical modèle of 
the Newtonian era, we find a 'biological model which has lee© ernphasis 
on rigidity and more on the fluid proceaseo of becoming# Model© eire, 
of course, ever a danger and Birch rightly points out that: "Q?o 
mistake the model for reality 1© to he guilty of what Miitehead called, 
the ’fallacy of misplaced concreteneee»’" (1968, p*199*) Yet Birch 
also writes g
"For procegîB thought the personal is the model for all 
entities# It starts with the personal and a, process of 
reduction from the higîier to the lower levels of creation#*•
It is a form of reduetioniem in which process and mind 
never disappear#" (1976, p#44*)
ImDiediately one wants to Imow precisely how this may apply to a stone, 
or an a.tom *» are they too %)ersonol?
Within this scheme it is Eieaninglees to claim that God causes this 
or that physical or biological event for God ie not an agent of 
mechanical causation though He is a 'divine causation*# Birch 
contends therefore tîmt "creation is not something that happened#
It is not a doctrine about past events# It is a doctrine of the 
present#" (ibid p#44*) He draws heavily on the Binsteinian 
destruction of the Newtonian model, contending that: "There ie no such 
thing as a particle* Reality is not things but process* Process 
involves becoming# Becoming involves something akin to 
anticipation*" (ibid p#42#) Thus the universe is seen as a living 
organism, not a mechanism* "Heohanism", he claims, "is an 
abî3traction from organism; to fail to see this is to reify psiooess*" 
(ibid p#43*) It follows that Genesis is not about temporal 
beginnings but concerns the basic relationship between the world and 
God*
Her© \io find an existontial influence as well as xfhat appeaî:s to 
me a pMloaophical absuzility, for if creation is not something that 
happened, how do we answer the problem of being at all* It is all 
very well to sliift the emphasis fnom being to becoming, but there can 
bo no becoming apart from being*
How does Birch view God? (Of # Birch 1968, p#194*) Ho suggests 
that we can either viexf God as spectMor of the created object or as 
integrated with creation such that no sharp distinction exists between
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Creator and creation. But this posits a false dileaima « aro these 
the only two alternatives? It seems to me that because he has 
abandoned the idea of a real, creation as a beginning he is forced 
into equating providence and creation, whioh, as I see it, are two 
distinct real-ias. For Birch* God neither rules sovereignly nor 
causes all being and becoming to be (for accidents occur). Tîie 
creation of order in natur’a is a trial mid error process of autonomous 
nature# Thus the oono3.usion ie for<îed on us that for process 
theology the world is in God •* nanentheiam « in a new attempt to 
combine the transoendenoe and immanence of God.
22.3.8.4# Fa^ ancis Gchaeffer (1975, p.27f.)# Schaeffer is one of the 
most influential conservative scholars today and has suggested seven 
areas of f3?eedom and ‘Wo of absolute necessity in respect to a 
biblical doctrine of creation. The seven areas of freedom £ires (a) 
the possibility of a break between Genesis I5I and 1;2; (b) the 
possibility that God created a grown-up universe; (o) the possibility 
of a 'long day’ (period) I n  Genesis I5 (d) the possibility that the 
Flood affected the geological data; (e) in Cîenesis 1 the use of the 
word ’kinds’ is not equivalent to ’species’? (f) the possibility of 
animal death before the Fall which would account for fossils from that 
period? and (g) only the word ’bora* must mean an absolute new 
beginning - used only for the original creation (Gen.1?1*), for the 
creation of conscious life in contrast to vegetation (v.21 .)* and for 
the creation of man (v*27.) - the other xwrcls being used, ’asah’
(made) and ’yehi’ (let), do not necessitate absolute new beginning. 
Schaeffer also posits two limits on these areas of freedom3 (a) the use 
of the word ’bara’ gives discontinuity with what went before *» although 
the other words can fit continuing creation? (b) Mam was Mstorio»
22.4. Towmm A BI{3LIGAL BOCERINE OF GSMTION
Creation ie connected to questions such ass % y  is there something 
rather than noticing?? Is there reason and purpose in existence?? Miy 
are things the xfay they are? In seeking to formulate answers the 
humanistic trap of excluding revelation must be avoided. The 
question of the origin of the world apart fa:om revelation is 
imanswerable as Genesis I5I and John I5I indicate, as does Popper (cf. 
t97S/a, p.*29f«). Humanly epeaJiiing we can thii# of creation in 
several ways in the mystery of new life^ of birth, of procreation? 
or in the poet who creates, as does the painter and sculptor, by 
forming out of pre-existent materials. But such analogies breaîc
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doma for in ’the’ creative act of God we deal* not with finite men,
Imt the infinite God who ie truly there*
BiblicM statements do not give a (primary) eoientifio picture - 
but represent a world view, ILVea Flew realises the validity of this
approach, as does MacKinnon who notes s "To believe in Creation is to 
see the world in a certain way; to have one’s responses to its 
manifold being coloured in a certain style," (1969» P*175*)
The creation doctrine reveals God as Sovereign and Transcendent; 
the idea of ex niliilo indicating that He is not limited by anything 
(such as Plato’s Demiurge), Thus wo have firmly established the
fundamental ontological dependence of creation, God is free imd 
purposeful* giving to time and history significance and direction*
The world is affirmed as real and orderly, not m  illusion or the 
product of chance; essentially good, even if marred by the FMI,
There is a basic distinction, then, between the Creator and the 
creation. But how is God related to the cosmos? Firsts tlirough 
the Word-based doctrine of creation where CM?ist is mediator of 
creation, grtmting meaning to it before the Father, Seconds through 
the covenant of God with man £uid nature ** which is not to assert a 
covenant of grace prior to the Fall, but to realise the implication of 
a covenant of works, Nature has it si o\m intrinsic value apart from 
man before God*
22,4«1* The Universe Is lot Ftemal But Began To Be, From ancient 
times, and even in the early church fathers (Origen) it was 
considered that the wo3?ld was eternal, that it had no beginning in 
time. It was argued that if God was Creator, then He was eternally 
such as this was His intrinsic character, and thojjefore creation itself 
must be eternal# (a) But the idea of creation per se implies 
fini'bude (of* 2 Cliron, 6;18#), (b) l#lle God is Creator, and tîiis
is attributed to His diaraoter, it is not therefore necessarily of the 
essence of His being* The essence of His being and that which are 
His attributes imist not be confused# (c) If time is created sueli 
objection falls to the g£*oi?nd* (d) Gcripture clearly,implies a 
beginning Gen.lgl# Jn»1|1# Ps,53»6,9# a creation through the Word, 
end through the brooding activity of the Spirit#
The whole Trinity is involved in creation# The Father primarily 
is the One who creates; but it is also by Christ that all things are 
created. He is the Alpha and Omega, the eternal, infinite and divinely
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perfect esqiression of the image of God* All thoughts of God in 
relation to all tilings b2:o taken thiîougïi and out of the Son* In 
creation the ¥oixl gives existence outside of Himself to all creation, 
which ia a thought of God, a creative ¥©rd of God* As Paimenherg 
commentas "the Johaimlne logos sibiiultaneously has cosmological (as 
Mediator of the creation of the world) and soteriologioal (as Redeemer 
tî'amïgh revelation) functions*" (1968, p*,l60*) But Paimenhex’g, like 
Moltmami, views crea,tion eschatologioally - it împpenpj from the future, 
from the ultimate end* Creation is not viewed froaï the perspective 
of the heginning of the world. So referring to a passage like 
Golossians 1;15 he constructs an eschatologioal mediation of creation 
hy Gîjrist «* mediation, not with respect to the origin of creation in 
time, but to the wœîld process as a whole. Cîirist does not provide 
a creational law, but an end reconoi 1 iation of the cosmos. (Cf * ibid 
PP*l69»392*595f#) But it is siy* contention that tMs lgn.ores the 
plain meaning of Golossians as well as'the philosophical problem of 
ifhy there is being In the first place, and hence leaxis into a meta­
physical labyrinth where the future finishes up detenaining the 
present (cf* Bets, Alves, MoltEiann)* Rather, Gîxrist mediates and 
upholds creation from the beginning and the structure of Golossians is 
(a) OMist creates all things (v*l6)§ (b) preserves them in temporal 
existence (v*17)§ and (e) reconciles all things (v*20). The 
creative aspect belongs logically to a beginning in time*
As the light and thought of God in creation is through the Son, so 
the force of life, its harmony t=»nd commmion, are in the Holy Spirit* 
(Of* Gen.IgS. Job 26?13* Ps*35s6.) Thus ^  the Father, through the 
Son, and in the Spirit are all thing© created. ' The Spirit of God 
was not merely a source of eupematural îmowledge in the Old Testament, 
but in a fimclajnentM way the ground of life in its inclusive sense. 
Thus Psalm 104 describes in impressive lanfpxage the vitalising effect 
of the Spirit of God and the total dependence of creatures on their 
Creator* (Cf. Ps*104|29»50* Gen.2?7» B‘i3ek.37î5f.)
reject any foim of pantheism (that the tmiverse is the existing form 
of God, the living garment - dj^,.l©bendiges Goethe)? or
iiylosoism (that there is intelligence in nature). Theism believes 
In an infinite eztramundane mind to whose power and will the origin of 
M l  things are dependent, and that all things are quite distinct from 
tlmt power and will* To the objection ex nihilo nihil fit I reply
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that wo as© not her© dealing with the undoubted limitations of man 
and hie thought, hut with a transcendent God who can do precisely that 
wMeh is hmnanly impossible,, God is not a mere exips:o-hiiman heing.
There is, then,, the immediate oreative aot of God His mediate 
acts to he considered* In His immediate act God calls matter into 
being - ’In the hegiming God created the heavens and the earth*’
He calls into existence the things that do not exist (cf* Hom*4î17*)» 
But there Is also His mediate acts where He forms, shapes and moulds* 
One example is sufficient to establish tMss in Genesis 1?27 and 2;7 
we find that man was not called into being îmaed,iately» but that God 
used the dust of the groimd to form him, to mould and simpe himir. 
Therefore It ie clear that t W  foraiing by God out of pre-existent 
material is not taught, but that the forming out of created material 
is* So it is reasonable to argue for an instantaneous creation 
ex nihilo by the Word of God? and a mediate, progressive creation by 
the power of God and/or secondary causes -imder His rule*
It is a. comroon assertion that oreatlo sac nihilo is nowhere 
explicitly taugîit ixi Scripture, and Simpson (1925) (uid Barbour go as 
far as to contend tha;h it is not implicit either - arguing that the 
concept only appears in 2 Maccabees 7§28* (Cf* Barbour 1968/b, pp*
383-5 • ) That tills has some substance is confirmed by the hyper- 
orthodox Hoeksema (1973» p*170f,) rwho concedes that tills is a concept 
foreign to Scripture, and that the basic thrust of the Hebrew words 
’to create’» ’to form’ and ’to make’ all imply a, process of separation, 
moulding and forming# Nevertheless ho implicitly allows creatio ex 
nihilo* Most attempts to establish this point appeal to Genesis 1 
and the use of ’bora’ and Hebrews 11?3« 8o while there is no 
tight linguistic argument for ex nihilo it should be bourne in mind 
that there is îm word in Hebrew, Greek» Batin or JMglish wliich is 
exclusively expressive of this single concept*
The doctrine was» of course, articulated in the early oentu5?ies of 
the Christian ora m  a refutation of Gnostic heresy* That it should 
be given a prominent role today seems clear to me» and oezrtMnly there 
is no scientific or Scriptural reason why it should be negated*
Indeed Fleif» in his discussion of creation with î€acKimon, grants the 
concept as valid within the Christian framework# (Gf. Flew 1969» P,171#)
I would defeud the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo on the following 
basis* (a) Scripture gives no explicit statejnent of there being a
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pr6-©xist©nt material out of which God fomed the unlveree, nor is the 
universe anytzhere seen as an emanation of God, or identified with Him* 
(h) Scripture says: ’Bet there he and there was*#.*’ ’For he spoke,, 
m d  it Game to he? he commanded, and it stood forth*’ (Ps.3359*)
(o) The imiverae is consistently seen as of God* He is the source 
of all, not in a &iostic sense, hut in line with other hlhlioal 
representations which refer the existoaee of all things exclusively to 
His oommand# "The universe, therefore, is ’of Him’ as its efficient 
cause*'® (HodgB 1,960» Wl.X p.559*) (d) Hebrews 11 ?3 depicts
creation as the fondamental doctrine * It is a basic tenet of the 
faith, understood by faith and given to us tln^ ough revelation* (e) 
God alone is infinite, all else is temporal and dependent (ef*. 2 Cor*
4# 18# Ps #102;25$26# ) # ( f )  Â beginning in time necessitates creatlo
ex nlMlo or we end up in an eternal dualism of God and matter#
(g) The temporality of created reality is implicit in the idea of 
God’s preserving grace (of* 0ol#1|l6»17« Hev#4|1t*)®
It seems to me there are only four logical possibilities concerning 
this topic# (a) Either we have aa absolute nothing, not even God, 
out of whioli all came to be; or (b) we have all beginning from an 
impersonal something, that is, there was primeval energy or something 
which was somehow sparked Into what is; or (a) we have a beginning out 
of a personal something, who caused temporal created reality to be; or 
(d) we have mi eternal dualism of good and evil, God and energy/matter. 
It seems to me that Scriptural warranty c m  only be found for (o)*
(Gf, Augustine 426» p*506#)
None of tills negates that there Is also in time a continuing act 
of God.* Barbour gees this bm merging with the Idea of providence 
and excluding oreatio ex nihilo* He points out that traditionally 
creation and i>rovid©nce were seen as dlstinot - creation was 
temporally God’s i^ iltiaX act, while providence was His subsequent acts* 
There was an ontologiool difference here in that in creation He acts 
immediately, izhlle In providence Ee act® along with or throu^i 
secondary causes ; and. a theological difference in the former pointing 
to His transcendence and the latter to His Immanence* This is a 
fair statement of the difference, though Barbour rejects it and adds;
"Now if creation is continuing, the first two distinctions 
vanish# If time is infinite, there was no intial act, no 
state of ’nihilo’t and God has alwayg been working along with 
otloer causes* Even if time is finite, creation occurs 
throughout its spmi and in the midst of other entities*" (l968/b 
p.385.)
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Tims ho loses a valid theologlcal distinction by reducljzg creation to 
the oontirminig^  conoept alone#: Xn opxiosiag such a reduction I
reaffirm that Î accept the idea of contlja.ixii!g providence (of. Ps. 104; 
14—3Q»)* In dietingiiishing creation and providence, I do not wish 
to make an absolute separation for "without proceeding to His 
providence, we cannot understand the fhll force of what is meant by 
God being the Creator." (Calvin I56O» p.93#)
2g4dalanSiM^Lai®_S£iA,MêaSi>J^^ did not
have to create to fo3.fil His love, to have someone to respond to that 
love. The ontologieal Trinity with its love and comnmioation 
between the tln?Ge persons obviates this objection» Again such an 
idea (that God had to create to fulfil Himself) would be an unacceptable 
limitation on the being of God who is free end independent.
The following definition of creation is posited: CroE),ti(m is that 
act of the Almighty will of God by wMch He gave tîmt wîi3.ch was 
eternally in His counsel, existence in distinction from Himself in 
time. ¥e are faced with an ul.tima.t0 problem of wl'zy oamething is there 
ra.ther then nothing,^ and to this science has no answers# Even if 
science imcovered the mechanics of creation as ezïiaustively as humanly 
possible» it would not explain why a primeval ma-ss was there in the 
first place. Nature derives from God, it does not stand autonomous 
from Him but "is simply the efficacious expression of the Divine 
wisdom and will#" (Bimpson 1925» p.78.)
If there is one thing the Bible insists upon throughout it is the 
priorness of God and the total dependence of creation. It seems to 
me that this is Cfmpatibl.e in a thoroughgoing iray with the idea of 
oreatio ex nihilo. while the continuing work of God within creation 
relates to His existential holding-in-being of creation* God reveals 
Himself in His works such that wo understmid all things to be out of 
the Father, through the Bon and in the Holy Spirit? all things are of 
God, tîirough God, and to God.# (Eom.11|36.)
The cosmos is other than God but depends on Elm? the cosmos is 
contingent and derived in being, while Gad is necessary and underived 
in being and creates and sustains the world by fiat. "In Genesis, 
and in Christian thinking, the world exists entirely by the fiat of 
God." (Peaoooke 1976, p#49#) The doctrine of ex, niMlff is a denial 
of pantheism, panentheisia,. îtoichæiBm and atheism; but it is also a
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sreasoBable act of God#
It neecl© to be reiterated that the Bible doe© not give a full 
blown model but a woxldvietf depicted in a pre«abstractive mmmer.
Thus, in broad terms, a bibllcM. oosiuologj»' states that the imlvoree, 
m  created by God, Is real; that man is real g and God Is real - but 
tlmt there ■ ie an ontological discontinuity betx-reen God and creation.
It aeserts that in the search for meaning we only îaïow something truly 
as . our knowledge of it conforms to God’s 5.nteriiretat5*<m# Bo only in 
the widest sense can Scripture indicate what is scientifically 
possible and what is not. Obviously Bcriptiira suggests dependence 
and Theism instead of autonomy and atheism# The problem is the 
scientist who plunges œi into Ills scientific Intricacies and loses 
sight of the overall perspective of which any part is but a facet and 
not the whole? loses sight of the personal truth of the xzholeness of 
creation in the seeming irqiex'sonaX particulars? loses the true 
integration point#
Gosmological3,y the Gopexnioan and Ne#;onian episodes have shoxm 
tîmt Christians can and do make mistakeo indeed all man do — in 
coni'uBlng warld-picture and worldview? that there shouM be a 
willingness to change our mind in the face of accredited evidence? a 
need to oxomn® deeply the essentials of belief and refrain from 
do^mtlc stateiïients In arnas not pertaining to salvation# Perhaps
the Eeforaa-tion attitude of an open book that wa.s alone supreme and an 
open mind before God are worth remembering.
33ut lest we endeavour to usurp God, let iia remember also that we 
are orealures before the Creator, that we have been set limits and 
boundaries#
"....let U8 M'Jlingly remmln hedged In bÿ' those boundaries 
X'zitîdn which God has been pleased to confine our persons, 
and, as it 'were, enclose our minds, so as to prevent them 
from losing themselves by wandering imreatmhaed."
(Galvin 1560, p.?4*)
Our calling is to live in creation » to talcs a pious delight in the 
work of God, and to praise and glorify M m  in all tilings#
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TOWAÎl'DB A CHilSTXM^ PERSPEGOIIVE OF ’LAWS OF MATÏÏBB»
mmomoTioN
Boieno© is dependent on the concept of law, of an underlying 
pattern and order in nature which the scientist seeks to uncover*
Indeed without an initial assumption of uniformity science becomes 
impossible for this* rationality is of the essence of scientific 
activity. As an assmption it is, however, in need of exajoination 
for the concept is an article of faith* As VJliiteheacl noted:
"Boienc© is founded on the notion of Law — The Laws of Nature***
♦ ••the restless modes® search for increased a.couracy of 
observation and for increased detailed explanation is based 
upon unquestioning faith in the reign of Laxf* Apart from 
such faith, the enterprise of science is foolish, hopeless*" 
(1947, PP.51,173.)
The origins of this concept of law are in the Christian religion, 
and especially in the Heforsoation (of, 23*2,$*). It cannot be denied 
that science arose in the context of a Christian worldview that 
stressed the reality of the Creator who had formed the world and 
imparted law to it, Davies argues that in the 1$th century:
"The Intellectual power of man was being rediscoveized, but in 
a new context - that of Christianity* Tliis religion involved 
a belief in a governing Lord* leading directly to a belief 
that there were governing 1^^*" (1975, P#$1,j
However today the concept of ’laws of nature* is often used X'Zith 
a strong honorific intent but little precision* It is not a 
technical term peculiar to a particular empirical science but a 
generic term present from the start* Nagel (1974, P#49*), fact, 
contends that because it is a generEil term it is futile to try to 
define it and that anyhow the term has undergone historical changes. 
Undoubtedly the term has altered meaning through the centuries, but 
tha,t should not stop us trying to come to some understanding of the 
concept - especially as it is perhaps ’the* foundation on which 
science is erected*
Often we talk as though the ’laws of natixre’ caused events to 
happen, but as related to science they never cause anything, they 
sim%)ly state a %)attem to which events, once induced, conform* (Of, 
Lewis 1960, p.6$*) In the formulation of laws, science does not so 
imioh discover as uncover the fom of regularities whose existence has
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already been recognised or hoped for. Ftolemy, Bacon and ICepler 
could never have studied the refraction of light as they did if they 
had not believed in some regularity to be discovered in this 
phenomenon, but it was not until Snell that the ’form’ of this 
regularity waa uncovered.
23.2. HISTORICAL Smim  OF Tim GOlOBgT OF ’LAWS OF NATURE’
2$.2.1. Two Basic Sources. It has been suggested tîmt there mze two 
basic sources for the idea of ’laws of nature’. The first from an 
analogy based on the practice of civil government by statute law 
introduced by the absolute monarohs of the I6th and 17th centuries; 
and the second from the Jex-jisî:t"Ghristian conception of God as Law­
giver. '(Of. Mason 1962, p.173*)
23.2.2. Law In Greek Thouglit. The tern itself was first used by the 
Greeks but not with any general reference to ordered patterns in the 
external world* It referred to the intemaS. world of human passions^ 
The Stoics used the term a little to izzefor to the universe, probably 
under the influence of Babylonian astrology. Essentially, however, 
in Greek thought the idea of law was placed within creation. TMs 
could be achieved subjectivo3.y and/or objectively. Subjectively
the law was found in the subject functions of reality; wMle 
objectively the law was founded in the object functions of reality. 
Mien ’I smell a, flower*, both *1’ and ’flower’ are subject to God, 
bolhobject; but in the Greek perspective the former accentuates the 
’I’ and the latter the ’flower’. Mow undoubtedly when *I smell a 
flower’, ’I’ funotiois subjectively and the ’flower* objectively in 
relation to the ’I’ of the above auction, but neither is the true norm 
for reality or Miowledge* la other words in Greek thought the 
lawfM functioning of ideality as governed by, and subject to, the Law 
of God was confused and identified with the Law itself In one of its 
aspects.
23.2.3. The Reformation Basis. The Middle Ages saw no real emphasis 
on the terzD and the concept only comes to the fore from the l6th 
century onwards. ’ It would therefore seem that this is an 
inheritance to science from the Refonmtlon period (cf. 3*5#).
Mason, after reviewing îâilsel’s attribution of the origin of law to 
sources in civil law and the thought of Jean Bodin, goes on to 
suggest that:,
"perhaps it was not also a matter of chance that some forty
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years before Bodin another Fcenohman, John Calvin, in  the 
fie ld  o f theology, was working towards the conception of 
God as the Absolute Euler of the universe, governing by laws 
decided a t the beginning." (ib id  pp.173-4*)
C ertainly i t  cannot be denied that through the 17th  century nature’ s 
laws were seen as testimonies to  the wisdom and providence of God by 
theologian and sc ien tis t a lik e . Indeed the study of nature was to  
become a prelude to the study of revealed theology fo r men such as 
Derham, Hay and Paley (o f. 5 .2 .)*  Coupled with th is  was the 
Baconian desire to have knowledge of the order of nature that man 
might gain power over nature to predict and control, and so f u lf il  
the cu ltu ral mandate* But as time passed the quest beoasn© inverted 
and an autonomous law was granted power over man.
2 3.2 .4 .1. .Following DefJcarteB. ■ mid .Newton. Descartes was crucial in 
the development of the concept of law, effectively marking a break 
from the Reformation concept of the term# The Reformation worldview 
envisaged no autonomous law, but Descartes identified the laws of 
nature with the principles of mechanics. Henoo in the Cartesian 
dualism which was to bo so influential, events tzere seen as determined 
by the raeehanioal. law of the universe and not by divine action. God 
WÊiS introduced merely as an initiating cause to avoid a solipsism*
There was l i t t le  resistance to th is  emancipation of tlie  concept 
from its  relig ious origins in  the providence o f God -  though 
conservative thinîœrs such aa Boyle became increasingly unhappy with 
the idea o f ’laws of nature’ seeing the term as ’an improper and 
fig u ra tive  expression. ’ ( Of « ib id  p .172.) By the t^ e  of Newton the
1 . Gillespie (1959» p.1$f) gives an interesting discussion of tMs, 
from which the following two quoliations aro noted* Graveeande wrote 
in 1726 that: "A Lmr of Mature then is the rule and Law, according to 
which God resolved that certain Motion# should always, that is» In all 
cases be performed* Every Law does immediately depend upon the Will 
of God." (ibid p#1$*) This-is not dissimilar froai another 
definition by Musschenbroek in 17441 that laws of nature are "those 
constant appearances, which are always the same, whenever bodies are 
placed in like circumstances....The wisest of mortals could not have 
discovered any of them by reason and méditation» nor can pretend to 
have any innate ideas of them in his mind. For they all result from 
the arbitrea^ ÿ' appoiaitment of the Greater, by which he has ordered, 
that the same constant motions shall always obtain on the seme 
occasions." (ibid p.1$.)
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concept was in g©no3?a3.» if not widespread,.. u8e In a manner tîmt would 
gather strength as an autonomous principle of law# The trend was to 
absolutise the idea of law; to loosen the,.concept from the providence 
of God and shut it up to Beistio implications (cf* 4*1? 4*2*)#
(«f» oh.5,). m o
Deists, of course, mad© lew into an autanomoiis principle and it is
from the contention of people like 8chweiser (about 186$), who opposed
miracles against the given order , of the imivorse, that the modem
2concept of a mirswle as a ’viola,tion’ of a law of nature sterns* The 
Deists and the men of the Ihilightenment were the twin forces which 
enthroned the autonomy of reason (law) above man, and indeed above 
God. Interestingly it is with the Enlightenment that the ptoase 
’law of nature’ becomes extensive in literature as something 
determinate and objective? nature waa coaqielled to follow law (of* 
Laplace)o
23*2 .4 *3* In Theology* The debate over the ’reign of law’ was 
prominent in the evolutionary debate of the 19th century (of* 7*31 
7•4*)» Here were diverse reactions — from the attempt to derive 
spiritual analogies from the physical world by Drummond in a 
subjeotivislng response, to the more consei/vativ© response of Hodge#
It should be noted that Hodge deals with tMs topic in terms of the 
providence or government of God and not with respect to c3?eation alone* 
Nevertheless he seems caught in the autonomous principle of the 
Enlightenment and makes oeiitain ambiguous statements* Ho rightly 
asserts that there is in Scripture the reoo#iition of cm external 
world, B material imiverae, imd that in this universe matter is active. 
(Hodge 1960, Vol.I p*6o6.) This however leads him to what seems an 
autonomous statement of the principle of law when he writes 3 "These 
pïiysieal forces act of necessity, blindly, end uniformly* They aro 
evergwh©]?© and always the etmie*" (ibid p.606.) Ho maintains that 
the ’reign of law’ gives laws which are immutable, uniform in operation, 
and wMoh cannot be disregm\led* (cf# ibid p*609#) 80 he is caught
in a curious tension between the concept of autonomous la,w prevalent 
in hie day (from the Enli^tenment ) and the idea of the severely 
providence of God (from Scripture)* This tension Is well displayed 
in. the following e^ ctensive quotation*
2. David Hume is also critical for this ’miracle as a violation of 
a law of nature’ concept*
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"The phrase ’Laws of Nature* Is  # * « .generally used in  one or 
the other of two senses# I t  e ith er means mi observed 
regular sequence o f events, without any reference to the 
cause by vzMch that reg u larity  of sequence is determined? or 
i t  means a uniform ly acting fore© In  natui?©# In  th is la s t 
sens© we speak of the 1mm of grav:lta,tion, heat, light»  
e le c tric ity , etc* That there are such Isiws, or such physical 
forces, acting im lfom aly, wîiich are not to be resolved in to  
’ui'.dfom modes o f divine operation,*’ is*#,*an Important 
Scriptural fa c t.
The chief question is. In what illation does God stand to
these laws? The answer to that question, as drawn from the
Bible, is, First, tîmt He is their author# He endowed matter 
with these forces, and ordained that they should be ■imifon'a* 
SecondI.y» He is independent of them. He can change,
annihilate, or suspend them at pleasure# He can operate with
them or without them, ’The Reign of Law’ must not be made to 
extend over Him who made the Laws# Thirdly, As ’fche stability 
of til© universe, and the welfm?e, and even the existence of 
organised crea.tures, depend on the uniformity of the latvs of 
naturep God never does dieregurd them except for the 
aooompiislment of some îiigh purpose. He, in the ordinary 
operations of his Providenoe, o%)orat©s with and tîreougîi the 
laws which He has ortidalned# He governs the material, as well 
as the moral world by law#" (ibid p#607.)
Mii.le this may seem a fair statement of the Christian position it 
tends to eXevai© law into an autonomous principle of nature which God 
can set aside or violate to achieve higher purposes - yet at the earn© 
time it is His law# So God is seen working against Himself, 
violating His own operations, or setting Himself aside to achieve more 
immediate purposes# (Hodge may be covered here in th© last 
sentence of the first paragraph)# But he also wites that:
"It is manifestly inconsistent with the idea of an infinite 
God,, that any part of his vjorks should be absent from Him, out 
of his view, or indexjendent of his control. Though every­
where thus efficiently present, his efficiency does not 
supersede that of Ills creatures#. It ie by a. natural 3.aw, or 
physical force, tlmt vapour arises from th© surface of the 
ooean, is fœmied into clouds, and condenses and falls in showers 
upon the earth, yet God so controls the operation of th© laws 
producing these effects» that He sends rain when and where Ho 
pleases#" (ibid p#608#)
However it may again be tliought that this creates an hiatus between 
God and th© laws of na/ture# Hodge goes on to distinguish between 
the general, special and extraordinary providence of God» He sees 
the ’laws of nature’ as under the g^ eneral providence of God for 
controlling his creation g special providence does not violate these 
laws but nevertheless prayer in sickness is not irrational for God, 
wMl© not setting aside or counteracting the laws of nature, controls 
them and causes tliem to produce the effects that H© sees fit# A
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real problem oomee with the question of miracles (of# 2 4*1*2 *$.)*
"îi* *
This brief review indicates some of the chseigeB mid problems in 
the concept of ’laws of nature’* The basic problem is that of the 
(pretended) autonomy of law, and perhaps it would be better from a 
Christian point of view if the ptoase ’law of nature’ was substituted 
by ’law of God’ or ’law of science’ for the former tonds to contain 
the aesuBiption of law as a property of autonomous nature existing in 
and of itself, insteacl of dependent existentially on God*
25*3* .COIWMPQIIAZIY BETOW OP T m  STATUS OF ’LAWS OF MATimE*
23*3*1 * Farioua Viewpoints* It is popularly said that scientists 
discover laws of nature; tliat ©rdorlliiess implies some rule of law; 
and tlmt the scientist uncovers the Gomplexities of phenomena, thus 
exposing the underlying reguleirities to reveal natural law* This 
viewpoint rests on on ©ssentialistio view of science (cf# oh. 11.) for 
if laws were truly discovered In this fashion they would endure for 
all time» and this is not so* A more critical view would be that 
wMch sees a natural law as "merely a résumé" of behaviour o3? activity, 
whether I® the aniiaate or the inanimate wor3.d»" (Shnpson 192$, p. 146.) 
Thus the late Professor Simpson went on to suggest thats "The laws of 
Nature represent at any selected time the manageabl.e relations of 
things as registered on the basis of experience at that time, and 
within limits the phenomena of Nature crniply." (ibid p#150*) (Note,
however, the personification of nature*)
As the 20th century has progressed and worldviews become steadily 
distanced from Cliristianity, a certain ambiguous relationsliip has 
arisen. The idea of law is not conducive to much of modem 
philosophy; fu3?ther it has come under attack from those who see 
science based on a fundamental level of disorder* So many or© 
unliaiipy about the use of the term ’law’ in reference to the world of 
science# Harre actually points outs "The term ’law’ is a survival 
in this use of a certain theory about nature, in which there was a 
law-giver#***I do not hold this theory*" (196?, p#1D7*) This 
statement is revealing* Firstly, ws have confirmed by yet another 
source the roots of the lai-p-idea in the Cîiristian worldview the
molity of God* Secondly# Harre is in a dilemma, for although he 
does not want the term, and refuses to accept the worldview from wMch 
it comes, he is nevertheless forced to use the pii3?ase ’law of nature’
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albeit "as little as possible." (ibid p.lO?.) Take law away fazom 
ecionce and there is no science for even randtjm approaches depend on 
the ’Im-m’- of thouglit, of averjiges and statistics*
¥hen we sim?’ey the modem scene three concepts of laws of nature 
are evident* (a) There are those who consider them as brute facts, 
knoim only by observation § vm know ’that* not ’why’ * (b) Others
envisage them as the application of the laws of averages on a random 
nature* (c) Others see them as necessary truths and any alternative 
as meaningless nonsense* (a) is patently inadequate In defining 
the concept; (b) relies in its explanation on ’law* (-mytfay? while (c) 
carries in the concept of ’necessity’ an idea of some coercive force 
or law* Nowhere can la,w ,be escaped*
Popper (1972/b, pp.4 1,6 1*) claims tliat laws of nature are laws 
because the more they jjrohibit the more they say (of* civil law); and 
that the search for Ibmb is equivalent to a search for causal 
©xplmmtions which can never be intimately accomplished* ■ Basjiit© 
this ho states# in opposition to Heisenberg# that laizs are precise 
even if we camiot reach them? end we can never know if we have finally 
reached a law because it is always of the nature of a hypothesis*
Botli Popper’s and Heisenberg* e views are ultimately founded on a faith 
in law and indeterminism that is incapable of demonstration*
In oj)position to Popper, Toulmin (196?» p«70*) asserts that as far 
as laifs of nature are concerned the words ’true* and ’probable* have 
no application* Here hypotheses yield laws in teims of a fruit­
fulness of the hypothesis being established* A law of natmze is 
neither true nor false but a statement about its range of application, 
The basic apx)roaoh to science is crucial for he is working out of an 
instrumental concept of science (cf* 10*4.1* )5 whereas Hopper, closer 
to a Gîiristian view, is prepared to see that laws must either be true 
or false even if we can never be sure (of, 10*4*$#)* It would seem 
reasonable to me to concur with Davies (1975# p*8#) tlmt laws aro 
simple well tested general theories about our universe tha'fc can be 
disproved* Openness to disproof •» for e:mmple the disproof of the 
law of parity - indicates that #ie terms ’bzue/false have some 
application^ ) (Of* Xtüson, 1952, p*$0#)
Holton and Holler, incorrectly intea^ preting the relationship of 
law and its religious roots, w rite thats
"Although the laws of nature are usually called inexorable
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and inescapable.# probably because the word erroneously 
suggests analogies with divine and judicial law, they 
actually are humanly formulated généralisations that are 
neither eternally true nor unchangeable*'® (1938, p*239*)
How X oould agree with this conclusion if# and only if# by laws of 
nature is momit ’laws of science*'. Xt seems to me that we are 
•needing to mate a careful distinction between three quite different 
concepts the laws of God; the Imzs of science (as in Davies above); 
and the autonomous concept of laws of nature*
23*5*2* ®I'he Heceesitv of Law* The above section (cf* Itore) showB 
that we cannot escape from the idea of law. Modem science# and
modem hmmnlstlc thouglit# utilises a Christian concept ao a
5fundamental prmilss# ' The very idea of 3.avr is itself interesting:
"For. if there is a law# there is an :lndicator of direction# 
tmd then there is direction# and thus meaning* < Or, on the 
other hand if ojcistenco has meaning# it must emphasise 
relationship and ord-or# and then law is iraplied# for the 
examination of existence is possible only in relation to a 
standard*" (van Riessen 1973/b» p#26*)
The idea of law held "(fill deteiiiine a man’s philosophy* Is laij the 
law of God’s provision; or is man the laifglver on the basis of social 
necessity, Instrumental or idealistic constructions ; or is there a 
law without a lawgiver? or even no law at all? (The same holds for 
meaning* ) The above alternatives contain the Christian, seculsir 
and nihilistic views* Today it seems clear that oeculas? thought has 
lost the concept of a 3.awgiver other than men who alone discovers# 
decides and evaluates. It is interesting to note that some
commentators (e#g* Oppenhelmenr) have suggested that modem thought 
could never have psîoduced modem science because its concept of law is 
too weak and limited* Mien mmi becomes the lawgiver laws and values
begin to fade away and are lost as enytliing real and objective to man 
«* hence the dominance of the instrumental view in science# pra^natism 
is all that is left. Tim Hie®sen twites of this pragmatism# noting 
how It ha,B developed out of the reaction to the earliea?
Xîositiviatic approach:
"'But this system (so. %®sitivism), too# was speculative# and 
it top beoane more^  end more divorced from real life* Men 
began to see that science mbb incapable of disclosing 
essential truth# It appeared as - tho%gh science was
3* That this conceiit is twisted in application does not alter this 
borrowing# and to date in my reading I have not come across a 
satisfactory humanistic justification of the usage of lai-J it is 
simply en article of faith unsupported by any humanistic rationale*
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stripping from reality all of its important oharaoteriatios 
- oontinuity, individuality, freedom and so forth*
In order to solve this problem# philosophy adopted a very 
subtle and dangerous method# tîiat of pragmatism* According 
to this new position# the task of Wissensolmft of science and 
scholarship# was not to discover truth. Wissonschaft was 
simply an instrument which man used to maintain social 
practices and to help to realise his practical goals. The 
question of whether science was true or not was completely 
unimportant# unless it affected the question of whether it was 
useful... .Mien closely examined# pragmatism turns out to be a 
philosophical niliilism, a nihilistic denial of objective 
truth." (ibid p.3$.)
Nevertheless, it remains that every philosophy - even niliilism - 
stm?ts from some lav^ -order which is believed; even to speak is to 
acknowledge law. ^
23.5,5. The Ambipuity of Today’s Thowdit. It is evident that there 
is uncertainty end confusion surrounding the tom 'laws of nature 
Indeed Toulmin# in noting this, concedes that most text-books used to 
start by trying to define the concept# then cleared their throat# 
forgot about their attempt and got on with it by simply assuming that 
laws were there to be uncovered. Modem text-books often do not 
make the attempt. Are laws of science# then# discovered# Imposed on 
nature by man# or simply definitions? Depending on the particular 
philosopîiy embraced scientists make their choice. But simple 
discovery is ruled out on the basis of there being no uninterproted 
data; simple definitions are clearly inadequate in the face of the 
history and practice of science; while simple imposition on nature by 
man tends to idealism,
23.3.4* Some Provisional Parameters. My tentative suggestion is 
that the laws of science are impositions mixed with discovery# or man 
made representations of the patterns of God. Ideally all the laws 
tlmt science formulates should be true to the reality of the external 
world; they should all tend to foriii one seamless web of truth. But 
our equations come inevitably from our definitions and biases and not 
from external reality alone. (Gf. Feather 1970# p.14*) In the final
analysis the basic laws are those that describe that which determines 
the structure and behaviour of spheres of being; that give the universe 
its character of stability end change, These laws are much wider 
tiian pliysical# aritlimetic# biologlceil and so on*
4* ¥e might well tMnk of Wittgenstein•silence* at this 
juncture - of. Wittgenstein (1961# p.74#)
471
Scientific laws in the arithmetical# spatial# kinematic# physical 
and biotic spheres tend to be foimulated a© mental ideals - th© 
concepts used are ’rigid’, ’exact’, ’strai^it’ and so on, which have 
no correspondence in reality* (Of# Popper 197^/h# p.64*)
Laboratory experiments set up to test and micover are necesearily 
artificial# For examples to test light refraction we use special 
opticajL glasses tîiat ere human artifacts, and the whole procedure 
tacitly assumps an hypothesis that optical propei^ ties depend on the 
constancy of density and the degree of homogeneity of this glass#
Before progressing to an ©xmdlnation of the concept of law and 
attempting to derive some positive guidance for an understanding of 
it, tïnzeo features of the modem scene need to be home in mind*
(a) Boience today is governed by mi agnostic approach such tha,t even 
where an individual believes in God, Ho is (generally) excluded as 
having nothing to do with science per se* (b) Science cannot 
operate without the concept of law, but as a consequence of (a) tîiis 
has become an autonomous principle* ' (o) I%oh of science is seèn as 
mechanistic and deteraiinate, or random and indeterminate, leav.ing 
little room for the dignity and responsibility of man#
F M ¥  IN THE C0SMQW41C PHILQBOFHY
sweerd^ s Urltlque. (Cf* 19*7*4*)^ ,In the Cosmonomio
Philosopîiy the world is seen as governed in a3.1 its modes by the 
’hand’ (le,w) of God» Booyeweerd maintains that logical thought 
exhibits an inner restlessness of meaning until It finds its Arche, 
and that tills restlessness is seen in the tendency of philosophical 
thought to move toimrds origins thus revealing tliat the ego is subject 
to a central law that effects the selfhood wîiioh operates in ell 
philosophic thought* This law derives its fulness of meaning from 
the Origin of all and limits and detemiines the centre and root of our 
©acistenoe* (Gf* Booyeweerd 1969, Toi.I p*11*)
For Booyeweerd the created cosmos hae! two correlative ’sides’: a 
law-side and a subiect-sideg The foimier is simply the aggregate of 
God’s laws or ordinances for creation, while the latter is the 
totality of created, reality subjected to those laws* It is crucial 
to not© that in th© Gosmoncmic^Idea the law-sid© is -unaffected by sin 
and is therefore always universally valid* Since sin is dis­
obedience to the law, we find sin only in the subject-side of the
3rWrDScy%3erd 1969; Tol.I pp*1l,12,9>t1$5 Toi*11 pp*8,37,1 $4, 
1$8| Toi .III pp*212,281| Tol.XT pp.1$2-13$.
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cosmos» Another feature of the siihjeet—side is that l.t is only 
here that individuality is found.
By the law, God controls all th:lngs and gives all noms for 
creation* The law, like God and the selfhood# is a supratemporal 
reality which is not hound hy creation hut refracted into different 
aspects within temporal reality. This is not to suggest tlmt we 
have here some entireljr new idea in philosophy although Dooyeweei^ 
has undouhtedly given neif emphases* As he himself notes# different 
systems of ancient, medieval and modem philosophy (he cites Leibnia 
(ibid p *93*)) expressly orientated pMloeopMcal thought to the Idea 
of a divine world-order which was qualified as lex na;fcuralis^  lex 
aetoma* h^mnia nraestabilitia* etc#. In this basic orientation 
there is nothing Intrinsically new, Mmt ie different ie the 
insistence tîmt this Gosmonomlc Idea, is actually at the basis of every
true philosophical system, even when that system denies creation (of*
ibid pp*9>*95*)« Thus there is a depandencQ of all modal concepts 
of law, subject and object, upon the Gosmonomlc Idea*
"In pure mathematics, for example, the logistic trend 
conceives of the numerical and spatial laws as purely 
analytical, and the series of real numbers is considered to 
be continuous by reason of the logical continuity of the 
principle of progression; this concept of mathematical laws 
is grounded on a cosmonemic Idea of a logicist and 
rationalist type. The mechanist trend in biology conceives 
of the spécial laws of organic life merely as physical-
chemioal ones; this concept of biotic law ie entirely
dependent on a eosmonomie Idea founded upon the deterministic 
Hmmnist ideal, of science in its classical form*" (ibid p*98*)
Booyeweerd talces the root idea of law (Wetsidee) and contends that 
God has given this law-atmcture as a boimd&w between himself and 
création? tha,t laiMorder is the * law-side’ of temporal reality. He 
argues that every philosophical system is based on some sort of law- 
idea whether or not it is explained or aclmowledged, Thus he tries 
to expose tMs Idea in other philosophies and to give a detailed 
account of its role in his own system of thought* OHaat wtsidee 
is not directly equivalent to ’laif-idea’ is best explained in his own 
words s
"From the start, I have introduced the Butch team websidee 
(idea legls) for the trsmscendental ga?oimd-Idoa or basic Idea 
of philosopliy* The best English tern corresponding to it 
seems to be 'cosraonomio Idea,, ’ since the word ’law’ used 
without further specification would evoke a special, juridical 
sense which, of course, cannot be meant here," (ibid p*9$*)
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So ho seeks to drive hack to imcover the hidden preenppoeitione, 
to expose the basic religious orientation» of all thought# Either 
a man will jjresuppose God or self; either he will affirm God or him- 
self at every point of life# The OhriBti.en. must ever start with 
God, while the hivaanistic .denidl of God necessitates an inadequate 
Integration point in man* Th© Christian assumes God as the final 
self-contained reference point» that m m  and the facts around him are 
created; while the non-Oliristlan asBiiEios man as the final point of 
reference» that man is ultimate» end that his environment is uncreated *
(Of. C. VSB m  1957» p.27.)
In the final analysis only hy aooeptlng God’s Word as the ordering 
principle of our scientific worïc. can. we hope to make sense of the vast 
arrray of so-called ’facts’ around us* True Imowledge is only made 
possible hy ‘true religion», and this can cmly come thi?ough the knowing 
ajotivity of the human heart being enXig^ ifcened throiigh the Word of God 
by the Holy Sxiirit» If» however, abstractive thought is unable to 
reach the true Origin of all meaning in God it is forced to elevate 
some aspect of being to the status of the absolute* Booyeweerd 
maintains that this is the cause of all absoluti.aations of the relative; 
and hence his definition of religion m  "the innate impulse of human 
soXfliood to direct Itself towards the tszue or pretended absolute 
origin of all the temporal diversity of meaning." (Dooyoweerd 1969#
Vol.I p®3?w) Tills means tliat the choice before en individual is not 
that of science or faith, but a choice of two faiths (of. 19.$o$o3#). 
(Of. C. van Til 1955, P.H9.)
We are therefore driven back to a two-fold presupposition of 
philos ophicsl thought air- the begiiming* Firstly, philosophical 
thought assumes an Archimedlon point for the thinker from which th© 
ego ill this activity of thought directs its view of totalité/’ over the 
modal diversity of meaning. Secondly, it assumes -a choice of position 
for this Archimedien point ;hi the lighb of the Arche which transcends 
all meaning. (Gf* Booyeweerd 1969, Vol.X p*11.) Booyeweerd then 
sugges'bs three 'basic requirements of the ârcîrlmedian point. (a) It 
muet not divorce itself from our own subjective self, for It is ’I’ 
who am engaged in philosopM^c thought and only in the heart can X 
transcend the diversity of the modes of being*. (b) It may not be 
divorced from the concentric law of the ego’s existence for apaa?t from 
law the subject slides into chance and nothingness. The law alone 
cleteivalnes and limits the ego« (c) It must transcend the modal
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diversity of moaning and be foimd in the unity of being (of# ibid 
p#12,#)o Me do not live In part of the creation hut in the totality 
of its aspects*
The Cosmonomic Idea points to the origin and meaning of the 
coomoo-nomoo, imd to its relation to oiibjeotivity, therefore giving 
expression from the onto et to the limiting character of this idea 
itself# Essentially it focuses on preliminary questions concerning 
origins, totality and modal diversity# It seems to me that here we 
find a Ciiristian justification for the assumption of law which is 
lacking in humanistic science# As Schaeffer contends with respect 
to positivism» "One must alwa^ 'B judge a system in its own total 
struotm?©! you cmmot miic systems or you get a philosophical chop-suey 
rather than any real thought #" Then he goes on to point out that 
positivism cannot prove its o\m first moves "You have no reason 
within the system to îcnow tîiat the data is data, oa? that what is 
reaching you is data*" (Schaeffea? 1972». p*56«) And secondly, this 
system cannot guarantee any difference in its first move between 
reality and fantasy# (Of* Morris, 1976» ppa40-56*)
The Gosmonomlc Idea also relates to the subjeot-slde of reality 
every bit as rmoh as the idea of law# "For the cosmic nomos has 
meaning only in indissoluble correlation with the subject-side of the 
cosmos#" (booyeweerd 1969# Yoll p#96#) The Coaraonomie Idea implies 
the idea of the subject as pointing toward the factual—side of reality 
with respect to the basic relation betizeen totality» diversity and 
unity of meeining# This is important* For the Ginzistian the 
concept of law is based transoendently on the sovereign will of God; 
everything within creation is subject (Fr* sujets ’placed under’)#
This stands in marked contrast to Kent’s ding an sich which derives 
from a concept of 3,aw imionently based on autonomous thought# God 
certainly holds to His sovereign law, but only creation is subject#
God 1© sovereign? He is creator, designer and sustainor of the 
pl'qrsical universe and Its laws# As sovereign He stands outwith 
time, therefore all time is now, and all space here, for Him# Yet 
He has also entered into creation in the Incarnation# In His 
sovereignty God uses His creation to Intewene and interact witîiln 
history# Sin is revolt against God’s sovereignty, it is the 
UBurptioB of His power; it is th© absolutizing of meaning in some 
aspect of reality to the level of God’s being# In ein the logical 
functioning of reason is affected though Dooyeweercl maintains that only
the activity m à  not the logical lawB of thought are
affeçted.
23.4.2. IiaM âB Boundary Betimen Creator tmd Creation. Law 
originates from the Boverei^i God coneti-tiites the hounda^ /^ Between 
God and M e  creation^ a homidary Between the Being of the Arche and 
the meaning of everything created » as subject* In subjection to la.w.
(Of# ibid pp«99f10Q«) Mnal meaning and comprehension Is found only 
isi Christ g In Him the heart confesses, Ood as Creator and hows tinder 
the law as the hotmdary between Creator and creahnze. But care ie 
needed here for the idea of God enclosed by a boundary has been 
attacked by Frame (tmdated pp.27*^ 32*)« However Booyewoerd is at 
pains to draw out the point that this boundary is merely a mark of the 
basic distinction between God and man, as Laifgiver mid subject. In 
their relation to lex* God is never subjected to, or limited by, lex; 
while man is always under it*
It follows that in reality the law is not of temporal reality, but 
rather is a law for it prescribed by God# ®ho law is not a boundary 
for God but ior creation* This idea of a. bomidary doss not mean tloat 
we have a, tliird area between God and creation^ for the law is ultimately 
Go*terminuB with the character ©ml Being of God. (Of* ibid p#2g.)
Obviously man (as are all things da creation) is under the La-^r of 
God* This is quite different fx’om the Greek concept of law whea?e, in 
the matter-^ iotive, lex was conceived in a juridical sense of na/ture as 
uiieacaxDable fate (anangke)? wMle in the form-motive, lex was seen in 
a more teleologiesl way by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle# (Cf*
Booyeweerd Vol.I p.112«) In Greek thought the subject was
never viewed æ  (sujet) subjected to the divine law in the integral 
biblical msmer* Similarly Christiaa»«soholastic concepts of nature** 
grace concerning lex were dominated by a dialectical ^^ound-motive*
For the Christian there should be no absolutizing of m.j relative 
temporal reality jn its meaning* The meaning of creation and the 
Beiîig of the Arche can never be viewed on the ssuïîo level* Hor must 
we confuse the teiaporalHieening of the faith aspect vïith the fulness of 
meaniiig in the religious orientation of the heart which transcends the 
boundary of time and cannot be enclosed in a modality of meaning*
In the religious fulness of meaning there is but one law of God, but 
under the boundary tills law separakea into a rich diversity of mod.al 
aspects of meaning*. Booyeweerd illustrates this by reference to the 
Vîay ill which a prism breaks up one bemn of light into the different
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coloiira of the speotrum, and goes oms
®^ Th0 unrefraoted light is the time^tranBcending totality of 
meaning of our cosmos with respect to its cosmonomle side 
émd its euhjectwside# As this light has its origin in the 
eouroe of ll^t so the totality of meaning of our cosmos has 
its origin in its *ai?ohe* through whom and to whom it litas 
been created*
The prism that achieves the refraction of colour is cosmic 
Mme, throu#L which the religious fulness of meaning 
broken up into its temporal modal aspects of meaning*
As the seven colours do not owe their origin to one another, 
so the temporal aspects of meaning in face of each other have
«? ssâ^:J®sâs^WâS!:*''dt’^-* 3*101 • )
Booysïieerd tiaes the tezm
to describe lat-r-spheres or aspects of meaning*
W v  spheres are a uriori constant frmMational structures of 
empirical reality idiioh forn'a the basis upon which are enacted
all the changing phariomona in creation* âa such the^ - possess an 
ontical character, not, as Kent affixmied, groimded In subjective 
consciousness, but ixi the created temporal order of reality* (Of#
Spier 19669 p*35*) KVery sphere lias its own irreducible kernel of 
laws which means i;h.at it can never be validly reduced to another 
Bphei?55^> This is 'the problem of all iamisixientistio philosophies i;;hioh. 
must absolutize an aspect of reali'ky and thereby/* reduce the temporal 
diversity of craation to one sphere for explanation » But every part 
of creation belcngB,, not to an aspect, but to the diversity- of Im-M 
sphe2?©s* Ho (me law can evex" fully describe or qualify an event 
because all ©vents, and things, are complex* hence personality, for 
examplo, cannot be reduced to mathematics; or momls to the 
Motorical development of a social contract*
E3sâ$âîl&..MJ1^2ÈsS&.sLEpàaBJMzâS@M4KSEïB&§asHâiffiÈi;«
Mo aspect or sphere exists in itself but points beyond to a greater 
unity and diversity* The richness of these concepts are best 
indicated by an illustration wMoh I borrow feom Ifelsbeek (1975» PP* 
36-42*) « Xn this specific example of a human aotivity the 
launching of a maimed space ‘vehicle - it is easy to distinguish the
5^7''''^'*® caused comtrovcm^ sy in 'l;he Cosmonomic school*.
Booyeweerd. envisages cosiflulc time o’ver the cosn^ cs as temporal in all 
its aspects* Ho therefore refrains from reducing time, as Kant'does, 
to space*«time Jai the psyohioal. modality* Instead, time is seen in 
the •succession’ of numbers, in tJia • syrichronloatlon• of the spatial 
mode, in the 'duration' of the Idnematioal, in the jurld.‘lcal period of 
•valifiity* ete... (Gf. Ifart 1973.)
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aspects clearly sncl in an ordered fashion*
ABFEQT TYPICAL AGTXITITXES
1* Arithmetical # .Calculations of all kindo - from the number of 
food packages to time schedules*
2* Spatial*..•••♦The amount of space needed for the crew, their 
Instnmients, tfasto materials etc**
3 » Elnematlo* * * * .The predictable movements caused by the moon's
gravitational pull; the types of movements expected 
at each stsig© of a nor^ aal lift-off*
4* Physical *.... .The peculiar properties of fuels which make them 
ignite, theory of imtearlels etc.*
5* Biotic*******.The precise tests on the crew's breathing, digestion, 
circulation etc*.
6. Sensitive..*..Tests to determine emotional and psychological
reactions to weightlessness, cramped quarters etc*.
7. Analybic......Tlie detailed planning of every part of the project
long before it x-im eosiraited to publication.
8. Historical. * ..The development of a culture capable of conceiving
such an entez^ priseg a stage of teoimique capable of 
accomplishing it.
9* ïiîngiiai*.......Development of new sets of symbols to describe new
activities*
10. Social........The social cohesion developed among the crew; their
relationships with ground control.
11. Bconomio.... * .Careful budgeting to finance each item.
12. Aesthetic.... .The beauty of the teclmology which inspires all
sorts of woiiss of art.
13* Juridical. * *. .The questions of 'free space'| negotiations to
determine whose laws and courts will control 
activities carriod on in space.
14. Ethical.......The efforts to justify spending huge sums of money
in the face of starvation on eaeth.
15. Pistioal..... #î'km's opinion of îiimself end his work revealed in
the vision of space travels wanton arrogance? the 
pioneering spirit? the urge to control the universe 
through the sovereign power of teoMology? an effort 
to obey the cultural mandate? Both questions and 
answers relate to the faith aspect of the whole 
project. Also the faith placed in teolmology*
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To e:icpand this coiioept in a different direction let me illustrate in 
more depth something of the content related to the first foin? modes 
of meaning - aritimietioal, spatial, kinematic end physical *
723«4»3.2. The ikritlimetical Sphere This the first aspect in the 
temporal order. The meaning, or mzoles*r moment, of this is seen by 
Dooyevreerd aa 'discrete quantity*. îtabers are discrete quantities 
which ere always mutually distinct, so that 2 is more than 1 but less 
than 3 etc.# The transition from one nimiber to another is not 
gradual but always a leap, a bridging of a distinct.gap - even between 
1*99 ssid 2 ther® remains a certain gap« There is no essential 
continuity in numbers. Around the nuclear moment of number there 
are only m#içip#ory moments which point fonfssrd to the higher aspects. 
There are no retrocipatory moment^ as the aritîimetical sphere does not 
have a modal foundation. This means that this sphere is the least 
complicated in structure, and that it is the foundation of all other 
spheres. %erc .1# nothing :ln the univers© in which number does not 
play some role. Space has a specific number of diraensions; motion
involves the travelling of a distance which c m  be eigressed 
numerically; a living organism lias a number of organs; feeling involves 
a complexity of sensations; wMle thouglit is coaly possible in a 
multitude of.concepts. hike all spheres there is a law and a subject 
side. lujïibers themseSves belong to the subject side for nuimbers •» 
1,2,3,4f *n ™ and are always subject to the laws which God has 
established for the world, of mvabers — 2 x 2 is always 4* IJe can 
make mista!{es, but tliis is a trangression in the thought world and not 
in the numerical* (it is inter©st:lng to note here the discreteness
of modem particle pliysios where pïiysioal phenomenon Imve been 
reduced to mathematical equations.)
Space has its modal origin her© and 
all that is spatial is original to this whether it be a/craospher© or 
outer-spaoe (though such spaces have physical qualifications). The 
nuclear moment, or kernel, of space is extension which is intrinsically 
different from discrete quemtity. Mumbers are discrete, but in tho 
spatial sphere we are presented with continuity ®* continuous extension* 
A plane is extended in all horizontal directions and reveals no gap or 
boundary where two-dimensional apa.ce terminates* Three dimensional 
space is continuous in horizontal and vertical directions and is not 
terminated within the cosmos.
7. This is a gross simplification end follows Spier (1966, pp66ff.)
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This sphere has a nimerlool retrocipation referring to the nucleare 
moment of the ninerloal sphere* Hiaiibere a.re preeupposed in every- 
tiling spatiale Anticipations also exist - movement is only possible 
on a spatial assumption; organic life cannot function non-spatially; 
and so on tlirough all the, spheres. Things are subject to spatial 
laws in their subject function for all things are under the rule that 
no two things can occupy the seme space at the same time# Cosmic 
time is seen in simultaneity wMle the scientific discipline which 
examines those first two spheres is mathematics.
.%.4.«a«A# . Them is a tendenoy to marge motion
and energy but scienkifically it is not permissible to identify them, 
though we do so in pro-abstractive exj;erienoe# A uniform movement 
without any reference to a oausitlve agent is a meaningful topic in 
the kinoma,tlc but not the pîiysleal sphere. In the latter, physical 
movement is always related to energy, to cause and effect. The 
science of kinematics can, however, deal with diverse motions without 
reference to a.,causs.tlve energy*
Here the kernel of the sphere is the idea of continuous flowing, 
and cosmic time is expressed in the succession of moments# Here 
there are two retrocipatimis space and number. Bpatially there is 
the sense of flowing space or extension wMch occurs in the kinematic 
aspect but is founded on the spatial. The moments of tliis form a 
series of moving moments, while the sisiultaneity of positions in the 
spatial aspect is a statical matter. The direction of a movement 
3n flowing space is a spatial 'analogy' rafearring to spatial 
dimensionality# ' There is also the mioaez’ical ratrooipatim in tïmt 
not only several moments, but successive momenta of on© moticai are 
numorabl©.
Bo far in these three spheres we have seen aspects of things but 
not yet anything that would qualify concrete reality. They are 
qua3.ities of all existing reality but not tilings.
3^j^ à*3.»3M.Æho_M^B M 3 2 1. 3 Æ ^ Q * This sphere is chmzacterised by 
energy* In this aspect of reality movement appears but not motion 
as such, but simx>ly motion in a phfsioal sense caused by energy*
Eïiergy is the kernel of this sphere, revealing' itself in chemical 
substances and their reactions, in light, sound, electricity, the atom 
etc.* 3?ields of gravitation, eleotro-megixetlc fields, electrons, 
neutrons, etc. ere real physical things with their movement, position
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end niiïïiber foimded on the first three law-epheroB. Tho totality of 
phyeioal reality is variable from moment to moment*.
M l  energy assujnoB motion, space and nmiber and therefore the 
physioal modality has tliree r©trooipa.tions an well as «lanjf 
anticipations * Groirkh i%i orgmic life is possible only because the 
physical modality anticipates the biotic* Conversely growth in 
organic life is a physical retrooipation in the biotic modality*
The law of gï?avlty is an example of a simple pliyaical law all is 
subject to ii; in their physical subject-^ f^unction* Time is seen in 
terms of the duration of working energy; whi3.e it is the province of 
physics and chemistry and the related natural sciences^ , with respect ■ 
to investigation*
25*4*4» Ihirther Points* Here we see several features which are 
readily distinguished* For each sphere' there ere x^aetlcular laws 
and norms which are peculiar to it alone, a certain irreducible kernel 
which cannot be defined or interpreted in texme of other spher'es* 
ïrm'aediately It becomes clear that wo have an explanation of such things 
as %eno's paradoxes* The paradosc of the arrow which never reaches 
its destination, or the hare that never catches the tosrfcoieo, resides 
in an attençpt to snolyG© motion in terms of a lower sphere, namely the 
spatial* But tills is to feiil to realise the irreducible element of 
motion and to deify mxother aspect of reality* Therefore the 
antimony resulted* TMs reduction is still present when, for 
instance lavy, a professor of mathematics, asserts* that g scientific 
law*.**•states a numerical relation between qualities that are capable 
of being isolated»'* (1947» P*?2!») (Gf* 18*6.») Here is a twofold 
errors that mmiber can be used to express all laws, and that qualities 
Can be isolated* In the classical tradition the empirical subject 
was reduced to a complex of causal relations by which it could be 
completely determined* In more modem statistical approaches law 
Is dissociated from the modal structures of the different spheres and 
conceived of as autonomous products of scientific thoiîght which tr^ y 
to‘order., by way of 'logieal econo#"', the so-called facts understood 
as sensory data* Philospphioally speaking, rationalistic views 
absolutize the laws, while irratioaa}.iBtic views absolutize the 
subjective individuality* But each sphere has a nucleus which is 
an unqlue refraction of one lav; of God's cosmos*
Within the overall schema there are different realms vjhioh in 
turn divide :lnto different sub-groups* (Gf* Appendix G«) I'or example,
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there is the animal kingdom which possesses a cormon structure up to 
the psychical aspect; the plmit Idhigrlom which possesses comnon 
structure up to the biotic end so on# Ite any realm - man, axiimal, 
plant or 1;lxing - the last modal, individuality subject fmiotion is 
tesmiod the qualifÿing f«notion; tîiat is faith for men, lïsychical for 
animal, biotic for plant, and plxysical for thing. But though this 
C|ua].ifies, it never desoribes the essence of enytîxlng® There is an 
exception to this jn that all th5n^ formed by men are qualified by 
their use. Thus a painting is not merely a physical object but 
designed with an aesthetic end-purpose, and therefore qualified by 
the aesthetic aspect*
This po;lnts 5n turn to the reality of individuality structures 
which are entities operating as object in certain spheres and as 
subject in others* (Gf* :Oooyei;eerd 1969, Vol.! p<»493») Individuality 
structures i\mc'f;ion ixx some vj# in all modal structures and the two 
imst not be confused - aspects are not individual structures, Aspects 
ask the question *»• how? g while the latter ask the question - what?
(Gf# Kalsbeek 1975» P«72f.) There are therefore several levels 
involved In the law-spheres# There is the plastic drbnenaion which 
is the dimension of individuality structures; which In turn is enclosed 
by the modal dhiiensiong idilch is enclosed by the horizon of cosmic 
time; which^  ^finally^ Is enclosed by the religious horizon or origin.
From tills discussion- of law :b:/. the philosqpliy of the Gosmonomio 
Idea it is evident tîiat a scientist never inmatlgates reality as an. 
object war sc* but is concerned with aspects of meaning, fields of 
investigation» It is vrrong for the stsientist to disregard 'tho view 
that a rose ie red and beautiful because he has reduced the 
experience of this rose to subjective perception. Likewise It Is 
wrong for ordinary ezperienoe to scorn the Insights of science.
A acientifio law never controls events in that it is a human means 
of Gorr©lat;lng experh’ûents to a pattern which Is built round ooncejrbe. 
to? scientific laws do not prescribe wha,t must hapxjen but represent 
wlxat has happened and allow predictions to be made. The so-called 
. of ..ne^ 'tee are in reality the ordinary operating patterns of God's 
will which science seeks to reflect in Its fomulations and are not to 
be associated with a Kantian ding an sich character. Eeality never 
distinguishes between the measurable and the qualitative as does
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Bclonoe. Soieatîfie laws are therefore to be seen as mmwm&e
azepreeentatlons in mxdi and, mathomatleal symbol of the personal God*e 
corns tm%t patterns of operating His creation#^
The hypotheses m â  laws dealt with in soieno© are essentially 
speeiaX oases of theories which may be true or false in their 
reClection of the patterns of God* Baviee helpfully suggests that 
we can distinguish between liypothesis» law and fact in the following 
manners an hypothesis is a tlieo# of low generality^ , low testedness 
end therefore has a low inner perfection; a 3,aw is a theory of 
reasonable generality^ simple and well tested, therefore possessing 
not too low an inner perfection rating; and a fact is simply a theory 
of confidence but which Is not theoretically general ore precise, 
but which has been well tested and never refuted (of*15*4 15e.6$) *
But in m  much as. a law tells uo nothing about phenomena if talma by 
Itself, and in the light of the ncn^meohanlstlc approach now 
advocated in many circles, it seems to me that the Dooyeweerdisn 
approach gives helpful insights to the nature and status of *law*.«
la the final ana3.ys3,8 ' there la a personal Greater who is in 
ooatrcd. of all things. It seems to me that we are needing to 
recover in cur day gome tiling of the force of the reality and doctrine 
of creation ^ and the need to integrate thought in God# Thus we are 
In a better position to understand the nature and status of our 
Bcientifie lav/s« Wl<â% of modmm science has been forced by the 
reality of God's creation to a position timt is not eltogether hostile^ 
It aids In dlstlnguiehlng reality and man's representation of It; 
scientific laws are symbolic:^ apprescimations but, hopefully, can 
reflect a degree of truth. Yet the true law wMoh our constructions 
seek to reflect la not the property of an imtonomo’us nature but the 
objective and regular pattern of operation by which God susteins and 
contrôla M e  creation# These laws are not alterable by man thou#i
hie approxiïaationo are* It is also In^ortant to see that the Im-M
structured creation provides laws, for all aspects of meaning and not 
just for a matheaaticfo-pbysical sphere. There are spiritual and 
moral laws as well as physical,^  though tîiey are normative rather than 
cbjeotlve. But we must never delfÿ an aspect of creation and lose 
si#it of the primary agait of causation*
8. It might be objected that *representaticn' is vague, but I would 
suggest it was m  more imprecise than 'explanation' - or 'description*.
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" u. # .ornrn© and effect Is easr si-Literaent of the way He Xb 
oonMnxxally working in arid sustaining Hia world, and hence, 
we must never elevate this aspect of reality to a point of 
ascendaney over ïîim. The servant mmat not he seen as king# 
In fact# in this case, the servant would cease to exist were 
it not for the King who not only has creEited it and given It 
its distinctive character ‘but constantly suatains it as such. 
The word of God stands in a most obvions antithetical 
relationeMp to the tendency to see any part of creation 
whatsoever, laws inelndedp in a #  measure independent or 
self-eMstent.” (Ream 197^ » P«56#)
CIîAPm 24
m a  TBEOLOaXCAîi BABIS O? SCIMGB : M W  a m  CWj?UML ACTIVITY
This oîiapter seeks to pinpoint aspects of the theological 
foimciation which oaLlfa soienoe to ho a God-glorifying activity* It 
is not exhaustive* heither does it seek to establish a theology of
science, nor analogies between science and theology, but to derive a 
theological framework witMn \;Moh science becomes possible and 
coherent*
24.1* T m  DOQTEIME OF M ¥  (Cf. oh* 23.)
24.1.1* The Biblical Tiew of Law* A consistent Oliristlan philoaopîîy 
of nature will include biblical data, a philosophy of science, and the 
data available from the sciences*. These three features will 
interact with one another, and need to bo consistent. The biblical 
material is Important as the Word of God is always consistent with the 
work of God* Tîio status of tliis material is interesting, even from 
a humanistic viewpoint, for the Bible, xmlike other contempora#" 
xîritings, is remarkably free from error* Ihe Greeks, for ezcample, 
held that the wiiverse was aion-oreatcd and therefore eternal, and that 
it moved in a purposejEhl i?ay under the indwelling influence of diverse 
divine forces. They never really doubted that there was some order; 
nature was not totally capricious for it obeyed certain regularities 
that v/ere capable of explanation* But in, contrast the Hebraic- 
Chï?istiaïi worldview woa a totally dependent universe. The universe 
was non-etemal and its very existential existence depended upon God; 
the natural order was in no way divine, or the home of the divine, but 
simply the creature of God*
I therefore wish to consider the biblical concept of 'law' and its 
relevance for a modem scientific understanding* It is neoessary, 
for a Gteistiaïx view of science, that a consistent biblical concept of 
la,w be established. In pursuing this X will igïiore the role of civil, 
moral and religious ceremonial law.
24*1*1.1* Maiure Is Oreature* The first feature of the biblioal 
vievf of nature is the frahtc oroationism presented in both the Old and 
Mew Tostas;iento. In the c3?eation all tilings are in a unity of 
creaturehood before the Creator; God is nowhere equated with His 
creation or seen as contained within it; nor is there any division 
into nature and grace, soul and body - the Hebrew word 'soul'
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(laephseh) is translated 'body', 'life', 'heart*, 'man*, 'permtm*,
•mind', etc*. It follows that no sphere of created being is to be 
xirorsMpped or absolutized | worship is only to be given to the Creator* 
(Gf* 20.1.2.)
24*1*1.2# tef Is Mot Greatura* A second feature is that the ^ 'law* 
that gQirorïis creation is not intrinsically a created featwjo# The 
law of God is not Jn nature but transcends natmze as the controlling 
ordinances of God upon created being; it is not a created structure 
within the cosmos; nor is it something to which God simet confom in 
creating. To posit law over God is to absolutize laif and make it 
God* law is rather a boxmdary betwéen creation and the Creator - 
from Bian's perspective» (Of* 23*4*2#)
24*1*1*5* Creation Is Ordered* It is evident that the biblical 
records recognize law, order and regularity wltluLn the created sphere 
of being - of. Gen.8;22s ' Jer.5;24s Job 28;26* However the number 
of a?ef©rences tîiat mig^t pertain to a modem concept of law are few in 
nusnber* I’hore are the references to God's controlling ordhianoeB - 
Heb* ohuaoahg custom, statute, ordinance, appointed* The following 
four instances are noted*
(a) Job 56$ 55*54* "Do you know the ordinances of the heavens? Can 
you establish their rule on the earth? Can you lift up your voice 
to the clouds, that a flood of x-jaters may cover you?" (ESV) This 
points up tho regularity within creation* Hotrever it emphasises, not 
the regularity itself, but the overriding control of God. It stresses 
His omnipotence*
fb) Jer* 5g24* "They do not say in their hearts, 'Let us fear the 
Lord our God, who gives the rain in its season, the auizumi rain and 
tho spring rain, and keeps for us the weeks appointed for the Imrvest." 
(R8V) Hore the emphasis falls on the ordination of God; regularity 
is attributed to the Creator* T'here is no evidence of a concept of 
mx autonomous law intrinsic to nature*
Cc) Jer* 51;55*36* "Thus says the Lord, who gives the sun for li^t
by day mid the fixed order of the moon and the stars for the light by
night, who stirs up the aea so that its waves roar — the Lord of hosts
is his names 'If this fixed order departs from before me, says the 
Lord, then shall the descendante of Israel cease from being a nation 
before me for ever." (HSV) Here the thought of a 'fixed order* is 
perhaps more to the for© in terms of the etellEW regularities, but
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again the writer ie pointing to the Mho — He outsiiines ■ the how or the 
whÿ.
(dl Jer. 93:25f. "Thus says the Lord g If I have not established mj 
covenant with day and ni^t and the ordinances of heaven mid earth, 
them ' I will reject the descendants of Jacob and David. **" (H8?) This 
could appear to be a closer reference to modem concepts, but ^aln it 
is ccniched in terms of a covenant with the Almighty Creator.
These references contain no thoiight of any autonomous existence of 
laws of nature, for the emplmsis falls on an existential divine control 
and sovereignty* There is therefore no re^ gularity of independent 
operation witliiïi the realm of nature which God might, or might not, 
act into, but rather the continuous upholding power of God ordaining 
certain regularities within His creation. Mature obeys God's 
oixlinances (cf* Ps«119»89**95*)* Scripture clearly teaches tho 
regularity of the created order as due to the Constancy of God — the 
laws of nature are the laws of God. So the uniformity of nature is 
a biblical idea and not the invention of modem science; the idea of 
the v/orld as a "vast, ' ordered, ' la%-j—abiding system under God was deeply 
imbedded in Hebraic thouglit. However, because the Hebrews used a 
different vocabulary from us tliis is often missed,, as is the point 
that they had no wosxl equivalent to our terra •nature*. (Gf* Hamm 1971» 
p.58f,)
The universe is created by God and sustained by Him. Miracle 
and prayer are facets ' that do not infringe an autonomous ' law but occur 
within the ovorâll will of God* Biblical Theism is not forced into 
azi impossible. choice between God *md nature for within the Theistio 
view of nature "a noBml, natural, C2?edible doomzay weis left open for 
God to finswer prayer, work the miraculous, and even send His Sen into, 
tho world..." (ibid p*6l*)
¥e need to dietinguish between, primary and secondary causation. 
Borip'kure clearly declares that the secondary laws of the world are 
God's laws/order in the first instance.* God causes the mists to 
rise, tho li^itning to break forth, the rain to fall, the winds to 
blow (of* Jer*10|35*)» He melees the grass to grow and feeds the fauna 
(cf* ?s* 147ÿ8-9*)î He sends the snow, frost, hail and ifarm winds (cf. 
I?s#. 147516-18.)» In the Hew Testament we find the same,: God sends 
His rain upon the earth, and lets His sun shine (cf. Mat. 5î45»)ÿ He 
feeds the birds and clothes the flowers (cf. Mat* 6326-30*)% it is
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God alone who gives life and hmaMi that we might exist (of. Acts 17| 
25*)# It is the upholding power of the Word of God that allowe 
being to exist at all. (Cf. Col# 1|16^17.)
fomz azeaBons can W
miggested w %  this view ie remarkahlj free from ©laehlng with any 
established Boientifio view# (a) The Hateewa were not mi artiotic 
or literary people and therefore tended to teaw directly from mature 
rather than impose 0;wmbolo between nature and themselvea# (î>) But 
neither were they apeolfloally eolentlfio* They poeseeaed no great 
seientifio tradition, but precisely In this they formulated no 
fallaoio'tis theories; they remained close to a simple ooimaon-eemse 
approach end in the final analyeis attributed all to the primary 
causative agent — God# (c) Their strict monotheism excluded any 
animal or plant mythologie© or worohip, therefore keeping them free 
from the deification of acme relative mode of being# (d) Overall 
they eaw nature aa the creature of God#
God, of course* in M e  Word give© no direction m  to the detailed 
scientific etruoture of the universe, nor should we look for that 
there as Hi© Word is conceraed with the. special revelation of His plan 
of salvation# ïto* then, is part of a natural and a spiritual order 
and does not have to choose between God and natural law* for the laws 
we live under are the laws of the Creator* Scripture sees neither 
man nor the cosmos depersonalised before the Greater. But modem 
science often excludes the who of God in its disciplinary thought and 
therefore the w(hy looses significance and integration# Thus in a 
sense we ore today, when caught In atheistic concepts of ecience* 
worse off than the ancients whose how was quite vwong, but yet
1recognised the existence of the TrJho. The Cteistlan worldview sees
God as the ground of nature; the materialist sees that ground in 
m atter, energy, e tc ., as intrinsically autonomous*
Law md mfovldenQe. The Ghristim i position c learly  a ffin m  
that existence depends <m the wl3l/wrd of God# This undercuts any 
concept of self-existence or attempt to elevate science in to  a self- 
existent .aimm of autonomous neutrality# Autonomy and providence 
are mutually exclusive oonoepts# Under the providence of God "no
i*- Gf. Schaeffer (I969, p. 124») where he gives the illustration of a 
savage and a technologist in an areoplaiie, end asks which imderstands 
the world best# The answer is the former because he hea not shut up 
reality to one dimension#
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I m  1b a aelf—©xiateiit or so3.iVsuata:ined opeization*" (Beam 1 9 ? ^ »  P « 4 5 * )  
Mill© In px’aetioe tM.a aiigîit not affect a particular paazt of 
scientific research, it will affect the overall 'anderetanding of the 
cosmos by a scientist# (Of$, 21*4$5*&*) Bo there is a decided 
attitudinal difference betifeon the Oîn?i.stian and non-Ghriatian* The
Christian believes that the regularity of the relations he perceives 
and seeks to unfold are proBerved by the constancy of God*. It is 
only in the continued upholding of the universe by Cod tlmt creation 
is lai'J^ structured and sustained# It is necessary for the Cîn?iatim 
view that God be seen ovoryirrhers and not just brought in as an added, 
Siiperf3.uous benediction to an easentially autonomous science#
"The essentia?, point made in the Bible, and in a sense^ X 
think, the key to the whole proMeia of the relation of science 
to the Gliristian faith, is that God, and God's activity, come 
in not only as ezctras here and tho3^, but everywhere* If God 
is active in any part of the physical world, he is in all#
If the divine activity moans anything, then .all the events of 
v;hat vre call the physical trorld ere dependent an that 
activity*" (îtelCay 1974, p#57*)
HaoICay continues his argument hj pointing out that in the Ctoistim 
view, laws of nature are "not alternatives to divine activity but only 
our codification of that activity in its normal manifestation#" (ibid
p. 60#)
The id(5.a of God as tlm celestial medianic or oraftamsm has long 
since been dispensed with a,s lacîdlng any relevance in terms of the 
p3?ovidence of God* Another analogy has been that of God as creative 
mztist wliich lays more stress on the inmanence of God but still 
leaves amoh to be desiazed# P.robab3.y no model can ever be satisfact­
ory, but Maokay has given a useful extension of the 'God as artist' 
model whea?© he makes use of modem teolmological inventions. Instead 
of an artist using oils and canvas he uses a television aox^ een to 
display M s  creation, 'using the "transmitting station to generate wha'b- 
ever he wishes to display an. the screen* Here the picture 
continues to exist by the will of the artist; it contixmes to have fora 
only as long as the artist continues to generate the progrmme* lAien 
he stops generating the picture ceases to exist# Thus the 
contiîming activity of the artist is highlighted, but this still leaves 
tho participation of the Divinity in His creation to be accovinted for — 
the Christian God is more than creator. He is Oreator-Partiolpant# (Of. 
Jeeves 1969, P» 24#) However the thru.st of the analo&y is that
nothing continues to exist except under the escistential activity of
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GW.» So It is to w k  if the laws of nature leave room
for the aotivity of God.*
"How could they leave room for God's activity, slaiosi God's 
activity)' is present th^ time? Or agalji how could God 
intezrvene and susuend His laws from time to time, since He is 
there all tlie time holding everything in existence? In-\diat 
sense could God uge natm?a3. lavm, since natural laws are only 
our way of sujiimarizing om? ezgerienoe of the regular 
occurrence of events In the creation wMch God holds in being 
all tho time?** (ibid p»27*)
As H# van Hie seen pictures its law is the sceptre In the hand of God 
by which He rules the imlverse# (Of# Kalsheek 1975? p»73*)
The laws of ohomiotrj'' or statistics are, in the final analysis,
God's Icvws and so all processes have a transcending dimension to relate 
particulars with, the whole* _ It mems that processes, wM.le natural, 
hcWe a supranatural dimension, though we need to he careful in the 
designation of normal and supranomxal# One of the major myths of 
ooi? time woMd seem to he that there Is a thing ca3.3.ed 'îfettoze* 
defined. as "a creative, coiitroll.lng agent, force* o.r principle, or sot 
of such forces or priD.eix>les, opemtijig or operative in a thlzig and 
determining wholly or chiefly its constitution g development* well— 
being, or the like." ^ This grmts autonomy to nature and, in effect, 
equates It with God. Indeed nature and God wouUI, seem inter- 
chexigeable terras in many cases# But God alone is reepasieibXe for 
natural phenomena, there is no Xfw inherent In naturo for law is over 
%}.ature* Matural phenomena, liîœ man, are subject to law.
There is no dichotomy In the Cbristlaii perspective betiveen nature 
and grace. Such dual is tic thaiglit is prevalent in our modern world 
for the iwo^ reahia a priori of humanism drives a wedgo be'Ween ffiot and 
va3.ue, theory and practice, mental and physical, freedom and 
authority, faith and science, church and world. A modem Dutch 
philosopher wltes tliat "the causa of this dualism lies in the exiling, 
faom our conc3?ate and daily axstivltlea, of faith in God as Grea/bor of 
heEiven and earth." (Dengerinic 1977» P»12.)
24.1 *2.1 ». Itaw. jmd Chance. The biblical view eonoeivee of no basic 
e3.ement of chance. The concept of cluance is often used in an 
ambigucats way to mean mi unexpected incident or luciderit whose 
:bmnediate cause is unlmomi, and this is quite consistent with biblical 
usages. But the specific scientific formulation of chance as an
'Ë# ' l&mr'&d edition Merrlam-Mebster Unabridged Dietionmzy.
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assertion iimrc ©venta eon ooeiir whieh are absolutely imoauaecl and 
imctonditioned la imbiblioal* (Cf*. Nagel 1974» P-.324f*) Todniy 
scientist.a may posit a ohenoe origin of tli© imlveszae; they may posit 
an Intrlnaic iiidetermlMam in the anh*^tomio world hut in the 
nature of the case tMa can never he aoieniifically eatahlished*
Xt aeema to me the incieter^ Biniam in the auh-atomlc world is th©3?@
(©) hecauae of the liiiiitationa of finite minds j and (h) hecaiisG of the 
Irradtioihle kom©3. of the plyaicaX modality wMoh is mdefln.ahle«
(6f„ 27.4.2,)
Me need to reject hath Iiasrd determlnlam and s'briot. indeteraiiniem 
(cf# eh* 27®) as foxm0.a;bed scienti,fically at preaont for in all things 
the TWist is called to he aware of the teicl of God imderlying the 
secondary level of iimnanent experience. (Gf# Calvin's 'Xnstitntnes' - 
1;l6|6-8#) ÂB Rtxaverbs has its "The lot Is cast into the lap, hut 
the decision is wholly from the Lord»" (16|33*) On to 'bum to 
secular sources 5 Martin Gardiner (1968) has argued that in the realm 
of mathematics, not only is there no appa5?ent objective way 
mathematically to define a comp3.etely 3?endora series, hut that most 
mathematicians presently agree tiiat the concept of an absolutely 
disordered series of digits is logically contradictory# te to 
quote a piece from Nagels
"To fir our ideas, ccaieider the atoms in a given piece of 
radiuca^ } mid suppose that the time at which each atom 
dis.l2ategra.tee is recorded. Now there will doubtless he no 
ohvious foxBiUJ!.a connecting tho number of disintegrations wi*bh 
the tiiaeB at which they occur* Nevertheless, since hy 
hypothesis there ie a correapondenoo between the 
disintegmtiona and the times ^ a mathematical fmiction relating 
the ' foxmer with the latter is thereby defined in extension*
It is therefore not logically imposFiiblo that a general 
formula asm be constructed which states this corerespondence, 
oven if the f ozsbuIeî. should tmm out to be forbiddljagly 
compilers». Accordinglysr there ie no 'absolutc' disorder hi the
distribution of the atomic disintegrations in time, since there 
clearly is some order in their arrmigement# In short, the 
notion of fan" absolute,, unqualified disorder is self- 
oantradlotory*" (1974». pp*555"4#)
Law* not chance, is the basic prefmppoeition of science and it is 
theietic in ohmzaoter*. Ream contends tlmt "what we call chance and 
what t-fe call accident m?e in fact neither chance no3? accident but 
actually God working in His world and unfolding history#" (1972, p*51*)
24*1?2w2* b&w and Gtmsal.ity* Cause 1ms ii.lBtorical.ly been 
conceived in a legal. assoGio.tion, as an efficient agent and as an
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invariable fimotional depondenee# From Hitm© onwards there îiava been 
attempts to explain oause in terme; of temporal spatial contingency, 
but this hao remained psychologically and philosophically 
unsatisfactory for there is another class of causality liidden ±li the 
denotation and connotation of words like 'produoo', 'reason', 'wl%r', 
eaid 'move ' » As an initial limitation on any investigation of 
causality is the fact that to initiate and carry out any discussion 
the category of cause and effect is required!
Many ©2camp3.ee of diveajse attribution of cause can he cited*
Simply tho act of naming a 'khing involves an elementary concept of 
cause* On tho temporal level we can cite that iron rusts in moist 
air, or tlmt Peter broke the window; numerically w© have the causal 
relationships involved in Ohm's Law or the lever princip3.e; v/liile on 
the general scale we have a, concept like gravity* These examples 
involve cause - hut not as defined an any on© way* To put it 
another ways consider the following questions* VJi^y does ice float 
in water? Why do humans have blood? I’lhy did Hitler invade Poland? 
tJhy did Luther posit his 95 theses? Why is the sura of any sequence 
of consecutive odd integers starting from 1 always a square? In all 
these w© can search for a cause, for some invariable order, but 
obviously the status of our answers and their meaning will vary,
ToulBiin (1967, p*80f*) suggests four classes of statements found 
in scientific writing; (a) abstract, formal statements of laws or 
principles; (b) historical reports concerning the scope of a law or 
principle; (e) the application to particular cases of tli© above; and 
(d) conclusions and inferences• Nagel (1974, p*75*) -*• noting causes 
as involving invariable miifosmdty, spatial contiguity, temporal 
contiimity and asymmetry - suggests fousz classes of laws (pertednMg 
to (a)), These are: (i) pervasive and basic types with respect to 
the notion that there are natural kinds; (ii) invmziable sequential 
orclers of dependence with respect to events and properties j (iii) 
invariable statistical relations bet\;een events and properties; and 
(iv) relations of functional dependence between two or more variable 
magnitudes associated with stated properties*
I’rom Locke and Hmse argument has raged as to whether laws of 
nature are neoesait?y or contingent* Locke envisaged laws of nature 
as principles of natural necessitation; while Hume and îtoh argued 
they were merely statements of constant conjunction* To add to tMs 
confusion, Mhitehead has ar^ed in more recent times that laws of
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nabure are eonjeotiityes about miifomities holdAig over limited space 
and, time; while Toulmiii and Eamsay hold that they are not propositions 
wMeh are true or false at all, hut merely inetruotions for the 
formation of ouch propositione* Toulmin euggeets ' that Xio.cle© and 
Bme are both right and %wong: in that Hume was correct with respect 
to contingency In terms of (c) above; while Locke %rae correct ooncem- 
ing 2iecessity with respect to (d) above - but that neither refera to 
the ac'kual 'laws* envisaged# Popper sees laws of nature as 
possessing a contingent, accidental character i/ith them as necessary 
to singular facts, but contingent when compared to logical 
tautologies! (1972/b, p#429#) He argues that 'necessity' leads to 
essentialisffi which he rejects,
As already noted this diecuselon must ever remain speculative for 
the category of cause and effect is necessary to go deeper into cause 
and effect! Bo ell that a coordinate or antecedent expression gives 
is that man can recognise temporal saad positional relationships.
Here is another type of relationship that is irreducible and 
undefinable# This realisation is fundasnental to both perception and
thought# and cannot be denied without first be;lng assumed. Since 
causal rcMisation© are necessitated by any rational observation and 
tloinking they are recognised observation and not derived from it# 
TMa Is neither a cultural development nor a pszoduot of human 
Inventiveness# but a gift from. God#
Today the scientific determinism of pre-atomio phj/'sics has given 
way to the suggestion tliat physical laws are probability statements# 
Determinism claims tîiat scientific laws are stoÆements concerning the 
necessaryinvariable behaviour (universal) of things; wMle the 
probability view sees laim as statements which merely have a high 
probability# However modem pîiyeios does not necsssarils?’ lead to a
denial of imiforDii'% end causality# Heisenberg introduced a 'Wo- 
level concept of causality about which Northrop incites §
modem physics paraiita the concept of causality to have 
two different scientifically precise meanings, the 021e 
stronger than the other, and there is no agreement among 
physicists about which one of these two meanings the word 
'causality' is to be used to designate," (1971 « p,19#)
There is a moderate view opposed to statistical irrationality — that 
causality operates according to statistical laws* This is no 
contradiction between law and statistics though the fact of there 
being laws means that there is order superimposed on the statistical
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oîiaoB of the atomlo level. Tkae some have conoliided that we are not 
faced with a choice be'Wemi 19th ceatmzy determinism and 20th century 
statistical irrationality, hut can achieve a resolution in terms of a 
atatietioal determiniam* The most comnon view of determinism — 
îiard determinism — assmies that all events are determined, that 
freedom Is the absence of deteaaainism and is therefore illusory.
Soft detesmmiism,- however, assumes tliat all events are determined, hut 
not tlmt freedom is the absence of deter^ ainisiA. Rather freedom is 
also a kind of determinism, namely self-determismtion (of. ch. 27* )*
The Thoistic view will, however, maintain that God does not work
with, or in conjimction with# laws of naiïure as ijiis attributes
autonomy to law - whether determined or statistical* This will
necessitate a distinction between first and second causes and this
seems perfectly reasonable. The first csiuse is ever God who
originates all matter and motion, without falling into pantheism or
deism* Secondary causation seouszes the free will of man as a tme
*5causative agent and of 3.evels of causMity within creation."^
"Although# in relation to the forelcnowledge and decree of 
God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and 
infallibly; yet by the same providence, he ordereth them to 
fall out according to the natare of second causee# either 
necessarily, freely or contingently." (Westminster Confession 
of Faith V;2.)
Inevitably there is a systery here, but then there is mystery in all
. o
scientific theories* A simple formula such as s ta -fgb roay be a 
precise mathematical, statement of what liappene in certain 'ideal' 
eitimtions# but It oim never explain how it happens* îKie 'how' may 
be sought.in. *g' (gszavlty), as equivalent to 'soBiething that malces 
something go'% but solent.ifie explanation is never final or 
eschaaistivQ of even the simplest phenomena (cf* sphere irreducibllity).
The fact that historically laws are seen developing and ohariging 
— for example Boyle's Law modified by vmi der Maala coszrection — does 
not clciange the status of the law of God* It is a reflection of our 
changing .mterpretation/coîRprehsnsion of the behaviour of gases*
24*1.2*3. Law and Mracle* It is commonly accepted as a basis for 
debate that miracles are essentially a setting aside of the laws of 
natmzo and something extraordinary loappening* However objection îios
5* Btoker's 'coherence of contra/«*pola5? dinstinctions' is useful hero. 
(1973, p.144f.)
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been voiced tteoaghout the eeirteies. Aiigiistine# for instance# 
objected to the Idea of leaf being violated or set aside # for if the 
laws of nature are bat expreeslmm of the will of God then they can 
hmàlj ha set aside much les# directly violated % (Gf# Augustine 426, 
sectiom 21|S#)
The definltica of a miracle as a violation of a law of nature is 
of the essence of the Humean view and has resulted in muoh 
diaouseion# Thia definition eeeme plausible ■ but has serious 
difficulties and bb formulated cannot he accepted.
"A miracle is a violation of a law of nature; and as a firm 
and imalterE&le experience hae established theme laws, the 
proof against a miracle*#.»#!^ as entire as any argument from 
experience oan possibly be imagined." (Hume 19Î1# p.210.)
Home was assuming lawa of nature as a body of positivietic îaïowleâge 
based on ©scperience — a view stemming from Newtonian detemiinism.
This standard view Is deeply In^sljied even with orthodox 
theo3.ogima» Hodge defined a miracle as "an event# in  the external 
world# brcm #tabout by the immediate efficiency# or sMpl© v o litio n  
o f God." ( i960* ¥ol.I p.618 .)  He divided events in to  three classest
(a) those dim to the ordinary qperatione of seccndary causes; (b) 
events due to  the influence o f the Holy S p irit such as regeneration | 
and (c) events wliich belong to  n e ith er o f the above. He noted the 
objection of Aoguatine but f e lt  able to  argue tlmt» (of.25.#2 ,4 #5«)
"The form in which the objection is presented by those who 
make nature the will of God* Is answered by saying that 
nature is not the will of God In any other sense than that 
He ordained the sequonce of natural events, and established 
the 1mm or phyBlcal causes by which that regulsr sequence is 
secured. This relation between God and the world, assumes 
that nature and Its laws are subject to Him, and therefore 
liable at any time to be suspended or counteracted at his 
good pleasure." (ibid p.620.)
The premiss here is tending to view God in a Cartesian manner* in 
terms of the Deistlo clqckmaker. Mhile accepting that the absolute 
immutability of natural laws is a gratuitous assumption,. Hodge goes <m 
to point out that God is not subject to the laws of the universe* but 
is absolutely independent ' in all His works. Thus God can set aside
the laws of nature. The problem is that he locates law 'in Nature' 
rather than *'in God* end so grants effective- eutmomy to nature.
The Westminster Confession of Faith is also caught in this viewpoint 
when it states that» "God in M e  ordinary providence maketh us© of
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means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them, at M s  
pleasure*" (Section V;3#)
The problem revolves not just round the question of 'law',, hut 
also around the xm^ zd 'miracle'* Me îiave seen something of the 
problem connected with the former# but the latter also is used 
loosely*. Miracle is derived from 'mirroa?' , to wonder, and in tMs 
sense can designate any extraordinary event wMch arouses vrondor and 
evokes attention* In Bcrlpture the several words used indicate the 
design of the ©vent, 2?ather than the imtmzo of the evmt to which it 
applies, as crucial* Hence it is a pGrfeet3,y correct assertion (e.g# 
by Luther and Drmmond) that a great miracle is the conversion of an 
individual sinner* But a conversion is hardly a violation of the 
physical laws of nature, indeed it is notMng to do with them*
XCuyper considered that a miracle was "notMng more than that God 
at 8, given moment wills a certain tMng to occur differently than it 
Iiad up to that moment been willed to occur*" (Da Eetui 1972, p*62*)
If the laws wMch are observed in creation are not independent 
autonomous functions of some self-existent macliine, but the operating 
patterns of God, then it follows that a Mazaole is not a violation of 
thèse laws but simply an unusual operation of God* Scripture itself 
nowhere presents the miraculous as antithetical to a self-contained 
universe# and the whole idea of miracles working against laws of 
nature implies a strong allegiance to the idea of the self-sufficiency 
of reality and its laws* Perhaps we are still suffering from the 
mechanistic self-sufficiency of the Newtonian era# but the modem 
autonorny of chance is no better*
Mlien God acts in a different way/will from M s  normal operative 
will there is no clash between that norm and the unusual; it fits 
neatly into the flow of secondary causation* (Gf* Lewis 1960# p.63#)
It is simply a question of viewing the law-structured reality around 
us as the oMinary operations of God (cf* Mat* 5l45* Is# 10;3.) while 
His extraordinary operations we see as miracles (cf* John 2; 1-11*)* 
Mithin tMs schema a miracle will be seen as sometliing that is 
interlocked in a forward direction in time with the natural world# 
whereas the ordinary operative patterns of God are interlocked in the 
natural wor3.d in both a baokwerds and fortfaMs diazaetion in time,
The question is really not as to the miraculous but as to how it 
is that tîie world is as regu3.at? as it appears to be* TMs is the
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assumption of science but it can only be justified from the theistic 
aspect of the personal faithfulness of God* Xt is God's world, not 
our world, and M l  thing© froiji the Scriptural viex^ jpoint have a 
rationale in the will of the Creator#
"The bib3,ieal claim is timt wherever God did. 'work* or 'bring 
into being* m. event which we call a miracle, whether or not 
it brbke with scientific precedent, he did It because iti the 
over-al3. patbem of M a  drama it made more sens© at that points 
because his total plan and purpose for our world would have 
been less coherent had it not occurred in 'fche way it did." 
(iteKay 1974», 3?*64#)
24*2* Tim DOOTRINE OF CïïLTUjBÂL ACTIVITY
common grsoe (of. 19.3.3. ead 
C. vaa Sil 1974.) salcos Christian action in the world possible. It
means that the Christian can act Chriatianly as seiontist,. philosopher 
or what have you* Xt Is not merely a doctrine which attesipts to 
justify certain mqiects of the world but which seeks to stimulate the 
O'tozistian to positive action in the world*' Common grace gives to 
the believer the material for fulfilling his culturM calling, to be 
culturally formative and to struggle for the Kingdom of God in the 
world of our culture, It is the basis for Gliristian Bcholsrehip to 
be developed, providing the platform on which cultural tasks may be 
acted out* "Ogmmon grace is the preaunuositiai of the uossibility 
of OMistian cultural activity*" (Zuidema 1972, p*57*)
24*2*1*1* Every Thought Captive* Yet for our present purposes the 
doctrine lias an equally Important meaning in establishing the worth 
of non-Christian thouglit and activity within the creational order* 
God's word also li^ts the mind and philosojil^  of the ium*43hristlan. 
Paul m ’itefss "W© destroy argument© and every proud obstacle to the 
Icaowledge of God, and talc© every thoug^ it captive to obey Christ,**"
(2 Cor* 10;5*) Now often this ha© been misread by taking only the 
first phrase about casting down every high thing — and seeing it as 
a simple mandate of destruction spoken against worldly wisdcm* But 
the second phrase — about talcing captive all thought — indicate© tlmt 
there is a positive relationship between Christian and non-OMistion 
thought timt transcends negation and exclusion* The thoughts of the 
non—Ohristieai are to be brought into the Christian worXdvieX'? and made 
acceptable to God#
24*2*1 *2*. A Iteative end a Positive Bide* Common grace, therefore, 
applies to both Ciiristion and non-Christiaji* It is a motivation to
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the G teiatiaa to work la  the woa?3xl, and i t  aleo ie  the means of 
presewing men and the earth ffzom the ravishes of sin — preserving 
that xfMch is  of worth in  the mind In  rebellion  against its  Creator# 
Common grace# then,, has a negative and ei positive influence# I t  has 
a constant ro le in  restrain ing sin and has its  effects in  both man and 
the univers©.# I t  has a positive progressive action where I t  
fonctions as a oulture-fom tng and activating power in  history w ith 
man as botli instrument and eo«worker of God#
I t  restrains the process of the 
s in fu l development of history* This presupposes the doctrine of 
to ta l depravity in  extension, not intension# Thus the effects of 
death and decay are held in  check, not xdiolly but in  paszt# Not
wholly, so that ' the fe a rfu l results o f sin may be obvious; in  p a rt, so 
that the wealth of God's creation and re-creating power may be 
manifested# I t  is , however, quite d is tin c t from God's saving grace# 
The constant restrain ing influence of common grace means that God holds 
on a leash the curse pronounced in  Genesis 3 upon nature and the 
e ffec t o f ein in  the human heart and mind#
conteast w ith th is  there is  also
a progressive operation of common grace by ifhioh God eqtdps human life  
and brings i t  to a deeper end rich er under© "Wmdlng of the universe in  
xrMch He has planed man# Kuyper has picturced the difference between 
these two operations by seeing in  the former, restrain ing impact, God 
wozdcing quite independently o f man; while in  the la tte r  God working 
in  Golabomtion w ith man#
"It was in his ocamon grace to all mahtcind that God as the 
supreme architect of the world brou^ ^it progress in his 
providence, which is the fountain of human histo3?y#*.»*Mie 
world nmst continue, men must be bom, the course of history 
mist show progress; for all of these things to tsdce place, 
common. grace is necessary, whereby tho original powers latent 
in creation may come to fruition, and find theii? Mg#iest 
development to the glory of God#.##.#we may speak of a continuous 
development of "^ he human race by wMch it collectively exhibits 
the Image of God#" (H# von Til 1974» p*120#)
.24»2#1#5# Gomon Grace mid Particular Grace# The domain of comion 
grace Is outside that of particular grace and does not bear a 
neeessari3.y chci©to3.oglc, distinctive sta%p# A GMistian marria^ 
is an ordinary mo3:?riage.,. a Ohristian family is an ordinary fondly, a 
Christian association is an ordinary association, a Christian society 
is an ordinary society, a Christian state is an ordinary state — 
ordinary with respect to the ordinances that pertain in creation for
raarrMge, association, society and state# A Christian view
o f science is  also # i ordinary view of science -  w ith respect to the 
creational ofdinaiices.*
Common grace nevertheless rests on the Second person o f the T rin ity  
(ad d is tin c t from the Incarnate C hrist) in  Hie m ediatorial ro le  in  
creation; while particuXeir grace rests in  Christ as the Incamiate Word 
who accomplishes the m ediatorial work of redemption and renewal#
But even the former must he tempered w ith the fact that as Saviour, 
C liris t re-creates, re-stores, re-deems, not ju st the inner personal 
l i f e  of the believer, hut a ll things (c f* Col# 1;20#)* In  Colossians 
1 we read how Christ is  not only creator (v*l6#) and preseiver (v#17*), 
hut redeemer of a ll things» "and through hinn to reconcile to him self 
a ll things, whether on earth or in  heaven, making peace by the blood 
of M s cross*" (v#20*)
Tlierefore i t  would appear that Christ has a twofold claim to  
kingship over our s c ie n tific  activ ity#  F irs t as the Creator w itliin  
the creational ordinances; second as Redeemer w ltliin  the kingdom (ru le ) 
of God#
In  th is  way common grace, while independent in  cliaracter, also 
reveals a dependent character upon particu lar grEioe# Common grace 
always operates in  our fa lle n  world w ithin the perspective of 
p articu lar grace* The raison d 'e tre  is  outside its e lf  in  p£irtioular 
grace* Common grace points beyond its e lf;  i t  seeks to bring 
creation to its  destination which lie s  only through the redeeming work 
of Glxrist fo r man and cosmos# We see something o f the in d irect 
positive influence o f peœ ticular grace upon common grace in , fo r 
example, the Protestant etM c; wM3.e we see something of the d irect 
positive influence v ia  the mediation of the îCingciom o f God in to  tho 
X'/orld in  the liv e s  of ind ividual Christians# For conimon grace means 
above a ll that there is  to be no '^ lo s tic  culturophobia• in  C M istian  
liv in g * To be active in  the sphere of common grace most certa in ly  
does not mean that an :lnclividual is  d irty in g  his hands or soul — a 
needed stress against imch P ie tis tic , evangelistic and charismatic 
thinking today#
Advocates o f common grace never maintain that the actual 
cu ltu ra l a rtifa c ts  of man w ill survive in to  the e tern a l, fo r the 
fashion of tM s earth passes away* But on the basis of Revelation 
21;26 -  "and they sîm ll bring the glory end honour of the nations in to  
it"  (i#e# the new Jerusalem) — there is  a case that the cu ltural
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development of mankind will earzy over into eternity, rnimm,. of 
ooursQ, the influenoes of ©in# The meek are to inherit the earth «•
end surely it ie not to he an earth naked, robbed of all 
accomplishments of men under God (cf# Rev# 14|13*)* Omz works are 
the products of our labour, under both eominon end pcnzticular grace, 
and we are told 'their W03z2s© ©hall follow them, ' This is emmaed up 
in the supposition tliat the whole of creation ie not to he destroyed 
hut rather shall he glorified, The form may pass axfoy, hut the
substance remains,
24*2,2,. The Caktaral-Mandate, A hasio ■ h ih lic a l given fo r man is  the 
cu ltu ral mandate (Gen, 1 |28*)., . Man is  called to huild the creation 
up and keep i t  (Gen, 2; 15*)» he is  to work as a c itize n  in  the kingdom 
of God so that a ll things in  the o re a tio ii'w ill unfold and fin d  th e ir 
proper place in  God's purpose* Of course the F a ll meant the
usuription hy man of the rig h tfu l place of God; i t  meant sin and the 
curse of God on riian'a relationsîiip  to natm’o , felXowftan and s e lf, as 
v/e ll as to Ills  O rigin; i t  meant i;hat he worsMpped  ^and served the 
creation instead of the Creator, But now in  Jesus Christ 
reconciliation and redemption Imve been accomplished. Despite 
dislocation^ destructim i and death in  the cosmos there la  beliind a ll 
th is  the working power of C hrist* "H istoiy is  placed in  the sign of 
a to ta l recreation» the fu ll revelation o f the Kingdom of God," 
(Belmuman 1976» p*12*) Christ la  not only the head of the 
individual believer but haa power over a ll tilings whether they be in  
heaven or in  earth.
24 *2 *2 ,1 » A Fourfold Motive. There is  the basic motive o f creation, 
f a ll  in to  Bin# and redcrvotiph in  Jesus Chri?ist, But i f  the f ir s t  
aspect of the crea.tional mandate is  expanded and fu lfille d  In  the 
thiizd aspect; so also the second aspect — the F a ll — is  continued 
today in  disobedience* Hot everyone follows the m otiw  of the 
Kingdom of God and even the deeds of Gteiotians are often out of 
liarraoiny w ith it ,.  This fourth feature extends and crystallises the 
characteristics of the second aspect, and unfolds the chaotic and 
destructive powers of reb e llio n , Thus we haves
FAIL INTO BIN
(i) oimTiom
(ii) I
(Hi) ' I
(iv ) ^'"^DISOBEBOTOE
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Plaoe.of Soienee/TeoMolof^. I t  ie  a^alîiet .the 
’back^ 'j^ pmid of ooœmoii gmce., c iil'ta ra l Biaiidate eaid the fow fo ld  motlTe 
th at the pleioo of selanoe mid tecIiaoXogy iii the wos^ lcl. ohoiild he 
coiiÊîMered* Some Ghxletisiis soem to  tMnîî: that technology and 
science are in trin s ic a lly  had* But th is  Is  not so» technology 
and science are Both hlessin.g and curse heoause in  omi fa lle n  world 
everything tempo3?al is  mixed «*■ hearing the stamp of creation end f a ll ,  
the marf.c of reden^tlon and disohedlenoe* Alongside the appeal to  
the c itie s  of Cain and the tower of Bahel, we can posit the Ark and the 
îîîompls as instances of Gocl-jnspired teoîmologloal a rtifa c ts . Q?he 
problem in  our culture is  manlh detexTOination to  gain oontrdlp the i-d,!! 
to  power fo r and of himself# In  pursuit of th is . Western man often 
attrib u tes  absolute power *{;o science and the application of a techno^ 
s c ie n tific  method.* Consequently by shuttling man’s diverse callings  
up to tM s , there has been a re s tric tio n  of human c re a tiv ity  and 
responsibility* We see th is  .In the destructive w ill to power;, in  
the pursuit o f technology fo r tecJmology’s sake; and in  the pursuit o f 
technology fo r economic ends* God*ngiven motivation and goals are 
elim inated from the mind o f moflem laan* This iwong motivation means 
tlia t science and technology can, and do, bear a positive re flec tio n  of 
the GiiTBo* "Technology as a curse w ill increase i f  the motive of 
technology is  not changed*" (ib id  po1?*)
The Christian seeks to  unfold God^ o orig inal cu ltu ra l ca llin g  to  
man xdiich despite the F e ll has never been abrogated* The b ib lic a l 
m otivating force in  h istory is  the task o f building, keeping and 
preserving the creation* Wot preserving alcsie.,. fo r th is  re fle c ts  a 
choice fo r nature a^çalnst culture; and not building alone., fo r th is  is  
a choice fo r culture to the detriment of nature# Theso two aspects 
must be held in  creative tonslon w itîiin  the ca llin g  of God*
24-*g*^*,,Maa «», GocI’b, Offloom^Bearer  ^ The Psalmist te lls  us tJiat the 
heavens are the Lord’s but that He 1ms given the earth to mm. This 
focuses on m n’ e) function and place wlth:!n God’s creation where he is  
called to be servant and steward* I t  is  cm icial that the fu3.1 tluTust 
of God raaîsing man in  his own Image and placing him In. the world to have 
dominion over i t  be grasped# "Man has a royal position ixx the 
world*" (Bengerihk 197?  ^ P*15*) Man Is  called to be God’s o ffice­
bearer# One of the reasons why we have lo s t eight of the concept o f 
the sc ien tis t called by God w ith in  the parameters of sphere-soverelgnty, 
seems to me to reside in  a, loss from modei^ n consciousness of an
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awareness of the rolo o f o ffice  in  life *  Thie was one of the great 
themes redlscoTored 'by the leaders o f the Reformation# The idea of 
o ffice  as preeented la  the B ible Wings ne to the centre of re lig io n * 
The word ’o ffic e ’ its e lf  may not ocom? very often hut the idea ia  
expressed 3ii ouch terms as ’ service’ , ’ servant o f the Lord’ , etc##
I t  relates natu ra lly  to the previous concept of a  c u lttïra l a a llin g  or 
commission  ^ where man is  given a delegated authority* a d e fin ite  
appointaient to  carry out a task* O ffice , then,, refers, in  Scripture 
to the aXloeat3.on o f a partlcn3.gn? task and the g5;::anting’ a p articu lar 
rig h t i%) carry out# This imjiXies in  turn the Sovereign On© who 
delegates, who gazants authority, who gives the coramlssion# O ffice 
always means lim ita tio n * Evan Emmerda philosopher, wastes @
"O ffice is  not merely service (d3.enen); i t  is  also 
adm inistration (hed3.©n©n)s i t  is  service of God and an 
administering of God’s love and solicitude to  the creature 
a t the same time# O ffice as adiiilnistration (preserving and 
orderly form^-giving) includes the Idea that the future weal or 
ifoe of what is  being administered depends upon whether the 
office-bearer does or does not serve God.*" (1970  ^ p»147#)
So o ffice  points us to man’ s adm inistration of the cmtlre world which 
God has given Mm* Genesis c le a rly  pol^ its out that man is  appointed 
over creation to  n;ile i t  3m obedience to  God* The o ffice  o f man 
involves his position before God, M s relationship to his Creator as 
servant called to obedience# Man i.s therefore servant* He is  also 
guarcXian, called to bring his charge (creation) to iiiatirrity# So 
Go^ v, 3n equipping man fo r th is  task, has given Mm the g ifts  which 
enable him to n?le and exercise dominion «• the g ifts  whereby he 
oicecutes his science and technology* But having thus provided man 
M  Ms tasks w ith g ifts , and called him to a p articu lar bbedienco — 
responsibility is  involved# Han’s o ffice  involves M s stewardship 
of l i f e ,  that is  the way he orders M s life  and M s goals, end the 
things, God has given Mm in  lif e  to control# He has to give account 
to  God as to how he carries out the deslgnatecl ca lliîig #
Hence w ithin the b ib lic a l perspective we see th at the cu ltu ra l 
a c tiv ity  of man ±a positive response to the mandate of Go i^esis 1;28 
is  worked out in  oult^uzal, s c ie n tific , p o litic a l and economic terms#
As office-bearer mm. fxmctions in  a d ivers ity  of in s tittitio iis  «* 
fam ily, church,, s ta te , school, s c ie n tific  community and In d u stria l 
enterprise# Each of these societM  structures stands in  God’ s world 
before God’s o a llii’is fo r that si'tuation* The norms tim t He gives 
are not to be a rb itra rily  changed by men or judgement w ill result.*
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One of the problems today is that Christian witness has all too 
often been re^ itrioted to a limited concept of xiozvonsl testimony 
(evaïigelical) or restricted by absorption of secular presuppositions 
(liberal) * But we must call 5iito question any tendency to atomise 
the faith so tlmt It loses the sense of CMist’s lordship over earth 
and heaven, individual and society# Ctelst 1b the* transformer of 
culture for Ho continues to create, here end new in the midst of a 
rebollimis worS.d, a, king:;dom of truth# It was a^ çainst the back— 
ground of tMs thought that Calvin could not rest with £?. preaching of 
the Gospel alone g. iaiportant as that was, but strove to transform the 
social life of Geneva into a model of Christian living# The 
Ohr3.otlan is called as renewed person to present his body (Eom#12;1,.2#), 
tîmt is the tilings of his daily task, as a lilvlng sacrifice and in 
service to God# Xhider his calling as God’s office-bearer within 
creation man is called to exercise his dominion over creation throng 
M s  science mid Industry as well as art and learning# This is man’s 
basic task in life namely to take the raw materials of God’s creation 
and by means of his industszy, artistry, science and tecîmiqucB unfold 
the possibilities hidden in creation. (Of# ohs* 25 and 26.)
But It is essential that this calling over the fnXXnesB of life 
be conscionsly pursued and that himianistic motives resisted in the 
name of Glnzist. (Of. Vkiale 1960, p.266.) Ao CMvin Seerveld, a 
leading aesthetician, put its
"Art is a symbolically significant euqiression of wlmt lies in 
a man’s heart, with what vlslmi he views the world, hm-f he 
adores whom. Art toll tales in whose service a man stands 
becawae art itself is always a consecrated offering, a 
disconcertingly undogmatio yet terribly moving attempt to 
bring honor and glory and power to something." (1968, p.28.)
As he himself recognises, what is t^ zue In this connection for art is 
true for all of Xife. Science is a ’s3vgnlfleant expression of trliat 
lies in a man’s heart’g technology ’tell tales in whose service a man 
stands. ’ Science mid tecîmology are ’a terribly moving, attempt to 
bring honor &md glory and power to something.’
4. Of. H, Richard mebuhr (l95l), and H« van Til (1970)*
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Gimerm 25
mm'EOTIMG THE BEVIH01®«T ^
The la s t few years have seen a new awareness o f non-renewable 
resoxmces, energy eonsxmption, p o llu tio n , and food shortages# The 
remarkable feature o f our present c ris is  belsig th a t, wMle its  
constitutive elements have occurred in d iv idually  before in  h is to ry , 
they are now a l l  happening a t the sajne time# In  th is  period of
rapid world cheaige -  as we witness a change from the old in d u stria l 
structures to automation and cybernetics g the end of the old colonial 
empires § the problems o f the new developing nations? and the 
increasing trend o f urba^iisation -  there are predominmtly two issues 
of global consequence (excluding that o f lixternatioaal harmony), 
namely oconomio growth and the environment* Each year the average
citiKon of the ÏÏ#B#à# consumes some 20 tonnes of new m inerals, which 
indicates both an environmental impact and mi economic consequence fo r  
that country mid others# % iis induetxdcd growth is  a oomparitively 
new x>henom©non and i t  is  only recently that large in d u stria l combines 
w ith th e ir  concomitant motives o f p ro fit , progress and production 
have been seen as a major thszeat to  the survival o f man# But 
survival is  not enough and we need to go beyond the question of a 
pragmatic mmi:î.pulation of the environment fo r the welfare of man to  an 
attitu d e  of honour, respect and regard fo r the environment which is  
necesssiry i f  man is  to  fin d  M s proper place w ithin the cosmic scheme# 
(Gf# Elbbens 1976, p#18f.)
25*1*1# The Importance o f a Worldview# To respect the environment 
w ill involve some understanding o f ecological problems, of attendant 
problems such aa population and p o llu tion , mid the attitudes of 
progress and production# But the enviromaent is  wider and deeper 
then eco.logical cqncem; respect is  more profotuad than s e lf-  
preservation or the optimum use of resources* I t  is  my contention 
that we can only gain rea l respect when we understand that the 
environment is  subject to the creative act of God, and rea lise  man’s 
creational relatediiess to God and nature# While ecological c ris is  
may be a llev ia ted , humanly speaking;, by the combined actions of
1 # This ohax>ter is  a shortened version of an essay fo r the 1977 
Arthur Jones Memorial Prise in  G itiaenship, Glasgow University# The 
fu l l  tex t is  in  the U niversity Library*
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sc ien tis ts , technologists, economists, p o litic ia n s , e tc ., X believe  
th at one o f the main barriers to  e ffec tive  action is  the fa ilu re  to  
establish a philosophy of the topic which can provide a basis fo r  
action and attitudes which are ecologically responsible# There 
already is  a considerable lite ra tu re  on the p o litic s , s ta tis tic s , 
aesthetics, h is to ry , biology and cheiaistr^ o f ecology, but l i t t l e  on 
its  re lig ious connections despite considerable reference, from various 
stances, to the need fo r re lig ious commitmont* As Lynn lih ite  
perceives, recognissing that ecology la  rooted in  a worldview: "l& at 
people do about th e ir ecology depends on what they think about them  ^
selves in  re la tio n  to things around them. Itaan  ecology is  deeply 
condit-loned by b e lie fs  about our nature and destiny -  th at is , by 
re lig io n *" (1970, p*77«) He continues, a fte r  attacking "orthodox 
C liristian  arrogance towards nstmzo** to  suggest thats "Since the roots 
of our trouble are so la rg e ly  re lig io u s , the remedy imst also be 
essen tia lly  relig;ious, whether we c a ll i t  that or n o t.” (ib id  p .85 .) 
Accepting his recognition of the relig ious nature o f the topic and the 
need to establish a sound philoBophico-religious base fo r any va lid  
response to  the c ris is  of the environment, I  m at note that I  do not 
accept his h is to ric a l m ialysis or solution. However I  agree that 
science and tecimology uer ae ai?e not the answer.
'B lueprint fo r Survival»
defined it thus g
"We can define the environment as a system which includes a l l  
liv in g  things and the a ir , water and s o il wîiich is  th e ir  
habitant* This system is  often referred to as the ©cosphere.
To describe i t  as a system is  to accentuate its  u n ity ; a 
system being scmiething made up o f in terre la ted  parts in  
dynamic in teraction  w ith each other, and capable, fo r certain  
purposes, o f co-operating in  a common behavioural programme."
(1972, p.24.)
But it io not simply the environment in terms of the natural, pîiysioal 
resources that is involved for we must taî«3 account of the social and 
spiritual environment viithin which we live with all their ramifications, 
Indeed these latter aspects ore critical concerning attitudes to 
resources and the problems of pollution* (Gf. Het^ el 1974» p.180*) 
Within the social milieu, modem man is faced with an horrible 
dehumanisation which has accompanied modem industrialisation end 
urcbanisation* Ellul oweepingly denounced this in prophetic manner 
long before environmental problems became accepted (of* I964? P»4 *• 
of. 26*5.2.1.)*
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Ecology, then, is the study of all things in their interworking*
It is an attempt to see things in their wholeness, relating industry 
with resourees, the right use and the prevalent waet© of our society# 
X!loo3.ogieaX concerns will weigh the economic v/ith the social, the 
benefits of this generation Mth future ones, they will seek to 
balance Industrial development and the preservation of the world’s 
resources, they will seek to preserve and build up# Moreover they 
will have to do with the relation of rich to poor, and with social 
justice for developing nations*
The problem of omz environment can only be faced in this overall 
perspective, in the realisation that modem man faces a crisis that is 
inner, social and metaphysical as well as ecological* Man has an 
inner crisis of identity seen in the changing forms of imrest fcom the 
Hew Left to Woman’s Liberation* Socially- there is the breakdom of 
relatedneas at work end home; while metaphorsically there is "the sense 
of separation from the ’whole scheme of tMngs* because we have no 
conviction that there is a scheme of things or abiding value in the 
universe." (Birch 1975» p.506*)
So there asze many norms for tho environment. It is not simply- 
a question of resources, pollution or survival* . Positively we should 
be seeking harmony between technology and nature, between technology 
and man, such that the present disadvantages of technology might be 
excluded as soon as possible and be prevented from recurring in new 
forms# This will involve an appreciation of the aoathetic 
rolationsirlp between sian, his teolmologjr and nature# Socially man 
ie part of creation# So often, it seems to me, witers on this 
subject forget timt man is pert of the picture — his aspirations and 
C37eativity eanuot be negated. But we are not to mcploit, but rather 
build and keep 'khe creation for it is not omzs* It is given to us. 
Thus only when we look at the environment religiously can we begin to 
appreciate it truly*
25*2* THE r«ÏEOHMIÉML BIIMiâ
Thero is a dilemma, fac:mg man today that fei^r would question, 
lïistîzess sii^ ials are flying on all sides s geologists ^eure us that 
raw materials and energy reserves are being used up at a rapid szateg 
biologists vîarn of decreasing numbers of species and tlireats to the 
ocesjiic chain of life; environmentalists warn of increasing worldwide 
iiollution; even psychologists warn that the psychical pazessmze of life
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today causes frustrations th at border on shock phenomena# To 
compound th is , the ijoalthy nations have increasingly become the ’have- 
nots* in  terms , o f v ita l rœsources#
Thus despite the envi^ zoximental gains that have been made by some 
bodies the destruction of the environment continues* To act through 
the correct p o litic a l and leg a l structures can take years to  secmre a 
ban on one toxic chemical — w liile in  the In terim , thousands o f ouch 
cheiidoals have come on the market. There is  therefore in  our 
situation  a ris in g  impact of negative features from in d u stria l ’progszess ’ , 
Em increasing number o f pressure points where man’ s aspirations, and 
indeed l i f e . i t s e l f ,  snze threatened*
( i )  The related problems o f war, disease, famine end economies# Our 
world echoes to wars and rumours of war, the tinreat o f internecine Wfir 
and racialism . The global v illa g e  increases the threat o f epidemics, 
concomitant w ith a ris in g  resistance by many pests and microbes to  
drugs# There is  the horrib le  re a lity  of famine and poverty, especially  
in  densely populated regions# The problems of economic d isp a rity ,
the anoreasing gu3„f between ric h  and poor, the problem o f unemplcjmient 
or underemployment due to c a p ita l intensive in d u stria lisa tio n  which is  
export orientated, the lack o f public services such as housing, sowers 
and transport, the in b u ilt segrega.tion of socio-economic groups — a l l  
are noted without comment*
( i i )  The feax* of a population crash follow ing the current population 
explosion; and more immediately the problem of urbanisation. The 
gearing of agriculture to large-sceile economies where bigger is  deemed 
b e tte r and more e ffic ie n t has led to cap ita l intensive farming with a 
resu lting  loss o f employment and swing to the c itie s  # Then as fewer 
and fewer are le f t  in  the country the problem in ten s ifies  with the 
collapse of the economic base of small tomis* (Of# Haddington 1974» P*56.)
( i l l )  There is  the fe a r o f an ecological disaster due to  the creation  
of ^mforseen iraba.lances in  naturo and/or po llu tion . We can thinly of 
a nuclear disaster due e ith er to peaceful disaster or war* Cuizrently 
much pollution control is  e, ’pollute; your neighbour* policy#
(iv )  The fear o f the genetics race — note the recent, a lb e it localised  
and temporaxy, reseax’oh moratorium by certailn jiuthoritioB in  the U .S .A ..
2* Of# Hlshan (1975» p#10*); GMxmese (1975» pp#62f#)s and W.C.C. 
(1974, P.36.)
There is  also the fear o f a genetloal oalgmlty tlirough raéliation 03Z 
drugs -  radiation mutations are hamnful.
(v ) There is  the opposing fears of ris in g  anti-soientism  on the one 
hand which tends to a tyranny of technology, and. on the other hand the 
c a ll to re'kum to  ’ simple earth ’ »
(v i)  The recognition by environmentalists o f the shortness of tiras in  
which to a lte r  the basic patterns and attitudes of the present*
( v i i )  The existence of a moral vacuum end the attendant increasing 
th reat o f anarcl-y and urban vu ln e ra b ility  to bladaaail*
( v i i l )  The problem o f vested in te res t lA ich is  the g u illo tin e  o f 
effec tive  action. Recent reposzts suggest that even i f  the U*8*A* 
govermaent wished to control its  big multi^-national companies i t  could 
not do so. (Of* B m iet and M uller 1975»)
( ix )  The 8 ,ttitu d in al problem o f jg ^ e s s* Progress seems the 
inevitab le and inescapable path fo r modem maja* He must gist on, 
consume more, raise M b  standard o f liv in g  higher and higher* The 
dr;lve fo r progress undergirds the very fabric  of society -  how many 
p o litic ian s  vrould dare campaign on the basis o f the thinking of the 
Club of Rome* le t  feom J*8.M ill to H«,Ghlaromonte (1972, p*49*) i t  
is  realised that progress Is  no option fozz man*
(x) The atti-fcudinfil problem o f production (o f* ¥rieae 1975, P*55#)* 
Pszoducts presuppose a consumer and the abundance of them presupposes 
intensive consumption* Production presupposes obsolescence to make 
vzay fo r b etter and more goods* Obsolescence cazoates an uncaring 
a ttitu d e , a throw-away m entality| i f  things are only there to be 
enjoyed fo r the moment wliy try  to intefpzEite them in to  some las tin g  
whole# 8o production designs not only products but a life -s ty le , a 
new kind of existence where man surrendeszs to a reduction of his being, 
How many have fa lle n  in to  the tszap of saying of ai vase o f roses thats 
•Those can’t  be re a l, they’ re too b eau tifu l, too perfects* In  th is  
I'Zay production arouses easy, surface emotions which lack depth 
commitment* So many are ensnared by production and techxiology, 
thinking tlia t i t  alone mlooks re a lity  in  a mean;lngful way* Indeed 
a rig h t technology w ill unfold re a lity , but absoluta.secl technology 
shuts i t  up, izediicea i t  to  a consumer-oumMecc&iomic re a lity  which 
forces men to liv e  in  an environment that is  less than i t  should bo*
The constraints of modern society mean that large firm s, motivated 
by powesz and p ro fit, cannot to lera te  insecure markets and thex’eforo
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seek to prefabricate the wishes of the consumer (advertising) in oMor 
to create stable markets* Within this one might he excused fosz 
thinking that production was an impersonal force with man its subject 
slave (Mlul) instead of in szeality being a complex of hujDia^i 
activl-ties called into existence by himian desires and aspirations.
In this way production always reflects a stance-in-life, which in our 
day reflects a mateazialistic acquisitiveness and greed# Production 
processes may pollnte, but every bit as îmrmful to our environment is 
the fact that it is being buried under a deluge of products#
(xi) An increasing lack of with modern man having no fim
base on which to act.
(][ii) The Bner^ 0' Crisis# It is genemlly accepted that oil cun 
only be a stop*gap solution as 3.t constitutes a non-renewable resource# 
This raises the question of nuclear mid other energy al-tejmatives#
The case for nuclear energy is that here is a ready source which can 
preserve fossil lïiels for other purposes and give less pol3-iition* 
Against this we have the problem of radioa.otive waste both now and for 
future generations, the vulnerability of such powea>*stations to 
sabotage and centralisation. They would also increase the teclmical
gap between fioh and poor nations as well ae open up weaponry- 
potential, to new nations* Further*, non-brecdor 3zeactors are 
dependent on the scarce azesouroe of ur@n3.iva, while breeder technology 
has not yet been vindicated* Interestingly wM.le scientists warn 
of the need to be cautious it is engineers who want to push ahead*
‘K" %
These tizelve points, in no order of importance, indicate the 
extent of the problem facing any real respect for the environment*
The struggle against environmental deterioization will only 'begin to 
succeed if mmi can begin to be satisfied with a lower growth income, 
and even a lower income, end a lower energy oonsump'tion* This 
dxdves us 'back, not to the problem of pol3.ution or production, but to 
the religious or5.entation of man’s desires*
appeau that eooncaaio
and enviromental considerations often stand opposed to each other*
In fact there iss
" * * , *a profound inoompatibillty between deeply rooted beliefs
5# This latter statement will no doubt be open to question — but 
this does not obviate the reality of the energy orisis*
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in continuous gszowth and the damiirxg reaogni'tion of the earth 
as a apsce-ship, limited in its reeouroes and vulnerable to 
thoisghtless mishandl^ing»" (Blueprint 1972» P«5«)
Belief in growth is aided, and the environment damaged, by the reality 
that man ie not need to maicing plans which cost him, and which he ie 
not sure of taking advantage during M e  lifetime# The desire to 
steadily incroaa© oux* standard of living io hardly reconcilable with 
respect for the environment* Today we are rro3.ed by a faith, a 
religious commitment to growth* J*K*Galbraith notes: "A rising 
standard of living has the aspect of a faith in oux* ciflture*" (19&7# 
P*,164*) President Ford, fo3? example, vetoed the more 
environmentally;' caring approach being advocated for B*l;xdp-mining as 
it would slow production*
The problem is therefore political as well as teclmological • It 
is political ’economic necessity* that demands so much waste in our 
fflodo37ti world «« ordering grain to be dumped, stockpiled, or even paying 
farmers to keep their fields barx’en* The dilemma is magnified "by a 
grievous lack of political will, and even where action is token it 
often leaves the problem of the developing nations unsolved* Markets 
are designed for profit and ' therefore in terms of the world’s hungry 
the capability to produce food is not geared to this need* It is all 
ve?zy well for the afflueiit to decide not to use B*B*T«, but the cost 
of fiieny such anti—pollution measures pushes'up costs in the 
developing na;tions to imacoéptablo levels*
This leada, in a situation where global act3.on is needed, to 
loopholes being provided for developing nations* Undoubtedly such 
nations need to be developed, need social justice and s'latus within 
the world comxmnlty - but it tends to fling ecological action into 
chaos* Thus the 25rd principle of the 1972 Stockholm Confereno© 
points out that wo cannot expect the developing nations to proceed as 
if they too had reached the point of ecological transition*
In the face of the curren'l si‘lua,tion respect for the environment 
on national and international levels is no easy option* Cancel 
choices aizc faced which cannot be resolved toeîmologically: is it to 
be continued employment for the chemical plant that depends on 
disgorging effluent into the nearby river, or a clean rivarf 
Employfient or environment? This only sezves to highlight the need 
to get behind the symptoms of our dilemma to its root cause, As long 
as tfe consider the economic sys'kem as some autonomous machine isolated
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from man, and that by tinkering with it here and there we might get an 
answer, then we are doomed* Teohnieal countemeaBi'treo do not work 
if they ojcclude Dian’s basic responsibility* The problem is that we 
separate economic problems from the resjionsibility of inan which is 
pushed off to the background* But respect is a human stance, not a 
technical measure*
25*2*5* The Dilemma In Persusctive - Whose Fault? From the above 
it might be thought tîmt production driven by economic systems, plus 
the apparently intractable pzzoblem of increasing pollution and 
population are to blame foj? the present crisis* But in 
apportioning blma©, in seeking some culprit, it is all too easy to 
Bliss the central question which must be as to what exactly is being 
polluted and how. This drives us beyond seeking piecemeal culprits 
for environmental deterioration, to the deeper reality of our 
polluted milieu* It is not just a question of the dominance of 
technic but the underlying values, aspirations, mabitions of men that 
are crucial*
This raises the question of dominant motives, of various 
weltansohammgsletoe* SevoraS. sources have laid the blame squarely
on the Judaietic-Ohristian tradition as seen in the Genesis account 
of man’s dominion over nature* John Pa,ssmor© (1974* p*18.) considers 
Giiristianity dmgerous in connection with environmental respect as it 
lifts man metapliysioally out of nature, which can then be ravaged with 
impunity (of# L* VJhite)* He argues that only when man is seen to be 
a3.one in an alien world can he hope to face up to the crisis* 
Interestingly, this is countered by the economist E*J*Mishan who 
longingly wonders If the ordejzing deity which we have lost sight off 
Blight not have been able to help in our hour of trial (1975» p.24*)* 
Passmore goes on to argue (in a ra,ther peculiar historical 
construction) that while he approves of the idea of stewardship, this 
comes not from the Ginzistian tradition at all, but from Kant!
The World Gounoil of Churches* project on ’The Ititure of Man and 
Society in a World of Science-Based Technology* ( Wîiito participated) 
while acknowledging that science-baaed teciinology is the instrument of 
the present crisis, the instrument of domination and o3Cj[)loitation, 
luioritically accepts that: "Theology, in pursiiing the doctrine of 
dominium terrtie* has opened the door to thoughtless exploitation and 
destruction*" (WCC 1974* p*56.) This Biay be true of certain streams
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of theology, but not all theology# It Is a sweeping generalisation 
which fails to penetrate to the heart of the history of the suhjeot 
or the philosGphlcally driving ground-motives*
¥e need a renewed dlseuaaion on the baalo assumptions of the 
autonomy of teohnio; a renewed understanding of our historloal eontext? 
and an appréciation of the Christian doctrine of creation and man’s 
place in It# To accomplish this we will need to overcome the 
rupture between nature and history as it occurs in both Marxism and 
American Pragmatism, as wall as in modem philosophy and theology# 
Another requisite will be the refutation of the dialectical 
methodology of the influential ELlul - a methodology derived directly 
from Barth*
Within the Christian era there has alimys been those who renounced 
the world and others who affirmed it* In the early history of the
church there were the hereoles of Mercion and the Gnostics as they 
struggled with the problem of the imperfection and imoomprehensibillty 
of the world, and posited Christ over against the God of the Old 
Testaraent — thus driving a wedge between creation and salvation# So 
the creation doctrine of ex-nihilo was formulated by the church to 
fight the idea of a non-Christian demiurge* Nevertheless, despite 
the early affirmation of the validity of the world as created by God, 
Ohrlstiens down tlirough the years have had a variety of attitudes to 
the natural world# Some see the world as a totally ruined creation, 
marred by the F#l, where the world is simply evil and men are called 
out of it, to be above the world and to endeavour to impart througii 
Christ something of grace to it as long as they live there# Others 
see the natural world as a revelation of the divine plan (design) 
where all is for man’s benefit# Yet others, parallel to certain 
modem movements, have viewed untrammelled nature as the way to God, 
thus opposing urbanisation end industrialisation (ef* the Amlsh).
The problem of all those views is that — as Christian ** they are often 
unbiblical and certainly largely irrelevant to the modem powers of 
man over the environment#
Yet the undervaluation of creation ie strong in Western thought — 
both philosophically and theologically* This follows from both 
atheistic and theistio existentialism, and pragmatism# Barth with 
hie aotualistio belief in revelation; Brunner idLth his deeper respect 
for creation, but wealc point where he drives a wedge between creation 
ordinances and the redemptive work of Christ; and evangelicals in
their Flatonie concern for the sonl to the negation of the whole 
personal3,ty *- all devalue nature# Such views split existence into 
some fcma of material-spiritual dualiem, instead of holding these two 
aspects together in creative unity*
It seems to me that the modern weltanschauunggslehre stems more 
from the hiBBstnistic motive of nature-freedom which came to the fore in 
the Ehi.ightenment» ttai from a lœong view of creation by the church#
The ïSn3.îghtemaent saw the secularisation of Western man from God, and 
from then on humanistic thou#it has tended to dominate (even In 
theology). Man has become central on the stage of life with his will 
to power, while God has been quietly shuffled off to the wings.* For
modem rsïan God is dead. In this situation I believe that there is a 
need to recover a biblical doctrine of creation which will be, not a 
celebratiom of the goodness and integrity of nature, but a realisation 
of the initial ’goodness* which is now fallen along with mai.
The problem of seoulazzisation ie th.at it establishes man ai; the 
centra and gives its blessing to affluent nations which "have been 
Imbued with the ideology of acquisitiveness and greed" ( WCC .1974» 
p*50e) even where this is 3.arge3.y unconsciously absorbed by the 
majority through the social mores and exposure to relentless 
advertising-# As Paul Abrecht puiis its "One problem is 'bhat all rich, 
developed otmntries, both capitalist or socialist, have been committed 
to the goal of m,at©rlal progress." (1974» P*5«) The fruits of this 
secularisation are a blind faith in scientific capability, education, 
progress £md technologioa3. ab3,Xity* It is a faith which grants 
these aspects a degree of autonomy over men such that -fcîiey are not 
questioned but rather blindly followed - for eicaiaple the widespread, 
technological tendency to do something If it is possible. (Cf« Mishan 
1973s pp.12-15.) %  must remember that witMn the context of the,
Enlightenment lies the Industrial Revolution* (Of* Goudswaa^ zd 1975/&» 
■p*3.)
The 19th century scientists wore always looking to physics as the 
key to reality and progress, and this led to the dominance of the 
methodology of physics - to atomise, to see thing’s in specialised 
isolation - .not environments wholes. In our century the emphasis 
shifted to t3ie question of progress in knowledge and cultural deeds, 
and therefore technology came to the fore in governing our life-style* 
On3-y 15 years ago technology apparen'bly ïmew no boimds - it would tome
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the ragfmg toznzant and the bleak desert, it was the age of 
tsehno3.ogioal expectation as the politicians were swift to realise 
(cf. J.F.Kennedy and H.Wllson). Technology wou3.d lead to the now 
leisured society, it would lighten the burden of man, fand the key 
words became automation and cybernetics. But the crushing irony was 
that the vezy teeîmological dominion timt led to affluence, led in the 
end to increasing polliition, the consumption of resources and 
psychological alienation. Few îmve awakened to the nightmare 
reality (of, Booker 1970» p+71f*)«
38pohb.es TO mm 3)i»m
25,5,1, Xntroduotoszv Bmvev, The majority display a total lack of 
interest — this is of course precisely the problem, that people, both 
individuals, goTomments and companies are oaught in the growth/progizess 
ideology a Of those showing coneexn, the majority are notoriously 
middle-class, the poorer classes viewing environmental coneerns as 
merely another stick to keep them domi. Yet despite this interest, 
the boin,'geo3.s middle-class mentality is generally poor in any real 
sensitivity or respect of nature
The typical active response is basically one of survival — this is 
true of the Olub of Rome, the ¥*G*G, project, and the ’Blueprint for 
Survival’, 2n contrast the Cliristian motive will centre on respect 
for the creation of God, responsible etevjardship over it, Miile 
survival will no doubt play a role, it cannot occupy a i>rimary place 
in a philosophy which is integrated in God, not man* Christians 
have been accused as the cause of the ecological crisis and it must be 
conceded that in terms of iwrld—renunciation, or two-realm theories, 
their views have often been defective, They have often failed to 
realise that the earth is the home of man; they iiave been, paracIo2£— 
ically, too man-centred in theisz conception of salvation. But the 
Bible clearly states that ’God so loved the cosmos’ (jn, 5; 16,), not 
just msm. In this realisation the response that advocates a man- 
centred resaorilisation of the environment (which is caught in an 
unresolved dialectical tension between nature and civilisation) is 
inadequate# A better response is found in .H#?,Santmire*e ’Brother 
Earth* (1976) where ha posits that only a blbli,cal staoce can overcome 
the tension between the adoration and manipulation of nature. He 
criticises the man-centred domination of Bultmann and Barth, and the 
manipxilation of nature for E^ ocieil justice aa found in Cox, For 
Bmitmire, Scizipture accords iieituxe an intrinsic worth, it too
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pazztâoipatoe in the divine plaUj, not as some autonomous
Beidîoniai aiaoh:u.%e@. Thera should therefore be neither to,.nor
from, nature, or exp3.oitatlon»
F*A,Schaeffer (19?0) also provides an iTitelligent critiquo but 
suffers from brevity* Ha faij.s to got be'iiind the symptoms of 
pollution to the problems o,f production and eoonomlcs. He restricts 
the environmental task to the churoh and the individual, but it is 
ao3U3orat© Sndustz^  that pollutes, it is governments that allow and 
foster wastew Man is always éan-3n-üontext and therefore we must
seek religious direction and take a stand In the areas vihere we are 
3n daily life. Nevertheless, Schaeffer gives an excellent critigue 
of the failure of humanism and pantheism to give a basis for any true 
and lasting resjiect of nature#
25*5.2. The Optimists# The optimists of modem society are varied in
belief and derive from such diverse figures as îtex, HZckmer, Toff lor, 
Tielhard do Chardin and MoLuhan# Dr*, P® Abelson, director of the 
Omznegie Institution’s Geophysical .Laboratory in Washington H*G#* 
optimotically argues that while mem is up against it and there is a 
grievous lack of Imowledge, yets ”h*hen ïmowledge is lacking, he can 
develop it, for example by monitoring*" (1971? p%6») But while 
lcnov;3.eclge may Increase the evid.ence seems to suggest that it will not 
provide all the answers — ignorance is a real ecological p:eobIenu
The most detailed optimistic accoimt I have com© across is that of 
Beckerman (1974) •* though Toff 1er moy be thou,!^.it of alsof^  He points 
to the dark days of the past, the slums and pollution of our cities In 
the early 18th century, of the danger of typhus and other horazific ■ 
epidemics now largely imder control* ■ He questions the assumptions 
of the axiti«*growth school, that pollution mist rise with economic 
growth:such that life becomes unsustainable• He Eirguee that our 
reserves hcive been greatly mis-estimated, taking little or no aoeomrfc 
of the potential of new teclmologiss, recycling or potential 
substitutes for cimzent materials* He concludes that economic 
groi'irth will simply slow down, of its omi acoord and that it is 
politically impossible in democratic ooimtries to envisage any other 
k:h.id of retardaticai on growth*
Bo teclmology is still conceived as designing and building a
4* Of a Gleezke (undated.) -  a good re v ie w  of Beokerïnan<
better tomorrow* Yet the problem remains that laan^ e imoritioal 
implementation and worship of hie powers in technology leads to 
impersonal standards being coerced on man# Impersonal technology 
co-ordinates and administrates the life of man, speaking to his every 
need* Therefore we become the sublimated slaves of techoological 
society; we become Marcuse’s ’One Dimensional Man** (Of« ch* 26.)
It must be recognised that we live in a world where the pJiilosophy of 
Marxism and neo-Marxism is strong, and that in the materialistic 
dialectical concept of social chmige, technology assumes a key role, 
facilitating^ the reduction of man to teclmioal-man* Technology is 
placed in the domain of productive forces making possible the 
production capacity necessary for the development of economic well- 
being,
The problem is the absolutisation of man and his powers - technic, 
science and organisation (ef* 26,5*) — while negating his created 
natuaze, emd therefore subjeot-status as relative, not central* 
Ironically it is in a ¥.0.0# booklet that we find the humanistic 
motive of man-centredness expresseds
"At the inaugaral meeting,.President Nicolae Ceauseou has 
emphasised the necessity of placing man in the centre of all 
our pjzeoccupations and defining guiding principles for the 
elaboration of policy projections," (Malitgia 1974» p*25.)
But it seems to me that tMe idea- — that nmn can master the world, 
control it as he likes, that technology solves a3.1, and that man is 
the sole object of concern in the first Instance ^  is simple arrogance, 
materialistic and idolistic arrogance. It leaves no room for true 
respect and opens the door to manipulation for the ends of man*
25*3.5. Jolm Frame* The W.C.C* project oscillates between optimism 
and pessimism — probably indicative of its consensus character.
Willie aware of the problems, John Francis, for example, correctly 
points out that future ezctrapolations are difficult in that the 
escpansioii of the last hundred years was only possible thzzough the 
discovery and exploitation of petroleum, atomic energy and aluminium* 
We do not know what the future may yield. But he warns ua, quoting 
the words of the W.G.G* Consultation held in Cardiff in 1972, thati 
"Any level of use not just increasing use, if sustained long enou^i, 
ultimately exhausts conventional resources*" He goes on to point
5* In ’Anticipaticm• iJeo. 1972, p*9*
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out that economists consider that energy has been, and Is, in  a 
condition of high e la s tic ity  o f supply because it can be produced in  
divers© ways# becaua© technology seems on the verge of new and more 
powerful aoiirces (so lar and nuclear fission); because d is trib u tio n  
can be improved g reatly  and economies of use can be achieved* Thue 
given a  set o f id eal pmzametere there is  hope, but FxwiCls is  hardly 
the naive optimis'fc» for the likelihood of these condltione occurring 
together seems remote.
25*3*4* The Pessimiste. The realisation of crisis has resulted in 
mi anti-soience and miti-teolmolo^ movement which is seen in the 
strong; romantic and pantheietio streams ooimected to tMs question 
(of* 25»5*4«2*)* There are the ’simple earth’ types who in one way 
or another advise a return to the non-tecbnloal past, with a few 
positing structural changes as an escape hatch* This movement 
generally advocates the breakdown of urbanisation and the creation of 
small groups baaed, on agricultural economies. (a) The biological 
determinism of some natural scientists who, absolutizing biology, 
advise men to return to the simple earth because it holds the key to 
M a  origin end existence, often viewing the undisturbed wilderness as 
the norm with ram a foreign Intruder* (b) The cult of personality- 
Ideal - the naturalists, nature lovers, conservatlonlst-at^^any^rloe, 
those oonoemed to establish an identity with, and dependence on, the 
natural world# (o) The counter^ c^ultirce i^hlch advocates a radical 
land etkle* This embodies the misgivings of the (mow old) Hew Left 
concerning science and technology* The problem is, however, that the 
ecological platform for this group Is often only a facet of a wider 
and deeper search for meaning and identity a search where experience 
detlirones analysis and the last tolces over. Conversely, ecological 
concerns are simply a stick to beat the establishment»
25,3*4*1. E.L.Heilbroner and .Schumacher. Typical of tliis 
position of pessimism Is il.L.Heilbîzoner’s book •The Human Prospect *. 
Here he has moved from earlier optimism to pessimism# Now he mks:
"There is a question in the air, more sensed than seen, like 
the Invisible approach of a distant stcæm, a question that I 
would hesitate to ask aloud did I not believe it existed 
unvoiced in the minds of many: ’Is there hope for man?’"
(1974. p.15.)
Heilbroner gives an analysis of despair seeing the threat to mankind 
coming* from the population explosion, and incidentally deploring the 
Malthusian solution of checks by famine and disease; from the tMeat
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of nuclear war or tezzrorist blEwWall; and from environmental 
deterioration * He sees, in ilist, no hope for man unless a radical 
change in life-Btyle takes %)laoe which would accept a limitation on 
industrial growth# But deepeiirlngly he realises that both 
capitalist and socialist governments believe in economic growth, "both 
soclo’-economio systems are committed to a civilization whose striking 
asxjeot is its productive vi^ ztuosity,"' (ibid p#94#) In the end he 
trails off in-bo mystical.^  romantic, solutions, unwilling to face the 
real.it;v of no hope, yet imderstanding the impossibili'by of man lifting 
hhnself up by his o\m shoelaoea#
One of the most Importa^ zt contributions to this debate has been
Bchumaoher• s book ’Bmall le Beautiful. ’ # This is one of the 
sanest and most practical books on the subject* Nevertheless there 
is a difficulty la the sentiment of smallness in that it tends to be 
romantic, a nostalgia, for the past* It is quite feasible to i/rite 
•Big Is Beautiful'^ as well* The appeal for a small scale technology 
is val3.d but we need large scale ones a3,so* Water and electricity 
supplies, the service industries, are obviously better on some 
nationalised scale «■ the water crisis of 1976 In some parts of Britain 
could have been avoided in a national system* Another reservation 
against Sohimiacher Is that he tends to a vague pantheism* In his 
appeal for smallness, his concejîts of society remain eoabiguous, there 
aaze no clc-asz societal. s'fcructi.o:'es with character and purpose delineated* 
But in his appeal for a teclmology with a ’hoaitm face’ he drives at 
the heart of our d.ilenaTia»
25*3*4*2* Homanticism and Pantheism* The ’simple etirth’ or ’organic*
movement, despite valuable insights, is going the wrong way* Just 
to move aifay from money and belief in science, or salvation through 
tecimology, is noi; enou.^ 1* It is romantic nonsense for nature is 
nei their benevolent nor perfect* Barry Coimener’s third lavr that 
nature knows bes’b «« fg just not true* It would mean the elimination
of all doctors and medicine if follovred to its logical oonclusion!
The idea of Thoureau that the salvation of menkgnd la^ y in the 
wilderness is nonsense for mankind can. sta^ id only a little wilderness 
or it perishes*
Equally romantic is the idea that all may be well if we only 
educate people, or if we could come to regard nature as sacred. In 
fact societies who regEirded nature âs sacred have destroyed their 
natural habitation as Plato (1971» PP*151*^ 5*) records, describing
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Attica* Veneration is quits as damaging to the environment as 
toclmologioal prowess* Eoosak falls into this romemtic approach, 
hoping that ecology will replace scientific anaXyais by "a new science 
in which the object of Imovrledge will be rather like the poet’s 
beloved; something to be oontempla.ted but not analysed, something that 
ie permitted to retain its ii^ eteries*" (1971» P* 136,) Bo he tends
to a poetic mysticism - others tend to a more straightforward pantheism^
Richard Means, replying to Lynn White’s criticism, postulates a
pantheistic solution# But it is a peculiart? pantheism. Having
quoted Schweitzer’s reverence for life, he jiolnts up the problem of
ethics in relation to ecology by condemning' Fletcher’s ’Situa'bion
Ethics’ which has no reference to nature, and Cox who deals almost
exclusively with the ethics of the city. So he calls for a return
to a pantheistic appreciation of nature, to the need for a moral base
via a vis the environment. But he remarkably dissolves both
pantheism and ethics into the pragma,tie* "Vdiat then is the real
moral crisis? It is, I think, a pragmatic problem..,(1970* p*89#)
This is philosopMoal nonsense and Means' answer is no answer, for the
ethical cannot be reduced meaningfully to the pragmatic and man live
with it. This only servos to higjilight the barrenness of his stance
which lias no firm base, no absolutes* It is no answer because he is
6using words comiotativoly, as motive words to a pragmatic end.
Pantheism can never provide a solution to our dilemma or engender 
real respect for nature - for true reejjeet involves cEire and control. 
Pantheism gives no meaning to particulars, for within its philosophy 
only unity has final meaning. Indeed, tliose great religions which 
envisage man as merely part of nabure, such as Jainism, Hinduism and 
Buddhism, tend to be world—renouncing and make little contribution to 
the world of day to day affairs, (Of. Guinness 1973» p,208,) Thus 
while the protest of Western pantheists or mystics may often be 
justified, it offers no solution, either practically or philosophically 
to the question of respect for nature. Indeed mysticism often seems
to be using the ecological question as a helpful new weapon against 
rationality. Therefore neither faith in technolo^^, nor reaction 
against it will solve our problem#
Neither will the romantic solution of men like ICoestlor, Hishan,
A,Huxley and IC.Claxk, who propose some form of cheiaical or biological
.Huxley’s ’Religion Without Revelation’,
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ïûÊmipMatioî'i of mom, be acceptable* TMe may give an answer to the 
iiamifiil attitudes that men have - but what wou3.d it do to man, qua 
man? To manipulate man hardly fulfils the respect for man that nmst 
surely be an integral part of respect for the environment*
25*3*4*3* The Club of Rcane**^ The tlirust behind their thiniïing is 
that, while disagreement might remain concerning time-scales., there is 
a crisis, V/hether it is ten years or a thousand, does not alter the 
need to change our patterns of living* ¥e need to realise that we 
cannot build paradise on eaazth - this being the vacuous promise of the 
religion of political msitorialisra. Three dangerous fallacies need 
countered: (a) that any nation can ignore the problem, fox* 
environmental concern is global; (b) that we oan equate pollution and 
environmental deterioration; and (c) that science and technology can. 
overcome all problems, because already global depletion of resources 
and destruction of the quality of Ilf e-support systems has militated 
against this*
The tlxree reports show an interesting progression of thought,
Xt used to be generally accepted that the key ley in turning the 
motivation of people, but this is difficult fizom humanistic premises 
for no satisfactory philosophical or religious base can be provided*
So while the first report stressed the need for a Cîopernioan turning 
point in the attitudes of modem man, the second report, more or less, 
dropped the idea* In the third report a political, and not a
religious turning point, is mooted - albeit a political turning jDoint 
which may ’use’ religion.
The first two reports assume that man is blocked by the ’limits* 
of earth - ’The Limits to Growth’ — thus revealing the hidden belief 
th€it the earth is too small for man who eem expend unlimitedly if 
allowed to do so. But this is fmidamenta].ly to fail to realise the
place and role of man on the earth. This primacy of man is borne 
up in the tliird report, which sees the problem as one of survival and 
seeks to design a worlcl-culture. To do this, recognising the highest 
need of man as religious, it seeks to design an universal humanism 
compounded of many elements. But Oliristienity and imivorsol 
humanism would seem to be uneasy partners in this coalition. The 
problem is the motive to design, to mould religion to himan ends « a 
most menacing philosophy for :i@ny religion that believes in revelation.
7# The tliree répoizts ares (l) Meadows et al (1972); (2) Mesarovic & 
Pestel (1975)} stid (3) Laszlo (1977).
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The report/ goes mi to speak of one world government (of* Merx and 
Lenin) where the state will die and men will live acoording to 
cybernetic principles* So the solution offered is highly îtestis’b in 
prineiple and in pszaotioe call© for a convergence between end the 
West*
The danger becomes tlmt the problem is buried in statistics and 
discussion* Statistics, for exemiple, may indicate how well off the 
affluent nations are, but they cannot reveal the stress, emotional 
alienation and frustration that is experienced* 9?aXk becomes a 
substitute for action* The 1976 conference on Habitat organised by 
the United Nations was caszefully steered into academic discussion — 
not deliberately perhaps, but tame# John Francis wly eonmenta of 
an ear'lier U*l* Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, that s "A 
mountain of print is the sobering aftermath#**" (1974» p#23*) Such 
ventures at least achieve the political success of getting delegates to 
sit clovrn together, but one fears of ’fiddling while Rome bums’*
25.4* T0¥AB3)S A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE
29.4*1% The Need of a I'Jeltanscjkmrnmm^ lehre * There is a general
realisation of the need to establish a fiBii philosophical base from
8wM.oh to 'back3.e this problem* This raises the choice of possible 
worddviewe* As noted, pantheism (or paTa-every-thin,sj«ism) ia a. 
popu3.ar choice, but leaves us in an absurd universe and gives no 
meaning to the diversity of particulars# It ia both theoretical-ly 
end practically weak, world-renouncing in theoizy and fostering disease 
and famine* IHirther, it offers no rationale to 'bhe reality of the 
Janus-like quality of nature — hostile and benevolent* In pantheism 
man becomes sometliing impersonal, absorbed into the whole mid therefore 
denied his status as an individual created being* GertaiJaly it must 
be conceded that Byzantine end pre-Ronaissonee Cliristianity were not 
mioh better (despite the eulogy of Birch) because of their rather 
’heavenly* perspective. But then, neither is the nature-freedom 
tension of Rousseau or Kant much improvement* It seems to me an 
answer only begins to become possible in the attitudes and life-stanoe 
of the Refomation# Think of the great Butch painters, like van Eyck, 
who for the first time began to point nature as nature; the Puritan 
emzthinoBS; the rejection of the Platonic dualism of body and soul; the 
postulation of a non-dialectioal motive of creation-fall-redemption.
8# Cf. Blueprint (1972, p*1#); and Montefiori (1971» p.35.)
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This is not to say tliat 'the Reformation gave a perfeot outlook, for we 
can thiiüc of the Blaok-Stooking Calvinists of the NetherlÊinds who wre 
extremely oiniol to animals#
More insidious than the clanger of pantheism or Christian aberrations 
is the philosox>hy of materielism whioh so dominates Western sooiety*
The Diaterialistic presupposition is that an increasing standard of 
living must he sought# Now undoubtedly there is a problem here for 
humanism in that it is not necessarily materialistio in this way#
But it has no basis on which to say that materialism is wrong# The 
problein inherent in this and other approaches is that they are 
reductionistic of man EWid nature* The danger of the economic 
inte:e%)rotation is that it ignores the spheres of diversity of the being 
of man as biological, social, aesthetic etc*, and indeed the 
envlroimen'b-as-CGiMiodity meiitaJ.ity that this gives rise to pays little 
respect to the dictum that certain eco-aystems should not be touched 
(such as marshes). The reduction to one mode (economic) makes for 
neater analysis, but man is a complex being and the problem of 
relationship to the enviromient is deeper tlian individual modes - it 
is essenbially a religious relation*
Man cannot be reduced to an aspect of his being, he cannot be 
reduced to technical man (pragiaatism and materialism) or to social man 
(Marxism)). Neither of these faces the problem of death - on my 
deathbed I am not technical man or social man. Technological 
innovation or economics cannot deal with the problem of alienation and 
lonliness - indeed all too often it h æ  furthered such phenomena. So 
any real solution must bo deeper than simply deal:mg with facets of 
our being. Certainly there will be economic measur'es to be taken, 
policies concerning resources, and the improvement of land use; 
political measures which will involve democratic eetabllshment of 
choices of organisation and civil liberties, seeking justice for all; 
teclmioal measures which will seek to develop ener^ gy, and so on# But 
edi of this must be within some overall worldview, some phlloBophloo* 
religious base. X suggest that the only base caxzable of Goj)ing with 
all this ie the Theistic one - which leaves a large area of discussion.
Within this Christian life-etanee certain prevalent assumptions 
must be quashed. The world does not exist for and through man, but 
because of its Creator. Man does not have a right to never* ending 
increasing staîidards of living, this being based on a false equation 
of happiness and material well-being. Also, teclmology will be seen
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in a balanced way being potentlMly a bleseing and potentially a 
Gureeg depending on the religious direction of 3.ts motivation#
Many have contended that the biblical approach to the environnent 
will not do (of* Passmore, Miite, and Allaby (1972* P * 3 6 * ) ) ,  but it is 
precisely my contention that only it will do* and thsd; the future can 
only be faced in continuity with the revelation of God# The 
biblical position does not mean that we will have instant solutions,
Itut it dees mean that we îmve a perspective, a framexfork that can 
contain them and point in the direction of siabstcmtial healing# In 
this context I would poini; out that this life-stance is not at heart 
theological, but rather a cosmoscope (of* Hart 19?0)» a perspective 
which governs all of life in the realisation that the cosmos is not 
man’s but God’s* Man is viceroy on earth, the created subject#
But he is not, despite being made lord over creation, thus God# God 
alone is God# A cosmosoop© is not a theology (that would be 
reduotionistic); it is not tied to church life; it denies any 
separation of nature and grace; and involves total obedience or 
disobedience of man before God#
This timis on a correct perspective of creation — not redemption#
A correct view of creation is singularly lacking in humanism#
(a) The humanist sees man as different because he has evolved some 
higher faculty of mind and is therefore conBOlous of reality and able 
to control it tlnzough the tools and techniques of tecîmology. So he 
adopts a ’problem-solver ’ approach, that by the development of new 
tecimology can become as God, both omniscient and omnipotent, 
Imowing and control3.ing a3.1 (of. President Jolmson’s words on signing 
the Water Quality Act of 1965& "Today ire proclaim our refusal to be 
strangled by the wastes of civilisation# Today we begin to be master 
of oim environment." {in Ribbons 1976, p*19*») Or, (b) the
humanist can advocate sin abdicEition of control, to live ideally like 
the animals close to the earth# Mi outlook reflected in much of the 
recent appeals for conmiimal, self-sustained rural living# But 
people are people as God made them and not as they would like to 
consider themselves; they are rational, emotional, aesthetic and 
biological beings who with their God-given aspirations and creativity 
cannot live consistently at either of these two poles of humanism#
Man needs to affirm the xwrld, yet fulfil his transcending nature#
V/e need a biblical view of history that realises that man does not 
speak the first or last word, that man does not give final meaning to
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history, that man is not self-suffioient or autonomous* We nosd a 
light from outside, sMning into our daazkness, £U).d Christ is that Light, 
In this historical perspective there must he no positing of îAan-as- 
nature over against ffian'^ as-hietory* 0?liis is often done by
theologians who stress the historical aspect of salvation Imt squeeze 
out the creational aiTdinanees which firiîly root man in crealion as 
part of nature. There must be no spiritual-historical/natural 
dichotomy. We need a imified motive (cf. 24.2*2.1 *)o
TMs view of creation rejects the scholastic view of life as some 
sort of static whole; nor does it seek to negate socio-economic life 
by means of a higher* realm of grace. The emphasis© for man’s life in
creation as a, socio-economic being flows froia a stress on man’s 
vocation.* (Cf. Goudzwaard 1975/a, p*11f.) , Man has a creational
Oîflling before God such that all of life is und.er His creational 
Lordship. God is over all and therefore socio'^ econoniip life is not
sinful but rather governed by "bhe idea of stewardsh3.p.
25.4.2» Heality Is Relational. (Of. Sittler 1976» p.15f*) We are 
driven back to the fundamentEtl question of reality* Reality can only 
be understood in relations, in an ontology of oommimity, communion and 
ecology, and not via ©srlitive things# The fundamental relationship 
whereby all things hang together ie with their Greater. If. I 
remember correctly it was Galvin who stated tliat God was the fountain 
of all livingncBSfl But core 1b needed for I am not positing 
Ooinifioner’s first law that everything is eonnected to everything else. 
This is not true, and if it were would be meaningless (like the dlctim 
to expect the unexpected), Nevertheless we must begin to r©a3.iso 
tbi-rb there exist© an interwovenness in restlity^  ^that nothing exists in 
and of itself, but through» before and to God. No milieu exists 
x>îithout positioning*
The Theistic view of nature and man’s life therein miust originate 
from a creational, understanding which realises that nature is of value 
as nature apart from man because it ie created by God who saw that it 
xms ’very' good’. Greationally,man and the rest of creation stand as 
equals in their origin before the infinite creative power of God.
There is one hmianity (as created) separated from nature by being the 
image-bearers of God; yet one wi'feh it as orea'tee before the Creator*
In tills context, reality is relational., demand5wg tha.t we see it in a 
way 8p%)3zopriate to its created structure, seeing eûLl things in terras 
of regard and spiritual honour:lng:^  When Jesus C{fj|.:Ls us ’to behold’
524
(Mt* 6;26-28.) He invites us to ataM  In  the midst of His creation 
with a reverence fo r i t ;  He certainly does not inv ite  us to a^zrogantly 
%mlk through the world with disdain fo r the non-self* We are called
to appreciate the Interwoveimcîss o f re a lity ; to have a f ira  
understanding of things as they exist individim lly# Pan is  to enjoy 
the ’ thin^.ineBa’ of things* So we need an onto7.ogy of relations  
wMch w ill yield a- looking/beholding in rela.tionB, and in  turn yield  
a.- thlnkiBg-in-relf.itions* Only in thinkimg this way can we avoid a 
epiritual-inatorial dichotomy# I f  we do not achieve such a relational 
doctrine of creation i t  seems to me \fe end up with a reduction, or 
perversion, of the doctrine of redemption — for salvation affects the 
i-diole of creation, including socio-economic stmctmzea#
As I  stand before a tree I  need to feel rela,tionaUy toward i t ,  
both in te llec tu a lly  mid psychologica3.1y* There is  l i t t l e  practical 
value in a theoretical assent that i t  too Is  part o f creation i f  I  do 
not feel towEird i t ,  experience that i t ,  lik e  me, is  created# Wo 
despazmtely need to  overcome what Simone Weil called the ’de-created-* 
ness* of our modern world, and i t  seems to me that by such creational 
relatedness we can begin to do so# There is  a value in a ll things
around, not because khey have autonomous value, but because they are 
made by God« This does not mean, that I  cannot cut doi'm. trees i f  I  
need firewood or timber fo r a fence -  we must not become romantic 
for the tree is  rq lationally  there to serve man when he, needs i t .
But T<re raust respect the tree fo r what i t  is * Make i t  autonomous and 
we destroy i t  and ourselves»
IWinion?
The creational mandate of Genesis 
1*28 has a 'fclireefDld direction fo r ïimi& (a) to be fru itfu l and multiply; 
(b) to have dominion over the earth; mul (c) to replenish the earth#
Xt is  in  the omission of (c) tiia t the falsa conception of dominion as 
exploitation has arisen# Man’ s dominion is  ever under God’ s 
dominion end imcler God’ s dimain» Because of the F a ll, man has used
Ms doFtinion wrongly, smd 'thought of i t  wzongly, by exploiting the 
earth and seeing h.:Wse].f ea the integration point of meaning* But 
creational dominion does not mean that we crush every ant we come 
across; i t  means that we atop over the ant when we meet i t  on the 
pavement outalde, but also that we have a right to rid  (mr houe© of 
them) beceusG they have no place there# S im ilarly, a right respect
fo r our env:?ronment w ill moan that while i t  ie  permissible to himt
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anlmaÏB for fooâ, It :ls wrong to do bo for pleasure « ®ie plant and 
the anime*!, a%'e not Esero before man» hut Irive value,
homlniozi meene to fill and rule g to eat the fruit, kee%) and 
cultivate the earth# In rergarding it as this it seems to me 
necessary to reject the idea of I’ielhard de Chardin that hwaan 
technique contributes to inoarnaÆion and redemption^ , Ellul has
devastated this, but in turn uidielpfully sees the I'all as from imlty 
into multiplxcitsj-p from freedom Into necessity» Dominion means, 
rather^ reception and enjo^ mient of the diversity of creation as created. 
But it is BoeoMary dominion, our rule comes after, our activity to 
Biibdue is derivative, it is the completion of a task# In Genesis 
1226 the Hebrew ( k^a^) gives the idea of development, of an effort, 
not play, the performance of a service responsibly before God* This 
dominion is also to be characterised by rest, not just for man but for 
creation# Here surely is a valid principle for our over**worked and 
groaning environment» It too needs a day of rest, a principle 
standing in contrast to the Marxian lack of a 6abba;fchl
The biblical motive, thenj. is one of preser%’"ation and building up» 
Preservation alone is not enou^ÿ):). for such action is romantic and a 
choice for natural disaster mid fate* Building alone is not enough 
for this, the way of Hax^ xiem and Prapj/ietisyn, is a choice that leads to 
cultural upheaval,* This call to work and have dominion is only 
truly fill.filled rela/bionally and respectfully withhi this motive to 
disclose creationpotential,^ T# do tliie man uses tecîmology to
honour God and care for M s  neighbour^ Technology is not something 
mmthema^ but tM.t wM.oh relieves the fallen state of na'turej, it 
reduces drudgery and the phj^ wicsl burden of work^ t it helps cure 
diseasefl TJuxs in its diversity of applications^ tecïmology can work
toijsrds the redemption of creation marred by the Ea3.1# Bo doubt it 
also poses a threat but teclaiology in biblical perspective has no 
imequivooably evil character,*
Men^B dominion is to be exercised, in responsible stewardship (of, 
24«2«3ft)s[ he heis to listen to the Master to whom he is responsible, for 
creation Is not M. b to dispense v.dth as he pleasosy Disrespect 
comes from tbisHcing it is ours and that we can do what x^e like, with it 
hivh whes'i we realise it is not oursg but anothers^ to whom we will 
have to answer for our use of it> then respect begins to floi-f feom 
this calling and sense of duty* The earth is not too small for man? 
we are not to subdue It endlessly (cf».2?epXenish)» Our responsibility
to Gare for the ©axth means primarily to  give I l f  e -p o s s ib ility  to  mmip. 
animal and p lea t* and only them seometeily to aeok our own economic 
ends* We are to  replenish the earth which meana to  fill it to a 
certain le v e l* not to  fill it to  ite limits of capacity#
25#4»3*2. Dominion Is F a llen .  Ae the above already ehowa the ideal 
o f the cultural mandate was warped at the Fall and the Bible in no way 
glosses over the dark side of life #  There is disease and dlst^rmony* 
in  man and mature th ink o f the devastation o f trees by the gipsy 
moth ** and the Bible o ffers  no easy romantic solations* Bmi is 
confronted by thorns and th is tle s  g he w ill haw to  sweat fo r a return  
from the earth . It is  equally clear that the earth* s troubles are 
man's fa u lt *« and who today would deny that nature groans because o f 
man# lavertheles© this groaning is  not hopeless fo r the Bible sees 
i t  in  the context o f hope* of c h ild b irth  (of# Ito# B|22£#)*
A fte r the Fall there is  im absolute break from tlm creational 
ordinances* M&m still liv e s  by the fruit o f the earth although he 
remains unsatisfied  when the 'tre e  o f life* is missing; he still 
carries through the mandate to  subdue the earth as M s  technology 
wonderfully reveals* though th is  too is  a mixed blessing# Again* 
xmrk is  not to dominate l i f e  e n tire ly * although clearly in  b ib lic a l 
perspective man was made to  work and does not work to live, Man 
subdues creation* Increases what he has* what he can do* what he knows; 
he enjoys more fru its  and masters more forces, but at the seme time 
increases his covetommess and lust# In  a fallen world all is  
mixed as blessing and curse#
There are certa in  biblical prin cip les worth noting . Every men 
serves god(s) in his life o f some form or another ^Augustine's low 
o f concentration of the h e a rt); men need some in teg ratio n  point* 
therefore they e ith e r seek rest and fu lfilm e n t in  God, in  creation* or 
in  themselves. Secondly* every man is  transformed and driven by the 
image o f h is god* fo r I t  is axiomatic that any idol* hoxfover re la tiv e , 
be absolutized and worshipped -*■ such as technic* science and 
organisation* T h ird ly , we realise th at mankind creates and forms a 
structure o f society In  its own image, not God's#
Creation **♦ F a ll **> and now redemption 
tMougii Jesus Christ# C hrist alone restores lost harmony to creation , 
the a b ility  to  govern the earth and the sacred rest# His grace takes 
up nature and holds out perfection to  i t ,  not destruction* It was 
not Karl IWmei*, Hohillebeeckz, Metz, Moltmami or B irch , but Aquinos
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who said ^ gratia non toilet naturma sod perfioit” — grace does not 
destroy hut perfects natmre, and here both Luther and Calvin quote 
him with approval# However* within redemption there is for the 
present no total healing of the curse of the Fall# I - find at this 
point a concept of Schaeffer helpful - there is substantial healing 
now with respect to the separateness of man from man, man from himself, 
and man from nature# Healing in reality but not perfect restoration.
TMe healing will begin to flow dynamically in the lives of men when
they realise iii a new ifay their calling to have dominion of a nature
tha/fc is held in trust from God*
The response of the Christian is not some romantic longing for 
the past, or some anti-technologieal aspiration. Within the scheme 
of redemption tecïmology has its part and is used as a symbol of 
salvation in the ark (of.>temple and tabernacle)*' But'technology 
for its own salce, or economio ends, becomes a, curse* It was 
technology for its o\m oak© timt led Oppenheimer to become enthusiastic 
over the H-bomb* The problem of humanism is that "man with liis greed 
has no real reason not to rape nature, and treat it as a reverse 
•consumer object*” (Schaeffer 1970, p*67*) But in the realisation 
of our* creational mandate, Schaeffer com writes
”\'Jhen we have learnt this «* the Christian view of nature — 
then there can be a real ecology; beauty will flow; 
psychological freedom will come, ànd the world will cease being 
turned into a desert* .Because it is right, on the basis of 
the wliole Christian system - which is stroxig enough to stand it 
all, because it is true — as I stand, as a creature, and face 
the buttercup, I say, - *PolloxMcreature, fellow-creature. X 
won't v/alk on you* We are both creatures together*'”
(ibid pp*68-9*)
The danger facing the cultural mandate, and to wMch it has succumbed 
in the past, is the sécularisation of its motive; the reduction to an 
unlocking of creation per se# .Instead of a realisation of a calling to 
unlock creation in a God-ward direction.
Basic to our dilemma is the ethical failure of man, his short­
sighted apï}roaoh, his greed. But the realisation of this and 
XJragmatic solutions will not help. We need an ethic of the 
environment that will stand as an ethic and not as a pragmatic 
manipulation for the end of survival. We must firmly reject Means' 
pragmatic ethic for it is precisely an ethic subject to socio-economic 
action and therefore places goods above people* \-/ithout exalting 
man we need to realise that the problems of political will, of 
economies aaid technology are hwaan problems, and therefore need to be
528
approached as if people mattered, respecting the rights of 
individuals and their ethical responoihilitiee*
We need to develop am eth ic  o f the lend which respects nature in  
itself and not merely as subservient to ma>i; to  begin to  realise that 
to care for the environment may often mean simply leaving it alone*
We need an ecological ethic that will restore the importance o f the 
biopîjysical world in human affairs and stress the interrelatedness of 
existence# We need to overthrow the false gods of individualism/ 
collectivism, economic self-interest and fragmented'learning and 
realise that w© stand in the wholeness o f our beings as individuals 
and groups before God*
cowoLnsicm
The dilemma is seen in the general theoretical acceptance o f a 
c ris is  and the almost blanket fa ilu re  to  do anything in  p rac tice .
The challenge is  daunting: stewardship that ie responsible and fairness 
between nations* The challenge is  global s "The world is  our 
constituency" declared P ierre  Troudeau. The problem is  not pollution 
or technology n©r se* but the high levels of consumption engendered by 
m a te ria lis tic  values*. Here is where a diroinuation is  required *« in 
consumption and therefore in  production. We need to  decrease the 
tempo o f development in  order th a t we may re fle c t on what we are 
doing, to take stock of what vre ought to do* lo area of technology 
is  necessarily wrong, but it may be in  the path it pursues*
In  a p ra c tic a l way, what can be done? Pollution control often 
merely s h ifts  the problem; pesticides cannot be controlled except by 
using le s s . The B lueprint (1972,. p*15*)s fo r example, suggests a 
premium on d u ra b ility  and a penalty on, d isp o sab ility , the promotion of 
the sm allholding and the upbuilding of re a l commmities* But the 
question remains as to the feasibility o f th is  in  current trends*
Society, ae it e x is ts , is  qu ite simply not suetMnable* Life is 
threatened in  terms o f q u a lity  and survival* The new awareness of 
wliat Coimoner has called the 'n o -free-lcnd  ' theory points to  the simple 
fa c t that all productive activity by man in some %my drains 
environmental resources* All activity, not only has an economic 
costo but ecological costs as well as spiritual and aesthetic* In  
th is  s itu atio n  many now see the goal o f manlcind being not growth, but 
s u rv iv a l, an overcoming o f the now decreasing standard o f life 
(globMly) in terms o f the d is u tilitie s  of environmental deterioration g
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while at the earn© time striving to give an equal standard to all# 
A^ fainst this aim must he set the philosophical■ inadequacy it possesses, 
as well as the political reality where nations still regard, themselves 
as in individual life-hoats rather than as part of one world. In 
fact, as Farmer (1974) recounts, the third xforld is averse to the 
gloha3.lsa.tion of Western crisis of the environment as it is often done 
at the expense of the crisis of the developing nations which is, ao 
far as they are concerned, social and not environmental* Psmmir 
argues, rightly, that the root cause of the environmental problem lies 
in the production %]attems and consumption of the affluent* There 
is simply not "enough resources to support more than one ÏÏSA*” (ibid 
p*20.) But the problem then is tixat the developing nations are even 
here trying to emulate the material values of the West. So we come 
l'ail circle mid the consusjption-production spiral of the affluent is 
also the problem of the developing nations.
Wlmt is required is agreed to be the creation of a stable, 
sustainable society. Stability does not necessitate stagnation.
But such a sustainable society will be impossible apart from new life— 
patterns; equal distribution of scarce suppliesj corporate social 
decisions and a need for supply that can be matched, by resources* 
Intermediate technology will be based consciously on the basic needs 
of people food, shelter, health and education; on local resources at 
present ignored; and aiming at the integration of man and nature.
To achieve this we re^ id of several avenues posited*. (i) A policy 
of aero economic growüi — which would involve a cut in production with 
increasing unemployment, lead.lng inevitably to a deflationary cycle. 
Therefore such a policy would liit the lower income brackets, the 
unskilled, and inoreasi© the poverty of the already poor. (ii) 
Government ^ redistribution of economic surplus. Milo much discussed 
this fails to deal with the critical problem of production and 
consumption. (iii) The corporate redistribution of economic surplus* 
Here firms, in tlieory, become aware of ecological problems and reinvest 
some percentage of profits to cleaning up the mess they make* AgaJn 
this is wealt: in taelcllng the j)rbblem of resources and pol3.ution, and 
w3.ll lead In any case to the contlnu3ng disparity of wealth between 
rich and poor nations. These suggestions provide temxjorary relief 
to specific problems while leaving the basic problem untouched. At 
the same time they yield new problems*
Are we therefore reduced to living with the system os it is, or
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accept uîiemploynent? J.AgOIthius (1974) suggests that any 
solution must involve the following; (a) the conseinration of resources g
(b) the reduction of pollution levels; (o) a low level of unemploy­
ment; (d) consumption xiattems that are orientated to quality and not 
simply qumitltyg (e) a growth of quality values in terms of marriage, 
faiîîiXy life, political responsibility, artistic a%)preelation etc*;
(f) a more equal distribution of wealth, while recogaising that it caxi 
nevesz he totally equal* Solution (i) above meets criteria (a) and
(h), part (d) and (e), but not (c) or (fj* Solution (ii) tends to 
meet only (c) and (f); while solution (iii) meets only (c) and part 
(f). OlthiuB argues tîmt wha,t is needed is not increase or decrease, 
but a shift in demand patterns* An aggregate sîiift, say from colour 
televisions to paintings, ifouXd lead to the conservation of resources, 
3:eduction in pollution, low level unemployment, consumption 
orientated to qua3.ity and a more équitable distribution of income.
Socio-economic life is itself a confession, a religious confession 
of what we believe in* Our beliefs are revealed in our style of 
consumption, our attitude to v/ork, every bit as much as in our spoken 
allegiances* It is evident that a conversion is needed in our life­
style and attitudes to life* Even if the task seems politically 
impossible we are in,div,ldually called before God to be responsible for 
our creational cMling* Therefore while every society should be 
concerned for a just and responsible society, for the quality of life, 
for commmi3.ty and the spiritual basis of man's existence it will 
only be so as individuals are thus concerned* It is not a question 
that I as an individual can avoid* Vfe have not yet as a world 
comimmity made an ir:cevocable choice for the gods of materialism and 
technic a æid it ie incombent for each to show forth In their lives a 
true and proper perspective, a real respect for the environment in the 
little things of life*
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CHAPm 26 
TEOmiOS : P Q ia  -  POWERLESmBSS
26.1. m û  imoBTmcE of teqpics ^
There can be little doubt that one o f the dominant facets of life 
today Is  the technological achievements of man# Aiy attempt to 
underetaîul man, his life -s ty le  and a ttitu d e s , must therefore grapple 
with the problems and benefits of modern technics or it will have 
abandoned a major tract of life. This chapter seeks to introduce 
the impact and the implications of the powers that man has developed 
from the impetus o f science, and which play a crucial formative role 
on man and society; and the resulting powerlessnoss of man before 
these powers* It Is  impossible to  understand man today apart from 
the problem o f technics and ae Humford m?itess "ho organic view of man 
can ignore the weight and significance of man's technics." (1973, p*5*) 
Tet while technics is of paramount importance in understanding our 
modem world l i t t le  has been done in this direction by theologians.
It has to be stated that moot of the valuable analysis here comes from 
outwith the theological field — from w riters such as Marcuse, Henry, 
Bruoker, Toff 1er, Misiian, Himiford, McJiidian, Koeetler, Ellul, van 
Riessen, Sohuurman and many others.
2 6 .2 . THE HI8T0RI0AI, BAOKGROmP
Mumford (1947) outlines three distinct periods of teclmological— 
industrial etmc1n.ixe; the eoteolmic period (medieval) which survived 
doim to the middle 18th, ea rly  19th, century| the naleoteolmic period 
(the in d u s tria l revolution) from which we have not yet fully emerged, 
and v?hioh saw the establishm ent o f the machine age and the enslavement 
of man to his technologies and gadgets; today we have entered the 
period o f m gji^&m lo.
ïto  In au stela l Révolution 
occurred w ith in  the line o f C hristian thinking developing from the 
l6th century onwards and epitomised in Calvlnistio and Puritan thought. 
It was essen tia lly  Reformation presuppositions that exercised a 
scientific and cu ltu ra l Influence on society as a whole and sponsored
1 # I p refer 'tech n ics' ra th er than technology as it is wider in  
meaning and not as conceptually limiting — of. Baraun's 'tecime', from 
the Greek for a r t, skill, regu lar method o f malting, craft and cunning,
as well as the work o f a r t, skill, etc#5 and Ellul's 'tecîmique'.
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progress (cf. 3 * 1 3 * 3 ;  3*5% 6.1; and 6.2#).
Galvin and Ms foXI-owers, despite contemporary mythology, saw 
nothing inherently evil In the world from which man should seek 
cleahsing - rather, holding to the doctrine of the sovereignty of God 
and His rule over creation, they sa,w the world as open for man to 
exploit the possibilities of his environment, without abuse. 0?hus 
the old idea!* of withdrawal and asceticism was negated In favour of 
entry into the world and enjoyment of the creation that God had 
provided for man* In the early stages of this period, private and 
business affairs were governed by the same ethical code based on the 
individual's personal ace omit ability before God. BeMnd this ethical 
base was the Hefomaatlon stress on the doctrine of the calling of all 
men to serve God :ln their daily life which endowed ordinai?y 
occupations with Ohriatian dignity#
Turning swiftly to the pre-Depression scene of the 1930*S we find 
a picture where labour was still numerous, the mood of workers 
largely irrelevant and mmmgerial staffs relatively small. The prime 
factor had become the product as seen from the tecîmologioal aspect. 
"The problem of marketing the product, pe3:haps even its meaning, 
receded into the psychological background before the hardness of the 
material - the obdm^ aoy of the techKiical tgmks themselves.” (Hiesman 
1969, p.112.) Work was seen in terms of physical objects and ideas 
— people qua people slipped out of the picture#
The Depression changed the industrial scene# This is readily 
seen In the sMple fact that the chief economic goal altered from 
achieving more leisure to seeking the ideal of ihll employment. An 
ideal reiterated in more recent times in *right-to-work' protests.
But in this shift it was perhaps inevitable that work as an activity 
of man should degenerate# Bo longer was work seen as something man 
lived to do, but rather as something he had to do to live.
Consequently work became exposed to the tyranny and domination of the 
tîiree powers that stand over against man's freedom - the poi^ ers of
O
org^ misation, technics and science. Today those powers are
greater and of different character than in any previous ego. Man
2# Van Eiessen's thesis states tliat men as he has developed his 
powers of science, technics and organisation has idolised them by 
mulling that which is relative absolute* The thesis is found in many 
of his I'jritings — though I £im familiar' with it throug^ i his lectures 
and discussions I have had with him.
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has never lived in isolation from some form of organisation and 
toohnio, but our century has seen the development of them, based on 
autonomous philosophies, leading to the • autonomy* of these powers 
in and of themselves.
26.2.2* The Heoteohnio Period.. The third uhase of industrielw,##  mm) II m i*  I'm
development is recognised as a, distinct step® It is variously 
called the *9uper-*indiistrial revolution* (Toff 1er — 1973); the 
♦Imowledge revolution* (Bmicker - 1969); the age of automatism and 
cybernetics (B.Lall.Taylor - 1970)# said 'teehnopolitaii*. (Oox - 19&7)#
The critical factor is. that this thirduhase of the teclinologieel 
advance has arrived at a time when Western man has not vet loêmied to 
oque. with the uressures and tensions of the industrial revolution.
He is therefore ill-prepared to face the effects of yet another 
reorientation in his basic life-style/structures and this has led to 
a state of heightening crisis.
26.3. THE F0«B W  ITOSTBIAL society - THE V M  irilîBBM THESIS
26..3..t.l.. Jatmductto  m aléation. Man's ability
to face crisis has been attenuated by the confluence in the 20th 
century of the tîiree îïuman powers mentioned above. We have already 
looked at science, the first of these powers, in some detail. The 
l)ower of science Is crucial for it is the driving force behind technics 
and organisa,tion. As Harold Wilson could say during the I964
elections "If there is one ivord 1 woiild use to identify modem socialism 
it is ’science*o" (in Hose & Rose 1971 ^ P*93*) The second power is 
the (advent of modern teolmics from the 19th century; and the third the 
creation of large organisations in the 20th century* Those tMee 
powers converge in our day with the modem revolution (neoteohnic) and 
intensify man’s struggle for significance * Man’s power© are of a 
unique chmjacter today and thus assume new importance and meaning for 
they actualise man’s freedom in a sequence of new things and events 
which constitute© the essence of history* Modem technics, in the 
widest sense, mediate© the other two powers that stand over aga:lnst 
man’s freedom.
Within the context of this study the problem of technics vie a vis
CM'istian theology will be treated as revolving essentiaAly around
the dialectic that has arisen between the power and impotence of man*
This theme undergirds the approach of many thinker© to the question of
3man in modem society. Mon is apparently caught in a dialectic of
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freedom and power - freedom to live hie own life and yet caught in 
the powers that constitute his man-made environment • Hever has he 
been so free «• never eo enslaved# Behind this dialectic lies the 
philosojAiieal-theologieal question of the driving worldview of our age#
Modem critiques vary from the optimistic humanism of Toffler and 
the metaphysical hopefulness of Ooz and Mumford to the deep rooted 
pessimism of Marcuse (one dimensional man), Ellul (man dominated by 
'la technique’), and Henry (cultm?e e^ gainst Bian)# The first three 
tend to see techiiee as cathartic while the others see it as crisis*
I partially accept the latter position without accepting the 
accompanying unsolvable dialectic to which these wzitors tend. Crisis 
undoubtedly forms the major bulk of interpretation and it is worth 
noting that Toffer and Cox exhibit paradoxes within their work between 
pessimism and optimism* Both strive to present an optimistic view 
of man in modem society which is often in tension with their data* 
Time and again ToffXea? builds up data which is indicative of crisis — 
technology ia seen as a runaway traJja with no one In the cab — only 
to jump to -imwarranted optimistic conclusions# He sees change lean­
ing to ’future shock’, brealïing up the patterns of life and creating 
a aociety whore man is no longer? in control, and then blandly 
Xjronoimces that can "Humanize distant tomorrows*" (1975» P*440)
5» Of# FroMti (1971)& Yet modern man feels uneasy and moare and more 
bewildered*. He works asid strives, but he is diialy aware of a sense 
of futility with regard to M s  activities* Mille his power over 
matter, grows, he feels powerless in M s  individual life and in society#" 
(p#4#) Towar<*ds the conclusion of this work he writes s ’^v/e 
consciously believe in man’s power and dignity, but - often 
unconsciously — we also believe in raasi’s - and particuarly our o m  - 
powerlessnesa and badness###*" (p*2l2.) Mumford (1975) oeoe man 
slipping "Helplessly back from freedom to automatism###" (p#l6*) 
Bilberman comments 8 "Yet contoïï^orary technology has contributed to 
a pervasive sense of helplessness azid impending doom at the same time 
that it has evoked expectations of nirvana*" (1970# p#20#) Julos 
Henry in his excellent study ’Culture Against Man’ (197%) (o^:i 
expressive title) concludes that man is caught between two cultures - 
the culture of death and the cultirœ of life (pp*382ff*) Or 
finally as ïteouse puts its "A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, 
democratic imfreedom prevails in advanced industrial civilisation, 
a token of technical progress#” (1972* p*l6*)
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Before eontiimiïig a caveat is neoeBsarys one of the basic 
weakneesGB of many îiiodom critiques is their tendency to subsume all 
facets of life under one heading, Thus Hiesmon (19&9) tries to 
analyse all in terns of inner and other directed people; Toff 1er (1975) 
sees the concept of accelerating change leading to future shock as 
the key; wMle Ellul (I9 6 4 )» who is othenfise penetratingly accurate, 
is caught in his categories of teclmique, A consequence is tîiat 
these writers tend to grant autonomy to their categories of 
interpretation, Ellul, hov/©'VG3?, is one of today’s most InfluentiM 
commentators despite having written *Ia, Technique' in 1954 (in this 
study his 19^4) • ' He and Ifercuse p3:esent the classic example of the
dialectic of freedom and power*
Typical of the character of the thx'ee human powers science, 
technics and organisation - is that they taJre on an objectified form 
that is relatively independent of man. This independence is 
significant for it means deliverance from the limitations of man 
concerning skill, judgement and quantity of work. Van Riessen I'jriteei
"The trait of the new human powers is that they work 
independently of man end that is %vhy man is so powerful*
Man is so powerful today because in these powers he has 
created he has sui^acsed his limitations. This can be seen 
best in teoMic# PJy energy is not so great but that is not 
important because now we use natural ©nergjr* My craftsmanship 
is not BO good that it can make something very smooth with a 
tool in ny hand, but I can malce a machine that can malce things 
very smooth, I can count in. riy head, but a computer can 
calculate something I could not perform in a lifetime. So you 
see by snaking these tools independent we are able to perform 
tremendous things which we could never have done on our omi, or 
with tools dependent on us* That is why we are so powerful*
That is one side - we are potferful as never before* Yet we 
ore so powerful we are also, in experience, very pmfcrloss - 
we are bound by all these powers* ¥e aee caught in them and 
mie no more f3zee," (imdated/b, p,2*)
Elsewhere he has noted that g "Science oheaiges technics into modem 
toohnics and organisation into modem orgaîiisation,” (l975/«, 1>»5 2 *)
Science is the power behind the tMone» The other powers derive 
fronig end are dependent on.g science with its method of abstraction 
and anlysis which cute up and separates reality., thus distancing man 
from the object* This abstraction leads to a loss of importance for 
man and only his theo3?i©s remain* The centrality of science is 
evidenced by the role of the Scientific community in our culture 
which is still (despite a swing to the humanities and a new awmzeness
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of seieELtific accoiEitabllity to eooiety (of, Goodfield 1977» oh,8«) ) 
the 'cultural maximiser* of our society (Henry 1972» p,56,)* They 
are the ones, the scientists and engineers.» cm whom we depend; they 
are the ones who make, orea-te and change our lives and environment.
26.5.2. Technics. Within thie broad setting Marcus© (1972) develops 
his idea of man's one dimensionality today in thought and behaviour.
He sees 'technological rationality* leading to the ascendance of 
teohnicB over man's freedom and causing the integration of opposites, 
the decline of pltn?alism, and the paralysis of criticism. This 
assumption of technical autonomy is on the one hand quite rational, 
yet "its sweeping rationality..#.is itself irrational." (ibid p.12.) 
Both Marcuse &md Ellul note that science domiziates the technic 
mentality of our age*.
Technics must be seen to include technology but as wider than it — 
there is technique in politics, education, economics etc*. The 
best analysis of this seems to me that of Ellul where we are told that 
in effect 'technique' refers to any "complex of standardised means for 
attaining predetermined results,” (E.L.H.Taylor 1970, p*124*)
Technics liave become nothing more than means and the ensemble of mesns, 
and ae such are indifferent to all traditional ■ hxvnan ends and values 
by becoming ends in themselves. "Tectoique is the totality of 
methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency in every 
field of human activity," (Ellul 1964$ p.xxv.)
26.3.2.1. Ellul 8 3?lve Features of 'Technique* « Ellul sees the basic 
features of tecMique as follows (ibid pp«78-147«)%
(i)The association of technology with rationalism whore tecîinique 
becomes the quest by man to solve the complexities of life ' by reason. 
alone® Os Guinness witesg "Tecîmiqxie is the calculus of efficiency, 
the reduction of facts, figures and even men to procedures in the 
service of the tyranny of objective rationalism." (1975* P«153*)
(ii) The aspect of mztificiality where the point is reached where the 
natural environment ie replaced by the technological® Me are 
increasingly made to live in an unreal, synthesised world, where even 
the flowers on our table are liable to be plastic. The recent 
Btrathclyd© Park Development progrŒiie went to great e^ oonomic and 
teclmological lengths to malce the countryside 'national*,
(iii) Autoiaatieraa the search for the one best way which when found 
becomes self-directing. If I remember aright both l'îœiîford and I'*roïnm 
declmre that 'one ought to do whatever it is teclmieaXly possible to
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do»* VRien E.Oppenhoiiner heard how HXain and Teller had disposed of 
tritixua and the complicated refrigeration equipment needed to keep it 
cold and tamed to a solid» stable compound of litMiira and deuterium, 
he commentedâ "That's, it2 Sweet and lovely and b e a u t i f u l T h e  
new bomb could destroy every unprotected man and woman witîiin a radius 
of two miles and he thou^t it 'sweet** 'lovely*» 'beautiful*• (Of# 
a© Hopp 1972» P*51*)
(iv) The self-auAXTientatioîi of techniaue means that any one technique 
eats up more and more to itself, leaving less and less that has not 
been directly influenced by the all-pervaeiveness of technique* 
Technology feeds on itself and, maJ^ es way for even more technology, and 
all the time it is conditioning man to follow its dictates#
"Teclmology not only transfomis the exterior world* It also grea/bly 
modifies the way we think#" (Cox I9 6 8 , p.2 7 6 *) But even worse than 
modifying the way we thi^ ik, technique often denies the luxury of 
thought* What place has thought when the sequence is preset? (Of.
Jaiul 1 9 6 4, P.395.)
(v) A last feature is monism. Here Bilal pictures technique as en
ii?reversible force rolling its autonomous way over man with man 
totally impotent before it# He mid Fiarous© conclude that tecïmique 
cannot be otherv/ise than totalitarian (of# ibid p#129*) Marcuse notes 
that "the neutrality of teelmology can no longei? be mainta,ined#" (1972, 
P*l4*)
2 6 *5 .2 *2 * Implications for Man's Work* These characteristics of 
tecîmic mean that- there is a devastating ii^aot on man and M s  work* 
Accepting the primacy of technic means following attributes such ass 
human relations must be kept witiiin the technical demands of the job - 
there must be no interpenetration of personal feelings or emotions 
into the industrial field; human relations must be universal, based 
on criteria which any arbitrary grouping of the population can 
satisfy independently of any prior social or group relations mooimected 
with the work in hmid; a third ohara^ oteristic is rationality, 
opera’fcing to the exclusion of any possible emotional or sentimental 
distïct'baÆce of the mechanical technique; and finally relations must be 
impersonal» based on the question of optimum validity and not on aey 
subjective choice* The primacy of technic demands these as 
requisite charfiîcteristies in work*
This crisis is heightened when maji seeks to identify himself by 
his work* Henry xœitess "Most American workers have learned to put
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the constsiitly rising standard, of living in place of progressive 
self—realization*” (1972$ P*41«) The new power of technics is 
therefore seen to he an autonomous tîireat wliieh opposes man’s true 
manishness, its threat existing in the very autonomy men has given it* 
"Teclmies," \witm Brunner, "has been cut free from the Dioral and 
religious context of human life and has become autonomous because its 
deepest desire was the desire for autonomy on the part of man*” (1948, 
p*11*) Thus we are brouglit full circle back to the association of 
this power with rationalism (of* 26*5«2*1. (i)).
To stay for a moment with work - it is often argued that man has 
advaiaced by virtue of his technics and become more skillful than his 
predecessors* But in what way is he more skillfult Cœc, for 
instaïico» a3Jgues that the advent of cybernetics or automation leads 
directly to fewer jobs, higher skills, and an adequate productivity 
level tîmt will banish poverty. But it can be argued that 
automation has an economic viability in only a limited range of 
industries and is generally too expensive for smaller firms, With 
regarde to skill there is a loss of applied craft skill* This is 
not to say people arre not skilled, but often work requirements are not 
for these skills* (Cf* Bruokor 1969, Ft*IV*) And without p2?aotice 
skills atrophy. Graft skills have been replaced by mechanical 
procedures, while in a limited area craft skills over materials have 
been replaced by . manipulative ones over people* But is the ability 
to manipulate people to be looked on as a progress of skill from a 
work/teclmloal point of view? To rise in one’s profession today is 
to be forced to abandon it* This is seen in many fields where the 
professionally skilled man becomes a more administrator - note the 
plight of many headmasters * This dileimria is liighlighted by the story 
of an engineer who is offered the more lucrative post of sales- 
manager*
"The aian loves engineering, but his vïife won’t let him turn 
down the promotion, his sponsor in the organisation tells 
him it is now or never s does he want to be wearing a green 
eyeshade all his life? He reluctantly accepts. That night he 
has a drean* He has a slide-rulo in his hands, and he 
suddenly realises that he does not know hoi? to use it* He 
wakes in panic* The dreaa clearly symbolises his feeling of 
impotence in a new job whe3?e he is alienated from his craft*” 
(Riesman 1969» p*130*)
The very advancement of technology robs man of his traditional skill*
The machine and the organisation now replaces the skill ho once
possessed - "the inâ;astrial process advances by building into machines
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and into smooth-flowing organisations the skills that were onco built 
by & long process of apprenticeship and charaoter-fomation into men.” 
(ibid p#15i*) Man becomos an extension of the machine, a machine- 
hand mû. a diM-watcher instead of a craftsman*
26*3,3* Or^'anisatlon* One of the basic manifestations of science 
and technics today is the organisation. We live in an ago of 
nationalised industries and inte:mational companies where the sheer 
size of enterprise becomes staggering* Thus Marcuse pictures men 
as "sublimated slaves” at the mercy of aîjy developed industrial 
civilisation*
the decisions over life and death, over personal end 
na,tional security are made at places over which the 
individuals have no control,**«the surrender of thought, 
hope and fear to the powers tliat be*” (1972, p*40*)
Man, seeking to flee the dehumaîiîalng'proeoss of this modem life,
"tumbles into the snares of dreams, he tries to comply - and falls
into the life of organisations," (Ellul I964, p*521*) At work he
is reduced to a cog in the machine, easily replaceable and quite
expendable, for with increasing size of business concern there proceeds
apace the loss of the individual's control on his place and function
within the orgmiieation* Popper (l973/b, Vol.II p*114«) even remarks
that it is wrong to blame the capitalist or bourgeois for the
direction they talce ao tîioy are simply caught in the autonomous system
which controls them*
Cox contends that the advent of bureaucracy has led to the 
'Organisation Man' who is here to stay of necessity* He sees the 
organisation as flexible, future-orientated, secularised, exercising 
limited claims on its members end free from the religious overtones 
that moarked (and marred?) the Reformation period, (Of* 1967, p*182f,) 
But despite this hopefulness, Cox recogjiiiaes the dangers this bz^ ings; 
there are tresspass points where the orgaaiisation invades zjealms that 
are not its concern (of* .ibid p*178*)« But the basic problem he sees 
is the increasing impersonallty of power that the system displays*
"The danger of this technological logic is that responeibility tends 
to be diffused so that no one feels personally responsible for what is 
happening* There is no one to blame or praise*" (1968, p*276*) .Men 
are no longer in control and the power that directs the affairs of 
men in their daily vocation has become faceless and imknowabl®.
In this connection E*L*H*Taylor (1970, p,131*) criticises the 
mania for the implementation of time and motion studies* The price.
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he clsâïïis, for sucli 'sGiontifîc* forma of work is too high, and 
alternative methods nmot be sought* The worker is caught betweeEi the 
jawa of. :lnoreaaing efficiency and remaining truly human; caught 
between being a fi’ee and r©Bj)onslble person or a cog in the machinery 
of ICafîca's 'Castle** Van Riessen, witing as an engineer and 
pMlosopher, comments %
"The price for scientific organisation, whenever 
consistently applied, is the freedom of man in labour, his 
personal responsibility» the appeal to initiative, to 
decision, to effort, to skill, and everything over which man 
disposes in the scope of his freedom." (1953$ p.145*)
The price of modem teoîmioal progress in the organisation can
therefore lead to the devaluing of the demands of work, the
dehumanising of the worker, and the dissipation of the individual
into the amonymous mass man*
26*5*3*1# The Law of ¥orkw^ Efficiency* TMs spells death to the 
small fixîa* This law decrees that there nmet be increasMg size, 
mergers, nationalisation, and mtemational companies - features that 
mean the end of the family firm* The oomer shop cannot compete with 
the supermarket, or the supemiæHcet with the hyperstore*
Inoroasing size of wo3±forco inevitably means tliat the individual has 
a, smaller and smaller role to play within the production unit* lo 
longer does he see the final resiHt of his labour, the fruits of 
which are not shared by his fellow-workers but by the enterprise 
that hires him* While some see this depersonalisation of work as 
desirable (ef* Hiesman) it must be unequivooably rejected by any 
Christian approach wîiich stands against a reduction of the individual’s 
personality in any area of life. Work in the GMistian view is not 
something 'done to live* but that which *m^i was created to do* *
The governing feature of modmm industry is the primacy of 
production, and the basic unit of production is no longer the 
Individual but three shifts# Man becomes amioiiymouo,, a number to 
clock in and out, a oomodity, m d  it is just this aspect that can 
easily lead to labour-management conflict* M  Juenger wrote?
"The worker loses his identity; as a person he loses his 
individuality; he is only noticeable as the performer of a 
function* As a human figure he fades out; and from the 
point of view of technical progTOSs it would be desteible 
if he faded out altogether.” (1949# P*?5*)
26*3*5*2* The Lav?s of Production (JIem?y)* . Han fad.es out and 
production holds the field with its own irrationM rationality, its
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m m  laws and commandmenta. Henry (1972, pp*26f.) suggests the first 
two 1mm of produeticai exe 'Create more desire'^ » and 'Thou ©halt 
conemme'g m d  in a brilliant exposure of tlie advertising Industry 
shows just how true these are in our dally lives# This has 
inevitably involved a psychic revolution in the lives of the oonmamer 
who is, after all, only the worker in another role# There is the 
deliberate oreatlcn of needs within people that demmids the unhinging 
of the "old impulse controls" — the freeing of the id to eat up the 
ego - which leads to a restoration of psyoMo balance at a new level 
satisfactory to the comiandmmite of desire and consumption# Man 
cannot escape whether as worker or consumer — he simply becomes an 
économie factor in the system at the mercy of self^augmenting technic# 
"For the proletariat » as for the bourgeoisie, man is only a machine 
for production and consumption*" (Ellul I964» p«S21#)
In the midst of this perlmps the most frightening aspect is the 
VIaj In which our children are schooled to accept this state of affairs 1 
Toff 1er» Hiesman and Henry all point thie feature out, with Henry's 
Indictment by far the strongest* Children under the peounl&cy 
philosophy of our age are trained to "Insatiable consumption” said 
"i's^ulsive choice", and he goes <m to remark satirically»
”V/hat should businessmen do, sit in their offices mid dream, 
while millions of product-ignorant children go unlnstruoted?
This would be an abdication of responsibility, Besides, the 
businessman might go bankrupt." (1972, p#68*)
It. is the contention of this study that we will only be able to 
arrive at a proper understanding of science, technics and 
organisation, and their relationship to faith, when we see man in a 
state of crisis induced by these tliree human powers, A crisis which 
confronts him with a loss of meaning, responsibility, self and 
identity themes of much literature and drama today as Tillich (1962) 
reminded us* Other attendant problems include speclalisatlcn, 
utilitarianism, impersonality of power, and unfreedom#
26,4*1 * Loss of Meaning* Man suffers a loss of meaning# Why do 
many workers - including the teetoioal and scientific — look on their 
tasks as merely something that must be done in order to eat and live? 
&dTy do many regard work as a necessary evil, agreeing with Aristotle 
that to avoid it is imperative* The key to such attitudes lies in 
the lose of meaning that characterises man end his activity today.
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Man and M b  Boience, man and M b  technics» suffers a loss of meaning 
because they have become divorced from the structures of creation, 
and through false doctrines of mm*
How can meanjmg be achieved when we make tilings we do not need; 
when we build in obsolescence? She tragedy* is that work is 
considered in terras of sorne*bhing done to make money, rather than in 
terms of fulfilling the calling of God* How can meaning be attained 
when we attempt to explain man and his history as the flux of economic 
forces, the result of blind chance? "Modem n;an has lost the 
awareness of being called to a task by an au*l;hority beyond the cosmic 
horizon; ho no longer Jmoi/s what happens* »*or what his work means*” 
(van. lilossen 1953, p«230,)
Modem industry has little scope 
for the longing for individuality» responsibility and status which 
therefore remams largely -unsatisfied* The employee is not basically 
self*discip!.ined but subject to external controls that remove any real 
responsibility he might have over his work (of* the attempts to 
counter this by -fche abolition of -bhe oonveyoz? belt)* Ellul (1964, 
p#4G0*) sees this loss reoul'bing in man being "spiritually outraged", 
wMie Hoïiry (1972, p*32*) sees It resulting in "deep narcisstic 
wounds” that lead to an endless search for the perfect job* This is 
reminiscent of Cox's Mlegation that in modem industry it is 
difficult to find where decisionsare made or power actually wielded. 
Masi becomes merely an extension of the machine, required to blindly 
follow the dictates he reoeivee but wMch cannot be located*
Toohnics leads to the destruction of self - 
not necessarily but in practice* Laissez-faire capitalism and 
totalitarian commmlsm both regard men as a function rather than as 
a person created in the imago of God* This atti*bude behind the 
cultural manifestations of these systems means the inevitable 
depersonalisation of the individual and the loss of the self * It
leads to a 'swing to f\m' in dialectical relationship to the fe£ir 
engendered in self-less relationships,, whether it be on the asaentjly 
line, boardroom, or research laboratory# "This loss of self”, writes 
Henry, "and the rise of the values of the Id have combined to create 
a glittering modem pseudo-self, the high-rising standard of living 
waxing like the moon in 'A Midsimmier Might's Dream' of impulse release 
and fun,” (ibid p*113*)
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26,4.4" Loss of Identity. Han also suffers an identity crisis 
brought about by imnanenoe philosopMes. In a world whore thought 
patterns become inoreasjJigly subjective and the reality of the 
objective world slips away, men often seek identity in their work,
So the job is seen to identify, mià a jnagazine like 'Time* repeatedly 
gives a person's oocupation before their name. Conversely he may 
seek integration in the artifacts of M s  hand or mind. But a facet 
of life csm never sens’© to identify the whole of mazi's being. Idiile 
man’s a.otive involvement in life through M s  work ia a major facet of 
life it can never provide a star*fciîig point from which to build a 
system of belief or a way of life that will hi the final analysis 
stand up to the pressuz^ es of reality, Man seeks mecu)ing and 
identity for his life, but where is it to be found? The result of 
the technological age has been plastic man - plastic,one of the 
supreme products of tecîmccraey, (Cf* Roolmiadmr 1978» peSOOf.) £‘îan 
cries out for hie humanity but all that is offered ie gadgets which 
enslave him. Han le caught in his work 'by its one dimensionality, 
its frustration» its failure to provide a reference point that will 
integ):ate reality. fei seeks to identify himself in his work, or his 
fsaaily» but It crumbles to ashes and he le left with the themes of 
alienation» lonXiness» despair and illusion. M l  that remains is to 
escape into fantasy» mysticism and irrationality (cf. much’modem art 
- Kaflcap Bacon» Ionesco smd Cage in literatm?©» painting» drama and 
music respectively fl.)
. ofc fteaaom asd Pomr. Betee a
solution can be sought, a,cceptance of the crieie facing us is 
necessary — which is not to accept an imsolvable dialectic, A crisis 
of freedom and power faces man and the tragedy is that modern man, 
folloisfing Kant8, accepts this dialectic, distinguishing a territory of 
freedom and a territory of necessity, The ground of this dialectic 
lies in absolutizing some tiling that ie relative within creation - for 
example, existentialisms which sha3?es with Meo-Harxism a protest for 
freedom against power, would absolutize the autonomy of man's 
existence to the loss of his essential meaning/beiaig.
Today \fhen man ie beginning to realise that he is :m crisis, when 
the myth of progress has been ©icpased as a 19th century illusion, the 
Ciiristian message iiaa a new opportunity on a biblical basis to relate 
to the lives of men; to provide the tzue integration point of reality;
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and to show that eolence and tecteiology need to be rightly governed 
and motivated by the OMistiasi ,gx'oand-motive of creation, fall» and 
redemption If they are to realise their God-given potential*, Ao long* 
as men fail to realise that they can look up to heaven, that there is 
a seen world and an imseen one equally real» as long as this is 
rejected» man :1s doomed to darkness — morally, spiritually and 
intelle otnally #
This is an appropriate point to eimmaxlBe the argument so far,
The relative indenendeiicy of man's powers is the excuse fo.r the 
suggestion that those powers are a.bso*i.utelv independent and inclusive 
of all life. Absolute independency is, however» an idea of man and 
therefore merely an apnearaiice. Vten men hold such ideas and work 
them out Into society» they project them on to the world and give the 
world their shape, Thus the appearance can beeosie effective in a 
similar way to the idole of any period® Belief in them makes them
effective - even though they are false* (Of. 25.4*3*2*)
(c f.
19»7»2«. and 20,1*3#) If true meaning and identity are “to be
established for man and a viable relationship to his culture found, it
Is imperative that the correct starting i)oint foz? thought and action 
be determined* The motive of oregvtion, fall, axid redemption is 
highlighted by Tillich as i>he basic feature of all Chrlstimi thoiî^t» 
and he furth.er notes tîmt,t & "Religion is the eiibstsaice of culture and 
culture the form of religion," (1972» p.42.) To accept tMs is to 
cojamlt oneself to seeking a solution with:în a unified frmiework; 
though there will be diversity within that unity* (Tlllichg in fact, 
advocates a two-re&Clm theory,)
To recap g Western civilisation from the Greeks onwarde has been 
dominated by fous? basic motives * The early Greek form"#atter 
dualism; the Scholastic motive of grace-mature from Ockha»i end Aquinas, 
which is still strong even at the extremes of the Protestant 
theological spectrum «« for example Cox mid ]3a.i?th| the post- 
khlightonment dualism of froedom-'nature, irmtionality-ra'feionality, 
personality ideal - soj,ence ideal; and the motive of creation, fall 
into sin» and redeïïiptims Within "bhe duai.istlc appz^’oarth Richard 
.Hiebuhr (1951) outlined four varla'bions ^ namely the Ciirist of culture; 
GJirist above culture; Christ and oul'ture; and Christ against culture. 
His fifth position Christ as ‘kransfomer of culture — would soem to 
%)ro]climte closest to the idea of creation, fall» and redemption*
Any Christian attitude to our modem situation must be based on 
renewed biblical insights axid understandings of the divinely ordained 
structures of creation* After all, true Imowledge is only possible 
under true religion, and it can only arise from the cognitive activity 
of the hwaan heart being enlightened through the Word of God by the 
Holy Spirit* In approaching the question of a relevant theology vis 
a vis, the problems raised by science, technics and organisations in 
our society it is essential, if any reality is to be achieved, to 
follow a unified motive for it alone can give a coherent explanation 
of man and his place in the world. We must be careful that our 
theology is not simplj»" a reaction to existential situations, but that 
it is rooted in the reality of the ontological Trinity and the 
Creatorhood of God, Only on this basis can true existential solutions 
be arrived at. It is my contention that to accept a dualism is to 
posit a fallacious abstractiosaal relationship wMch fails to appreciate 
the enlcaptical interwovmmess of creation, and that any acceptance of 
a dualism leaves an unsolvable dialectic*
26*5*5* The Realisation of Mio Han Is* Botliing within creation 
serves to identify man* But who is man? Even those who do not seek 
to identify mmi by work or family often blunder here in their view of 
man by seeing him as in principle under the gp?asp of science, capable 
of being formalised gmd analysed without reference to God* Such 
attempted autonomy has followed two basic and opposing streams of 
thought which see man atomistieally and collectively, The 
individualistic approach has been advocated by %ioureus, the 
Horoinallsts, Hobbes and Locke (whom some see as the founder of laissez- 
faire economic individualism). On the other hand collectivism has 
been followed by Aristotle, Aquinas, Rousseau aafid Gomte* The problem 
of the first is 'fchat it sees man only as the ;individual while the 
second absolutizes one of the many temporal communities* In answer 
to these tendencies E,L,H*Taylor (1970) suggests that Christian 
pluralism is the only possible reality within creation*
Man’s identity is aggravated, not solved, by seeing him as the lone
atomised individual or an aimonyimus factor in a group* In the last 
analysis nothiiK^ in this world serves to identify man* As Levin 
reflects in Tolstoy’s ’Aima Karenin’s "I work, I want to do something, 
but I had forgotten it must all end; I had forgotten death*” (1972,
p.343.) The world comprises particulars and man himself is a
partioulw doomed to death, therefore created particulars cannot
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Identify*
26*5*3*1» In Relation To God* Man is oiily identified by firstly 
relating to God* Once he does this he caai begin to relate to the 
cosmos and the partioulars around hira* His environment can no longer 
be an ultimate tteeat because he can begin to realise the reality of 
his being at the apex of God's creative act, and as Bis regent on 
oart}i have dominion over it, to tend and dress it, to categorise cmd 
rule the particnlgars# It followj that as creatures in the image of 
God, men should be treated as persons and never as functions or 
variables of a tecîmo-economic system*
The question of identity rests primarily on creational ordinances 
and not Ghristologioal considerations* There has been a tendency to 
view man in ClTrietological catégories today* TMe is seen in the 
categorical rejection of the importfince of the natural world and 
history by Barth, and in the evolutionary inearnationisra of Tielhard 
de Chardin* The basic problem is the infusion into theology of a 
philosophic dualism between sacred and secular, driving a wedge between 
Creator and Redeemer* But we worship no failed Creator aïid to posit 
this wedge in any form is to tread the border of incipient docetiom. 
Crea,tion ie good, but infected by sin and suffering from God's 
judgement it struggles towards the redemption that shall be revealed 
escha-tologioally in Christ*
26*3*3*2* M m  In Relation To Mature. Cox (1968, p*262f»), though 
partly a unification of Barth and de Chardin, can point to the biblical 
basis of modem society lying in the disenchantment of nature* He 
cora70ctly realises that the biblioa]. doctrine of creation demythologises 
creation and frees it froia holy superstitions where nature is the home 
of demonic forces which man must placate* The Bible sees nature as 
part of God’s cmative act and not an object of fear or worship*
But Cox goes too far when he removes altogether the area of society 
and work from within the sphere of God’s calling. 0?his ezdiibits a 
dichotomy between nature and grace which is incompa.tible vfith the 
biblioal view of creation - even as Cox himself presents it*
26.9*3*3. Man In Relation To Bis Task* The Goci of creation is the 
primary datum for any Christian theological system, and particularly 
in this instance as theology pertains to science, technics and 
organisations* Ban was given a cultural mandante by God before the 
I'all* Part of thie commission iras to subdue the earth and to have
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dominion over the things of the earth. Thus work, soience and 
technics are divine ordinmces for man’s life on eaa?th» As such, 
these aspects are Involved in God’s law structure for the universe, 
and therefore become a requirement placed on man® "The very fact 
that the Fourth Coiamandment of the Deealogiie is an injimetion to rest 
from labour gives the clearest possible indication of the biblical 
point of view «» that man is by his very nature a. worker,” (Richardson 
1932, p«24#) Work is not an optional extra but something built into 
our being, a commmid laid on us* There is to be no 'Gnostic 
oulturophobia' (^uidema). Science mid teclmics must bo seen in 
conception as a fulfilling of the command of God (though open to 
misuse and mixed by the Fall), This reveals the place of man in the 
order of creation; he comes after, his dominion is secondary, he is 
not autonomous. But maxi's work is still creative in a secondary 
sense for it is the reflection of God's work and his own character, 
"The active dominion of man appears then as the analogue of God's 
dominion,” (Blooher 1973$ p*1t*) The eoronand to have domiïiion is a 
power and a freedom given; the responsibility to respond positively 
to God and live to M b  glory •* and this has ecological, economic and 
sociological ramifications*
A special GÎîoraoteristio of man's dominion is that it is marked 
by a X’?ork-rest rhythm, Han is ordered to cease from woric. His 
ability to do so indicates whether* he is in control of his work or 
it is in control of him. Man is to find release from his work aad 
not be swamped by it; and rest performs a valuable function in 
providing a safety-valve through which "the superfluous steam of 
self-importance, self-conscious dignity, solesmity, end ovo3>- 
seriousneso oaai be let off,” (Brunner 1949$ P*390,) A correct 
doctrine of leisure is a corollary to that of work.
Work is a creative activity imdertalcen by man for the sake mid 
love of work itself. Because he is in the iroago of God and work has 
been commanded, man is simply to work well because it is worth doing*
",,**if his work is not genuine praise of Jehovah God borne 
out of faith, then it is a dead work, damned and dead,,,
' Only when human work is worahuip of Jehovali,*#only then does 
work lose its himan chains; only then does that narrow 
minded daemonic cla?ive to get and get,,,become stilled, 
converted into m  open-ended rush of joy,,,only under and 
out of (Jxrace does work find meaning," (Seerveld 1965/b, p,6.)
The probtoi is that work is dominated by men's pretendod autonomy.
3 #
and beoEEUiee of this work is bound in human chains* Moris, lilse men# 
is in chains because of the Fall. The response of man was incorrect* 
Han became separated from nature as well as from God# with obvious 
ecological and working implications; he became separated from himself 
psychologically and from othecs sociologically with repercussions in 
community and industrial relations. These separations are not, 
however, intrinsic features of the cosmos but rather the cosmos in 
its abnormality due to the Fall,
The original order and ordinances of creation are not abolished, 
rather they are changed and we have moved from the harmony of the 
universe to dissonance* This change is not to be seen aa a move from 
work as creative and good to be alien# for the cultural mandate to 
work and rule over creation remains although new charaoterietics have 
developed* Work is not a result of the ourse# The result of the 
curse Is that work became a toil, a hardship, a bondage, as well as 
retaining the positive aspects of creativity end proper responsible 
service to God*
Man still lives from the fruit of the earth as he uses his skill 
and mastery to exercise dominion over It, but the fruits of his 
labours are destined to have a bitter taste as long as he remains In  
separation from God* (Cf*25*4»3«) Han still subclues the earth and 
develops science within God's laws. The Goncord© is a thing of 
beauty because technical efficiency necessitates conformity to the 
laws that God has given.® The command to rest from work Is maintained 
thou£#. not neoQBserily combined with the command to worship on that 
holy^ay,
M « i m 3Ljag-.Ægg.-.-a£-A^ ^^  ffihs crux of the prOblea is that
our world lives im separation from God# This means an aggravation 
of negative features to all societal stmctures; it means that work 
does become alien, frustrating, dehumanised# manipulated; it means 
that workers become machines# commodities# economic factors; it means 
that craftsmen become dial-watohere; it means that science can become 
false and technology oppressive - as long m  men rejects the renewal 
God offers* The power of man in our day leads to impotence; hie 
freedom to reach out to the stars becomes his unfreedom as he becomes 
oaiight in self-directing technics; M s  autonomy has led to his 
imprisonment in a closed room (of* the artistic representations of 
this in men like Kafka and Bacon)* im van Riessen comments %
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"The remarkable history of apostasy Is that man has started 
with the Idea of his autonomy: hie Indenendoace from God.
That 1b M e  orlginM sin* The outcome of thie plan ie the 
idea of a oloeed mrld iflthln Wiloh are 
jaâgaaites M g ^ r a  in æelatlœ to man who ia onfege and 
puwsrleao," (1973/0, P«58.)
Thie is the dialectic tîmt modem man realises and yet earmot escape*
He is powerful.» his technology marvellous - and yet In the midst of it 
all he has lost meaning, identity and freedom* It is power and 
impotence that characterises man In our modern iforld* This point is 
clearly seen by Fromm when he concludes that; "Just as primitive man 
was helpless before the natural forces, so modem man is helpless 
before the social and economic forces he himself has created,” (1963» 
P-76.)
M ^ jsSiÊ..ÿ îm M ÏM M m 3 m i!m s M m .» la these a solutiœi? Within the
blb3.ieaX motive there is no final unsolvable dialectic, no autonomous 
threat to man by anything within creation* Despite the curse# work 
and its reward arc not abrogated and there remains an intrinsic call to,
and worth in, work* Hence the validity of soienoe# technics and 
oKfpnisations when cojitainsfl xrtthto a ccœreot a g M m aÇ^ amMgslebye.
The hope for man and his culture is the redemption Christ brings*
Ohrlst becomes the oruoial gateway to a return to true life and 
thought before God - though this does not replace the foundational 
creation ordinances* Mor is this in any way a negation of the value 
of aoa-GMietian life and thought for it too, under common grace, has 
value. But only redemption truly restores to man the real 
possibilities of God's creation* Christ offers renewal and 
restoration for that which has been marred, as we become united with 
Him in whom freedom and power are fully present in harmony* Christ 
holds out the possibility to transfom crisis, to change culture and 
open out in Him the potential of creation* This will demand men who 
bow before Him who is Lord of all and ooramit themselves to His calling*
26»5,»6*...l^ hrist Galls To, Wogzk* Me are called to all forms of work by- 
God whether it be termed 'sacred' or 'secular'. Some (Cox and 
Richardson - of* Hart 1968» pp*85-110«) deny this, maintaining that 
God calls only to the sacred sphere* But this ie to accentuate the 
dichotomy between nature and grace and grant neutrality and 
independence from God* Having given autonomy to nature it eats up 
grace and makes a mockery of it (of* Appendix A)* It leads to the 
sort of situation that A.A.Milne caricatures:
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Pump was not a lij/poarite. He wae a religiouo xoan^  whose 
ireliglon was too aaored a thing to be eaærieci into M s  
buelnesB* The toplmt that he hung up in M s  office was not 
the topliat that he prayed into before placing it thas 
hallowed, between his feet, even if the frock coat and the 
aspect of benevolence were the same# He had tvxo tophats, 
and one hat box for them# On the Monday morning he put God 
reverently away for the week mil took out Mammon# On the 
Sunday morning he came back ** gratefully or hopefully, 
according to the business done to God# ^After all, * he 
saids *Bo man can serve two masters at one end the same 
time.*" (1947, p.29.)
To posit the dichotomy means inevitably that men are caught in 
the dialectic that ELlul and Marcuse portray with no real hope of an 
answer# This replaces the moral dilonmia of man’s sin by a 
metaphysical finitude that leaves no possibility of integration for 
the whole of life in dignity before God# Perhaps we are needing to 
recover something of the spirit of Brother* Iswrenoe for whom the altar 
and kitchen were as one, and actions at each seen as adoring worship# 
"The time of business,^  ^he claimed, "does not with me differ from the 
time of prayer*" (I965* p*25*)
26*6. CQHObUBIOH
¥e will only begin to realise this when we accept a radical non*» 
dualistio a -priori# The modem dialectical crisis of power and 
freedom, seen as mieolvable, stems from dualistlc presuppositions, 
and only the acceptance of the enlcaptloel interwovoimess of creation 
offers resolution* Most of the critiques mentioned depict man 
cau^ît in a struggle for significance in the face of autonomous 
technics that crush the life from man# The tragedy is that they 
accept this as inevitable and to some extent as inescapable# The 
Christian, it seems to me, must reject this for the autonomy that it 
assigns to science, technics and organisations does not exist. It 
is illusory, an appearance, an Mol# The fundamental conflict is 
not between two realities of equal power but between truth and 
appearance, between worship of the true end living God end idolatry* 
Man’s autonomy is only in the final analysis pretended autonomy# for 
God alone is sovereign* All is subjected to Hie creational 
structures and within the law boundary of Hie creation# All life 
is derivative of Christ (Joîm 1|4*)* There can be no chance behind 
God* Man is free but not autonomous, he is responsible but not 
independent# leither, then, can any temporal structure possess 
autonomy# She problem is one of freedom and power and its
resolution is well summed up by van
"We have to understand that the deliverance of the creation, 
of history, and of society is already a fact g the cross and 
the resurrection of Jesus Ohrlet# History ie in the 
control of His victorious Kingdom# The true moaning of the 
creation will be fulfilled, whether man cooperates or not»# 
*#Men is therefore not so important that he ie decisive* 
Hevertheless he is important, for he is responsible*"
(1975/0, p.61.)
There ie a struggle involved, the struggle for man in Christ to 
restore that which is fallen, to carry out his cultural mandate to 
have dominion over the cosmos* In essence the stnmggle of the 
Kingdom of God against the kingdom of darkness. Our call Is to 
transform culture through Christ and to maintain (without paradox -» 
of# Richard Hlebuhr) the antithetic relationship that exists between 
the two kingdoms* It is a struggle that can be resolved as we obey 
Christ and work out in reality Els oledm to be Lord over all tilings, ■
4» Of# Schaeffer (1968/a, pp,2$ff, 58, 84*) and Schaeffer (l968/b)*
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GEAPSm 2%
DETERMIMISmwimPBTERHIMISM BtD PBOVIIMGE
27.1. IHTEQDUOTim
Having looked at creation and the universe in a v;ide sense I 
tvim to the question of man and his responsibility in the face of the 
problem of caueslity and detei^ fiinism, %ile physics may tend to 
statistical indeterminism in its mentality this is not true of other 
disciplines. Psychology, sociology and genetics increasingly point 
to biological and cultm?al determination readily evidenced in the 
manner in \È i lG h  human behaviour is simulated, on computers for analysis, 
Man’s freedom of choice and responsibility is still widely argued 
against on the basis that every event/act has a cause g that science 
per 80 iaivolves predictability and do termination ; and on empirical 
grounds* On the other hand, from physics, it is claimed tîxat causal 
laws do not operate and that disorder is basic. So within science 
there are these apparently irreconcilable approaches. But it should 
bo noted that causality, or chance, in one discipline does not prove 
or disprove it elsewhere in the created order*
27.2* WHAT 18
There are different senses of detenainisms the scientific whore it 
ie assumed that events have oausosg and the philosophical where it is 
argued that the future is inevitable whether it be scientific or 
porsonal-mox’al determination. The former is an epistemic 
determination which depends upon facts about loiowledgeg while the 
latter is mi ontological determination purporting to make statements 
about the world as it is, independent of human Imowledge. (Cf*
O’Coimor 1972, pp.Glff.)
It is important to note what deterniinisni is not (of* Flew 1971# 
ch*7*)* It ie not equivalent to predestination in theology* 
Predestination involves the self being influenced by a personal-moral 
agent, whereas determinism is a closed concept* A<bnittedly 
determinism and predestination have a comion implication that nothing 
happens by chance, but the former is a form of necessitarianism while 
the latter is concerned with God’s free will and implies that He has 
forelmovjledgo of what He wills. The determinist is committed only to 
asserting that everything that happens can theoretically be subsumed 
under universal 1mm of nature* Thus a theory in physios is
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deterministic if, and only if, given the values of its state 
variables for some initial condition, the theory can analytically 
determine an unique set of values for these variables for miy other 
condition.
27*2*1* Hard Determinism. In this version of the theory it is 
assumed that all events are rlgouroualy doteminedg that freedom is 
the absence by definition of determinism $ and that therefore all talk 
of freedom is illusory* This view lias a long tradition stemming from 
the ideas of leucippus and Bemocritus and is given its classical 
fomulation by laplaee* VJîiile the idea of this rigourous determinism 
has to some extent been weakened it is still prevalent, especially in 
the life-sciences# The deterministic, mechanical structure of maïi is
an axiomatic assmiption in behaviourism where mesa is conceived as a 
complex stiraulus-responso mechaiilsm* Before one too readily dismisses 
this as outdated it should be noted that Dr* Blakemore in his 1976 
Eeith Leotui'os operated witîiin this mechanistic frasiov/ork.
27*2*2* Soft Betei^ ninism* This also assîmes that all events are 
determined but conceives freedom as self-determination and not the 
absence of determinism* It therefore concludes that the freedom of 
man and the determination of events are compatible* Individual acts 
may be determined by motives which are in turn determined by eaz’lier 
events, but this does not lead back to hard determinism for motives 
may devolve from pl-ysioal forces, or more loosely as basic tendencies 
to act in certain ways, or simply as "dispositions and attitudes 
existing antecedent to and independent of acts*" (Barbour 1968/b, p*5G7*)
Classical mechanics is only a branch of inquiry dealing with a 
limited set of properties and relations* Thus, assuming that it is 
dotoriTiinistic, it is only such with respect to certain mechanical 
properties of pliysical systems, or more precisely with respect to the 
mechanical states of systems* It follows that Laplace was guilty of 
serious error in declaring that ’nothing would be uncertain’ as tMs 
omnipotence would only be warranted if he could 2mow all the p3?operties 
and analyse all the pliysicel traits* Siirthers mechanics does not 
give a sumiary account of sequential order for real events, rather it 
deals with limiting mid ideal instances, and consequently any 
resultant deteminism is with respect to the theoretical system of 
thought whose state variables are instasitaneoue positions and moments, 
end not with concrete reality# However- it may fairly be eaid that a 
theory is reasonably called determinate if inte^mal analysis indicates
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that the theoretioal state of the system at am instant logically 
determines a unique state for another instant. In this sense 
classical mechanics may he called determinate.
There are different ways of defining or characterising a
mechasiical state description# (i) It may he defined in terms of an 
infinite, rather them a finite, number of values with respect to a set 
of state of variableG - for exaeiple in the field theories of Maxwell 
electromagnetic theory which involves the study of continuous media* 
Nevertheless# the form of olassical electromagnetic theory is 
determinate for given constant boundaries and given all the initial 
data we can determine future values, (ii) State descriptions may 
also he defined in terms of variable values at different times, or 
during some period of time - that is, not instontaneous values* This 
is obviously applicable in the biological and medical fields which 
require a history of their subject, but we find this in mechanics 
itself in areas such as metal fatigue or electric hysteresis where the 
past history is required, (ill) A state description may be defixied 
with respect to the value of a variable that represents a statistical 
property of a class, rather than an individuals for example in the 
aggregate numbers of molecules in gases* Here while the individual 
moleoiilee do not enter into the prediction the aggregate does 
constitute, in the theory, a determinate system,
The P rin c ip le  o f pauoallty* Beterminiom la  tie d  in  the f ir s t
Instance to law and causality and not to predictability (of* Flew 1971* 
p#255#)* Thus we are driven back to the questions Do events occur in 
fixed causal orders ifhich science seeks to unfold, or is causality a 
methodological tool? The question is whether the laws of causality 
are inherent traits in nature or simply regulative principles of 
inquiry* la causality an es^irioal generalisation from evidence, an 
a priori truth, a concealed definition, or a mere conviction? (Of* 27*
4.2.)
Sinos Eume (1739a p.141.) many teve atssumecl that *A is the canoe
of B’ simply means ’B regularly follows from A in accordance with a 
law or rule*’ Kant (1787; PP*41^—5*) argued that when wo observe an 
event we assume a foregoing event and therefore the law of causality 
is reduced to the method of scientific research - causality is an 
a priori necessity* This view still seems valid despite Heisenberg’s 
disclaimer on the grounds of atomic physics and the unpredictability 
of alphar-particle emission* Whatever the truth may be the principle
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of causality ie not an inductive truth# Conceived as a maxim of 
inquiry the principle provides a basis whereby we may look for laws 
and theories that possess no explicit reference to the times and 
places at which events and processes occur. The principle thus 
constructed is a general recommendation to construct/find theories to 
which these may he applied# with no tight restriction upon the detailed 
form of the theory*
Several features may he noted# (i) The mechanical state does not 
itself determine all properties within a system, (ii) Causality is 
a necessity of analytical thought (cf# Popper 19?2/b# p*248, Hagai 
19T4* p,-324*)* (Heisenberg gets Into the peculiar position of trying 
to provide causal explanations as to why causai e:&planations are 
impossible#) (ill) In science the denotation of chance Is a technical 
term which refers to the absence of knowledge of causal connections 
and not necessarily to intrinsic chance, This ie not to be confused 
with the oonnotatlve meaning of chaos, unexpected events, or the 
Intersection of two causal chains# However some, following the 
%lcurean notion of spontaneous swerving atoms, advocate chance in 
reality as referring to some absolute rather than relational character 
of events, (iv) Northrop (1971* p#19*) indicates a twofold usage of 
causality by Heisenberg where (a) cause is strictly deterministic, and 
(b) where every determinate system Is a causal system but not every 
causal system ie a determinate one, Thus while Heisenberg upholds 
(b) within quaixtura theory, (a) cannot be maintained,
118 NOD mOHGH
1, The following lengthy quotation from Stoker seems to me to help 
crystallize the position 1 am aiming at in this chapter. It is taken 
from an essay I read subsequent to writing this chapter#
"1*2* Some coherential oontrap-polar distinctions as they (legitimately 
or not) appear in the history of science,..ores a priori/a posteriori; 
authority/subject 5 body/soul ; cause/purpose ; ehirœh/world; continuity/ 
discontinuity g eternity/time; existence/ essence; general/ Individual ; 
firm/dynam Ic ; freedom/dependence § freedom/nature ; God/cosmoag 
individual/society; law/subject; man/world; meaning/being; meaning/ 
reality; multiplicity/diversity; nature/culture ; nature/grace; 
necesslty/aCcldent ; necessity/reality; particular/universal ; perception/ 
thought! possibility/actuality! possibility/necessity; principle/ fact ; 
quantity/quality; rational/irrational! spirli/soul; spirit/matter; 
subject/ object g time/energy; thought/action^ thought/beingg, truth/ 
reality; unlty/multiplicltyg value/fact; whole/part etc.etc,
1*3* In our view the following at least may be aaid to hold good for the 
coherent contra-j>olarity of such contrasts :
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Two objections to strict determinism can be made the one 
logical9 the other moral, The logical objection has been advocated 
by many from Aquinas to 0,8 .Lewie and notes that if all human acts 
were the outcome of necessity, then rational deliberation would be 
Impossible. (Of# G’Oomior 1972* p*35f*) On the moral front it is 
obvious that if man is reduced to some pre-dotermined biological 
machine then he is doperaonaliaed and demuralleed# It robs man of 
any dignity as a responsible being, end undercuts the basis of society 
governed by law, for law assumes Individual moral responsibility*
27*3*1* The Reductionistio Beteamainism of Skinner* One of the 
crucial areas for this question Is psychology - what exactly goes on
a* They confront us with two distinct poles.
b* No pole Is heteroduolble (reducible) to the other*
o. The two pole© cohere. (They are mutually related, each requiring 
and referring to the other*)
d. Cohering, they nevertheless do form a contrast*
e. Except^ for distinctions like God/cosmos, or eternity/time * each 
coherential. Gontra-polar contrast ie particular in character.
f* That particularity must be fully recognized and respected, 
g. Therefore no such eoherential oontra-polas? distinction is to be used 
as a theoretical pair of pliers with the intention of compressing 
the whole of the cosmos (with its encompassing coherence of radical 
diversity) within it# - 
h# By virtue of their irreduoibllity both poles must remain balanced, 
both in theory and in practice *
1# Finally, all the various eoherenti.al centra-polar contrasts are
themselves mutually coherent in various ways and are, therefore, to 
be recognized end respected ae such*
1.3*1* The above being so, it is necessary that we further distinguish 
bstoeon la the former
the poles are mutually related, coherent; each pole requires the other#
In antl-polar oppositions the one pole excludes the other anti-theticallyi 
the poles do not mutually cohere. Thus ’necessary’ coheres with 
♦accidental’ in oontrarpolar fashion and vice versa. >lhen they are 
absolutizedÿ  however# so as to pit ’absolute necessity’ over against 
♦absolute accidentaXity’ (or absolute chance), then they constitute an 
anti—polar opposition in which each pole counts the other out* (So 
also where absolute necessity, or chance for that matter, are pitted 
over against the God of the Scriptures ») * # *..
2*2. *...In the cosmos we meet up with both; th^.ngseg^^ar,,s^^ 
accidental (the contingent ). Both are creaturely; neither is self- 
sufficient; nor may either of thorn be absolutized.«.**If and when we 
say...that God is the Absolute# then absolutising of ’necessity’ and 
’^ accidence’ amounts to deification of (conferring ©elf-sufficiemoy to) 
what ie oreaturely and dependent.. ..Moreover, determinations like 
’absolute accidence’ and ’absolute necessity’ are intrinsically self- 
contradictory,, since ’accidental and ’necessary’ here delimit the 
absolute which, as such, can allow no delimitation whatsoever 
(stoker 1973, pp145,147*)
SMs quotation should he kept In jaind throughout this chapter.
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in the bmi»/mnd of mmi, Muoh of this area is dominated by 
detemiBistie thinking - e.g. Bkimier and Blakemore*. Simmer 
epitomise© hard deteisoinism and writes that# "If we are to u m  the 
methods of soleno© in the field of human affairs, we must assume that 
behaviour is lawful and determined." (1955# p*6#) Ee argues that up 
until recently it hod been generally held that there was some sort of 
ghost in the maohine, some autonomous individual ego# mind, or centre 
of coneciousaeSB, that was free to choose# But in M s  significantly 
titled ’Beyond I’reedom and Dignity* he argues that m m  ie simply a 
machine governed by environmontal controls# by operant conditioning#
It ie# he claims# a "fact that all control io exerted by the 
environment." Man has no soul, no mind; he neither initiates,
originates or creates# (Of. 1975# PPa 196,180,195*) Immediately we
ask if this means that Michelangelo*s painting in the Sistene Chapel, 
the works of Bach, Mozart, Dickens and Tolstoy are the result of 
environmental conditioning#
Skinner likes to regard man as a dog (cf# ibid p#196*) rather than 
as a being mode in the image of God# H© may think this a step fonmrd 
but the Christian certainly cannot* But his prograsmia foils to 
answer several crucial objections# Who Is going to control the 
controllers of his utopia? (cf* 1962.) Why, on his basis, docs the 
biological coMaimity of mmdcind have any value in the first place that 
makes the building of utopia desirable? If man has regarded himself 
different from all else (animals, plants and things) for thousands of 
years, not just on the basis of I'irhat he would like to consider himself, 
but 021 the grounds of empirical, differences — hot; can any observation 
be trusted if all this was wrong? Are we not led to scepticism with 
regard to all knowledge and all Imowlng processes? (Cf* Chomsky 1975» 
P«117«) Again, there Is 021 his basis no secondary boundary condition 
to sciences that Is, added to Tfhat men can do, the question of what he 
should do.
27#3m2* The Oedipus Problem# But even assuming some form of mental 
determination, does this rule out freedom and reapansibility? If all 
was determined it would appear that any outcome Is already fixed — but 
Is it? The problem revolves around the factor that if an event 1© 
determined end we know all the Initial ccndltlcns we should in 
principle be able to forecast the outcome# But in the process of 
huiiimi action and knoifing how do we accommodate the knowledge of the 
prediction as affecting the outcome? (Of* Hum© 1759» p*45-46. ) This
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is the Oedipus problem, or the âJBpact of the publioatdon of an outcome 
on a subject of that prediction. In a paper published 1950, 
Popper showed that if we make the concept of the predictability of an 
event explicit, it earn be proved that not all of even large-scaled 
events (classical physics) can be predicted* It followed that the 
LepXaecUm view of the imlverse was In fact Incoherent* Thus# arguing 
from Godel’s theorem, he showed that to pass information to a 
oaloi'dator about its mm. state "ie 3J.abl0 to Interfere strongly with 
that state and thereby to destroy the predictive value of the 
Information#"  ^ So any calculating machine (the brain?) is 
incapable of predicting certain of its own future states* Popper 
uses this to argue that determinism Is an indefensible theory#
It follows that no completely detailed description of the present 
or future state of the brain can be equally accurate* The individual 
belief is irrelevant — for if accurate before belief, then afterwards 
the brain state Is altered so that the former description, is out of 
date». Similarly, If it were adjusted somehow to a3.1ow for brain 
effects of believing, them if you did not believe your brain would 
still not be in the implied state* (Of* Maolajr 1974, P*79l and 1967, 
pp#l6-17#) Simply because the rigorous da termini© t asserts that 
whatever I believe is strictly reflected in the state of my brain, it 
folloi# that no complete description of my brain, can exist which is 
equally true whether or not I believe it# Thus even if some super* 
scientist were to male© a detailed prediction on paper concerning meg 
it has no binding force with respect to my action or thought, it has 
no inevitable claim to my concurrence# (Of* MacKay 1966, p#434*)
This 1b the same point as Popper ♦s$ that even a determinate 
machine cannot produce a convergence <m to a specification of its own ' 
future states simple in that to embody such information in its owi 
system makes that system out of date# It is the problem of a 
photograph of a photograph ad infinitum within itself* The super- 
scientist faces the dilemma.where$
"In a very strict sense (sc* the description on the paper) is 
Incredible not only because you do not feel like believing 
it, but because any attempt on your part to believe it would 
make it out of date* ¥e therefore have the logical paradox 
that a prediction based on what the men has written on the • 
paper, although it may be valid for him as long as he keeps 
it to himself, is not ’the real truth’ in any universally
2* Popper, ’The British Journal for the Philosophy of Boienc©’ 
- 1950, 1, p*'
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binding and exoluslve sense, because ’the real truth’ is 
something that anyone would be right to believe end wrong to 
disbelieves but here la something which you would be vœong to 
believe - and which he knows you would be wrong to believe*
If you believed it, you would inOlco it out of date, and vwuld 
then be wrong to believe it too*" (Maclay 1965, p*63*)
lims without holding either determinism or indeterminism we can show 
what does not follow from a determinate viewpoint — namely that man 
can have no freedom* Even if there is some form of determinism it 
would not thereby rule out individual responsibility. MacKay, in 
fact, uses tîiis armament to undercut the Galvinlst-Arminisn impasse 
with respect to predestination, suggesting that even God’s deteKiiined 
Sovereignty does not nullify our valid belief that we are free from 
some fatalistic outcome* (1974# p*82*)
27*4* imm IS
It ie popularly believed that, while classical physics is 
deterministic, modeam quantum mechanics is incleterministic* It 
imuld appear that the former is mechanical and deterministic while the 
letter is meehanieal and Indeterministlo* Classical mechanics has a 
deterministic structure. Generally speaking mechanics is a set of 
equations that formulate the interrelationships of specific traits of 
bodies on other physical properties - for example the equations of 
motion* At this level, however, quantum mechsniCB is also causal 
since it too formulates causal relationehips* But classical mechanics 
is clearly distinguished as deterministic in tîmt given the force- 
function for a physical system, the mechanical state at any ti»ie of 
that system is completely and uniquely determined by the mechanical 
state of the system at an arbitrary initial time. (Cf* Nagel 1974# 
p.279*) However it would be wsmg to conclude that some system of 
bodies is determined - rather it must be that the theory concerning 
these bodies postulates a deterministic relationship * There is a 
discontinuity between reality and a theory about reality*
Quantizm mechanics, unlike classical statistical mechanics, is not
a theory of wholes or aggregates, but concerns individual basic
%
particles and probabilistic theory* In the former aspect it has an
3# More specifically the difference between quantum mechanics and 
classical mechanics may be expressed as follows 8 in the classical 
tradition, the state of any isolated, mechanical system at a given 
moment in time ie given precisely when only numbers specifying the 
position and momentum of each mass in the system are empirically 
determined at that moment in time; no numbers referring to
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objective sense and in the latter a subjective eense. However 
Einstein did not concur with this general view, contending that 
statistical theories, though important, were neither i\m.damenta3« .nor 
objective but subjectivistic theories introduced because of the 
fragmentary natuz-e of our îaïowledge* Thus he held that quantum 
theory was not a fbiidojaental theory, it was not complete* The 
objective reality, or completed theory would be deterministic and not 
probabilistic* Popper (1976/a p*154*) tried to counter' the 
subjectivism of both Einstein and his opponents by introducing a 
propensity interpretation of probability. (Cf,8.3.)
It is perhaps aignificant thalî when Popper visited Princeton in 
1950 he read a paper on ’Indeterminism in %mitum Piiysics and in 
Classical Piiysios* before an ©udience timt included Bohr and Einstein* 
Subsequently he had a long conversation with Einstein which revolved 
around this basic problem - is omj world de^teminiatio or 
indeterrainistic? During these discussions Poppe:r tried to get 
Einstein to give up his deterministic viewpoint* They also spent 
time discussing BoIii*’s principle of oomplementtreity which Einstein 
contended he could iaot understand despite M s  greatest effort (ibid
p.151.).
But the basic feature of quasitum .mechanics that precipitated the 
discussion on deterïTiluism—indeteamiiniam was the set of formula 
log;ically derivable from the assuimptions of the theory mid knovm as 
the Heisenberg ÏÏncertaixity Eolations. Ehilo these seem to emphasise 
tho measuring process uncertainty is not, in fact, derived froTî 
experimental evidence* It is a consequenco of the uncertainty 
relations.
y^iantum mechmiics is not to be considered indeterminate merely
dbecause of the uncertainty relations. ' The whole uncertainty
probability are present. In quantum theory, however, the 
interpretation of observation of a. system is more complicated and 
involves incompleteness and no overall accuracy. Position, if Imoim, 
moans velocity imprecisely Isnown and vice versa. Nevertheless, the 
conserv0>tion laws hold in both sets of theory, the classical form 
still applying in quantum theory where the revised fomi, derived by 
Einstein, is used for relativistio’energies. Similarly, the 
classical laws of thermodynamics apply to a classical gas of molecules 
end a quanti-ua gas of electrons.
4* Note that the woa:ds position, velocity, etc. have diffoaxînt 
senses in quantum theory from that of classical mechanics*
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relationship is based on an assumption of instantaneous values for 
each particle with:ln a system. Given this assumption, a3.1 would he 
quite reasonable, hut in point of feet qmmtum mechanios does not 
define the state of a system in this way. Bo we must grant that 
while quantuTû mechanics is not determinate with respect to a state 
description defined in terms of ixistentaneous positions and momenta 
as the state variables, nevertheless it does not follow that the theory 
is not determinate vfith respect to some other definod framework, (Of# 
Nagel 1974» p»506,) In classical mechanics the variables of state 
are associated with properties of the individuals postulated by the 
theory; but in qumitum theo2?y the state variable is associated with a 
statistical, property of the postulated element. So while classical 
discrepancies are attributed to lack of precise Imox^ ledge concerning 
the initial state of the system; in quazitum meelianics such disos^ epancy 
is also seen as a condition by noting that the assumptions and rules 
which coordinate the theoretical state of a system with experimental 
data co2itain uneliininable (apparently?) statistical components* 
Therefore we find that physicists can maintain that quantum theory is, 
in the nature of the case, indeterministio.
Many have extrapolated from quantum phenomena to the macroscopic 
world and claimed it is statistical in character* But is the whole 
merely the aggregate of the parts? Naf^l vra?ites that g
"It is,,,«a non sequitur to conclude that, because quantum 
mechanics is the foundation for all other parts of physics 
but is a statistical theory, all physical laws deducible from 
quantuca mechanics must also be statistical*" (ibid p*315*)
In the final analysis we can ask what evidence in the macroscopic 
realm displays indeteraiinlsm in character, and the answer is that 
there is no concrete enqperimental evidence for macro-indeterminism.
It is sometimeB maintained that quantum indeterminism has 
restored to man the freedom and responsibility that he lost in the 
strict Mev;tonian determinism. But indeterminism is based, not on 
freedom, but chance » While little is yet know/i about the influence 
of individual atoms at critical neural junctions within the brain it 
would seem that individual atoms have little impact. As MacKay
5o Charles Pierce posited chance variations in physical causality to 
account for the apparent spontaneity of the mind. Similarly William 
Jmies talked of a ’looseness* or ’disconnectedness’ in the universe 
to allovj for man’s experience and moral responsibility.
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points out# after we reach a certain age, cells are dying off at a 
large rate each day Imt appear to imk© little difference to our daily 
lives* Indeterminism is not ©quivaJ.ent to freedom* Do v;e after all 
wish to argue that Haydn composed his syraphonies free],y# or under the 
dictates of chance? It is reductionlstic to seek human 
responsibility in the microscopic world of the atom (it infringes 
sphere sovereignty). Likewise determinism is just as bad — can. we 
reconcile a determinate prediction of a symphony before it was 
conceived?
27*4*1» The Uncertaint.v delations* We need to distinguish between 
the unpredictability of a system and the indetenaiinanoy of a system*
Wg can conceive an unpredictable but determinate system as one where 
no ooa^ plete future specification is possible to us, but where replicas 
released from identical initial conditions would later be found to be 
in the same state* On the other hand, asi indeterminate system is one 
where, even if we had an ensemble of identical replicas, they would 
not be found in the semie later state* Thus 'imrolng to our universes 
is it (after Heisenberg) essentially indete37minate or merely 
unpredictable?
Mow, while it is commonly held that Heisenberg’e formula refer 
to measurements # Popper contends that § "The Heisenberg formul.a do not 
refer to measurements g which implies that the whole of current 
’quantum theory of measurement’ is packed with misiziterpretations*" 
(1976/a, p*95«) It is also erroneous to claim that quantum theory 
rules out exact measurements# although it is still correct to say that 
the formula which w?e peculiar to it (statistically interpreted) give 
no precise singular predictions* But %m can obtain precise frequency 
predictions, (Cf* Popper 1972/b, p*229*) The statistically intea?preted 
theory obviously rules out the possibility of exact measurements, but 
some of precise testability is necessary or the whole theory would 
be quite untestable and thus wholly metapliysloalS Under Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty relations it apparently becomes impossible iii principle to 
predict the path of a particle* But the uncertainty relations apply 
only to magoitudes belong-ing to the particle after the measurement has 
been made. Position and momenturft up to the instant of measuring can 
be asce3?tained in principle with unlimited precision.
The starting premise of Heisenberg’s schema- of thought is interesting. 
It is an epistemologioal programme to rid physical theory of 
•unobservables (of*10*5*4«) ™ that is# what was not accessible to
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experimental obeervation© warn to be regarded as metaphysical.. This 
led îiim to reject the concept which enabled the precise path of a 
partiel© to he found hy claiming that whether we should attach physical 
reality to a calculated past history was merely a matter of taste*
The end result of this may well he thought to he to attribute no 
reality to quantum theory hut a brand of suhjeotivism/Moallsm of 
certain inetrumental value* Against this# there have always been 
those who maintain the realistic view of science; who, while accepting 
for the moment the idea of ’wavicles* see no reason to abandon the 
olaseical realistic concept that sub-atomic particles are in fact 
particles possessing locality and momentum#
Popper, for example, reacts against any subjective interpretation
and proposes that an objectivé, statistical interpretation of the 
’isacertsunty formulae should be seen as the fundamental reality* One 
of Popper’s section headings in his ’Logic of Scientific Discovery' is 
revealing ’An Attempt to Eliminate Metaphysical. Elements by Inverting 
Heisenberg’s Programme; with Applications*' (ibid p.228*) Thus he too 
adopts the same epistemologlcM programme to rid science of meta- 
physics* VJhen we interpret uncertainty relations in a solely 
subjective ifay, then the concept of physics a's an objective science is 
undermined* Popper responds by arguing that the uncertainty relations 
are formally singular probability statements and that this allows an 
untangling of their subjective and objective interpretations* He 
gives the following illustrations imagine a mirror which is semi- 
translucent, letting part of light throu^ and reflecting part# The 
formally singular probability that a given photon passes tteough the 
mirror may be taken to equal the probability that it will be reflected* 
The estimated probability is defined by objective etatistioal. 
probabilities# that ie, it is equivalent to the hypothesis that one 
half of a, given class alpha of light quanta will pass throu^ the 
mirror and the other half reflected* Mow let photon k fall on the 
mirror, and let it be found that experimentally this has been reflected 
- then the probabilities seem to suddenly change (diseontinuously) * 
Before they equalled 1/2, while after the reflection they become 0 and 
1* (ibid p.255.)
Heisenberg
contended ■ that the uncertainty relations point to, or represent, 
indeterminism as a fundamental objective feature of nature* Thus 
indeterminism is an ontio reality* Margeneau wites that "the
564
micertainty does not reside in the in^erfeotlon in our measnremsnts# 
nor in man’s ability to know; it has its cause in nature herself*" 
(l954s p*6f*} But Heisenberg does not totally wipe out the idea of 
some form of weak eansalitj* Thus the future is not decided, but on 
the other hand it m  not toally open* ïn fact he endeavours to 
restore the concept of potentiality (in a combination of Aristotelian 
and Kewtoniasi views) as objective and not merely subjective* Yet he 
holds that subatomic phenomena are significant in man and § "To this 
extent# at least, the causality governing him is of the weaker type, 
and he embodies boiii mechanical fate end potentiality*" (Northrop 
19?1se P«25*) Here the Principle of Complementarity and an acceptance 
of the ’commtm-sense ' concept of body^mind stand and fall together, 
but it may be that both ideas are but stepladdeis which may one day be 
throw away*
2]^4#1.2.._mpsrWnt^ ^as mpermentol/^^^ I,W.tations. It
has also been held that uncertainty is an experimental limitation with 
respect to measuring* But while this holds up in many situations it 
does not account for the relevance of the uncertainty relations where 
nothing.is done to disturb the system# However this led on to the 
idea that the uncertainty resided in a fundamental limitation of the 
knowledge man could have* The uncertainty was conceptual and not 
experimental* This gives an agnostic position concerning atomic 
determinism or indeterminism, and ontlc questions are ignored or 
dismissed as irrelevant* Probability functions ere useful calculating 
tools for coordinating observations, but are not representations of 
the real world* Thus Prank assertss "We invite trouble if we ask the 
question, wliat are the 'real* physical objects*" (1962# p#244») T M s - 
is a powerful source of instrumentalism and complementarity*
27*4»1«3* TMoertaintv As Temnorarv Ignorance* Mmiy great names stand 
here such as Einstein, Planck, de Broglie and Bohm, all contending that 
the problem of uncertainty is epla temologioal and not ontlcal, 
believing that the sub-atomic realm is in all probability causally 
determined and that it is only our present ignorance that hides this# 
Einstein firmly believed ' that one day we would get beyond our present 
lack of knowledge and see that all was fully determined* (1975* PP«316- 
518a) This of course raises serious problems as to the choice and 
responsibility that man may be said to possess, for this was not 
simply a belief concerning quantum mechanics but the whole of reality 
(cf* 18.5*5*).
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Towarda A Coamonomie View of Indeto^ milniam» Gtelatlan
Interest in. this question give© no olearoxit prominence to m y  on© of 
the above altemmtivea. The Eoman Gatho3.ic lilatorl^ m of BOience,
Vmi Mela on (1952)9 chooses for determinism; wliile the pî^ ysiciatt- 
theologian# Pollard (1958) B@@8 in chance the working of God’s
provldenoG (which seems to tend to a g£3d-of«*the-gaps-idGa) # In the
tradition of tho Cosmonomlc Idea the physicist Staflen (19?6) sees 
the first Interpretation as an Illustration of the fundamental 
indivi-duality of all tW,ngs as created*
It seems to me that the first two aspects can be Combined to give
a forceful ©.rgwaent that uncertainty is here to stay at this level
6and that strict determinism is undercut# As Gtafleu sees its it 
seems to fit neatly into the idea of sphere sovereignty and kernel 
irreducibility that there is in created nature a basic level of
indefinability which has been exposed in quantum theo3%r# At the
same time the himmi mind is limited and finite and therefore 
uncertainty enters as a condition of conoeptual limîltation# We oaxi 
never 'ivsve exhaustive truth of nature, even ihou^ di we lïiay have true 
truth* But what man Imows at sny given time is (outside of 
revelation) provisional.# temporal mid relative, not ultimate# eternal
а.ncl absolute.
m  hot m m m  ^
Despite tto
limitations concerning qumitum theory, some thinkers have extrapolated 
from it to metaphysical generalisations — a result of its epistemio 
progx'aminel Thus Ecoles argues that the will of man influences neural
circuits without negating the pliysioal laws, in that the energy levels
involved are within the limits of the imoertainty relations# But 
MaclCay has countered thlss (a) by pointing out that there are about 
ten thousand million nerve cells in the brain and the chances are 
greater that any one will be disturbed by a physical (macroscopic) 
event# The uncertainty relations become inoreasingly determinate the 
bigger the object we ar’e s'budying, and s, nerve cell, while by our 
standasîds small, is massive compared to mi electron# (b) The brain 
is not to be compared to a wireless set where the failxix© of a valve 
upsets the whole performance# Nerve cells seems more akin to a rope 
where the individual strands work in teamwork# (c) The random
б. Of# footnote 1 — my reference to Stoker#
T# Of* footnote 1#
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variation© tiiat may bo allowed for in the imcertainty prlnoipl© are
small compared to physical variations such as temperature, blood 
fluctuation and external stlmulll* In the event MacKey thinks that 
tho introductimi of randomnosa in the chain of individual control 
tends to excuse a person from responsibility rather than crediting him 
ifith it «• which is what proponents of this view, in the main, are 
arguing#
27.5.2. Ohanoe and Necessity (Monod)# Jacques Monod is the apostle 
of unadulterated chance. He writes:
*%# .chance alone Is at the source of every innovation , of all 
creation in the biosphere. Pure chance, absolutely free but 
blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution: 
this central concept of modem biology is no longer among 
other possible or even conceivable hypotheses* It is today the 
sole conceivable hypothesis, the only one compatible with 
observed and tested fact* And nothing warrants the supposition 
(or the hope) that conceptions about this should, or ever 
could, be revised*" (1974, p*110#)
Note the total dogmatic (religious) claim being made here - this is 
the closed mind par excellance* Monod goes on, depicting man ae 
alone in an alien universe and concludes his book ’ Chance and 
Necessity’ with these words:
"The ancient covenant is in pieces; man at last Imows that he 
is alone in the unfeeling Immensity of the laniverse, out of 
which he emerged only by chance* Neither his destiny nor his 
duty have been written down* The kingdom above or the 
darîuiess below: it is for him to choose." (ibid p. 167*)
Man is simply the product of chance, a random product of the 
roulette wheel (of. ibid p*137.)* But in tMe it is inevitable that 
his values are subjective, his etMo solipsistio. The problem is 
that on his own basis he has no basis for values or judgements#
8 A much more consistent 
philosophical system involving a general worldview, science and ethics, 
is given by Karl Popper who advocates an indeterministio world but also 
suggests that indeterminism per se is not enough to establish human 
responsibility* While the mainline British philosophers such a® 
Ibiseell, Moore and the analytics hod investigated Imowledge with a 
Cartesian subjectivistic presupposition about what knowledge was, 
namely the mental state of particular individuals; Popper has 
consistently contended for an indeterministio but realist and
8. Cf. Popprâ (1975, cha.3,4.)s (l973/a)î and (l976/a, chs.10,38,39.)
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rabionalist concept of objective truth*
He posit© the necessity of holding to a imrld 1,2 and 5* World 
1 is the physical world of rocks, trees, people, physical force fields 
etc,; world 2 is the psychological world of men’s hopes and fears etc*; 
and world 3 holds the products of the mind (world 2), such as works of 
art, ethical vaines, social institutions etc.# Thus hooks Eire at one 
and the same time members of worlds 1 and 3* Two copies of the same 
hook are ilndividually physical mem'be-.^ a of world 1 ; hut in world 3 
represent the saise mentM content* It is crucial to Popper that the 
reality of all three worlds he held to, and that it is realised that 
oa-ch has the ability to ’kick hack* if its rules are Infdnged. He 
points out that until recently world 2 was the fashion, that is a 
monistic âmj'BBtorial.isîï/phenomenaliBm; hut that today world 1 has 
reasserted itself , that Is a monistic materialiom/pBychioalism* But 
he would suggest that toothache was real!
To distinguish wo3?lde 2 amd 3 is crucial, and the difference 
largely lies in that to thixilc a thought involves world 2, hut to 
forïiïulate and produce it into the external world involves world 3 *“ 
that is, the difference between thought processes end thought content. 
He indicates the relative autonomy of world 3 with the following 
exa^ iple* Ass^ uaing (and this is an assumption) that man has invented 
the sequence of natural numbers — 1,2,3»4»**»u - it might be held 
that this was sifaply an artifact of world 2* But what of the 
sequence of odd 03? even numbers, or primes, or the existence of perfect 
and aiiîioable numbers - can it be held that man also invented them? 
Goldbanh, for example, has given a theorem that every even number is 
the SIM of two primes, mid while tMe has been demonstrated as true 
for all Imown numbers, no proof has so far been discovered - it is an 
empirical discovery antecedent on the postulation of the natural 
numbers*
Classical detoraiinism is equivalent to world 1 determinism and was 
clearly formulated by Laplace* His view being that given the precise 
masses, positions and velocities of all material at some point in time, 
then in principle we can calculate all that has and will happen.,
This view leaves no room for hmian fzzeedoHi, and more seriously frem a 
logical point of viewj, the required, calculator would need to exceed tho 
universe* However, with the failure of Mmufell to explajn electricity 
and magnetism on, the basis of NewtoniEsn mechanics, the Laplacian world 
1 beoEUftQ open to a new dimension - field forces, though still ;ln world
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1 # Maïiy pîQFslolstB ©till believe that world 1 has no opeimess to 
world 2*
Indeterminism seemed to break this olrole of closedness end 
Popper siiggwtB that even elaseioal determinate Hewtonisn mechanics 
is in principle indeterminate ! That there is indeterminism at all
suggests, he olalma, world 1 may be open to world 2 and not
determined and closed. But auch opemiess does not establish freedom
in man* Popper argues Indeterminism is a neeessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition of freedom#
Strict determinism implies that the poetry of Homer, the 
philosophy of Plato, the male of Baoh end the science of Heisenberg 
are preordained, merely product© of world 1# This is abeurd* The 
opposite extreme of sheer chance is equally absurd as an explanation 
of such events # Thus Popper concludes i
"All this means that world 3 can act upon the world 2 of our 
minds# But if so, there is no doubt that, when a 
mathematician writes down his world 3 results on (physical) 
paper, M s  mind - his world 2 — acts upon the physioal world 
1» Thus world 1 is open towards world 2, just as world 2 is 
open towards world 5#" (1973/a, p.25.)
Therefore he envisages that our universe is partly causal, partly 
probabilistic, and partly open# "Man ie certainly part of nature, 
but, in creating world 3# he lim transcended himself and nature, as 
it existed before him*" (ibid p.26*)
Remembering the argument of HacICay for the openness of determinism 
(of* 27*3»2#), note that Popper is in effect using a similar idea to 
present the case for indotorminism* Hie idea of the three worlds is 
however Imprecise - appearing to be a hybrid of Platonic forms end more 
concrete ideas, such a© books, libraries etc** However, I feel that 
the thrust of his argument is a sound corrective against world 1 
determinism, for he suggests there is no scientific reason why mental 
end physical states should not interact# (Of. 1972/a p*29B*)
Popper presents his basic aim as follows: the firet conceptual 
revolution saw God replaced by Nature leaving all else unchanged — 
theological determinism simply became natural determinism; the second 
revolution by Hegel and Mam replaced Nature by History, and Popper 
asserts that his role is to combat this deification of History and 
reinstate Mature in its full Buprenïeoy# Perhaps the Christian should 
be endeavouring to go one step more and combat both the deification of
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hletory end nature# It ie God who has given to men the ability to 
treBecend himself end nature, to create end formulate his Ideas in 
world 3* Tentatively It might be suggested that world 3 also 
embodies the will of God for His creation as well as the content of 
man’s thoughts ** or should a world 4 be posited?
iMî-ÆSEa-œonraçB
i»s, of course^ had cmoh 
populai’lty in British smplrioiBra, (Of, Kœmer I969, p.235»)
Vitalism suggested that non-living 
matter was under a different set of laws fmm living matter. There 
is the more basic dual-stuff theory of someone like Descartes who, 
holding to a mechanistic view of the material universe, wished to 
safeguar'd responsible action from the realm of natural necessity# 80 
he distinguished two distinct realms of mind and body, with the 
natural laws applying only to the latter# (Of# Pears 1972, p»235»)
Kant also advocated a double—world theory, making a radical distinction 
between the phenomenal world and the world as it really Is (noumenal)» 
Also there was his clear separation between the world of physical 
necessity and that of the moral imperative# (Cf# Koimer 1969® p#235 ** 
Appendix B#) Such views are still very much with us and in a 
recent work de Eopp claims that there i© a qualitative difference 
between the mind of mem and animals, it ie more complex and operates 
in an entirely different dimension (of, 1972* p#203 cf# Heisenberg
1952s p.107.)
(of. 16,5.2.2.). This theory tonda 
to follow Ifeme (in seeking a nesoliition by iinguistio olanifioaticax) 
aiid Kant (in regarding neither predetexmiaation or freedom as illusory).
Her© a choice ie free in the realm of actor language, but determined 
when viewed in spectator language* Despite the obvious tensions it 
is claimed both are needed to qualify human escperienoe* Thus 
freedom and determinism are shut up ifitMn different linguistic aspects
of reality#
27#6#4* Eîcistentialiem, Tliie rests on the point that any concept of 
determinism resides on an abstractive analysis of some form, whereas 
freedom is a property of the act of the total person# So wo are to 
trust the impression of freedom that we all exporlenoo from day to day 
above any metaphysical or scientific aesumptionB# Man’s existence, as
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Kierkegaard reiterated time and again, earmot be captured in the 
Gategoriea of Hegelian logio* But experience can be wrong and 
ffîislesdiîïgî Once it was thought there were no atome; once It was
thought the earth was the centre of the universe#
27.7# GGD m o  MAN IN THE PERSmOTIVE OF mOVlDmGB
It la impossible to escape from the biblical perspective that God
creates and preserves, controls and directs the destiny of His creation* 
MovertholeBs the theological term ’providence’ is not in fact a 
Scriptural term, being formulated as a doctrine in the early church 
against Epicurean chance and Stoic fatalism* Augustine, Aquinas, 
Luther and Calvin all testify to their belief in this doctrine*
Modem theology has departed in general from such views for a variety 
of reasons: by conceding to science, in the tradition of Brltisli 
empiricism, with respect to the acquisition of knowledge; by confusing 
scientific uniformity with respect to all types end sequences of iwents, 
thus ruling out revelation ner se: and by failing to work out the 
relation of God to the cosmos * Liberal theology largely eliminated 
revelation by shutting up all things to the empirical is tic and 
ratlonalietic arena of humanist thinking* Existential, theology 
effectively shut God off from all realms except the personal where 
the encounter between man and God was maintained* Conservatives 
also shut God up to the realm of the personal encounter and denied the 
validity of the cosmos* All these tend to create, perhaps 
unwillingly, a God-ojP-the-gaps mentality, or at least operate within 
that mentality while ironically condemning past ages for the self— 
same fault* But if it is thought that scientific uniformity can be 
a barrier to miracle or prayer, if science is made autonomous from 
its religious foundations in the heart of man then we have entered 
into a mentality where a God-of-the-gaps is not only possible, but 
Inevitable*
Providence is obscured if connected solely to special acts of God* 
It ie the whole upholding (cohering) in being of reality that Is 
involved» The great Reformation statements firmly asserted the total 
rule and providence of God over His creation, and I firmly believe 
they are of particular value coming at a point when modem science was 
under way, but before the dissociation of God from the laws of nature.^ 
The Bible presents a creation with rational order but not determined
9* "CfToZfëssio Belgica Art»13§ Heidelberg Oateohism %*27#
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neoeaoltarian character; it presents no inherent natural law 
autonomous from the iflll of God, but conceives of this order as tho 
sign of God’s loving care* The order of natin?e is not our perceived 
or logical order but tImt which is willed by God# Thus both 
natural order and extrai-ordinerjr event are equally from God*
Providence, then, may be conceived as the continued operation of 
the divine power through which God as Creator preserves all things, 
is mvolved in all processes of becoming in. the trorlcl, and directs 
all things to their end* This ie not to limit providence to the 
foreosrdinatioïi of God, nor conceive some mechanically determined 
providence where what will be will be*
It seems to me that we are needing to recap'ture something of the 
emphasis of Galvin here, not only in that provid.ence gives a rational 
and reasonable worldview vis a yds the created order# but also gives 
comfo3?t and assurance* It is a doctrine that frees fa^ora anxiety 
because it is our Father who is in control of all tMngo* In tMs 
sense the doet3?ine of providence presents a p3?imary existential 
calling which imast not be dissected into bits and pieces of logic for 
there is a mystery, an -imdisolosedness of God involved* ¥e are 
asked to believe and to imderstmidg but while belief is total 
ooMiîit ment, Imowledge is ever finite end limited*
The providence of God Involves Hia preservation, that is His 
continuous work by vdoich He maintains His whole cassation in being, 
including a31 its properties and powers § it involves His divine 
government g that continued activity of ruling all things eo as to 
8eoin?e the end of His divine will; and. it must be seen in the light 
of co-operation or concurrence by man and nature with God* Nature 
may appear to act autonomously, but God is mediately operative in all 
things* Interestingly Aqu:lnas, lilce Calvin and Luther, rejected 
unbridled free will in man, and advocated the doctrine of 
predestination, reprobation and election* (Of. Hoo!cyaas 1973g P*107* 
and Flew 19713 p*233«) Now while Galvin would agree with this 
thrust, he neveirbheless contended that "the eternal decrees of God by 
no means prevent us from proceeding imder his will, to j)rovido for 
ourselves, and arrange all our affairs*" (156O, p*103#) God is
ultimate; but man is still a responsible rational being* The
problem is undoubtedly that of trying to reduce God and Bis ways to 
finite hivaan categories (of* footnote 1*)* We must face up to the
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reality that the ‘bl'bl.ioal pietiire of men, time and again® ie that of 
men faced with choices to be obedient or disobedient® believing or 
disbelieving - all of which is non-sene© apart from the anoazal 
responsibility of man*
1 support neither an absolute determinism nor man as autonomous 
from His creator* The Scriptures consistently present the divine 
sovereignty and tii© responsibility of men in juxtaposition«. Think 
of Luke 15 — the parable of the lost sheep, coin an.d son* In the 
first two aspects it is God who alone seeks out that which is lost; 
the coin and the sheep are passive* But in the third episode it is 
the son who wakens to the realisation. of his lostness and retvxns 
(actively) to the father* Another example is Jolm 6§39 end 40 
where the middle portions of these two verses (parts eaid 'o’ 
being parallel) clearly indicate the balance between God's side and 
man’s side.
G#B*Lewis suggests somewhere that reason has to but nod at its 
poet and the pa;trols of naturaj-iem will swiftly move in and talce 
over our mentality; that the minute we stop consciously directing our 
existential being to the total providence and sustaining power of God, 
then imagination, mental habit, temperemient and the spirit of the age 
infiltrate our defences. We Imaw that the revelation of God demands 
certain attitude, a certain wo3?ld and life stance, but our rajinds 
are often overcome by tho insidious ax>irit of the age which assumes at 
root a self-contained miivorse which is closed and has no God.
God alone gives us a va3.id esqpectation of imlformity in the v/orld, 
a unifoasflity without wMch science is impossible. But we ar-e not 
given that this •uniformity is an intrinsic property of an autonomous 
order; rather we are given it as an expectation, as a wo3±-a^day 
conviction which will be fii.lfil3.ed by end large, and not as a 
©•tatemen't about exhaustive reality and experience. .For irhon it 
assîmes this latter role it excludes God« To misappropriate the 
principle of uniformity is to limi'k the free operation of tho 
transcendent in human experience.
In non-theistio scientific approaches ‘imifozffiity is married to 
ei'bher irrational chance or rationalised determinism* But if the 
whole universe is the result, no't of the plan and power of God, but of 
irrational causes and reality nothing but matter in random motion, how
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can till© theory stand on its own (Cf Barclay 1974» p*105.) 
Detersiiniatic milfoamlty ie mo better for if nature * s order Is 
totally uniform then God’s relation to the tmivors© will need to be 
thought of as distanced* He may be the original creator who gave 
some potentiality to all things to unfold themselves, but He is not 
Involved in the affairs of the univorse, least of all ite physical 
aspects. This ie the failing of a3.1 who would do their science and 
then turn round and say ’On to God*’ Determinism leads to laws of 
nature, while theism points to nature controlled by the law of God*
Despite Heisenberg prediction remains good with respect to the 
boiling of kettles, the accuracy of clocks, and the putting of man on 
the moon# Fundamental irrationality and science are incompatible, 
for all research assumes uniformity somewhere along the line with 
respect to the methods used# So the Thelst does not reject the 
fact that past events and the environment condition the activities of 
people I yet he will always maintain that we can react in more than 
one way to any given situation*
Causality cannot be reduced to a mode or aspect of being# It is 
not sufficient to explain it away merely on the terms of temporal and 
spatial relationships # Without denying the existence and necessity 
of spatial concomitants and temporal precedents m  causal, it must be 
asserted that to rely solely on such conditions as providing a 
sufficient explanation of causality Is unsatisfactory. We recognise 
causality in observation; we do not derive it from observation - and 
this ability is a gift given by God to further our mastery and 
dominion of the universe * We need the category of cause and effect 
to do all other rationalising. In effect causality is a God-given 
intuitive realisation* To turn the whole question rounds do not the 
facts of experience give an insoluble problem to theoretical 
determinism*
This discussion should have highlighted the dangers attendant on 
the equation of scientific theory with theistic belief in insoluble 
bonding. While indeterminism is still debated In physios It would 
seem presumptuous for theology, which is after all another abstractive 
discipline, to step in and tell science what it should b e l i e v e . I t
10# It is %'forth noting that in May 1977 an International Conference 
on Space-Time Absoluteness was to be held by those scientists who 
reject the Einsteinian solution# Of. New Scientist 23 Sept#, 1976,
p.662.
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seems to me that theology should never irrevooably, tie the revelation 
of God (spécial) to some fleeting scientific theory « for to do so is 
to overestimate science* It can only say that some particular theory 
is apparently consistent with Christian belief, or is not* While the 
♦yes’ must be conditional, eertaan negations seem feasible* It seems 
to me that the Thelst can confidently reject any theory which involves 
either absol’otistic chance or determinism which precludes the 
wholeness of being and the responsibility of man*.
I conclude that Theism does not capitallee to any great extent on 
the new physics, because as Masoall (1956, p*147«) has indicated, any 
such capitalisation Is based on a crude equivalence of the physical 
and metaphysical. We must beware of confusing the metaphysical , 
wonder of the biblical revelation and attitude towards God with the 
quite different physical puzzlement of the exploring scientist. As
0.8.Lewis notes somewhere: in science we are, as it were, reading the 
notes to a poem, in Christianity we find the poem itself#
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POSÏSGBIPT TO PMT ÏV
Corning to this final posteorijrb I feel #mt X have barely
somtched the GW?faoe of an lamenee snbjeot of vital iyftportanee»
However I hope I have oueoeeded in indioating something of the
religions an.d theological foundation© of science and technology*
X have tried to indicate the religions foundations lying in a
governing worldview which is tied to some religions motive (cf* 5*55
11*65 12*5; 16.2; 18.1.1; Part IV; and Appendix A.) This is tied
to questions of a philosophical nature as well as theological s to the
ontological foundation of existence of self and reality as creatures
within God’s creation; to the epistemologioal reality that our
knowledge of self and reality (end hence of science) can only proceed
1when it is grounded in a true and living knowledge of God ; and to 
the axioloKical end which can be construed only eschatologioally from 
God and in no way as a messianic Marxism.
In understanding these foundations I believe the Christian has a 
relevant answer to many of today’s problems; an answer to the 
apparently divergent choice between coimter^oulture, Marxism and 
status quo# All of these are finally closed worldviews » and even 
where transcendence is appealed to (e.g. îtosKaJc) it is an immanent 
transcendence. But there is a God. And we live in the world He 
1ms created, and in the history He controls.
1. I'/hile individuals may contribute to development, man is 
essentially a corporate being and we must look at the fruits of an 
age. In this connection it is worth remembering the remark of 
Oppenheimer that modern science could not have given birth to 
itself as wo Imow it today because it has no foundation in our day. 
Of. likicountor Oct. 1$62,
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Ami. In the Scholastic period ’nature’ meant the world in which 
man lived and in which his mind possessed a relative autonomy.
’Grace’ on the other hand was bhe realm of the church, revelation and 
heaven* But in tMs dua3.ism, grace was ascendant and life was 
governed by the divine and supematin?al* ’Grace’ was over ’nature’, 
and the church dominated every toim and village both arcMtecturally 
and socially* The world W£is seen as full of spirits and ’natu3:e ’ 
ims not to be tsanpered irith by man, resulting in a loss of any true 
scientific activity. Aquinas marked the end of this period, 
maintaining the view of philosophy as ancillary to theology and at 
the same time holding to the Greek concept of the autonomy of reason* 
Therefore the way was opened to the independence of ’nature ’ from 
’grace’ (of* Maoquarrie 1571» P*279'*)s longer was it nature asid 
grace, but nature versus grace* ’Mature’ had been liberated from 
the constraints of ’grace*. But though Acpihcas made no hard end 
fast distinction here, what he did was open the door to the 
possibility of total separation* #ien he separated theology from 
art and science an Irreversible step had been taken* It prepared the 
road for these other disciplines to come 5jito prominence iîi their o m  
right, but also to assert an autonojaous existence and eventually taîce 
over the role of master and lord that Aquinas assigned to theology*
The crux of the raatter was not so meh the separation of disciplisies 
as the independent autonomy that was granted to the human intellect. 
The omcial feature in Aquinas, argues Schaeffer, is that he had an 
incomplete view of the kail, for while he agreed that man was fallen 
and that the will was corrupt, he did not extend this to include the 
mind, the reason of man* Tiiis meant that reason, man’s ability to 
work out from his oim rationalism, became the basic starting point 
for his search for truth* (Cf* Boss & McXiauglilln 1972, pp*29,50.)
This shift, this liberation of nature, can be seen in many ways*
Up to this point art had been essentially symbolical, but with the 
new climate of himianistic optimism this ceased to bo so. Mature 
having been set free from the constraints of grace could mow be 
appreciated in itself; thus nature could be painted as nature without
TT^Tschaeffer (1968/a; 1968/b; 1971; 1972*)
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any religious theuie imderlyljig it* The first man to do this was 
probably Albrecht Altdorfer, and Gombrioh writes of hims ’H4any of his 
water colours and etchings, and at least one of hie oil-«'pamtings, 
tell no story and contain no Immm being* rohis is quite a 
momentous chsmge* lihren the Greeks with all their love of nature had 
pa:Uited landscapes only as settings for their pastoral scenes." (1972» 
j>*275») Here ife al-so find the first recorded instance of a. mail 
climbing a mountain simply to conquer the challenge it presented*
As this shift develops the natural always tends to push otrb the super­
natural » or in Schaeffer’s phrase ’nature eats up grace*. But the 
problem was, and is, that not only does nature tend to become more 
Imjjortant than grace and finally replace it altogether, but nature 
thus liberated becomes by itself destru.otive« This is illustrated 
by Schaeffer from the wo3?ld of art*
"In kraace, Pouquet (c* 1416«1480) painted» about 1450» the 
king’s mistress8 Agnes .SoreX». .as Mary» I'krerybocly îmowing 
the court who saw it knew that this,was the king’s mistress. 
'Fouquet painted her with one breast exposed* Whereas before 
it would have been Mary feeding the baby Jesus» now it was 
the king’s mistress with one breast exposed - aiid grace is 
dead*" (1960/a»'p»16«)
Before Aquinas» then» there was little interest in nature (from 
Christianity) and his bringing it to the fore was a welcome move#
But the problem was the tension created between nature and grace which 
led to the setting up of autonomous reason as the f3?ame of reference 
for interpreting and constructing a woazldview. He-established 
na/bure if as good in terms of un.derstmiding the details and particulars 
that go to make up the world we live in; but because of the under­
lying dualism it led to chaos in failing to provide an integrating 
reference point whereby the univorsa-le» or absolutes» of our imiverse 
could be based* This was the first chink in the hope of a unified 
field of îmowledge and it led to a loss of absolutes in the area of 
morals and Imowlodge*
A.2* Following Aquinass
"The Thomistie synthesis of nature and grace was replaced by a 
sharp antithesis# Any point of connection between the natural 
and the supernatural was denied. This was the introduction 
to the shifting of primacy to the nature motive."
(Booyeweerd 1972» p#45*)
This general trend in the destruction of grace by nature gathers 
increasing momentwsi until it reached its elimanc in the Enlightenment *
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Here the the sphere of grace» was removed in totality
from the arena of rational thought* There eould he no room for it 
in the new physical solenoes which were beginning to dominate*
"By the seventeenth oentury nature had totally devoured grace ». 
and what was left in its place ims man’s striving for freedom* 
However men soon fmmd that their freedom was being 
threatened by the deterministic and mechanistic Image of the 
world which their natural science was creating* The fight to 
retain freedom was carried on by the Romantic movement, 
beginning with Eousseau and Kant*" (s*L*H*Taylor 1970, p.viif*)
This brings us to the next of Schaeffer ®s pivotal points which deals 
with the influence of Kent and Rousseau* By this time rationalism 
had become so well developed as a system there was no room left for 
any talk of grace within the field of the rational. All that existed 
was the deterministic views that had come doim from the followers of 
Mewton, and men like Baplace could assert that they had no need of God 
in their hypotheses# Grace was gone; eaten up by nature* ’Mature 
end grace® Imd become ’nature versus grace’; and now with grace 
gone it became ’nature and freedom’*
This new formulation of the dualism in terms of nature and freedom 
had however a greater lack of cohesion* From the outset it was 
virtually nature versus freedom* %%lle for Aquinas nature was under 
grace and in a sense flowed out of it, in Kant’s dualism there iras 
little in common between the concepts of nature and freedom* On the 
one hand there was determinism, the autonomous machine that was the 
world In which all eould be explained in terms of the sciences; and on 
the other hand there was a certain quality of freedom that had Its 
roots, not in the rational, but as mi Idea posited by ethics#
The autonomous had become fully developed, leaving no room for an 
area of revelation or grace* This took place, in Schaeffer’s tonne, 
’upstai,rs*« Schaeffer sees all these dualisme in terme of ’upstairs ’ 
and ’domstairs’i in the former there is grace, soul, freedom, 
mysticism or whatever form men happen to give It; wMlo the latter is 
the realm of nature, rationality, science end determinism# ' Only in 
the biblical view of creation, fall and redemption is a dichotomy 
avoided# It is Schaeffer’s contention that all other systems fail in 
that they fall into a dualism* (Of* eh*27, footnote 1.)
Up to this point all humanistic thought had followed an essentially 
threefold character; (i) it was rationalistic, starting from man end 
centred in him; (ii) it was rational, that is it operated on a basis
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of antithesis; and (ill) it held out the hope of a unified view of
îmowledge, that is any belief system could hopefully oontaiii all 
knowledge, or at least had the possibility to do so# This is not to 
claim to have exbaustive îmowledge but to know truly in all areas of 
knowledge# But by the time of Kant a point was reached when 
something had to give way# (Of* Schaeffer 1968/a» p«40#) In an 
endeavour to hang on to hla rationalism, his self—centreclnees, of 
making himself the sole reference point for all hie thinking, men 
abandoned rationality and the hope of a unified field of knowledge#
Men gave up trying to be rational# Hegel introduced the concept 
of synthesis instead of anti—thesis; now there was thesis end anti- 
thesis and by stirring them up la the melting point of mti.onalism we 
arrived at a middle way of synthesis. Thus truth and error became 
blurred as did morality# Man also abandoned any hope of a unified 
knowledge and no longer was any hope hold out of combining the two 
storeys a complete dichotomy was accepted and led to the 
structuring of the various disciplines into imtertight compartments#
This brings us to Schaeffer’s third step in the progress of 
the dualism of man’s thought# The hope of a rational unified view 
was abandoned and in its place was put a split field of knowledge# 
knowledge could now be on two levels beWeen which there were no 
ccmiaoting links# The original dualism was virtimlly in the form of 
a Gontifiuum and that of freedom and nature (while having a basic 
opposition) was contained within a rational framewosdc* But the 
dualism that now emerged was that of rationality and non-rationality# 
This is the modem dlchoto#r of faith and reason® Mow the division 
be'Ween the two spheres had become absolute for there waa no 
possibility of anything in common between the rational and the 
irrational® It was of the essence of Kierkegaard that faith lay in 
the area of the irrational and could not be explained or rationalised# 
His faith was not the biblical concept of faith which was that of 
putting trust in God arid Christ, and doing so on the basis of certain 
revelations s promises and acts of God# For Kierkegaard there was no 
basis for faith, no promises or acts to believe In - it was a leap in 
the dark#
The dilemma for man ims that in the area of rationality no meaning 
or values had been left# "Thus by the beginning of the nijietoenth 
century autonomous freedom and autonomous science stood facing each 
other In deadly combat#" (B.L.H.Yaylor 1970» p.viii.) But; "On the
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basis of rationality, logic and scientific doterininism man’s life no 
lon^ '^ r btae any meaning to it«" (ibid p.ix*) Hence the modem scene 
is dominated by two opposing views «* that of positivism (in some, 
probably attenuated, fo2sn) and existentialism*
E3cistentialism stands apparently in direct tension with the world 
of science which is supposed to contain a body of hard positiviatic 
tanith (still the popular myth). But it is worth noting that in our 
age many famliar with the world of science are moving inorea,singly 
to an irrational world that is beginning to take the form of 
existentialism* By and large however mocton science tends towards a 
positivistic view of reality « aiseept among frontline researchers and 
some philosophers. Only tha,t which is capa,blQ of proof or reducible 
to terms of a formula or mathematics is accepted as port of the 
rational structure of reality. The watchworcl; hhat use is it?
A.4. This is not to say that the founders of science held this view. 
(Gf. Schaeffer 1968/a, p.52.) However the position ttet has 
developed is a fina belief in the uniformity of natural causes in a 
closed system. God is excluded and men trapped in the system. This 
means a view of the natux’al that is material, is tic», and the development 
of a system of 'fchougiit thab allows only for the material. But this 
loaves the scientist with a p3?oblem. %en he leaves his laboratory 
at night and goes iioBie to his wife, he cannot say ’I love you’ with 
any rational meaning. \îhat to him wan rational, was left behind in 
his laboratory and he is caught in the dichotomy between the science- 
ideal and the personality—ideal. Thus to talk of love and beauty he
has to transcend his deterministic view of material reality. He
Go):mot live witMn the confines of his ovm worldview because he hasj
been made by God in a way that demands love, beauty and morals. To 
exercise his true humanity, his ’mannishness * as Schaeffer calls it, 
he has to talce a leap into the upper storey. It must be understood 
that this upper storey is disengaged from the world of determined 
rationality on his oim terms#
Thus we have m^rived at the modem representations of the nature 
grace dualism. Ho longea? is it seen in these temis but this is still 
the basic split that underlies the modem dilemma# The lower storey 
of nature has poEased into the sphere of the rational (on the basis of 
rationalism), the world of the machine, of a closed eecjuence of
determined causality. (Gf. eh.27.) It is a world of facts, of formula,
where man carefully pursues his sciences and defines his te:oas. The
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©nd result being the death of man qua man*
God is dead to modmm man Imving been long since removed from the 
life of tMs world* God has no part to play in mathematics, pliysics, 
chemistry or biology and is pushed off to the misty regions upstairs 
where nothing is defined and all is possible because notîrlng is 
rational. But in a sense the tragedy is that men is dead. By 
reducing all to the level of the machine the uniqueness of men is lost, 
lo longer is he seen as a special creation at the ape^i: of creation.
Today men is but a mechanical apparatus evolution is believed to have 
flung up, a collection of atoms that obey the dictates of environmental 
and biological- conditioning* There is no difference between m.m and 
animals, and men have lost the meaning and purpose that gave 
sigsiifieeaiLce to life.
Bomistairs all that is left in the sphere of rationality ie 
mathema,tios and pîjysics, the social sciences and psjfehology; wMle 
upstairs God, love, morals,, freedom and significance have become but 
symbols for mystic manlpula-tion. Upstals:© are coimotation words that 
can be tossed. abolit in various ways because they lack definition. So 
grace has become a^iosticism and mysticism. In the area of rationality 
man is forced into an ultimate wall of ag^ iosticiam because, starting 
from himself and working outward In. a closed system of detesmined 
reality, he cannot arrive at true truth. Thus the dualism ends up in 
an irretrievable dilemma g ends in despair of ever îaïowlng an^ 'thing 
truly5 ends in the death of man as well as God. On the other hand 
laan is unboundlngly optimistic and this is only possible by a leap 
upstairs, to the orea ’beyond* science.
This is, of course, a mere sketch of what Schaeffer to-kes seveazal 
books to wo5Jk out in detail. His own work should be seen in the 
light of Booyeweerd’s analysis (I969» vol.I.) of the same theme - 
indeed it lias been suggested that Schaeffer is essentially an 
Anglicised, popularised version of the former’s wo3:k. Hhile some of 
Schaeffer’s dates anil pivotal figures may give rise to debate, such 
controversy should not detract from the overall tlirust he is making — 
namely of the progressive separation of the two atq^ ects of the gr*ound 
motive in the mind of humamstie man#
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APMDIX B 
A HOTIil Oli THE SEGOMB M M  OF TI-MRTOBïAMÎCS
Boltsimann contended that the entropy of a gao increased with time 
by associating entropy with disorder? and showing that disordered 
states of a gao in a box are more probable than ordered states* From 
this he concluded a general mechanical, law which stated that closed 
systems tend to become more and more disordered the older thejf get*
Thus his H-theorem was i:aken to prove a one-directional, increase of 
disorder with time* But it was pointed out that Poincare had alreeidy 
postulated a proof that every closed system returns aftes? a finite 
time to the neighbourhood of the state in which it was previously*
Thus we have cyclic processes « Hence there could be no preferred 
direction of time associated with increasing entropy* Boltamami had 
to rethinlc, and Popper contends that he gave up his central argument» 
namely an objective arrow of time and increasing entropy with this* 
Howfever in a second reply Boltamami endeavoured to fix the fu*fcure 
direction of times
"We have the choice of two kinds of plctw?e* Either we assume 
that the whole universe is at the present moment in a veiy 
improbable state* Or else we assume that the aeons during 
wMch tMs iîBprobable state lasts, and the distance from here 
to Sirius, are minute if compared with the age and sl%e of the 
whole universe* In such a universe, which is inhieimal 
equilibrium as a whole end therefore dead, relatively small 
regions of the aiae of our galæcy will be found here and theaze; 
regions (which we may call *wo3?lds’) which deviate significantly 
f2?om thermal equilibrium for 3zelatively short stretches of 
these ’aeons® of time* Among thés© worlds the probabilities of 
their state (l*e# the entropy) will increase as often as they 
decrease. In the universe as a whole the two directions of time 
£ire indistinguishable, just as in space there is no up or doim* 
However, just as'at a certa5.n place on the earth’s surface we 
can call ’down’ the direction towards the centre of the earth,
80 a. living organism that finds itself in such a world at a 
certain period of time can define the ’direction’ of time as 
going from the less probable state to the more probable one (the 
former will be the ’past and the latter the ’future*), and by 
virtue of this definition (sic) he will find that his own smsiXl 
region, isolated froîB the rest of the univea^ se, is ’initially* 
always 5.n an I'jiprobable state. It seems to me that this way of 
looking at things is the only one wMoh allows us to uriderstend 
the validity of the second law, and the heat death of each 
individual world, without invoking a miidirectional change of 
the eniiire universe from a definite initial state to a final 
state." (holtsmaim; quoted and translated by Popper 1976/a,, p. 160.)
Unfortunately this tends to a subjective idea of time, to philosophical
idealism where the real ’becomes illusory* This is implicit in ïiis 
identification of unidirectional change as an illusion» Thus Popper 
firgues that his IWtheorem falls to the ground In that for his 
objective concept of time» entropy decreases as often as it increases; 
while for his subjective concept, entropy increases by definition or 
illusion», (popper ibid pp«. 1.56**167«)
Mow» the first lav? of thermodynamics is that of energy 
conservation; while the second concerns the reduction of energy 
available for vîork, that is entropy* A standard 1975 pîiysios tex't- 
book gives a general forînulation of this as follovjss
"An isolated system, free of external influence, v;ill, if it 
is initially in a state of relative 03:der, always pass to 
states of relative disorder until it eventufally reaches the 
state of masdrmnB disordor." (Weidner & Sells 1975# p*H9l «)
This accoamt goes on to reviev; that v?hile on the microscopic scale all 
processes/collisions are ideally raversible, this is not so of the 
Kiaeroscoi>io scale» or the scale of the real vforld oêï we experience it*
"By 0. microscopic state is meant a state eorsresponding: to a. 
specific position and momentum for each and every molecule of 
a gas. S'lere are available so many more microscopic states 
representing disorder or near disorder than representing order 
that the most probable macroscopic state is that of maximum 
disorder; Indeed, it is near certainty." (ibid p*293«)
Thus while individual collisions between particles are 37eversible in 
time such that we cannot tell v/liother a moving-picture film portraying 
an intermolecular collision is being run forward 03? backwéïrd, this 
does not hold when we deal v;ith large numbers of particles* It only 
holds for the isolated instance and my contention vrould bo that the 
isolated instance is oithoa? an ideal conception or an artificial 
construct of the laboratory; rarely is it representative of the 
macroscopic world* Me can toll when a film of em exploding bomb is 
27un backwards*
"Thus, the second lav? of thermod^mamics implies directionality 
of time* At 1;he macroscopic 3.evel, time’s arrov? points to the 
futmze* Oa:der turns to disorder; ordered energy is degraded 
into disordered or thermal energy." (ibid p*295»)
I note» hovrever» the objection» for instance by Adolf Gruxibaum, 
that there is a logical hiatus as v;e progress f3:om the microscopic 
reversible process to the macroscopic irs^ eversible process* It is 
from tills basis that it has been argued that since the probability 
that a molecule has a given velocity is independent of the sign of
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that velocity, reparation eould occur as readily a© mixing* There 
Is also 9. reversibility objection to the effect that foi? any 
behaviour of a system which resulted in an increase of entropy with 
time, it would also be possible to have entropie decrease. (This is
similar to the periodicity objection of Poincare*) Ginmbaum goes on,
after reviewing these objections to contend that:
"BoXts3P.ann.’s IWheorem can thus be upheld in the face of the 
reversibility and periodicity objections, but only if coupled 
with a very iraportant proviso: the affteiation of a high 
p2?obability of a future entropy increase must not be construed 
to aaseriî a high probability that present low entrox>y values 
were aSgÉSÉ %  still_log^ entropies the
relative i^ robability tha'fc a low entropy state was preceded by 
a state of higher entropy is just as great as the relative
probability that a low state will be _fpl^owed by a higher
state.**" (19689 P«409*)
Po|)per cites the Instance of .irreversible processes which do not 
involve entropy increase* Consider a large surface of ifater Initially 
at rest into which a stone is dropped « producing an outgoing 
concentric wave of decreasing amplitude* He argues that the 
irrover8ibllity of this process is attributable to the physical 
-in^ ossibility of the uncoordinated concatenation cji all points of a 
circle of the initial conditions s^ equlred for the -opposite effect. 
However, he admits in a closed system there is an entropy inc3:ease as 
a result of viscous losses — but Popper strengthens the argument by 
talcing a thin gas in an infrmite imi%''erse. (Of. Gnmbaum 1968, p.415f«)
Stephen iToulmin has an intoreesting essay on this topic. He 
aclcnowledges the ruii-dox-m theory that the o?ie-*way-system of the second 
law implies, and concedes that this law has "%?on for itself a supreme 
position." (I97O9 P<»24.) But then he asks if it ie iiniverfaaXly 
applica.ble* Boee a imiversal law necessarily imply a statement about 
the universe? Arguing from the fact that the second law refers to a 
closed system and that the miiverse is boundless (cf* Einstein’s 
boundless but finite universe), thm^efore the second law cannot apply 
to the whole even if it universally applies to the parts* So while 
the fact of the cooling do\m of the earth may be a fact of physics » 
the contention that the universe is decaying away is merely 
metaphysical speculation* Hence Toulmin endeavom?© to argue tliat 
miiversal laws are not laws of nature. He develops M o  argunient by 
comparing the 3.axf to a map projection.
But it seems to me that his argiuBont depends on even mo3?e tenuous
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assmptions than the ones he is a.ttaokin,g* The extension feom 
mapping tools to aeientifio laxfs, though oonsistent within his 
instzmmental position, has already been seen as inadequate (of# eh* 
11*)* As 3ie draws to a eoncluslon he writes:
"All this is not to say that philosophical attitudes to the 
uniimrse-as-a-whole are unjustifiable» and cannot he argued 
about* Perhaps we should be stoioal about the ultimate fate 
of all things, or carefree, or other-worldly; and no doubt 
reasons of some sort can he given in favour of adopting one 
of these attitudes or another* All we are entitled to ©ay is, 
that physios does not oblige ue- to adopt on©,, or indeed any, 
of these attitudes* The rmmlng«down universe Is a myth, and 
we shall discover about the Apocalypse from physics only what 
we read into the subject*" (ibid p*53*)
But surely his whole argument is constructed on a premise that only 
alloim him to remain silent? How, apart from a purely metapliysical 
jump ( on hi© terms ) does he get from the second lost to the last 
sentence in the above quotation? Surely on M s  own premise he can 
not say that the earth is nmning^dowi or not? If universal laws 
apply to the universe then obviously he must answer In the affirmative; 
but if they do not, he still ho© no mandate for a rejection of this 
possibility all he con do Is to espouse silence#
It seems to me that his whole object Is to avoid the logical
implication© of what lie aclsnowledges to be a law supreme in the
scientific world* As S.B.MontgoHiery points out all real processes
are Irreversible because of friction whloh reduce© the avallsbl©
potential; because of heat transfer across finite temperature
differences (though heat transfer is not Itself irreversible); and
because of unrestrained expansions* Reversible processes or cycles
are representative of the 3:eel processes, (8.R.
Montgomery -1966, p#50*) In any real. Irreversible process the
change in entropy is related to the heat transfer by the equation
dS^^/T where refers to entropy, to heat transfer
interaction, *1® to irreversibility, and to absolute temperature*
(This Is a direct consequence of the Clausius inequality*) As a
particular ooneoquonoe of this relation it follows that during any
1irreversible adiabatic process the entropy must increase* That Is, 
the entropy of on Isolated system can <mly increase or. In the limit.
1* An adiabatic process is one in which there is a change In the 
pressure and volume of the contents of an enclosure without exchange 
of heat between the enclosure and its surroundings - presumably there 
can be no heat transfer eutwith the universe*
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"8ânoe a ai*â lt@* envlronmimt together osmstltu'W an
Isolated system» any decrease 1% the entropy of that eyetem . 
duadüag m irsceveralble prooees imxat be aeooggpoadW by a 
' greater immasam In the entro^ of the gmvlrmment» @bl8 
omi he demoaetrated very »i«ÿKy f w  heat tagieaefbr Wtweea 
W dlee @039088 a f in ite  dllfageaee#" (Ib M  y#55-#)
In the Mgbt of this It eeeme evasive to 2?@j@ot the second %@*
In  teagm o f the universe* (WLoabtedly I t  is  the fsaae of some 
zeM m allB ts th a t the eoooptmoe o f aach oonolnMena leads Inevlteh ly  
to God* (Of* B*B#%01aah. 196t$L p*55v) Mdiaagtm seightly oompIMned 
that o rltlo e  o f the he@W.e@th o f the unlverse Who daim  that I t  is  
imsafe to  extrapolate feom sag- ^perienoe and knwledge to th is  
om olw lm  are sxootly the same o rltles#  who ia  gsfsrselog a p # o r 
<m, fo r Gxa^plo., the or%&R o f ooemlG rays in  galaxies heycmd 
telesoopio mags# look r l^ t  away to  see I f  the paper was 
ofmolotmit "%-îith the second law "* mad advise Ita  rejaotlcm  i f  I t  did  
iKot omfOrm*
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APPENDIX E
DIAGliAIvI SHOWING THE HDMANISTIC ABSOLUTIZATIQN OP THE RELATIVE
The diagram shows the development of Western Humanism, in which 
the gTound motive of 'nature* and 'freedom' progressively involves 
itself in 'dialectical tensions' and the reduction of the fulness of 
created reality to one or two of its modes, (This diagram is adapted 
from P.Russell and J.Pierce - 19^9» "between pp,5 and 6,)
Modes of 
Being
Pistical
Ethical
Juridical
Aesthetic
- -T
Economic
T
Social
r —
Historical '
Analytical
Psychical
Biotic
Physical
Kinematic
patial
Arithmeticalj
Descartes Hume Hegel Darwin Ayer
Locke Kant Marx Sartre Wittgen­
stein
Key; 1, ~ Mind ; 2, = Matter; 3* = Ideas; 4» = Impressions;
5, = Noumenal; 6, = Phenomenal; 7* = Absolute Spirit;
8. = Economic Determinism; 9® = Evolution; 10, = Eree Self;
11, ” World; 12. = Logic; 13, - Sense Data;
14o - Language Games,
■H- -X-
-X-
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o? TimiB
Ïhisï glos8a3?y is inclmded to give a sweraary of those teraio or 
expressions which may he considered to be imusnsX, or common hat 
given a speolfic content, or stem from the philosophy of Booyeweerd. 
Most of the refereaeea that pertain to Dooyeweerd are drawn from the 
glossary by M* Welters in Kalsbeek (1975# pp#94^554*) Wolters*
sniMiaries are marked «. -î-î-s though I have adapted them#
Lon $ à %eaning^moment* x-râthin one Modality referring to a 
higher modality* An example is efficiency^ a meaningwaoment 
which is found i&thin the tectoical«historicel modality, but which 
points forward to the higher économie modality* Contrast «• 
Hetroeipation *
% Literally * conflict of laws'* # A logical contradio tion 
arising out of a, failure to distinguish the different kinds of law 
valid in different modalities* Since ontle laws do not conflict 
an antimony is always a logical sign of ontological Eeduotionism* 
Ebcemple* %eno^s Paradoxes#
i^ Antlthesis i %ed by Dooyeweerd (following SCuyper) in a specifically 
religious sense to refer to the fundamental spiritual opposition 
between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of darîmess* Since 
this is an opposition between regimes, not realms, it runs tIirou#i 
every department of human life and culture. Including philosophy 
and the academic enterprise as a xfhole, and tlirotigh the heart of 
every believer as he struggles to live a life of undivided 
allegiance to God#
Arche @ God has revealed Himself as the only and absolute Origin of 
all things* As such this is to be sharply distinguished from the 
Arehimeclian Point#
MroMmedian Point § A sure place to stand; a vantage point from xfhich 
everything can in principle be seen in true perspective* For
Dooyeweercl this Is the position *in. Christ* of the believer*
"*Oomaon Grace § God's goodness to all men in maintaining the creation 
mid its structures* By vix*tue of this common (or conserving) 
grace there is much that is good, true and beautifiO. In the lives 
of unbelievers, including their philosophising,
%Cosmonomic Idea s Booyeweerd's own English rendering of MH?S1S£H,
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Occasional equivalents ar© 'transcendental ground idea', and 
'transcendental basic idea#*
^Dialectic & In Dooyeweerd's usages an unresolvable tension® within a 
system or line of thought, between two logically irreconcilable 
polar positionsi* Biteh a dialectical tension is characteristic of 
each of tlie three non*«christlan Ground Motives which Booyeweerd 
sees as having dominated Western thought.
%]kap8l8 Conkaptical.) % A neologism borrowed by Dooyeweerd from the 
Swiss biologist Heidenlmin, and derived from the Greek enkaotein*
'to swallow up*' The term refers to the structural interlacements 
which can exist between things, plants, animals, and societal 
structures which have their own internal structural principle and 
independent qualifying function# As such, enkapsis Is to be
clearly distinguished from the petrWAole relation In which there 
is a common Internal structure and qualifying function#
i%undatlonal Function s The lower of the two modalities which 
characterise certain types of structural wholes* The other is 
called the 'function of destination* or 'leading function# * For 
example, the founding function of the fmxily is the biotic modality*
i^ Functian of Destination $ Refers to the function wîiich primarily
characterises a structural whole. Also called qualifying function, 
The stateg, for example, has as Amotion of destination the 
juridical g while its founding function is the historical*
§ A German word for 'object** used by Booyeweerd as a
tecteical term for a modality when abstracted from the coherence 
of time and opposed to the analytical function in  the Theoretical 
a ttitu d e  of thought* thereby establishing the 'gegenstend relation# * 
'Gogenstend* is  therefore the tech n ica lly  precise word for the 
object of science* w hile 'object* its e lf  is reserved for the 
objects o f naive experienoe (p re-abstraotive thought).
^Ground Motive s Butch grondmotief. used by Booyeweerd in  the sense of 
fundamental m otivation, d riv in g  force# Ho distinguished four basic 
ground motives: that of Form and Matter* which dominated pagan Greek 
philoeopîiy; th at o f Hature and Grace* which underlay medieval 
C hristian synthesis thought | that o f Hature and Freedom* which has 
shaped the philosophies of modem tim es; and fin a lly  the biblical 
ground motive of creation* fall and redemption* which lies at the 
root of a radical and in te g ra lly  S crip tu ral philosophy.
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Fîmctiog  ^The highest subject function of a structural 
xfhole (o#g« atone, animal* business enterprise* state*) Except 
in the case of man* this function is also said to qualify the 
stmotural whole# It is called the mildin^ function because it 
'guides* or 'leads' its substrate functions* For example, the 
guiding function of a plant is the biotic* The physical function 
of a plant (as studied, e#g* by bioehemistsy) is different from 
physical functioning elsewhere* because of its being 'guided® by 
the biotic,
i%art s The concentration point of man's existence* the supmteiaporal 
focus of all man's temporal functions, the religious root unity of 
man. Booyeweerd says that it was his rediscovery of the biblical 
concept of the heart as the central religious depth dimension of 
man's multifaceted life which enabled Iilm to wrestle free from 
Heo^Kantianism and Phenomenology. The Scriptures speak of this 
focal point also as 'soul®, 'spirit', and 'imior man'*
Philosophical equivalents are Ego, I, I-ness, and Selfhood* It is 
the heart in this sense which survives death, and it is by the 
religious redirection of the heart in regeneration that all man's 
temporal functions are renewed*
'^ Individuality Structure i The general name for the characteristic 
lawful order of concrete things, as given by virtue of creation, 
There is an individuality structure for the state, for marriage, 
for works of art, for mosquitoes, for sodium chloride, etc*. It 
must be distinguished from Modal Structure. A theoretical 
analysis of the la,tter Is the indispensiblo precondition for an 
analysis of individuality structure# (Of* Zigterman 1977*)
%I,aw I The notion of creational law is central to Dooyeweerd's
philosophy* Everything in creation is subject to God's law for 
it, end aocordlngly law is the boundary between God and creation. 
Scriptural synonyms for law are 'ordinances', 'decrees', 
Commandments ', 'word ®, etc « *
g The created cosmos, for Booyeweerd, has W o  correlative 
'sides ®s a lavf-side and a subjeot^side# The former is simply the
aggregate of God's laws or ordinances for creation, the latter the 
totality of created reality, which is subject to those laws# It 
is important to note that the law«*side is unaffected by sin, and 
is always jffitesally valid.
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g Sm early equivalent for Modality - used by Sooyeweard 
to fatress the fact that each modal aspect answers to its own 
peculiar laws*
^Me^infc g Booyeweerd uses the word meaning In an imusual sense* He 
means by it the referential, in<^ «self“sufficlent character of 
created reality in that it points beyond Itself to God as Origin*
He stresses that reality Is meaning in this sense and that therefore 
it does not have, meaning* 'Meaning' is the Ohrietien alternative 
of the metaphysical Substance of immanence philosophy# 'Meaning' 
becomes almost a synonym for 'reality'»
i#odal Irreducibility % Incapability of theoretical reduction *» this 
Is the negative way of referring to the unique dietiactivenees of 
things which we find everywhere in creation and which theoretical 
thought must respect® Insofar aa everything has its own peculiar 
created nature and character, it'cannot be understood in terms of 
categories foreign to itself#
•^ ■•Modality a One of the fifteen fundamental ways of being distinguished 
by Booyeweerd* As modes of being, they are sharply distinguished 
from the concrete things to which they belong#
peesuuDOBita a Those initial assumptions necessary for rational 
thought* If m m  is to think rationally he must assume these#
Presuppositions s Those assumptions that a man has to make a choice 
over® A belief or theory which-ie assumed before the next step 
in logic is developed#- Bueh a prior postulate can be held 
consciously or unconsciously.
i%e"Thepretioal Thowht (or naive thowdit) ‘ g This is hummi experlemce 
insofar as it is not 'theoretical*' in Dooyeweerd'a precise sense* 
'Halve ' does not mean unsophisticated# Booyeweerd is at pains to 
emphasiae that theory is embedded in this everyday experience and 
must not violate it#
Mansl<aL.teglM4oaB). s For 3)ooyewoerf, religion is not an area or 
Sphere of life, but the whole of it# It is service of God (or an 
idol) in every domain of human endeavour. As such it is to be 
sharply distinguished from religious faith, which is but one of the 
many acts and attitudes of human existence* Religion is an affair 
of the heart, and so directs all man's functions.
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^Retroçiuation § A feature in one modality which refers to, is 
reminiscent of, an earlier one, yet retaining the modal 
qualification of the aspect in which it is found. The 'extension® 
of a concept,- for example, is a kind of logical spaces it is a 
strictly logical affair, and yet it harks hack to the spatial in 
its original sense.
Science z X have restricted my usage of this term to the popular 
coimotativ© meaning «°» that is, to the natiira3. sciences.
Boientia s Ithile realising this is the formal equivalent of 'science* 
in its denotation, I have used this in the distinguished sense of 
referring to not only the natural sciences but also to the social 
sciences and humanities (including philosophy and theology). 
Scientia is a3.wa.ys, strictly speaking, a matter of modal 
abstraction and as such is distinguished feom pre#-theoretical 
thought/experience# Thus the term is used in a more restricted,
and also a wider, sense than the popular usage of science#
■“ A teaasXstioB of E«3rP®3?*3 ptease gawemmitgM 
in ©igen kxing. by which he meant that the various distinct 
spheres of human authority, such as family, school and church, 
each have their own responsibility and decision malcing power, which 
may not be usurped by those in authority in another sphere, for 
example the state* Booyeweerd retains this usage, but extends 
the usage of the phrase to mean also the irreduclbility of the 
modal aspects* This is t!ie ontological principle on which the 
sociological principle is based, since each of the societal 
'spheres * mentioned is qualified by a different irreducible 
modality*
'inhere ïïniversalitv s The counterpart of modal sphere sovereignty.
It is the principle that all the modalities are intimately 
connected with each other in an unbroken coherence. Just as 
sphere sovereignty stresses the Unique distinctiveness and 
irreducibility of the modal aspects g so sphere universality 
emphaslEies that every one depends for its meaning on all the 
others, especially as evidenced by the analogies in the modal 
structure of each (that is the collective anticipations and 
ratrooipations.# )
%g)ject 8 ïïsed in two senses by Booyeimerda (l) as distinguished
from object (something qualified by an object function)| and (ii)
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as d-ietiiigiîlalied from Law# The former sense is roughly 
equivalent to common usage, the latter is imumial and oonfasing* 
Since all things are ♦sxibject* to Law, objects are also subjects 
in the second sense#
;%;SubjeqtySlde : The correlate of Law*-Bide« Since eia is disobedience 
to the Law, we find sin only on the subject-side of the cosmos# 
Another feature of the Gubjeot-side is that it is only hero that 
individuality is found#
Techno g (Of# teohne, teclmiqne*) Associated with man's technology 
it is a wider concept covering the attempt by man to actively 
dominate bis environment#
Technology s This is conceived as the practice,.- description, and 
terminology of any, or all of, the applied sciences which have 
practical value and/or industriel use»
Theoretical Thought § Thought that is abstractive @nd bears the 
character of being systematic, intentional and methodical, and 
operates in a verifioatory realm# Contrast Pro-Theoretical.
^^ Transcendental s A technical term from the philosophy of Kant 
denoting the a priori structural conditions which make human
experience (specifically human Icnowledge and theoretical thought) 
possible* Ao such it is to be sharply distinguished from the 
term • transcendent *.»
*Meteldee g The Butch original of 'Cosmoncmlc Idea', literally
'lawkmidea'# Dooyeweerd's philosophy is knomi in Holland as the 
der wetsldee (philosophy of the Imf-idea)* The 
name derives from the central place of creational law in M s  
thought#
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